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JUSTYNA BAJDA
Uniwersytet Wrocławski

Przekład intersemiotyczny. *Wyspa umarłych* Arnolda Böcklina w różnych stanach skupienia

Intersemiotic translation. *The Isle of the Dead* by Arnold Böcklin in Different Physical States

Abstract

This article addresses the issue of intersemiotic translation of a painting, taking as the basis the functioning of Arnold Böcklin's work *The Isle of the Dead* in European culture. The theoretical part of the article relates to the basic components of the theory of intersemiotic translation; in particular, it notes the importance of the difference between the closed system of signs and the possibility of their transposition into other sign systems. This part of the article also discusses the terminology used in intersemiotic translation. Since the creation of the first version of *The Isle of the Dead* in 1880, this work has been regarded as a masterpiece, though frequently – due to its numerous transpositions into various forms of art – as balancing on the border of kitsch. The descriptive and analytical part of the article, divided into four subsections, refers to the ways the painting has been transposed and has functioned in culture. The first subsection outlines the history of the work's creation and discusses the fundamental changes in its reception, which were influenced by the political and cultural situation in European history. The subsequent parts of the article overview different art forms that have been inspired by Böcklin's painting thus far. Examples of plastic art include copies, reproductions, and art forms that rupture the border between the image and the word (such as comic books) as well as three-dimensional realizations (such as theatrical sceneries and architectural designs). Examples of works of literature that were inspired by Böcklin's painting include elements of prose, poetry, and drama (such as works by Strindberg, Aragon, and Tetmajer), whereas the inspirations found in music include musical poems composed by Rachmaninoff and others. Finally, this paper presents an analysis of film productions that have made reference to *The Isle of the Dead*, ranging from works created in the 1940's to a commercial movie made in 2013.

Keywords: intersemiotic translation, Arnold Böcklin, *The Isle of the Dead*, painting, poetry, music, film.

Dzieło a przekład insersemiotyczny

Semiotykę interesują znaki i systemy, w które mogą się łączyć, tworząc nową jakość, oraz nadrzędne wobec nich struktury kulturowe, w których funkcjonują. Pojęcie przekładu insersemiotycznego wymaga odniesienia się do dwóch zasadniczych kwestii. Po pierwsze – do typologii sztuk jako zamkniętych systemów, posługujących się określonymi znakami, po wtóre zaś – do pytania o to, czy i w jaki sposób znaki jednego systemu można wyrazić za pomocą znaków należących do innego systemu. Zagadnienia te są przedmiotem dyskusji od czasu strukturalizmu. We wprowadzeniu do tomu poświęconego pograniczom literatury i innych sztuk Stanisław Balbus (2004) pisał o konfrontacji i współdziałaniu różnych systemów znakowych:

Doktrynalnie rzecz biorąc – „światopogląd semiotyczny” oznacza, że przyjmujemy, iż każdy rodzaj sztuki – literatura, sztuki plastyczne, muzyka – tworzą, każda na swoim terenie, s y s t e m y (kody), wyposażone w swoiste (i wyodrębniane) jednostki, z n a k i oraz reguły paradygmatyczne określające ich miejsce w danym systemie, i reguły syntagmatyczne, określające zasady ich linearnej kombinacji, czyli produkcji sensownych w danym systemie tekstów. Intersemiotyczność, czyli konfrontacja tekstów („wytworów”) z różnych dziedzin sztuki (literatury, malarstwa, muzyki) musiałaby w takim podejściu pociągać za każdym razem konfrontację (i/lub współdziałanie) s y s t e m ó w (2004: 12).

Jak jednak sam dodaje: system jest zawsze przewidywalny, sztuka natomiast – nie (Balbus 2004: 12). Rzecz zatem nie w tym, żeby znaleźć sposób na „przetłumaczenie” jednej dziedziny sztuki (posługującej się określonymi znakami i kodem ich odczytania) na inną, bo jest to niemożliwe i bezcelowe. Można jednak poszukiwać sposobów transponowania zarówno pewnych określonych struktur formalnych, jak i nadrzędnych wobec nich idei, próbować odpowiedzieć na pytanie o nową jakość, która pojawia się, kiedy jedno dzieło staje się inspiracją do powstania innego, zaistnieje w innym stanie plastycznego bądź literackiego skupienia.

Spotkania sztuk należących do różnych dziedzin mają swoją długą tradycję, znaczoną ich zbliżeniami (horacjański *topos* „ut pictura poesis”; Markiewicz 1981: 155-183) bądź oddaleniami. Tezy, które w XVIII wieku wyłożył w swojej pracy Gotthold Lessing (1962), definitywnie rozdzielały literaturę i sztuki plastyczne:

Malarstwo jak i poezja są sztukami naśladowczymi, ale posługują się różnymi znakami. Znakami malarstwa są figury i kolory w przestrzeni, znakami poezji – artykułowane dźwięki w czasie. Ponieważ między sposobem przedstawiania a przedmiotami przedstawianymi musi być zachowany dogodny stosunek, a więc malarstwo może przedstawiać przedmioty istniejące obok siebie w przestrzeni, poezja zaś przedmioty następujące po sobie w czasie. Ponieważ przedmiotami istniejącymi obok siebie w przestrzeni są ciała i ich części, one więc są przedmiotami sztuk plastycznych. Przedmiotami następującymi po sobie w czasie są działania, one więc są właściwymi przedmiotami poezji (1962: 63-64).

Problemy te były szeroko dyskutowane także w XIX i XX stuleciu. Jedną z zasadniczych kwestii w obszarze współczesnych badań interdyscyplinarnych jest terminologia, w obrębie której możemy wskazać co najmniej kilka różnych pojęć wiążących się z przekładem insersemiotycznym. Edward Balcerzan (1980) posłużył się na przykład terminem odsyłającym do tradycji procesów alchemicznych:

Transmutacja – pisał Balcerzan – oznacza, że tekst sformułowany w granicach jednego systemu (np. malarstwa) i zrekonstruowany w materiale innego systemu (np. poezji) traci specyficznie malarskie i uzyskuje specyficznie poetyckie właściwości (1980: 28).

Ale znajdujemy też inne, jak „przetworzenie”, „ujęzykowanie” czy – poprzez działania w drugą stronę – „dewerbalizacja”:

Jeżeli tłumaczenie interlingwistyczne nazywamy niekiedy „spolszczeniem”, to mamy na myśli literackie efekty polszczyzny, które nie są i nie chcą być powtórzeniem, są natomiast przetworzeniem literackich oddziaływań mowy obcej. Podobnie w dziele poetyckim, które eksploatuje doświadczenia innych sztuk, interesuje nas ujęzykowanie tych doświadczeń (lub odwrotnie: dewerbalizacja poezji w języku malarstwa czy muzyki) (Balcerza 1980: 28).

Balcerzan (1980) szczególną uwagę zwracał na fakt, że procesy transmutacji czy dewerbalizacji nie polegają na powtórzeniu jednego dzieła w innym, ponieważ ze względu na odrębność systemów językowych nie jest to możliwe. Można natomiast mówić o swoistym przetworzeniu, opartym na eksplikacji personalnie pojętej „prawdy cząstkowej”:

Wiersz eksplikuje prawdę cząstkową [...] Transmutacja nie jest rekonstrukcją dzieła sztuki, jeżeli dzieło pojmować jako rzeczywistość absolutnie pewną i niezmienną, która może mieć tylko jeden, nieodwołalny aż do końca świata, porządek opisu. Transmutacja jest rekonstrukcją dzieła sztuki, jeżeli (za Mukašovskim), pojmujemy dzieło jako strukturę dynamiczną, ewoluującą w historii. W takim ujęciu poezja odtwarza, a niekiedy – postuluje określony stosunek do sztuki. Interweniuje w procesy percepcyjne, mówi o przebiegach odbiorczych, zajmuje się swoistością muzycznego słyszenia czy malarskiego widzenia (1980: 33, 34).

A zatem dzieła nieposługujące się tożsamym systemem językowym i nieodczytywane według jednego kodu mogą przyjmować wobec siebie rolę swoistego translatora: proponować odbiorcy kierunek rozumienia / odczytania / interpretacji dzieła prymarnego, uwypuklić miejsca nacechowane emocjonalnie i w końcu też wypełnić miejsca niedookreślone. Tak na przykład myślał o utworze poetyckim Charles Baudelaire (1961), według którego wiersz mógł przejąć jedną z funkcji krytyki artystycznej, stając się nośnikiem jakości aksjologicznych, a tym samym rodzajem literackiej recenzji dzieła sztuki:

Skoro bowiem piękny obraz jest przyrodą przemyślaną przez artystę, dobrą krytyką będzie ów obraz przemyślany przez umysł inteligentny i wrażliwy. Tak więc sonet czy elegia może być najlepszą recenzją z obrazu (1961: 6).

Propozycja Baudelaire’a jest także aktualna we współczesnych rozważaniach o zależnościach między literaturą a sztukami plastycznymi. Podobne konkluzje znajdujemy w książce Andrzeja Nowakowskiego poświęconej twórczości Arnolda Böcklina, który utwory poetyckie inspirowane dziełami plastycznymi określa jako „sugestię”, „dokument przeżycia estetycznego”, „esej o sztuce”, „krytykę w innym stanie skupienia”, „wypowiedź krytyczną”, „komentowanie” czy „interpretację” (Nowakowski 1994: 214, 223, 224).

Na jeszcze inny typ relacji między tekstami kultury zwracała uwagę Alina Kowalczykova (1980), wprowadzając kategorię „wzajemnego oświeclania się sztuk”. Umieszczenie jednego dzieła w kontekście innego pozwala według badaczki na odnalezienie w nich dodatkowych wartości:

[o wzajemnym oświeclaniu się sztuk] można mówić tylko wtedy, gdy odbiorca dzieła zyskuje dodatkowe o nim informacje dzięki umieszczeniu go w kontekście dzieł innego gatunku sztuki. Jeśli malarstwo może być swoistym dopełnieniem literatury, to dlatego właśnie, że nie jest w stanie być kalką dokładną, przekazać tych samych co literatura informacji, że przekazuje informacje inne, w języku literatury niewyraźne (1980: 181).

W propozycji Kowalczykowej mało istotne są analogie formalne między „oświeclającymi się” dziełami. Ważne jest natomiast usytuowanie wybranego tekstu kultury w kontekście dzieł należących do różnych dziedzin i posługujących się odmiennymi językami przekazu. Zestawienie to zawsze dokonywane jest przez kogoś: autora, który odwołuje się w swoim dziele do prymarnego tekstu kultury, kuratora wystawy, wydawcę bądź w końcu także poprzez samego indywidualnego odbiorcę. To ostatecznie w jego umyśle i w jego wyobraźni (*via* pamięć) dokonują się procesy konkretyzacyjne, pozwalające na indywidualną interpretację jednego dzieła w kontekście innego. Jak pisze Kowalczykowa: „Nie dzieła sztuki bowiem wzajemnie się oświeclają, lecz jedne przez drugie próbuje wyjaśnić odbiorca” (1980: 186)¹.

Od wieków jedne dzieła stają się inspiracjami dla innych, prowokując twórców do tych tajemnych transmutacji i tworzenia nowych jakości, w obrębie których dają się odczuć – wyraźniej bądź subtelniej zaznaczone – odniesienia do konkretnych tekstów źródłowych. Jednym z takich dzieł jest *Wyspa umarłych* Arnolda Böcklina.

Historia jednego obrazu

Wyspa zrobi ogromne wrażenie
(z listu Fritza Gurlitta do Arnolda Böcklina)²

Kiedy w 1880 roku na progu florenckiego atelier Arnolda Böcklina stanęła Maria Berna, nawet sam mistrz nie mógł przypuszczać, jak potoczą się losy namalowanego dla niej obrazu. Co się wydarzyło, że pejzaż, który stworzył na zamówienie młodej wdowy, tak szybko stał się jednym z najbardziej rozpoznawalnych obrazów nie tylko w Europie, ale też na świecie?

Spójrzmy najpierw na samo dzieło: niemal w całości wypełnia je sylwetka skalistej wyspy, której centrum wyznacza grupa smukłych ciemnozielonych cyprysów. Otaczają je nagie skały, w których wykuto regularne otwory grobowe – jedyny ślad pozostawiony przez cywilizację. Kształt wyspy tworzy ramiona, otwierając się na przybyszów. Właśnie wpływa w nie niewielka łódź, w której dostrzegamy przewoźnika, trumnę oraz stojącą sylwetkę owiniętą białym całunem. Wyspa jest oddalona od wszelkich społeczeństw, po jej obu stronach zarysowuje się niska linia horyzontu. Rozpościerający się bezkres, zachowanie symetrii kompozycji, otwarta forma wyspy, a równocześnie odległy horyzont, brak znamion ruchu i dźwięku jednoznacznie definiują jej totalną izolację i kres ludzkiej wędrówki. Całość tej przestrzeni

1 Nie należy jednak zapominać, że każdy utwór jest w swej wymowie kompletny, z założenia nie wymaga dodatkowego określania czy dopełniania w postaci innego dzieła sztuki. Na kwestię tę zwracała uwagę Alicja Helman: „[dzieło sztuki] jest całością samowystarczającą, stanowiącą zamknięty system relacji. Sztuk nie można ze sobą łączyć na zasadzie dodawania, zatem w procesach składania czy syntetyzowania musi zachodzić jakaś osobiwa przemiana, która związki takie czyni nie tylko możliwymi, ale spójnymi i koherentnymi” (Helman 1980: 12).

2 „Die Insel werde *großes Aufsehen machen*” (Runkel 1910: 305, [cyt. za :] Zegler 1991: 5). Wszystkie ustalenia dotyczące historii obrazu za tym opracowaniem oraz: Andree (1977); Linnebach (1991).

skrywana jest w kobaltowym mroku nieba i wody, na tle których pną się ku górze przyczernione głębokimi brązami sylwetki cyprysów. Odcinają się od nich świecące ostrym nierealnym blaskiem skalne bloki oraz porażająco białe kształty trumny i stojącej nad nią postaci. To przestrzeń pozbawiona pór roku i mijającego czasu; przestrzeń, która trwa. Pejzaż, który ma wyzwolić w odbiorcy określone uczucia i emocje – oto cel, który chciał osiągnąć Böcklin, malując dla Marii Berny obraz, który miał jej służyć za *Bild zum Träumen*³ – dzieło do kontemplacji, wspomnień jej zmarłego męża.



Il. 1. A. Böcklin, *Wyspa umarłych*, 1880 (I wersja), olej na płótnie, Kunstmuseum Basel, il. za: [https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Arnold_Böcklin_-_Die_Toteninsel_I_\(Basel,_Kunstmuseum\).jpg](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Arnold_Böcklin_-_Die_Toteninsel_I_(Basel,_Kunstmuseum).jpg) [dostęp: 21.05.2019]

W latach 1880–1886 powstało pięć różnych wersji tego obrazu (do dziś zachowały się cztery)⁴, różniących się między sobą detalami kompozycyjnymi, ikonograficznymi i kolorystycznymi, a także materiałem podobrazia. Początkowo artysta nazywał swoje dzieło *Cichym miejsce* (*Ein stiller Ort*), *Wyspą cmentarną* (*Gräberinsel*) bądź *Miejscem spoczynku* (*Ruhestätte*). Znany dziś powszechnie tytuł *Wyspa umarłych* (*Die Toteninsel*) został nadany obrazowi dopiero w 1883 roku przez berlińskiego marszanda Fritza Gurlitta, który po obejrzeniu dwóch pierwszych wersji zorientował się, że na *Wyspie* będzie można szybko i dobrze zarobić. On też był drugim, zaraz po samym artyście, krytykiem dzieła. Bodaj już po ujrzeniu pierwszej wersji miał napisać do Böcklina w jednym z listów, że „*Wyspa* zrobi wielkie wrażenie” (Runkel 1910: 305). Antykwariusz namówił malarza do stworzenia kolejnych wersji, które natychmiast

3 Niem., dosł. „obraz do marzeń”, „obraz do rozmyślań”, „obraz do kontemplacji”.

4 I (1880) – od 1920 roku w Kunstmuseum w Bazylei; II (1880, na nią ostatecznie zdecydowała się Maria Berna) – Metropolitan Museum of Art w Nowym Jorku; III (1883) – Alte Nationalgalerie w Berlinie; IV (1883/1884) – od 1939 w posiadaniu Adolfa Hitlera, zniszczona w Berlinie w 1945 roku; V (1886) – Museum der Bildenden Künste w Lipsku.

zaczęły robić karierę w świecie coraz większego tempa rozwoju techniki, a równocześnie coraz większej izolacji ludzi i dopadających ich lęków związanych ze zbliżającym się końcem stulecia.

Zapewne sam Gurlitt nie przewidział, że dzieło stanie się najpierw ikoną dekadentów i całego *fin de siècle'u*, a w XX wieku zaistnieje w świadomości artystycznej i estetycznej odbiorców nie tylko w swojej pierwotnej formie plastycznej i nie tylko jako obraz mający przywoływać wspomnienia. *Bild zum Traumem*, namalowany na konkretne zamówienie i dla konkretnej osoby, wszedł w powszechny obieg pod postacią co najmniej kilkunastu różnych form gatunkowych należących do różnych dziedzin sztuki, stając się jednym z najlepiej rozpoznawalnych obrazów świata, ale też niebezpiecznie ocierając się o granicę kiczu.

Obraz


Realizacje plastyczne były pierwotną płaszczyzną odwołań do słynnego obrazu Arnolda Böcklina. Można je podzielić na dwa typy odniesień o charakterze przestrzennym: realizacje dwu- i trójwymiarowe. W obu typach mamy do czynienia z odniesieniami do całości dzieła bądź do jego wybranych fragmentów (najczęściej do motywu wyspy), z drugiej strony można wyróżnić kopie i reprodukcje bazujące na jednej z wersji dzieła oraz jego rozliczne dwu- i trójwymiarowe plastyczne parafrazy.

Już pod koniec XIX wieku w czasopismach ilustrowanych zamieszczano przedruki obrazu Böcklina, pojawiły się także krążące po całej Europie teczki z graficznymi odbitkami prac artysty (*Künstler-Katalog: brw.*)⁵ oraz karty pocztowe z reprodukcją *Wyspy*. Trudna dziś do zrozumienia może się wydawać niezwykła popularność motywu na widokówkach słanych przez żołnierzy z frontów I wojny światowej. Wcześniej parafraza *Wyspy* pojawiła się w kontekście dwóch zupełnie różnych wydarzeń: jej sylwetka znalazła się na francuskich kartach pocztowych wydanych we Francji w związku z aferą Dreyfusa (1894), a w okresie międzywojennym, w czasie wojny domowej w Hiszpanii (1936 – 1939) umieszczono ją na pocztówkach wraz z wymownym napisem „Totentanz in Spanien” (Zegler 1991: 62-63). W tych samych latach, choć w zupełnie innym kontekście historyczno-kulturowym (a właściwie głównie – politycznym) chromolitograficzne odbitki dzieła wisiały obowiązkowo we wszystkich niemieckich salonach mieszczańskich. Obraz, który jeszcze na początku XX wieku był ikoną dekadentyzmu, melancholii, wyzwalanego przez krajobraz nastrojowego *Stimmungu*, w latach 30. ubiegłego stulecia został uznany przez niemieckich narodowych socjalistów za pierwotny, pełen nordyckiego charakteru pejzaż i był interpretowany w kontekście germańskich tęsknot za potęgą przeszłości. Od 1939 roku jedną z wersji (dziś zaginioną) posiadał Adolf Hitler, a jego zdjęcie z Wiaczesławem Mołotowem i Joachimem von Ribbentropem na tle *Wyspy umarłych*, zrobione w mieszkaniu przywódcy III Rzeszy 12 listopada 1940 roku, nabrało wręcz groteskowego wymiaru (Zegler 1991: 12).

Pośród malarzy XIX- i XX-wiecznych, którzy bezpośrednio – choć w różny sposób – odwoływali się w swoich pracach do dzieła Böcklina, przypomnijmy Maxa Klingera (*Die Toteninsel (nach Böcklin)*, 1890), Karla Wilhelma Diefenbacha (*Toteninsel*, 1905), Salvadora Dalego (np. *The Real Painting of „The Isle of the Death” by Arnold Böcklin at the Angelus Time*, 1932; *The Isle of the Dead – Central Courtyard from*

5 Mowa o tzw. tekach graficznych, rozpowszechnianych w całej Europie. W jednym z ówczesnych niemieckich katalogów znajdujemy informację, że można zamówić reprodukcję *Wyspy umarłych* Arnolda Böcklina (wersja z 1880 r.), za kwotę 3 marek.

the Isle of the Dead – Reconstructive Obsession after Böcklin, 1934), Hansa R. Giger (*Hommage am Böcklin, 1977*) czy w końcu niemieckiego malarza Michaela Sowę (*Parodie auf das Gemälde Böcklins, 1992*).



Il. 2. Max Klinger, *Die Toteninsel (nach Böcklin)*, 1890, akwaforta i akwatinta na papierze, il. za: [https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Klinger_-_Die_Toteninsel_\(nach_Böcklin\)_1890.jpeg](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Klinger_-_Die_Toteninsel_(nach_Böcklin)_1890.jpeg) [dostęp: 27.06.2019]

Interesujące są też liczne nawiązania do XIX-wiecznego dzieła w pracach sytuujących się na pograniczu obrazu i słowa, jakimi są komiksy. Philippe Druillet, autor m.in. serii *Lone Sloane* (1966) i *Sześć podróży Lone'a Sloane'a* (1972), na wielu planszach swoich komiksów złożył szwajcarskiemu artyście hołd, dając własne plastyczne interpretacje obrazu Böcklina. W latach 90. ubiegłego wieku pisarz Mathieu Galli i rysownik Guillaume Sorel stworzyli serię pięciu tomów komiksów zatytułowaną *Wyspa umarłych* (1991–1996)⁶. Także bohaterowie francuskiej serii *Arcanes* autorstwa Jean-Pierre'a Pécau w jednej z części (*Le Dossier Karadine, 2004*) udają się na wyspę, której wizualizacja odsyła widzów/czytelników komiksu do Böcklinowskiego oryginału.

Obok licznych dzieł dwuwymiarowych warto też przypomnieć głośną trójwymiarową realizację odnoszącą się bezpośrednio do obrazu Arnolda Böcklina. W 1976 roku, podczas rocznicowego Festiwalu w Bayreuth pokazano inscenizację *Pierścienia Nibelungów* Ryszarda Wagnera w reżyserii Patrice'a Chéreau. Premiera monumentalnego dramatu muzycznego odbyła się w stulecie jego prawykonania w teatrze w Bayreuth (sierpień 1876)⁷. Scenografię do Wagnerowskiej tetralogii opracował Richard Peduzzi, który do ostatniej sceny *Walkirii* wprowadził dekorację odsyłającą widza bezpośrednio do kompozycji *Wyspy umarłych*⁸.

Obraz Arnolda Böcklina nieustająco inspiruje artystów do tworzenia plastycznych, w tym także przestrzennych transpozycji. Za jedno z najbardziej intrygujących i prowokujących do różnych interpretacji dzieł ostatnich lat należy uznać instalację, która powstała na początku XXI wieku w ramach

6 Por. https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guillaume_Sorel [dostęp: 07.06.2019].

7 <http://encyklopediateatru.pl/kalendarium/3426/pierścien-nibelunga-wagnera-winscenizacji-chreau#> [dostęp: 07.06.2019].

8 Por. <https://www.pinterest.fr/pin/626985579343719327/>; <https://www.pinterest.fr/pin/626985579343664151/> [dostęp: 07.06.2019].

szwajcarskiej wystawy Expo '02. Tematem przewodnim ekspozycji prezentowanej w okolicach czterech miast – Yverdon-les-Bains, Neuchâtel, Biemme i Morat⁹ – stało się hasło *Momentałość i Wieczność (Instant et Éternité)*, a jednym z jej uczestników była pracownia architektoniczna Jeana Nouvela. Jezioro Morat oraz szczyt Mont-Vully zostały potraktowane przez Francuza jako przestrzenno-obrazowe odniesienia do dzieła Böcklina. Czyniąc z elementów natury wizualny sztafaż, Nouvel umieścił na platformie na wodach jeziora monumentalny sześcienny kubik (34 x 34 x 34 m), który – oglądany z odpowiedniej odległości – nabierał zupełnie nowego wymiaru¹⁰. Nieoczekiwany dla oka, nagły intruz w pejzażu akwaticznym, minimalistyczna w wyrazie bryła ostro odcinająca się od miękkiej tafli wody, zdawała się lekko unosić na lustrze jeziora. Mogła budzić spokój patrzącego, a równocześnie frapowała, nie pozwalając oderwać od siebie wzroku wciąganego w świetlno-barwną grę powierzchni wyłożonej perforowanymi płytkami¹¹. Widz pozostawał w zewnętrznej opozycji do tej hermetycznej bryły. Narzucony układ relacji pobudzał u odbiorcy nagłą chęć zmierzenia się z tym, co kryło wewnątrz monolitu – podobnie jak wyspa Böcklina, do której dotarcie oznaczało brak możliwości powrotu. Jury konkursu, przyznając projektowi Nouvela nagrodę, uznało, że „mamy tu do czynienia ze strukturą mentalną” (Casa 2000: 372)¹². Niewątpliwie ideowe przesłanie tej instalacji prowokuje pytania o trwałość, przemijanie i ich kontemplację, które swoim dziełem stawiał także Arnold Böcklin. Z jednej strony wylaniający się z wód jeziora monolityczny soliter odsyłał, jak pisał Francesco Della Casa, do powracającego w całej twórczości Szwajcara motywu ruin i opuszczenia. Z drugiej strony było to czytelne odwołanie do koncepcji obrazu „do marzeń” (Casa 2000: 373), w tym przypadku – marzeń snutych bezpośrednio w naturze z odniesieniem do konkretnego dzieła sztuki.

Choć w ubiegłym wieku samotna Böcklinowska wyspa zmierzała ku niebezpieczeństwu związanym z nadmiarem popularności (wynikającym z liczby reprodukcji, kopii i plastycznych parafraz), to jest ku wulgaryzacji i uproszczeniu odbioru, karykaturyzacji zasadniczego motywu i przekraczaniu subtelnej granicy między arcydziełem a kiczem, to wraz z dziełem Jeana Nouvela triumfalnie wkroczyła w nowe stulecie, wprowadzając do odbioru „nowy nieoczekiwany polemiczny sens we współczesnej debacie na temat relacji między człowiekiem a naturą” (Casa 2000: 373)¹³.

Słowo

Wyspa umarłych inspirowała także wielu twórców innych dziedzin niż sztuki plastyczne. Na przełomie XIX i XX stulecia bywała chętnie interpretowana jako poetycka ekfrazja. Przykłady tego typu transpozycji możemy wskazać m.in. w poezji Młodej Polski – okresie, który szczególnie upodobał sobie opis dzieł sztuki. Obrazy Arnolda Böcklina były wówczas dobrze znane w Polsce – nie tylko dzięki podróżom

9 Ze względu na położenie wszystkich miejscowości nad wodą, przestrzenie wystawowe zostały nazwane „Arteplage” („Plaža sztuki”). Część ekspozycji była także rozlokowana wewnątrz poszczególnych miejscowości.

10 Por. <http://www.jeannouvel.com/en/projects/expo-02-swiss-national-exhibition/> [dostęp: 30.06.2019] Dzieło Nouvela (podobnie jak inne prace pokazywane na wystawie) zostało zdemontowane po zamknięciu Expo '02.

11 Pełny opis por. : <https://fr.wikiarquitectura.com/bâtiment/expo-morat-02/> [dostęp: 07.06.2019].

12 Oryg.: „...ici, la structure est mentale” ; tłum. Justyna Bajda.

13 Oryg.: „[...] un sens polémique inattendu dans le débat contemporain sur les rapport entre l'homme et la nature”; tłum. Justyna Bajda.

młodopolan, ale też poprzez graficzne reprodukcje, powszechnie dostępne w całej Europie. Wśród największych polskich admiratorów malarstwa Böcklina na przełomie wieków można wymienić Stanisława Witkiewicza (ojca), Kazimierza Przerwę-Tetmajera, ale też słabo znaną poetkę Zofię Gordziałkowską, która przemierzyła Europę, odwiedzając wszystkie muzea, w których zbiorach znajdowały się ówczesne obrazy Szwajcara¹⁴.

Rzadko pamiętamy, że Kazimierz Tetmajer był nie tylko poetą, ale też krytykiem artystycznym¹⁵, a jego recenzje ukazywały się w wielu młodopolskich czasopismach, m.in. w krakowskim „Czasie” czy w warszawskim „Tygodniku Ilustrowanym”, gdzie w 1899 roku umieścił (na zamówienie redakcji) cykl artykułów poświęconych Arnoldowi Böcklinowi i jego malarstwu. W jednym z tekstów pisał też o *Wyspie umarłych*:

Oto jest arcydzieło arcydzieł Böcklina – pisał – szczyt jego natchnienia poetyckiego i malarskiego geniuszu: *Die Toteninsel* [...] Nikt nigdy nie namalował większego spokoju i nie pomyślał uroczystszego symbolu krainy, z której nikt nie wraca. Opisywać zalety malarskie tego obrazu – szkoda pióra (Tetmajer 1899: 129).

Mimo poddania pióra felietonisty wobec siły wyrazu malarstwa Szwajcara, w *IV Serii* swoich poezji (1900) Tetmajer umieścił poetycką ekfrazę obrazu *Wyspa umarłych*:

Wyspa umarłych, nagie, strome skały,
wkoło dalekie, nieskończone morze,
gaj cyprysowy, ciszą skamieniały,
spokój wód wieczny... Bóg śmierci posępny
duszom ten grodziec zostawił ostępny
i odwróciwszy twarz, odszedł w bezdroże.

I w długiej łodzi o milczącym wiosle
Charon tu z brzegu białe wiezie dusze
i w ciemne, wąskie wwozi je zarośle
między dwa słupy z kamienia, na których
dwa lwy o głowach groźnych i ponurych
patrzą na siebie – zasłuchane w głuszę.

Po krzesanicach mech się pnie zielony,
cyprysy smukłe nad morską głębiną
widzą swój smukły kształt odzwierciedlony
i nieruchome patrzą w niebo w górze,
gdzie nigdy złoto nie płynie i różę,
a tylko sine mgły obłoków płyną.

14 Owoce tych peregrynacji był tomik poetycki, w którym poetka zamieściła 50 ekfraz poświęconych obrazom Arnolda Böcklina, w tym także *Wyspy umarłych*, (Gordziałkowska 1911).

15 Por. Bajda 1995; eadem 1998; eadem 2003; Gutowski 1997: 120, 131, 134; Nowakowski 1994; Stala 1994: 116, 131-133.

Słońce i księżyc tu się toczą kołem
zawsze spokojne, zawsze jednakowym:
nad wód granatem, pod nieba popiołem,
wstają z przepaści i schodzą powoli
w otchłań w martwego blasku aureoli,
długo lśnić światłem cichym i matowym.

Tu dusze cieniom podobne, milczące,
snują się białe przez ciemną zieloność
po bladych plamach, które kładzie słońce;
lub z wąskich okien kutych w skałach ściennych,
patrzają po falach szklanych i bezdennych,
patrzają się w mglistą, wieczną nieskończoność.

Inne na głazach, co się wznoszą z wody,
siadają z na dół pochyloną twarzą.
Mijają słońca zachody i wschody,
one, w granacie morskich fal widome
i na drzew widmie: białe, nieruchome
siedzą, do głazów podobne, i marzą...

Dusze, co serca płonęły pożarem,
te, co za wiele czuły i cierpiały;
co się pytały pod uczuć nadmiarem:
z jakiego kruszcu twarda Boża ręka
kuje pierś ludzką, że w ogniu nie pęka?
te w te spokojne, morskie idą skały (Tetmajer 1924: 256-257).

W wierszu zostały uwypuklone motywy, które tworzą statyczną kompozycję dzieła: sylwetka wyspy w otoczeniu bezkresu wody, strome skały i kute w nich grobowce, morze, niebo, roślinność, kamienne słupy z posągami strzegących wyspy lwów, łódź, a w niej Charon i biała sylwetka odchodzącej w zaświaty duszy. W opisie, który jest jednym z głównych wyznaczników ekfrazy¹⁶, pojawiają się także barwy: ciemnozielona (roślinność), biała (dusze), sina (mgły), granatowa (morze) – współtworzące monochromatyczną tonację obrazu. Dzięki tym wyznacznikom ikonograficznym i kolorystycznym czytelnik bez problemu może zidentyfikować obraz, do którego powstał wiersz. Była to piąta wersja dzieła (1886), oglądana przez poetę najprawdopodobniej podczas berlińskiej wystawy w 1898 roku¹⁷.

16 Na temat opisu jako kluczowego wyznacznika ekfrazy młodopolskiej por. Bajda 2003: 172-173. Tam też szersza bibliografia dotycząca opisu w wierszach o sztuce.

17 Wystawa z okazji 70. urodzin Böcklina, która miała miejsce w Berlinie w 1897 i 1898 roku. Por. *Akademie-Austellung von Werken Arnold Böcklin zur Feier seines 70. Geburtstages. Königliche Akademie der Künste*, 2. 12. 1897 – 16. 01. 1898, Berlin, za: *Katalog dzieł Arnolda Böcklina* (Andree 1977).



3. A. Böcklin, *Wyspa umarłych* (V wersja obrazu), 1886, olej na desce, Museum der Bildenden Künste, Lipsk, il. za: [https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Arnold_Böcklin_-_Die_Toteninsel_V_\(Museum_der_bildenden_Künste_Leipzig\).jpg](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Arnold_Böcklin_-_Die_Toteninsel_V_(Museum_der_bildenden_Künste_Leipzig).jpg) [dostęp: 21.05.2019]

W wierszu pojawia się także opowieść (fabularyzacja) snuta wokół utrwalonego na obrazie momentu. To kolejny zabieg, do którego często odwoływali się młodopolscy poeci, mierząc się z dziełem plastycznym. Tetmajer stworzył na temat *Wyspy* całą historię o blakających się po niej duszach – milczących, spoglądających w morze, marzących, ale też – jak przystało na dekadencją mentalność końca XIX wieku – cierpiących¹⁸.

Oprócz bezpośrednich nawiązań do obrazu motyw samotnej wyspy – z wyraźnymi odniesieniami do obrazowania à la Böcklin – pojawiał się zarówno w poezji Kazimierza Tetmajera (1924a: 190-191; 1924b: 5, 38-39, 62; 1924c: 199-203, 286-288)¹⁹, jak i wielu innych pisarzy XIX- i XX-wiecznych. Dziełem interesował się na przykład August Strindberg. W 1907 roku szwedzki twórca napisał dramat *Sonata widm*, w którego scenie finalnej pojawia się w tle *Wyspa umarłych* jako obrazowy kontekst motywu podróży życia i jego kresu. Pisarz zamierzał jeszcze powrócić do tematu. W 1918 roku zaczął pisać dramat *Toten-Insel*, w którego zachowanym fragmencie zmarły bohater Asir zostaje przewieziony na Wyspę Umarłych, a tam – powrócony do życia i poddany głębokiej psychologicznej analizie (Malekin 2010: 115).

Motyw samotnej wyspy bądź wręcz sam obraz w postaci artefaktu powracał w wielu powieściach XX-wiecznych. Jego reprodukcja wisi m.in. w sypialni opisanej w nietłumaczonym na język polski autobiograficznym poemacie Louisa Aragona *Le Roman inachevé*²⁰ z 1956 roku, wyspa jest też kluczem interpretacyjnym powieści fantastycznej Rogera Zelaznego *Wyspa umarłych* (*Isle of the Dead*) z 1969 roku²¹. We wszystkich tych dziełach artefakt odsyła czytelnika do Böcklinowskiego pejzażu emanującego melancholijnym nastrojem, jednoznacznie odnoszącym się do kontekstu wanitatywnego.

18 Obszerna analiza wiersza, por. Bajda 2003: 170-174.

19 Szerzej na teraz obrazowania Böcklinowskiego w poezji Młodej Polski por. Bajda 2003: 160-181.

20 Fr. „niedokończona powieść”.

21 Por. także m.in.: Meier 1979; Falkenhagen 1997; Kracht 2012.

Dźwięk

18

Obraz Arnolda Böcklina inspirował również kompozytorów przełomu XIX i XX wieku. Warto odnotować poemat symfoniczny Heinricha Schulza-Beuthena *Die Toteninsel* z 1890 roku, fantazję Felixa Wojscha z 1910 roku (*Die Toteninsel; Drei Böcklin-Phantasien für großes Orchester*, op. 53) czy kompozycję organową Fritza Lubricha *Die Toteninsel (Drei romantische Tonstücke für die Orgel nach Arnold Böcklinschen Bildern*, op. 37, Nr 3) z 1912 roku. Rok później powstały 4 *Poematy symfoniczne wg A. Böcklina*, op. 128 niemieckiego kompozytora Maxa Regeera. Jednak najlepiej znanym utworem, dla którego inspiracją stał się obraz szwajcarskiego symbolisty, jest poemat symfoniczny Siergieja Rachmaninowa z 1909 roku *Wyspa umarłych wg obrazu Böcklina*, op. 29 (Śledziński 1981: 820, 829). Rosyjski kompozytor po raz pierwszy zetknął się z dziełem w Paryżu wiosną 1907 roku, gdzie widział jego graficzną wersję. Mezzotinta zrobiła nam nim wrażenie, choć sam nie do końca potrafił określić, z czego ono wynikało:

Nie umiałby powiedzieć, co tak przykuło jego wzrok do owego dziwnego obrazu. Na pierwszy rzut oka dzieło pełne było akcesoriów nowego dekadenceckiego „neoklasycyzmu”, którego nie lubił i z którego często szydził. Nie brakowało niczego: ani ciemnych cyprysów i portyku antycznej świątyni, ani dymu ze stołów ofiarnych i marmurowych schodów, które zstępowały ku morzu. Wszystko to było mu nad wyraz obce. Ale za manieryczną i nieco teatralną dekoracją zobaczył i nie tylko zobaczył, ale i usłyszał coś bardzo mu bliskiego (Bażanow 1972: 258).

Przez dwa kolejne lata motyw wyspy powracał do kompozytora w formie natrętnego tematu muzycznego, coraz częściej słyszanego jako „monotonna figuracja melodyczna w bardzo niskich rejestrach” (Bażanow 1972: 259). W końcu w 1909 roku (Bażanow 1972: 259)²² Rachmaninow stworzył poemat symfoniczny. Trwające około dwudziestu minut dzieło rozpoczyna spokojny fragment, który można kojarzyć z monotonnym ruchem zbliżającej się ku wyspie łodzi. Muzyczny temat powraca w utworze kilka razy. Innym nawiązaniem do mrocznego przesłania niesionego przez obraz mogą być pobrzmiewające w poemacie pierwsze dźwięki żałobnego chorału gregoriańskiego *Dies irae*. Ostatecznie jednak, jak pisze Mikołaj Bażanow (1972), wymowa dzieła jest inna niż w obrazie Böcklina:

To już nie chwilowy, uspokajający żal za tymi, którzy odeszli, nie pełna rezygnacji i smutku pieśń „o wiecznym odpoczynku”, ale odważne i surowe requiem bólu i gniewu. Jego żałobne fanfary wzywają do walki i oporu. Dźwięczą na przekór żelaznemu porządkowi chorału gregoriańskiego, wzbogaconego [...] o intonacje starocerkiewnych kriuków (1972: 263).

Poemat Rachmaninowa zrobił ogromne wrażenie na słuchaczach, a sam autor nie ukrywał, że pierwotną inspiracją czy też impulsem do jego powstania było dzieło Szwajcara. W jednym z wywiadów mówił:

...Kiedy komponuję, pomaga mi wspomnienie niedawno przeczytanej książki, wiersza, pięknego obrazu. Czasami w wyobraźni pojawia się określony temat, który z kolei staram się przetworzyć w dźwięki, nie zdradzając jednak źródeł mego natchnienia... [...] Tak właśnie było z *Wyspą umarłych*. Całość powstała w marcu i kwietniu [1909 – JB]. A skąd się wzięła, z czego – nie umiem tego powiedzieć. Narodziła się w mojej duszy, zaabsorbowała moje myśli i napisałem ją (Bażanow 1972: 266-267).

²² Śledziński (1981: 820) podaje, że poemat powstał w 1907 roku.

Niezwykła kariera jednego obrazu trwa nadal. Owo „zaabsorbowanie myśli”, o którym mówił Rachmaninow, dotyczy dziś wszystkich dziedzin sztuki. W XX wieku uległ mu także ruchomy obraz.

Film

Czytelne odniesienia do wyspy, z której nie ma ucieczki, znalazły się w co najmniej kilku filmach kina grozy. W 1943 roku powstał uznawany dziś za jeden z klasyków gatunku horror Jacques’a Tourneura *Wędrowałam z zombie* (*I walked with a Zombie*), w którym enklawą śmierci jest jedna z Wysp Karaibskich. Jej symboliczne odniesienie w postaci ogromnej reprodukcji obrazu Arnolda Böcklina można dostrzec w posiadłości bohaterów – państwa Holland, na ścianie sypialni pani domu, która zapadła na nieznaną chorobę. Dwa lata później Mark Robson kręci horror *Wyspa śmierci* (*Isle of the Dead*), którego akcja rozgrywa się na jednej z greckich wysp w czasie pierwszej wojny bałkańskiej (1912–1913). Wyspa, na której bohaterowie zostają uwięzieni z powodu epidemii dżumy, staje się ich miejscem ostatecznego przeznaczenia...

Znacznie później, ale równie silnie wizerunek samotnej wyspy à la Böcklin inspirował także Martina Scorsese, kiedy w 2010 roku kręcił thriller *Wyspa tajemnic* (*Shutter Island*). Bezpośrednie odniesienie pojawia się także w filmie Ridleya Scotta z 2017 roku *Obcy: Przymierze* (*Alien: Covenant*). Rajską planetą, do której dociera załoga statku, szybko okazuje się planetą śmierci. Hans R. Giger, znany ze stworzenia postaci ksenomorfa do pierwszej części serii *Obcy* (*Obcy – ósmy pasażer Nostromo*, 1979), i tym razem wprowadził do scenografii filmu odwołania do twórczości swojego rodaka, a zarazem ulubionego malarza. Na planecie znajduje się kamienna nekropolia otoczona smukłymi cyprysami – idealne odwzorowanie cmentarnej wyspy Arnolda Böcklina²³.

Böcklinowska samotna wyspa na środku bezkresnego morza od momentu powstania w latach 80. XIX wieku inspirowała twórców różnych dziedzin do bezpośrednich i pośrednich odwołań plastycznych, ale też słownych i muzycznych transpozycji – utrwalania ich w innych stanach skupienia niż tylko sam obraz. Artyści przywołują w swoich dziełach prostą formę zasadniczego motywu malarskiego i jego wanitacyjny przekaz, a równocześnie odwołują się do symbolicznego niedopowiedzenia pozwalającego na jej interpretację w ciągle nowych kontekstach. Asocjacje tanatyczne nie są bowiem jedynymi, w których sytuowane jest dzieło. Dla niektórych twórców jest to też przestrzeń pociągająca skrywaną tajemnicą, łącząca Tanatosa z Erose. Taką właśnie inspiracją stała się *Wyspa umarłych* dla realizatora Bruno Aveillana, który w 2013 roku nakręcił *Legendę Shalimara* (*La Légende de Shalimar*) – kilkuminutowy film reklamowy opowiadający o powstaniu świątyni Taj Mahal, a równocześnie odnoszący się do stworzonego w latach 20. XX wieku kultowego zapachu Guerlaina²⁴. Historia interpretacji *Wyspy* zatoczyła tym samym

23 Ciągłe w tym samym mrocznym kontekście, choć już w zupełnie innej konwencji, wielokrotnie pojawia się *Wyspa* na ścianach Hotelu Transylwania w animowanej serii Genndy’ego Tartakovsky’ego z 2012 roku. Warto też odnotować, że nie tylko sam motyw wyalienowanej przestrzeni inspirował twórców filmowych. Np. w ostatniej scenie krótkometrażowego filmu duńskiego reżysera Carla Dreyera z 1948 roku *Zdążą na prom* (*De nåede færgen*) ciała dwójki bohaterów, którzy giną w wypadku motocyklowym, są przewożone łodzią przez współczesnego Charona.

24 Por. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A4hwgtvoUc8> [dostęp: 27.06.2019].

symboliczny krąg. Od obrazu, który miał prowokować do marzeń i kontemplacji przeszłości, dzieło Arnolda Böcklina stało się inspiracją do estetycznych marzeń o świecie istniejącym dzięki najbardziej efemerycznemu stanowi skupienia, jakim jest zapach chwili; świecie, w którym obecne ma być już tylko piękno zmysłowe.

Spis ilustracji

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- Il. 2. Max von Klinger, *Die Toteninsel (nach Böcklin)*, 1890, akwaforta i akwatinta na papierze, il. za: [https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Klinger_-_Die_Toteninsel_\(nach_Böcklin\)_1890.jpeg](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Klinger_-_Die_Toteninsel_(nach_Böcklin)_1890.jpeg) [dostęp: 27.06.2019]
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- Il. 3. A. Böcklin, *Wyspa umarłych* (V wersja obrazu), 1886, olej na desce, Museum der Bildenden Künste, Lipsk, il. za: [https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Arnold_Böcklin_-_Die_Toteninsel_V_\(Museum_der_bildenden_Künste_Leipzig\).jpg](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Arnold_Böcklin_-_Die_Toteninsel_V_(Museum_der_bildenden_Künste_Leipzig).jpg) [dostęp: 21.05.2019]
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ELŻBIETA BIARDZKA
Université de Wrocław

Entre le *déjà vu* et le *déjà dit* Le ludique et les arguments *ad hominem* dans les mèmes Internet

**Between *déjà vu* and *déjà dit*
Playfulness and *ad hominem* arguments in the internet memes**

Abstract

Our study deals with relatively short statements embedded in semiotically complex digital messages, both pictorial and verbal, which are created and exchanged by Internet users thanks to on-line generators. These messages are called *internet memes* (IM). We treat them as a new kind of on-line speech (determined by the so-called participatory web 2.0 digital medium), semiotically heterogeneous (both graphic and verbal in nature), putting into circulation comments on events and especially on the political word (slogans, catchphrases, slip of the tongue). These IM are subject to various verbo-graphic mutations. IM are thus endowed with a content that takes the form of a micro-political commentary, lapidary, playful and carnivalesque (Bakhtine 1970), characterised by a form of argumentation that can be said peripheral, because it refers more to the political person than to the political issues themselves (Gauthier 1992 et 1995, Amossy 1999, Perelman and Olbrecht-Tyteca 1970). IM are peripheral micro-argumentation acts of descriptive character, the impact of which is cumulative. In our study, we show that the funny side of the memes is a complex verbo-pictorial strategy centred on big political actors and based on the *ad hominem* arguments.

Keywords: internet memes, argumentation *ad hominem*, quote.

Introduction

L'histoire des médias connaît à présent un tournant important. Sur Internet, des millions de personnes consultent, produisent et échangent toute sorte de contenus numériques. Parmi ces contenus, se trouvent des messages numériques sémiotiquement complexes, à la fois picturaux et verbaux, qui sont en relation sérielle et se caractérisent par leurs motifs stéréotypés. Ils sont créés et échangés par les internautes à

l'aide de générateurs disponibles sur Internet¹. Ces messages portent le nom de *mème internet*². Dans sa forme la plus sommaire, un *mème internet*³ est donc un élément d'une culture qui se ramène à une idée simple diffusée rapidement à travers le réseau et qui peut prendre la forme d'un hyperlien, une vidéo, un site internet, un hashtag, une photo ou simplement un énoncé et sont une sorte de blague verbale et pictographique⁴. Ils s'inscrivent dans de nouveaux modes d'échange de l'information et d'intercompréhension qui sont offerts par le web participatif (web 2.0) qui permet d'accélérer et de réactiver l'interaction. Leur diffusion en ligne est rapide, non contrôlée et massive (cf. Gautier & Siouffi, 2016 ; Biardzka & Komur-Thilloy, 2017 ; 2018 ; Biardzka, 2018).

Dans leur ensemble, les mèmes sont très diversifiés. Il y en a qui sont purement ludiques, très pop culture, qui ont la réputation d'être stupides et qui abritent un folklore incroyable basé sur les images de *LOLcat*, *Grumpy Cat*, *Pepe the Frog*, Chuck Norris ou du monstre en spaghettis volant (cf. Dybka 2013). Mais il y a aussi des mèmes plus sérieux, qui sont devenus une forme intéressante de commentaire socio-politique, même si beaucoup de leurs messages contiennent une part inhérente de stupidité. D'après Meme Trends – outil similaire à *Google Trends* –, entre janvier 2016 et janvier 2017, la recherche des mèmes à sujet politique a monté en flèche⁵. L'aspect politique des mèmes a été étudié par exemple par Tay (2014) et par Kuipers (2002). Ce type de mèmes attirera particulièrement notre attention dans ce travail. Les sites que nous avons consultés pour recueillir notre corpus sont :

Know Your Meme⁶, Meme. FR⁷, Memecenter.fr⁸, Memedroid.com⁹ ainsi que 4chan. Org¹⁰. Nous avons utilisé aussi le moteur de recherche Google. Nous avons recueilli ainsi 200 mèmes politiques

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- 1 Par exemple sur les sites suivants : Memegenerator.net, Makeameme.org, Imgflip.com, Imagechef.com, Mememaker.net et Quickmeme.com ou encore <http://choualbox.com/generateur/makememe>.
 - 2 Il est impossible d'indiquer le premier emploi de ce terme dans le contexte de la Toile. Il se peut que ce soit au début du XXI^e siècle sur le site américain 4chan.org²⁰. La diffusion intense des mèmes date de 2008, avec l'arrivée des *rage faces*. Le mot *meme* provient de l'étude de Richard Dawkins (1976), biologiste et éthologiste d'Oxford. Le concept de mème provient à son tour de son ouvrage *Le Gène égoïste (The Selfish Gene)* dans lequel le chercheur anglais, s'inspirant de la génétique, explique que certains phénomènes culturels sont transférés, imités (par effet de *mimesis*) et transformés socialement de génération en génération exactement comme des gènes. Pour lui, tout comme les gènes transmettent des caractéristiques biologiques, les mèmes-éléments de culture se transmettent d'une personne à l'autre et sont, exactement comme les gènes, soumis à des mutations.
 - 3 D'après l'*Oxford English Dictionary*, un « mème » est plus exactement un élément d'une culture ou d'un ensemble de comportements qui se transmet d'un individu à l'autre par imitation ou par un quelconque autre moyen non génétique : « an element of a culture or system of behaviour passed from one individual to another by imitation or other non-genetic means » <http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/meme?q=meme> [consulté en ligne le 23 mai 2015].
 - 4 Le mot mème (en anglais, en allemand et en espagnol *meme*, en polonais *mem*) est un internationalisme issu de l'anglais. Le terme a été emprunté par les internautes puis vulgarisé. En réalité, l'emploi commun du mot mème n'a finalement pas beaucoup à voir avec la théorie initiale de Dawkins, qui renvoie à un concept beaucoup plus étendu et complexe (cf. à ce propos Gautier & Siouffi, 2016)
 - 5 À l'époque, la première position mondiale est occupée par les mèmes se rapportant au slogan électoral de Donald Trump : « Make America Great Again », abrégé souvent en « MAGA ».
 - 6 <https://knowyourmeme.com> [consulté en ligne le 23 mai 2015].
 - 7 <https://www.facebook.com/Meme-FR-1844941949154830/> [consulté en ligne le 23 mai 2015].
 - 8 <http://www.memecenter.fr>
 - 9 <https://fr.memedroid.com/memes/tag/francais>
 - 10 <http://www.4chan.org> [consulté en ligne le 23 mai 2015].

parmi lesquels nous avons sélectionné des messages prototypiques du point de vue des objectifs de notre démarche analytique.

La plupart des études sur les MI sont anglophones et se concentrent sur des événements et des sujets de discussion actuels aux États Unis¹¹. Les études francophones sont très rares. Pour combler en partie cette lacune, nous nous proposons de présenter les résultats de l'analyse discursive et rhétorique de la parole politique dans les mèmes contenant la représentation des acteurs politiques en France. Nous espérons montrer dans cette étude que les mèmes politiques n'ont pas seulement la fonction phatique comme le décrit Miller (2008) ou la fonction ludique comme le suggère Dybka (2013). À nos yeux, ils s'inscrivent dans une stratégie verbo-picturale complexe et très hétérogène, fondée sur le ludique, qui se situe dans la communication politique tout en s'inscrivant dans un type spécifique d'argumentation pensée comme lieu d'affrontement de discours contradictoires. Selon Gilles Gauthier (1995), cette stratégie peut être qualifiée de *périphérique* parce qu'elle se place en dehors de l'argumentation idéologique qui porte directement sur les enjeux de la politique. Ainsi, nous pensons l'argumentation mémétique comme un échange de micro-messages par lesquels des interlocuteurs, sur le mode ludique, tentent de faire accepter un point de vue. Les manières de reprendre les propos politiques ainsi que les images mémétiques (utilisant la déformation) desservent la stratégie argumentative d'une part persuasive (faisant appel aux émotions, si on associe le ludique à un sentiment de gaieté) et d'autre part argumentative (faisant appel à la raison ou tout au moins au bon sens) et témoignent d'une hétérogénéité exceptionnelle des mèmes. En effet, beaucoup de ces messages servent à contrebalancer les micro-oppressions sociales et les tensions politiques qui s'accumulent dans la communication politique. Ce sont des actes de micro-argumentation périphérique à caractère descriptif, dont l'impact est cumulatif. Ce type d'argumentation s'inscrit dans le cadre de la culture de masse à caractère carnavalesque (Bakhtine 1970), centrée sur le divertissement, l'hédonisme et la liberté d'expression illimitée.

Notre analyse s'intéresse à un sous-type de mèmes particulièrement répandu sur la Toile, ce sont les images macro¹². Ces messages contiennent une photo et un texte. Celui-ci est écrit le plus souvent en blanc, en caractères *sans serif*, il prend habituellement une forme binaire, et sa topographie est fixe car elle est plus ou moins imposée par le générateur de mèmes : une des séquences de texte est placée en haut de l'image, la seconde en bas, comme dans le exemple (5) qui est graphiquement prototypique. Le langage mémétique (du point de vue grammatical, orthographique, typographique) tend à se démarquer, les mèmes sont souvent criblés de fautes de langue (et surtout de fautes d'orthographe), mais cette insouciance langagière a quelque chose d'ostentatoire¹³.

11 Les approches analytiques globales (proposant par exemple la typologie des mèmes) ont été présentées surtout par Milner (2012), Chen (2012), Davison (2012), Kaplan & Nova (2016) et Shifman (2014). Le parcours historique des mèmes propose Börzsei (2013). Sinon, les aspects analysés sont très variés. Les mèmes ont été décrits comme type d'information en ligne ou comme genre de discours en ligne (Wiggins & Bowers, 2014), et comme phénomène socio-culturel (Shirky 2010 ; Rushkoff 1997 ; Milner 2013 ; Bakalarski 2018 ; Mateja & Ciesielski 2015). Les chercheurs se sont intéressés aussi aux fonctions des mèmes. Ainsi Miller (2008) parle de fonction phatique de ces messages alors que Dybka (2013) de leur fonction ludique. Sur la base des *clusters* et au moyen des modèles mathématiques, la propagation des mèmes sur les réseaux a été étudié par Leskovec, Backstrom & Kleinberg (2009) et par Segev, Nissenbaum, Stolero & Shifman (2015).

12 Selon la typologie de Milner (2012).

13 En anglais, les énoncés mémétiques sont écrits dans un langage écorché, en lettres capitales et avec une police spécifique. L'anglais écorché est surtout utilisé dans les mèmes *LOLcats* ; il est aussi appelé *LOLspeak*, langage dont des formes

L'argumentation périphérique

L'argumentation périphérique a chaque fois pour objet un *homme* politique précis, et par conséquent, l'un des principaux arguments périphériques employé dans cette communication politique est l'argument *ad hominem* : l'acteur politique est l'élément-clé de l'argumentation (cf. Gauthier 1992 ; 1995 ; Amossy 1999). Le rôle de la personne dans l'argumentation est fort réévalué dans *La Nouvelle rhétorique* de Chaïm Perelman et Lucie Olbrecht-Tyteca (1970). Les arguments sérieux ne sont plus supposés se rapporter uniquement au contenu des assertions et aux relations logiques entre elles. L'intrusion de considérations personnelles est définie comme pertinente. L'argumentation est un processus qui requiert la participation d'individus qui avancent des arguments ou y répondent. À l'inverse des théories qui refusent fermement de reconnaître l'importance de l'auditoire, cette conception de l'argumentation met en avant le rôle du public, l'argumentation ne se déroule pas dans le vide, mais elle engage pratiquement ceux qui y participent. Par la *praxis* discursive en ligne, la communauté des internautes anonymes s'approprie l'espace de la communication politique en devenant, d'une part, l'un des acteurs qui « *ont la légitimité à s'exprimer publiquement sur la politique* » à côté des hommes politiques, des journalistes (professionnels) et de « *l'opinion publique au travers des sondages* » (cf. Wolton 1989 : 30), et d'autre part cette même communauté forme un public virtuel global. Les participants de cet échange et le support technologique utilisé modèlent l'argumentation et la persuasion. Les messages sont courts, non linéaires, synergiques au niveau verbo-graphique, répétitifs, et se rapportent à de grands acteurs politiques. Dans cette perspective, un argument *ad hominem* n'est pas fallacieux (ce n'est pas un « raté » du processus de communication). En suivant l'approche de Gauthier évoquée *supra*, nous considérons que l'argumentation *ad hominem* peut être de trois sortes distinctes : logique (mise en cause d'une position, d'une idée, d'un point de vue, d'une thèse, d'un avis par incompatibilité formelle), circonstancielle (mise en cause de la position tenue par l'énonciateur cité en raison de ses traits, pour montrer une incompatibilité d'ordre psychologique) et personnelle (ne pas discréditer une idée, mais s'en prendre directement à son auteur). Les arguments *ad hominem* mis en scène dans les mêmes sont exemple l'argument de la « girouette » (reprocher à quelqu'un d'avoir changé d'idée), l'argument du tartuffe (mettre en évidence la contradiction entre un « dire » et un « faire »), l'argument dit de « l'homme de paille » (*straw man*, attribuer à l'énonciateur cité une position plus facile à attaquer que sa position effective)¹⁴, l'argument de culpabilité par association (discréditer l'énonciateur cité en l'associant à une doctrine ou à une idéologie impopulaire).

syntaxiques et orthographiques sont volontairement étranges, mais qui ont tendance à se stabiliser pour former une langue autonome (cf. Kaplan et Nova 2016).

- 14 L'« épouvantail » (parfois appelé *argument de l'homme de paille* par traduction littérale de l'expression anglaise *straw man*) est un sophisme qui consiste à présenter la position de son adversaire de façon clairement erronée. Créer un argument épouvantail consiste à formuler un argument facilement réfutable puis à l'attribuer à son opposant. La stratégie utilisée est souvent celle de l'extension, où on reprend la thèse adverse en l'élargissant au-delà de ses limites rationnelles, en lui donnant un sens aussi général et large que possible, et en l'exagérant tout en restant dans les limites de ses propres positions, aussi restreintes que possible. Un sophisme est une argumentation basée sur une logique dite fallacieuse. C'est un raisonnement qui cherche à paraître rigoureux, mais qui n'est en réalité pas valide au sens de la logique (quand bien même sa conclusion pourrait sembler vraie). Le sophisme mémétique est fallacieux, comme tout sophisme, mais il est prononcé avant tout pour amuser l'auditoire non seulement dans l'intention de le tromper, mais aussi, par exemple, de montrer l'absurdité des paroles ou des projets politiques pris pour cible (Gauthier 1992, 1995).

L'argumentation mémétique *ad hominem* qui prend pour cible les propos cités des hommes politiques met en marche trois types de conversions verbo-graphiques : conversion langagière, communicationnelle, conversion du genre de discours. Il est difficile, voire impossible d'assimiler automatiquement les types d'argumentation aux outils employés pour les mettre en œuvre. C'est ainsi que, par exemple, les substitutions lexicales conduisent aussi bien à l'argumentation du tartuffe qu'à celle de l'épouvantail. La nature des modifications sémantiques, le contexte graphique et les circonstances (cotexte) modèlent une argumentation mémétique polyvalente et, dans un sens, imprévue, dont les lectures possibles sont potentiellement multiples.

De la conversion à l'argumentation

Les internautes repèrent dans les médias les propos des personnages politiques (slogans, lapsus, « petites phrases »¹⁵) pour les utiliser comme base de production de nouveaux messages en ligne. Les paroles des personnages politiques sont ainsi soumises à une répliation qui implique que leur contenu ne soit pas simplement diffusé, mais repris, recontextualisé, altéré, réinterprété pour créer de nouveaux contenus. Nous analysons trois cas de figures de conversion : langagière, communicationnelle et discursive et nous essayons à chaque fois de montrer leurs modalités argumentatives.

Conversion langagière

La conversion langagière concerne la forme des paroles politiques citées. La modification peut être d'ordre phonologique, lexical, morphologique et syntaxique, les cas de cumul étant courants. Ces changements entraînent un contresens ou des effets d'augmentation sémantique du message : ils jouent sur l'humour, l'ironie, se rapprochent du pastiche, de la satire ou de la parodie. Pour interpréter les mêmes, la connaissance du contexte socio-politique se montre nécessaire.

En (1), le même macro se rapporte au slogan de François Hollande (parti socialiste), lancé lors de la campagne présidentielle 2012, « Le changement c'est maintenant », qui faisait lui-même écho au « Changer la vie » de François Mitterrand, resté célèbre après sa campagne victorieuse de 1981. Le message illustre la conversion langagière qui consiste en modifications phonétiques. Le gag porte sur la prononciation du personnage enrhumé (comme si le slogan était prononcé avec le nez bouché) et se rapporte à la malédiction de la pluie qui s'est abattue sur François Hollande dès son investiture le 15 mai 2012.

15 La « petite phrase » est, d'après Alice Krieg-Planque (2011 : 26), « un énoncé que certains acteurs sociaux rendent remarquable et qui est présenté comme destiné à la reprise et à la circulation ».

(1)



<http://golem13.fr/le-changebent-cest-baintenant-humex-rhume/>[consulté le 25 novembre]

Le mème (2) montre le détournement du même slogan par des modifications lexicales basées sur l'opposition dialogique du sens : le « maintenant » d'origine est converti en « demain » suivi de « ou » (signalant le caractère indécis de la promesse politique), pour se terminer sur « avant 2017 » (indiquant ironiquement la date des futures présidentielles censées ouvrir la voie à de nouvelles promesses électorales). Le mème (3) fait substituer « maintenant » par « pareil » aboutissant au contresens évident :

(2)



<https://la-feuille-de-chou.fr/archives/69256>[consulté le 25 novembre]

(3)



29

<https://lesbrindherbes.org/2017/06/07/le-changement-cest-maintenant/> [consulté le 25 novembre]

Les mutations mémétiques de parole politique en France exploitent surtout le côté hypocrite des promesses électorales. Les promesses utopiques annonçant la construction d'un monde idéal font partie depuis toujours de l'univers de la communication politique¹⁶. C'est ainsi que les internautes pratiquent l'argumentation du tartuffe. Elle est de nature circonstancielle, est donc liée aux événements politiques (campagnes électorales par exemple) et met en évidence la contradiction entre un « dire/faire croire » et un « faire » des acteurs politiques.

La conversion langagière peut inscrire les mêmes dans l'argumentation par extension. Prenons comme exemple des slogans de soutien apparus dans les moments de crise, comme par exemple le « Ce soir, nous sommes tous Américains » lancé au journal de 20 heures de *France 2* par la politologue Nicole Bacharan le 11 septembre 2001 et repris par le journaliste Jean-Marie Colombani dans son éditorial du *Monde* du 13 septembre. Le slogan rappelle aussi le « *Ich bin ein Berliner* » (« Je suis un Berlinois ») prononcé par John Fitzgerald Kennedy durant son discours à Berlin-Ouest le 26 juin 1963, à l'occasion des quinze ans du blocus de Berlin. Ces expressions plus au moins figées ont ensuite engendré le slogan « *Je suis Charlie* »¹⁷, qui a été repris et détourné dans une série de mèmes. En effet les « *Ich bin ein Berliner* », « *Nous sommes tous Américains* » et « *Je suis Charlie* » expriment la solidarité et le soutien dans les moments de crise. La reprise du slogan avec substitution lexicale, en (4), a pour effet d'élargir le sens au-delà des limites prévues de la formule d'origine. Si Berlinois a pu être substitué par Américains et ensuite par Charlie, c'est parce qu'à chaque fois, il s'agissait d'un grand moment de rupture. « Je suis idiot », sur l'image macro (4), contenant la photo retouchée après les attentats de Paris de 2015, rompt de manière évidente avec cette logique de soutien en convertissant la formule en commentaire sur l'inefficacité des

16 Le côté utopique des promesses est parfois exploité a contrario, comme dans le grand discours inoubliable de Winston Churchill devant la Chambre des communes : « *Je n'ai rien d'autre à offrir que du sang, de la peine, des larmes et de la sueur* ».

17 Slogan de soutien aux victimes de l'attentat de janvier 2015 contre le journal satirique *Charlie Hebdo*.

mesures prises contre le terrorisme mondial. Mais cette interprétation n'est pas claire et univoque. On peut dire aussi que le même vise uniquement François Hollande, qui regarde à gauche alors que tous les autres ont la tête tournée à droite, qui est soutenu par les bras comme on conduirait un handicapé mental, et qui a l'air de ne pas comprendre où il se trouve :

(4)



#JE SUIS IDIOT

<https://starecat.com/je-suis-idiot-merkel-hollande-marching-fail/> [consulté le 25 novembre]

La seconde interprétation se cantonne évidemment dans l'argumentation *ad personam* qui embrasse des énoncés du genre « X est un idiot ! » ou « Y est un menteur ! », qui cherchent beaucoup moins à tourner en dérision les idées des personnages politiques qu'à s'en prendre directement à ces personnes en mettant en avant un trait de leur caractère. Ce type d'argumentation s'inscrit souvent dans la stratégie du *shockvertising* (cf. Toscani, 1997 ; Dzamic, 2006), n'épargne aucune autorité politique ou acteur social, et se fonde sur un commentaire critique fort, de type humoristique ou ironique très hétérogène (farce/blague/boutade/parodie) tout en jouant sur des propos politiques qui sont déjà eux-mêmes souvent perçus négativement.

Conversion communicationnelle

Le conversion communicationnelle fait ressortir une valeur humoristique d'un discours en jouant sur la représentation des circonstances de production et de réception de la phrase initiale. Ce sont les slogans politiques qui sont souvent pris pour cible. Leur forme langagière reste souvent intacte en soi mais leur sens est redéfini par une « greffe » énonciative, c'est-à-dire par l'ajout d'un énoncé supplémentaire, comme dans le même (5) :

(5)



<http://izap4u.com/izap4u-les-images/lart-du-mensonge/> [consulté le 25 novembre]

En (5), le slogan se retrouve ainsi dans le cadre d'une conversation amicale (la forme d'adresse « tu », le lexique familier « sortir un propos ») entre Angela Merkel et François Hollande (incluse dans une de leurs photos officielles) et se veut être une blague racontée à table.

Dans l'exemple (6), le support graphique (photo de Nicolas Sarkozy) joue sur la conversion communicationnelle de la réplique du Président de la République au Salon de l'agriculture en février 2008. Sarkozy l'avait lancée en réponse à une personne qui avait refusé sa poignée de main et lui avait dit : « Ah non, touche-moi pas ! Tu me salis ! » Dans ce cas, le propos cité (dépourvu de guillemets) se présente comme une légende de photo et le même se place dans la logique de l'argumentation *ad personam* :

(6)



<http://legraouillydechaine.fr/2013/03/15/casse-toi-pauvcon-et-emmene-tes-copains-avec-toi/>

[consulté le 25 novembre]

Le mème (7) reste dans la logique de la communication politique (publique) à rebours (« vous y avez cru ? »), jouant sur le trope communicationnel qui fait du public le destinataire principal des propos politiques. Le slogan de départ est réduit au mot-clé (« changement ») qui est repris sur le mode dialogique¹⁸.

(7)



<http://maxeville.voxdany.com.over-blog.com/2013/10/30-ans-après-bon-le-changement-c-est-maintenant.html> [consulté le 25 novembre]

En (8), le texte greffé (ajouté) ironise sur les concepts de changement et de progrès social.

(8)



<http://www.ma-zone-controlee.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/hollande.jpg> [consulté le 25 novembre]

18 Rappelons rapidement que dans ce cas, le propos inséré dans l'image ne reprend pas toute la matérialité de la petite phrase mais en accueille un fragment (dit « enchâssé ») qui est une sorte de marqueur énonciatif qui renvoie à l'énonciation d'origine (pour le dialogisme, cf. Bres & Nowakowska, 2006).

L'image déforme une photo de Hollande en soulignant sa mimo-gestuelle légendaire, souvent parodiée (notamment dans les mèmes) en raison de son manque présumé de spontanéité.

Conversion discursive

La conversion discursive consiste en détournement du genre de discours de départ (auquel s'inscrit la parole politique reprise dans les mèmes). Cette conversion est illustrée par le mème (9) qui joue sur le slogan de François Hollande déjà évoqué. La conversion se fait au moyen de greffe énonciative où l'astérisque apporte une précision puisée dans le registre juridique contractuel qui place le propos dans la logique de la communication commerciale.

(9)



<http://la-feuille-de-chou.fr/archives/69256> [consulté le 25 novembre]

Sur le même mode de conversion discursive, le mème (10) détourne, quant au genre de discours, un propos reformulé extrait du discours prononcé par le ministre de l'Économie lors d'une rencontre avec la presse étrangère, au *Forum de Davos* en janvier 2016¹⁹. Ce propos est inséré dans un panneau d'affichage et signée, pour faire figure de publicité électorale contenant une drôle de promesse (ou un slogan politique). Cette conversion du propos d'Emmanuel Macron (« petite phrase ») en slogan électorale crée – selon la logique de l'épouvantail – un argument facilement réfutable pour l'attribuer ensuite au candidat aux élections présidentielles.

19 La phrase exacte d'Emmanuel Macron était : « Les salariés doivent pouvoir travailler plus, sans être payés plus si les syndicats majoritaires sont d'accord ».

(10)



<http://www.topito.com/top-pires-declarations-emmanuel-macron-le-vrai-visage-de-la-gauche>

[consulté le 25 novembre]

La conversion discursive des propos politiques fonctionne souvent sur le mode allusif. Ainsi, le même (11) reprend un propos implicite de Margaret Thatcher, « Le socialisme ne dure que jusqu'à ce que se termine l'argent des autres ». Dans l'image macro, le segment « l'argent des autres » fonctionne comme emprunt dialogique. La Toile française reprend le propos de Thatcher sous une forme détournée pour construire un argument épouvantail évident²⁰ : le propos initial (« petite phrase ») est d'abord modifié et puis recontextualisé comme slogan politique pour l'attribuer à François Hollande.

(11)



<http://la-verite-depatee.over-blog.com/article-politique-la-france-des-millionnaires-socialistes-102938777.html> [consulté le 25 novembre]

²⁰ La taxe de 75% sur les revenus supérieurs à un million d'euros a été promise par François Hollande lors de sa campagne présidentielle de 2012.

Le même suivant (12) joue sur le détournement du slogan de Barack Obama, sur un mode extrêmement allusif. Il reprend le « Yes, we can ! », « petite phrase » extraite d'un discours offensif du futur président américain prononcé en janvier 2008. Lors de la course à l'investiture démocrate, Obama a appelé ses partisans à un sursaut après la perte de deux points contre Hillary Clinton. Au milieu du discours, il a prononcé cette phrase, prête à la surassertion (au sens de Maingueneau, 2012) : « Yes, we can ! », qui est devenue ensuite le slogan électoral des démocrates. La Toile française la reprend sous une forme détournée, en construisant un contresens évident : « Yes we can » est repris dialogiquement en faisant un rapprochement entre « can » et « tax », pour enchaîner sur l'impôt de 75% sur les hauts revenus proposé par Hollande.

(12)



<https://bestcoffeeinparis.wordpress.com/tag/entrepreneur/> [consulté le 25 novembre]

Le cumul des moyens de mutation et la récursivité de la parole politique remaniée agissent sur la mémoire collective où se gravent des convictions et des principes qui répondent à une certaine logique de bon sens.

(13)



<http://lagauchematuer.fr/2016/05/30/le-mepris-demmanuel-macron-face-aux-francais-sans-emploi/> [consulté le 25 novembre]

La conversion discursive peut faire ressortir l'argumentation *ad personam*. En (13), le propos est extrait d'un vif échange du ministre de l'Économie avec des grévistes, lors d'une rencontre dans une école du numérique de la ville de Lunel, où le candidat à la présidentielle avait lancé : « Vous n'allez pas me faire peur avec votre tee-shirt : la meilleure façon de se payer un costard, c'est de travailler ». Les médias ont repris et diffusé le deuxième segment de ce propos (« La meilleure façon de se payer un costard, c'est de travailler ») et la Toile l'a repris à son tour pour en faire une matrice à produire des mèmes. En (13), la reprise dialogique de « costards » permet une parodie triviale de slogan publicitaire. Dans ce cas, l'argumentation vise avant tout à discréditer Macron en lui attribuant certains traits de caractère : stupidité, insolence, mépris. Ce dernier trait est d'ailleurs repris dans le même (14), qui exploite la formule « Je suis Charlie » :

(14)



<https://www.konbini.com/fr/tendances-2/t-shirt-pour-macron/> [consulté le 25 novembre]

Ce même représente un cas de cumul de deux conversions mémétiques : la conversion langagière (concernant la formule « Je suis Charlie ») et la conversion discursive réalisée par le support graphique et consistant en passage du discours politique au discours publicitaire.

Dans le même (1) présenté ci-dessus la mutation langagière que nous décrivons est accompagnée de conversion descriptive : avec le paquet d'Humex (un médicament contre le rhume) incrusté dans l'image, le slogan de départ rejoint le registre contractuel de la publicité.

Le graphisme des mèmes

Comme nous l'avons déjà remarqué, le graphisme des mèmes prend souvent des formes stéréotypées qui s'inscrivent dans une stratégie de *déjà vu*. Comme le décrivent Kaplan et Nova (2016), il s'agit de maquettes reconnaissables (du moins pour les initiés), qui forment le système graphique des mèmes et qui sont produites par et pour le système mémétique²¹. Mais souvent les images mémétiques sont puisées

21 Ces maquettes sont également exploitées dans les mèmes politiques aux USA, en France, c'est beaucoup plus rare. Il y a ainsi les *LOLcats* politiques, les mèmes *advice animal* (série d'images macro qui représentent la photo d'un animal – chien, pingouin, etc. – avec arrière-plan de rayons multicolores et deux lignes de texte sous forme de conseil), *downfall* (aussi connu

dans des systèmes graphiques extérieurs au système des mêmes et appartiennent à la culture globale. C'est ainsi que les images des acteurs politiques, mémétiques par excellence, sont souvent remixées et déformées.

Ces systèmes graphiques sont des invitations à produire d'autres messages en suivant le même canevas et à inventer d'autres modèles d'expression dérivés. Les mêmes ont un statut idéographique et translinguistique se caractérisant par la fusion des deux régimes sémiologiques. Le verbal et le visuel sont en relation complémentaire depuis longtemps sur le réseau : évoquons à ce propos les émoticônes qui sont désormais complètement intégrées au matériau linguistique. D'après Ernst Gombrich (1996), nous sommes dans la Culture de l'image, notre rapport au monde et à autrui passe par un flux de représentations en tout genre (cf. aussi Faccioli, 2007). Le visuel simplifie et clarifie le cadre nécessaire pour l'interprétation du verbal en structurant et en médiatisant le sens. Les images accompagnant les propos dans les mêmes revêtent un aspect polémique qui recourt souvent à une déformation consciente de la réalité. En fait, les nouvelles technologies offrent aujourd'hui la possibilité de réaliser des photomontages (assemblages de photos) grâce à des logiciels de retouche et de trucage d'image. Les déformations ont un fort impact sur les relations publiques et sur les opinions, agissent sur l'émotionnel et nourrissent différentes connotations tout en visant à augmenter l'attention du destinataire pour faciliter la mémorisation du message, pour donner sens à ce qui paraît flou. En tant que telles, les images mémétiques tombent parfois dans la stigmatisation, elles façonnent des modèles simplifiés de pensée et des stéréotypes mais, en dernière analyse, relèvent de ce qu'on peut appeler l'argumentation visuelle (Roque 2019), en montrant comment on peut convaincre au travers des images.

Conclusion

L'histoire de l'humanité a connu plusieurs moments décisifs liés à l'apparition d'inventions révolutionnaires. Aujourd'hui, tel est peut-être le monde du *do it yourself*, où les professionnels ne sont plus nécessaires et où s'effacent les autorités. Les individus deviennent de plus en plus autonomes, ils créent, et surtout, en créant *ensemble*, ils construisent ce que l'on pourrait appeler une « sagesse de la foule », qui s'appuie sur la similitude des points de vue et la réciprocité des échanges. En sachant qui rigole des mêmes choses et de la même manière que nous, il est possible de ressentir une communauté, de partager une argumentation. Les frontières entre les diffuseurs et les destinataires des contenus sont brouillées. L'Internet permet la création d'une communication politique symétrique et « participative ». Les MIP représentent des actes de micro-argumentation périphérique à caractère descriptif, dont l'impact est cumulatif. En tant que tels, ils représentent une forte atteinte non seulement à l'*éthos* des acteurs de la scène politique globale mais aussi aux contenus et aux affectivités de leurs dires (*logos* et *pathos*). Les MIP restent en relation étroite avec la presse *mainstream* diffusant les nouvelles qui alimentent leurs contenus. Ils s'opposent aux commentaires politiques « officiels » et peuvent être pensés comme le résultat de la crise de conscience du lectorat et des journalistes professionnels (Tétu 2008). Même si l'argumentation mémétique peut être

sous le nom de « Hitler réagit à... », cette série de photos ou de vidéos parodiques sous-titrées provient du film allemand *La chute* (2004), qui raconte les dix derniers jours de la vie de Hitler), *facepalm* (par allusion à la main qu'on place devant son visage pour exprimer sa consternation), *duck face* (une expression faciale obtenue en pinçant les lèvres à la manière d'un bec de canard).

jugée ambiguë, elle n'a jamais été aussi diverse qu'à présent, n'a jamais échappé à ce point au contrôle des autorités. Et l'individu n'a jamais eu un tel degré de liberté et de possibilités techniques pour s'exprimer, présenter ses idées et créations. De plus, il ne s'adresse plus seulement à sa propre communauté nationale, mais à la planète toute entière.

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KATARZYNA BUCZEK
University of Opole

Frisian as an Endangered Language: An Overview

Abstract

The main goal of the paper is to answer the questions whether Frisian can be referred to as an endangered language and if it managed to survive the constant influence of the surrounding larger cultures and languages. The first point to be analyzed is the geographic distribution of Frisian. The second issue to be considered is the historical and present cultural and social status of the Frisian language. The third matter to be analysed is the lexical variety of Frisian language and its complexity, which made its survival possible. The article takes the diachronic perspective and expounds upon all the mentioned factors and their role in the preservation of Frisian until today. The paper presents an analysis of Frisian along Fishman's Graded Intergenerational Disruption Scale (GIDS), its extended and modified version offered by Lewis and Simons (EGIDS) and the UNESCO's 'Language Vitality and Endangerment framework' (LVE) guidelines (2003).

Keywords: Frisian, language contact, endangered languages, Fishman's Graded Intergenerational Disruption Scale

Introduction

Language contact occurs when speakers of different languages interact, and their languages influence each other on different levels. As it is stated by Winford (2005, 2008) language contact always induces change. Still, the influence of one language on another varies and depends on the nature of the contact. Obviously, a language's influence widens as its speakers grow in power. One culture is influenced by a more dominant, formidable culture, and begins to lose its character and language. When we look at the history of European languages, and especially older Germanic languages, we can see that many of them, for example Gothic, Burgundian or Vandalic disappeared. Many other languages are endangered. According to Crystal (2010: 19) "there is a language dying off somewhere in the world every two weeks or so." Reasons for language loss or language shift towards a stronger language, are numerous. Besides natural disasters we should mention colonization, migration, and invasion, often resulting in cultural assimilation. The focus of this paper, however, is not on language death, but rather on language survival.

Throughout the years Frisian territories bordered first on the Roman Empire, later on the Carolingian Empire, whose languages and culture were dominant in Europe. Yet, the language of the Frisians managed to survive and grow independently.

Language endangerment

Language endangerment has long been a matter of great interest in wide range of linguistic fields. In broad terms, language endangerment can be defined as a situation in which a particular language is at risk of losing its active users and becoming extinct (Harrison 2007: 14). Nettle and Romaine (2000: 90) point out that languages become obsolete in the face of population loss or language shift. The issue formed the central focus of a study by Austin and Sallabank (2015) in which the authors additionally mention further causes of language endangerments such as “overt repression, often in the name of ‘national unity’ or assimilation (including forcible resettlement) (...) [and] cultural/political/economic dominance” Austin and Sallabank (2015: 5). There is a consensus among scientists that language shift can be either non-voluntary or voluntary. Voluntary shift takes place when a language speakers assume that they could benefit more from speaking the dominant language than their own. Very often a minority language speakers are believed to be “relatively powerless politically, (...) less educated, less wealthy (even living in poverty in many cases), with less access to modern conveniences and technologies” (Grenoble 2015: 34). Such situations lead to the abandonment of both the minority language and culture and adoption of the dominant, more prestigious ones (Lüpke 2019: 468-471).

Yet another important feature of language shift is highlighted by Austin and Sallabank (2015: 1), who stress that

[I]anguage shift can take place rapidly, over a generation or two, or it can take place gradually, but continuously, over several generations. Language shift often takes place through a period of unstable bilingualism or multilingualism, that is, speakers use two or more languages but one (or more) of them is more dominant and used increasingly widely until finally it (or they) take over the roles previously carried by the endangered language(s).

All this may lead to the situation in which almost 50% of the languages spoken around the world will be abandoned by their users (Harrison 2007: 3).

2. Language revitalisation and maintenance

Language loss is a growing concern among scholars. Linguists are becoming increasingly disquieted at the speed at which languages and cultures disappear. Mufwene (2004: 211) highlights the need to consider both language maintenance and revitalization from the broader perspective of a relationship that binds language, culture and ecosystem together. He continues, pointing out that “[I]ike cultures, languages are dynamic, complex adaptive systems that cannot be considered independent of the adaptive needs of their speakers” (Mufwene 2004: 219).

One of the researchers that discusses possible actions that need to be undertaken to stop or, at least, impede the process is David Crystal (2000) who proposes six factors that might help sustain the stability

of a language. He claims that the threatened language will not only progress, but also quite possibly recover, if its speakers (1) increase their prestige within the dominant community; (2) increase their wealth; (3) increase their legitimate power in the eyes of the dominant community; (4) have a strong presence in the educational system; (5) can write down their language; (6) can make use of electronic technology (Crystal 2000: 133–144). Ladefoged (1992: 810), on the other hand, reminds that linguists, encouraging the revitalization processes, should be cautious of their actions and consider the situation of individual linguistic groups with great care and sensitivity: “we should not assume that we know what is best for them.”

2.1. *The degree of language vitality—assessment tools*

Language revitalization programs need to adopt specific, most accurate in the particular environment actions. In order to do that, a language’s state should be understood and carefully evaluated. Obiero (2010: 203) postulates that a precise assessment of “the degree of language vitality is the basic indicator used in determining the appropriate type of language revitalization program.” Dwyer (2011: 1) elaborates on the idea and suggests that

(...) [a]ssessing the degree to which shift occurs invariably entails determining and applying a range of largely quantifiable sociolinguistic variables, such as the number and age of speakers, or whether there is a writing system, educational materials, or media in the language (...).

Similar approach is adopted by Grenoble and Whaley (2006: 3) who claim that “(...) a language spoken by several thousand people on a daily basis presents a much different set of options for revitalization than a language that has a dozen native speakers who rarely use it.”

There are numerous methods and techniques used for language’s vitality assessment, yet, the most commonly used are the following scales:

- 1) *Graded Intergenerational Disruption Scale (GIDS)* developed by Fishman (1991)
- 2) *Expanded Graded Intergenerational Disruption Scale (EGIDS)* developed by Lewis and Simons (2010) and further adopted by *Ethnologue* database (<https://www.ethnologue.com/>)
- 3) *UNESCO’s ‘Language Vitality and Endangerment framework’ (LVE) guidelines* (2003)

Fishman (1991) proposes a sequence of 8 stages that serve as a tool in the assessment of language disruption, and which may be helpful in the establishment of a plan of actions leading to the endangered language’s revitalization. 8th stage suggests a near total extinction, whereas stage 1 indicates the smallest disruption.

The Expanded Graded Intergenerational Disruption Scale (EGIDS) developed by Lewis and Simons (2010) is more detailed than Fishman’s GIDS and consists of 13 levels. Here, however, the higher the number on the scale the greater level of disruption to the intergenerational transmission of the language. Additionally, it is worth highlighting that the levels 6a and 6b correspond to Level 6 of Fishman’s GIDS, and levels 8a and 8b correspond to GIDS’s Level 8. There are also 3 new levels 0, 9, and 10. Table 1 below summarizes the stages the language might find itself in:

Table 1. *Graded Intergenerational Disruption Scale (GIDS) vs. Expanded Graded Intergenerational Disruption Scale (EGIDS)*

	Graded Intergenerational Disruption Scale (GIDS) (Fishman 1991)	Expanded Graded Intergenerational Disruption Scale (Lewis and Simons 2010)
0.		<i>International</i> The language is widely used between nations in trade, knowledge exchange, and international policy.
1.	The language is used in education, work, mass media, government at the nationwide level	<i>National</i> The language is used in education, work, mass media, and government at the national level.
2.	The language is used for local and regional mass media and governmental services	<i>Provincial</i> The language is used in education, work, mass media, and government within major administrative subdivisions of a nation
3.	The language is used for local and regional work by both insiders and outsiders	<i>Wider Communication</i> The language is used in work and mass media without official status to transcend language differences across a region.
4.	Literacy in the language is transmitted through education	<i>Educational</i> The language is in vigorous use, with standardization and literature being sustained through a widespread system of institutionally supported education.
5.	The language is used orally by all generations and is effectively used in written form throughout the community	<i>Developing</i> The language is in vigorous use, with literature in a standardized form being used by some though this is not yet widespread or sustainable.
6.	The language is used orally by all generations and is being learned by children as their first language	
6a.		<i>Vigorous</i> The language is used for face-to-face communication by all generations and the situation is sustainable.
6b.		<i>Threatened</i> The language is used for face-to-face communication within all generations, but it is losing users.
7.	The child-bearing generation knows the language well enough to use it with their elders but is not transmitting it to their children	<i>Shifting</i> The child-bearing generation can use the language among themselves, but it is not being transmitted to children.
8.	The only remaining speakers of the language are members of the grandparent generation	
8a.		<i>Moribund</i> The only remaining active users of the language are members of the grandparent generation and older.

	Graded Intergenerational Disruption Scale (GIDS) (Fishman 1991)	Expanded Graded Intergenerational Disruption Scale (Lewis and Simons 2010)
8b.		<i>Nearly Extinct</i> The only remaining users of the language are members of the grandparent generation or older who have little opportunity to use the language.
9.		<i>Dormant</i> The language serves as a reminder of heritage identity for an ethnic community, but no one has more than symbolic proficiency.
10.		<i>Extinct</i> The language is no longer used and no one retains a sense of ethnic identity associated with the language.

In his research Baker (2001: 79) additionally stresses that:

[f]or Fishman (1991), *Stages 8 to 5* constitute the minimum basis of reversing language shift. The activities at these stages rely solely on the efforts of the language community itself. Such stages reflect a diglossic situation where the minority language has separate functions from the majority language.

UNESCO's 'Language Vitality and Endangerment framework' attempts to evaluate the level of language knowledge and use. The document presenting the framework indicates in its closing lines the fact that:

(...) linguists, language activists, and policy makers have a long-term task to compile and disseminate the most effective and viable mechanisms for sustaining and revitalizing the world's endangered languages. Most importantly, they have the responsibility of working collaboratively with endangered language communities that enjoy an equal partnership in the projects. (UNESCO Ad Hoc Expert Group 2003: 18)

The framework includes six degrees of endangerment based on nine factors. The framework's authors stress, however, that "[l]anguages cannot be assessed simply by adding the numbers." Below are the 9 factors and a sample gradation of the degree of language's endangerment (Table 2).

Factor 1. Intergenerational Language Transmission (scale)

Factor 2. Absolute Number of Speakers (real numbers)

Factor 3. Proportion of Speakers within the Total Population (scale)

Factor 4. Trends in Existing Language Domains (scale)

Factor 5. Response to New Domains and Media (scale)

Factor 6. Materials for Language Education and Literacy (scale)

Factor 7. Governmental and Institutional Language Attitudes and Policies, Including Official Status and Use: (scale)

Factor 8. Community Members' Attitudes toward Their Own Language (scale)

Factor 9. Amount and Quality of Documentation (scale)

Table 2. UNESCO's 'Language Vitality and Endangerment framework' (LVE) guidelines (2003) *Factor 1: Intergenerational Transmission*

Degree of Endangerment	Grade	Speaker Population
safe	5	The language is used by all ages, from children up
unsafe	4	The language is used by some children in all domains; it is used by all children in limited domains
definitely endangered	3	The language is used mostly by the parental generation and up
severely endangered	2	The language is used mostly by the grandparental generation and up
critically endangered	1	The language is used mostly by very few speakers, of great-grandparental generation
extinct	0	There exists no speaker

3. Frisian language—the history

As it is commonly known the Frisians and their language were first mentioned in Pliny's *Belgica* and later on in *Germania* written by Tacitus. From these sources we find out that the Frisians inhabited the area between the Rhine in the west and the Ems in the east (Bremmar 2009: 1). Throughout the years Frisian territories bordered first on the Roman Empire, later on the Carolingian Empire, whose languages and culture were dominant in Europe. Yet, the language of the Frisians managed to survive and grow independently.

The first reason why Frisian survived is its geographic distribution. Now, Frisian is a language spoken mostly in the province of Friesland (*Fryslân*) in the north of the Netherlands (Gorter 2001: 103). In the past, during the middle ages, the speakers of the language inhabited the northern European coastlines of the Northern Sea that used to be called Mare Frisicum IJssennagger (2017). The area of Frisian speaking community was most of the time inaccessible due to the surrounding mud and marshes. Thus, it has rarely been invaded or totally conquered. Due to geographical reason migrations in this area were also rare, which gave Frisian the dominant position as far as communication is concerned. Frisians colonized often flooded salt marshes, therefore they built the farms on top of an artificial mound or a *terp*. As the population grew, *terps* were enlarged or a cluster of smaller *house terps* merged into a larger *village terp* (Bremmer 2009). Such geographical surrounding gave Frisians relative protection and made the land not attractive for invaders, first, from Roman Empire and, later, Charlemagne.

Around the 1st century BC, Frisians inhabited the areas of present Netherlands and constituted a third largest tribal community (Munske 2001). The areas they settled were bordering with, occupied by the Romans, Gaul. Despite intensive contacts and trade between the Frisians and the Romans, Frisian remained culturally and linguistically independent, Frisians, being excellent warriors and traders, did not focus on expansion and always came back to their homeland. This had a huge impact on the culture's and language's survival. There were much more numerous Germanic tribes such as Goths or Saxons prioritised conquering other lands. Such approach led to a less fortunate outcomes, as the tribes, due to the contacts with other peoples, assimilated and lost their unique identity. Frisians did not share their fate, however.

When we look at the later history, we can see that “[i]n the late seventh century, the Franks began to extend their territory towards the north and first conquered the coastal area between the Scheldt and

the Rhine” (Bremmer 2009: 2). Various Frankish kingdoms and finally the Holy Roman Empire tried to control Frisian areas. Still Frisian natural habitat was to their advantage, as the extensive marshes and peat-moors secluded Frisian from the inland. Such geographic distribution of Frisian language ensured the relative stability of the language and enabled the passing of the language from one generation to another.

The second issue to be considered is the cultural status of the Frisian language. Undoubtedly, language survives through its use in cultural and religious ceremonies as well as in writings. The earliest attestations of Frisian language originate from the inscriptions that are found mainly on coins and swords. Later on, despite the general dominance of Latin in Europe, there appear legal texts written in Frisian, which, undoubtedly, has an impact on establishing a standard written language of that time. Codification of the law with the usage of Frisian language must have had an impact on the usage of the language and its future existence and growth. Thanks to the well-established legal language, the members of the Frisian society could feel certain bond and unity. The fact that people could use Frisian language underpinned the independence and freedom of the Frisians.

The 16th and 17th centuries were the time during which Frisian language lost its popularity and importance. Frisian was perceived as a language of lower social classes (Bremmer 2009: 3-6). The official institutions used Dutch as a written language, and Frisian became the spoken language of the common people. Languages evolve and interact with one another. Frisian language also experienced some changes due to the contact with other languages, yet, it has never been absorbed or dominated. It established and, for long, sustained its own linguistic features as far as the lexicon, morphology and phonology are concerned.

4. Frisian language—now

The revival of Frisian writing and, therefore, its standardization begins already in the eighteen century. Hoekstra (2003: 199) mentions the immense role of people such as Everwinus Wassenbergh (1742–1826) or Ecco Epkema (1759–1832), Joost Halbertsma (1789–1869) or Eeltsje Halbertsma (1797–1858) who led to the establishment of a linguistic Frisian standard.


Now, we may say that Frisian language is characteristic for the region and can be put somewhere between a vernacular and a standard language (Feitsma 1978; 1981). What is more, Frisian has recently been recognized as an official language alongside with Dutch (Cenoz & Jessner 2000).

When we look at the language from the perspective of the Expanded Graded Intergenerational Disruption Scale adopted by Ethnologue and the Fishman’s Graded Intergenerational Disruption Scale Frisian language has already passed the 8th and 7th stage. Not only adults, but also young speakers and children use Frisian on a daily basis. Frisian is the native language of around 350,000 people in Friesland. It may be said that 74% of the inhabitants of Friesland can speak the language (Gorter 2001: 104). According to Edelman (2010: 46) “Frisian has a relatively strong position in the domain of family, work and community, whereas Dutch dominates in the domains of education, media, public administration and law.” This fulfills the requirements of Stage 6 which say that all three generations speak the language within the family. The criteria of Stage 5 are focused on the existence of literacy at home, school and community networks. At Stage 4 of the GIDS, the language is present at the primary level of education. Here, the research conducted by Edelman leads to the conclusion that “Frisian has a marginal position

as a language for teaching at all levels of education. It is an obligatory subject for all primary schools in Friesland, but only a small percentage of schools use Frisian as a medium of instruction” (Edelman 2010: 46). Gorter (2008: 510) mentions that only 73% of parents, when asked if it is important that their children learn Frisian at school, answered ‘yes’. When the same question was asked with reference to Dutch, 100% of parents agreed. Frisian is present at primary level education in Friesland, but it is not that popular outside the territory of the language community and therefore does not fulfill the criterion of Stage 3. Gorter (2008) concludes here that:

Frisian may be appreciated for its historical value or as the language of intimate contacts, but it is regarded as of low value for economic progress. Moreover, Frisian is not perceived as being endangered in the short run. Parents and teachers are not convinced that Frisian needs much more than a limited role in education. Today most people may be convinced of the ‘harmless’ character of teaching some Frisian, because it is not detrimental to Dutch (Gorter 2008: 517)

The revival activities receive support from the central government, which is important in connection with Stage 2. It needs to be pinpointed here that the 18th edition of the *Ethnologue* places the Frisian language at the **second stage**, which means that Frisian has a stable, unthreatened position among the world’s languages. Frisian is characterized here as Institutional (EGIDS 0-4) which means that the language has been developed to the point that it is used and sustained by institutions beyond the home and community.



Graph 1. Frisian Language Vitality according to *Ethnologue*.

It is also worth mentioning that Frisian is the only official language in the Netherlands recognised under Part III of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages which aims to protect and promote historical *regional* and *minority languages* in *Europe*. The European Charter of Regional and

Minority Languages was ratified in the Netherlands in 1996. It made the Dutch government responsible for the adoption of certain measures to strengthen Frisian.

Conclusions

Looking at the LVE, GIDS or EGIDS scales of endangerment, we may conclude that Frisian belongs to the minority languages that managed to strengthen their position.

Throughout centuries, Frisian was surrounded by much more powerful languages: English, French, Latin and finally Dutch. Still, because of the fact that it was so deeply rooted in the common life and traditions of the Frisian people, it managed to survive. Frisian has a rich vocabulary that differs considerably from Dutch and from other Germanic languages. It has its own rules for word formation, phonological processes which developed through various historical changes (Jorvert Breaking and the characteristic for Frisian rising of diphthongs), which would also be interesting to elaborate on. Finally, Frisian has a standardized spelling and grammar, is spoken and written, used at home, in cultural expression and in public life. From the time Frisian is mentioned by Pliny on, the language faced various historical challenges. Yet, it survived and managed to establish its position despite the fact that it is and has been spoken on a relatively small area. All this makes it interesting for scholars and introduces questions why certain languages continue to exist, and other die.

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PIOTR P. CHRUSZCZEWSKI
Uniwersytet Wrocławski

„(...) a sprawdzianem człowieka jest jego wypowiedź”
Z *Księgi Syracha* (Syr 27, 4–7)

„Tydzień z hakiem zmitrzążyłem w Moskwie, czekając na akredytację dziennikarską, co osłodziłem sobie startem w XXX Moskiewskim Maratonie Pokoju. Wszędzie na takich biegach zawodników karmią na trasie bananami, czekoladą, suszonymi owocami, a w Moskwie czarnym chlebem z solą. (...) Czas nieszczególny – 3 godziny, 35 minut i 55 sekund. 276. miejsce, i 44. w grupie wiekowej 50+”.

Dzienniki kołymskie (JHB, 2011: 73)

Reportaż narracyjny jako szczególny sposób na tłumaczenie rzeczywistości z Jackiem Hugo-Baderem w tle¹

A Narrative Report as a Special Case of the Interpretation of Reality (with Jacek Hugo-Bader in the Background)

Abstract

The entire text is just a small fraction of a much larger work (still not finished) describing an attempt at an analysis of narrative reports interpreting reality. It is a very brief overview of Jacek Hugo-Bader's (JHB) idiosyncratic ways

¹ Praca ta jest z założenia fragmentem zaplanowanej i powstającej większej całości. Autor dziękuje za uważne przeczytanie oraz wszystkie sugestie Pani mgr Monice Piechocie oraz red. Jackowi Hugo-Baderowi.

of rendering reality into his excellent very much field-work based narratives. The author of the text is of the opinion that the true meaning of the communicated text changes not only with the style of the text; the understanding of the actual meaning is based upon the profound knowledge of the interpreted information. There is only one way to get to the core of the true meaning of the described reality, it is done by the method known as participant observation. JHB knows that very well, and that is why all his narrative reports are preceded by extended field works.

Keywords: narrative report, participant observation, reality interpretation, Jacek Hugo-Bader.

Na przekór pudłom

Każdy przyzna, że już na pierwszy rzut oka redaktor Jacek Hugo-Bader (JHB) nawet z daleka nie wygląda na reporterskiego kanapowego pudła, zamieszkującego stoliczne redakcje i aportującego na zawołanie przełożonego teksty wychwalające pod niebiosa cokolwiek szef akurat by sobie zażyzył galwanizować. Nie, galwanizatorem JHB nigdy nie był; zna życie na tyle dobrze, że wie, iż to nigdy nie popłaca, a wręcz odwrotnie, sztuczne ożywianie martwych tematów i przypochlebianie łamie kręgosłup, powolutku, kręgu po kręgu, dzień po dniu, po cichutku, trzask po trzasku i człowieka nie ma, pozostaje na zawsze *wierny* wyrobnik. Takich kochają redakcje jedynie słusznych gazet lub czasopism; takich kochają odbiorcy i odbiorniczki jedynie słusznych wiadomości lub informacji; takimi żyje spora część użytkowników kraju z radioodbiornikiem ustawionym na jednej częstotliwości. Tacy potrafią z miłością i zrozumieniem opluć żółcią i to nawet podczas kazania (prawda, Ojciec Zdzisławie?), tacy potrafią z wrodzoną sobie delikatnością posłać do towarzyskiej Walhalli, tacy to przecie potrafią świętować w smutne miesiące, tacy to przecie nasi wielcy współcześni wikingowie z Olsztyna, którzy chcą obić nieogoloną twarz JHB przyjmującego na chodniku defiladę 11 listopada! Tylko wtedy ta twarz jest czarna, bo jest świetnie ucharakteryzowaną twarzą Afro-Polaka. Nie każdego reportera stać na tego typu akcję na pierwszej linii frontu, współczesne reporterskie pudła z Woronicza wolą zazwyczaj ostrzeliwać się słowami *zza* bezpiecznych szańców oplatających jedwabnymi rzymkami spojrzeń swoje etycznie zadymione biurka. Stać może nawet warto by się za nich pomodlić: *A furore Normannorum libera nos, Domine!*?

JHB to *starannik* reporterskich szlaków bolącej duszy, ryjący do głębi, do ostatniego pokładu tajemnicy interlokutora; to diabeł pod maską reportera z Polszy (zob. Łoziński, Hugo-Bader 2007), *samorodny* talent, potrafiący w mgnieniu reporterskiego oka przewrócić na nice duszę odbiorniczki lub odbiorcy, żeby wypełnić ich pojemnością swój dyktafon.

JHB to *pariokos*, który bliski oryginalnemu znaczeniu tego słowa, zawsze jest gdzieś obcy, bowiem przychodzi z dalekiego kraju i ma tylko chwilę na zaprzyjaźnienie się, wypicie, zakąszenie, nagranie, pogadanie, żeby później spisać, ale doskonale wczuwa się w rolę swojskiego ziomka z naszej parafii, który wydaje się być z nami od zawsze. Czy podtrzymuje przyjaźnie zawarte w terenie? Chyba nie zawsze, bowiem tyle tych tekstów już było, kto by to spamiętał. Ale pierwszy wyciągnie rękę na *povitanie* (zachowano oryginalną pisownię JHB) i potrząśnięcie rozmówcą.

JHB to archimandryta w warszawskim rycie kościoła polskiego reportażu, jest raczej typem wnikliwego obserwatora trotuarowego, pielgrzymującego szczura błotnego [lat. *rattus slavicus*] (wybacz Jacku tę metaforę, ale szczury to niezwykle inteligentne zwierzęta, przeciwko którym występuje jedynie stereotyp, rzecz ma się podobnie z dziennikarzem, czy reporterem, przeciwko któremu zazwyczaj jest tylko tzw. opinia społeczna), który zazwyczaj zdany wyłącznie na siebie musi poradzić sobie w najbardziej

ekstremalnych warunkach (np. niezwykle długa i zakręcona podróż zimowa przez Syberię, wysokie góry, ale też niebezpieczeństwo, samotność, nuda, zimno, hejt sieciowy i niezyczliwość bliźniego w realu z przesyłką pod adres domowy jego własnych książek unurzanych w cuchnącej masie przetrwionego pokarmu na czele). Reporter, wykorzystujący do przetrwania w niekorzystnych często okolicznościach przyrody (do których zazwyczaj sam się pcha na wyścigi, co często może trąci nawet brakiem instynktu samozachowawczego – zob. poszukiwania kontaktów z rosyjską mafią) walory swojego lotnego intelektu (na co dla mnie przekonującym dowodem jest wypracowanie przez JHB swojej własnej baterii środków wyrazu, czym może się poszczycić rzadko który znany mi akademik, tych przysłowiowych amerykańskich nie wyłączając), otwartą osobowość o wyraźnych cechach świergotliwego i pozornie ekstrawertycznego choleryka, który żeby przetrwać (tutaj: zdobyć ciekawy materiał do opisanie, potrzebny do wykonywania zawodu, czyli do tłumaczenia rzeczywistości) jest w stanie wiele zaryzykować i zagrać *va banque* – o główną stawkę – o odbiorcę lub odbiorczkę. Potrafi bez umówienia, zupełnie spontanicznie, wykorzystując wyłącznie swoją reporterską intuicję, że tym razem go nie wywałą przez okno, przejechać pół kraju, żeby zatelefonować spod bloku osoby, z którą chciałby porozmawiać. W końcu zawsze zapraszają go do domu. W starciu z rzeczywistością JHB wygrywa, czytelnik do niego lgnie. JHB cieszy się zasłużenie dobrą opinią świetnego reportera trotuarowego, chętnie zapraszanego (od kiedy jego kalendarza pilnuje najosobistsza agentka, to nawet za bardzo duże pieniądze) na spotkania autorskie. Zgodnie z prawdą dodać też należy, że nie jest przywiązany do zarabiania sporej sumy za każdym razem, bowiem potrafi się wielkodusznie wnieść ponad przeciętną ludzką pensję i ponad codzienną krajową chciwość i długo opowiadać kilka setek kilometrów od domu i to zupełnie *pro bono*. *Ave Hyacinthus!*

Środowiskowa interpretacja interkulturowa

W pełni należy się zgodzić ze zdaniem znakomitego przekładoznawcy, czystej inkarnacji legendy badań nad przekładem – profesora Petera Newmarka [1916–2011], wedle którego powiedzieć, że ktoś zajmuje się przekładem może być nadużyciem, lub co najmniej może być niezrozumiałe, bowiem Newmark twierdził, że całe życie jest interpretacją rzeczywistości; idiosynkratyczną interpretacją zastanej i dynamicznie zmieniającej się rzeczywistości na sposób zrozumiały dla osoby odbierającej docierające do niej bodźce². Co więcej, później właśnie ta osoba (jak w zasadzie każda inna) po dokonaniu swojej własnej interpretacji rzeczywistości, przekazuje tę swoją wersję dalej, w sposób potrzebny jej interlokutorowi, a ten z kolei dokonuje, często niezwykle twórczej adaptacji odebranego tekstu do własnej wizji rzeczywistości. Nastąpić wtedy mogą tylko dwie rzeczy: a) przyjęcie lub b) odrzucenie uzyskanej informacji. Przyjęcie niemal zawsze jest tożsame z adaptacją otrzymanego tekstu do swojej wizji rzeczywistości, odrzucenie skutkować będzie niemal natychmiastowym zapomnieniem, lub przynajmniej próbą zapomnienia tej informacji.

W tym miejscu warto odesłać Czytelnika do klasyki przekładoznawstwa, czyli prac Petera Newmarka (1973, 1988), który postulował, między innymi to, że sens przekazywanej informacji

2 Na podstawie informacji przekazanych podczas wykładu przez profesora Łukasza Boguckiego – szefa łódzkiej anglistyki i kierownika Zakładu Translatologii Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego. Łukasz Bogucki osobiście usłyszał taką opinię z ust Petera Newmarka. Wykład prof. Boguckiego przedstawiony został 19 marca 2019 r. w Uniwersytecie Wrocławskim na zaproszenie Kolegium MSI UW, IFA UW oraz Komisji Nauk Filologicznych Oddziału PAN we Wrocławiu.

zmienia się wraz ze stylem. Dodać należy, że sens odbieranej informacji zmienia się nie tylko ze stylem, ale też – czy przede wszystkim – z doświadczeniem odbiorcy, bowiem oczywiście inaczej zinterpretuje rzeczywistość obserwowanego nieba emerytowana profesor astronomii, jeszcze inaczej domorosła wróżka Verbena, a zupełnie inaczej pięcioletnia Ania. Tutaj nie wystarczy podstawowa znajomość języka i kultury, bowiem żeby oddać stan ducha nadawcy/odbiorcy informacji potrzeba dokładnej znajomości wartości komunikacyjnej interpretowanej informacji, wydawałoby się znacznie wykraczającej poza ramy tłumaczenia komunikacyjnego (zob. np. Newmark 1988)³.

Co więcej, inaczej interpretuje oglądaną rzeczywistość Polski lat 80-tych XX wieku przez pryzmat swojej obserwacji uczestniczącej redaktor JHB – wtedy jako jeszcze niemal zupełnie zielony szczurek (ang. *greenhorn*), a zupełnie inaczej abstynent i generał broni w zielonym mundurze – Wojciech Jaruzelski. Co ciekawe, obaj panowie pewnie spotkają się kiedyś w polskiej sekcji rajy, i to nie tego zaprojektowanego przez redaktora Szczygła (2010); a następnie to może, bowiem generał ponoć zdążył wypowiedzieć się przed śmiercią swojego ciała, a redaktor JHB, jak sam mówi, „na starość zacząłem nosić bożę na szyi”⁴. Będą mieli całą wieczność do przegadania. Z tego wniosok, że generał postąpił wręcz modelowo – biorąc sobie do serca wzór z samej Golgoty, a model ten obejmuje wszystkich bez wyjątku, nawet najbardziej zapiekłych generałów, nawet tych wprowadzających stan nocy zimowej i wywołujących wojnę we własnym kraju, nawet tych generałów, na których zagiął parol JHB. Wystarczy chcieć i poprosić, tylko trzeba zdążyć to zrobić przed odejściem, a zielonemu generałowi zimowych nocy się to (chyba?) udało. Stąd, skoro JHB i generał być może będą razem na całą wieczność, to może czas w końcu skończyć z przerzucaniem się historyjkami między czerstwą partyzantką z Czerskiej, a niepokalanymi z Nowogrodzkiej? Panowie raczą nie dostrzegać, że dręcząca obecność ich dykteryjek, ich pomników, ich tablic, ich gazet to już zamierzchnia lamusowa przeszłość dla współczesnej młodzieży. Szkoda tylko, że cały czas tak żywa w ich wersji terażniejszości. Teraz są dużo ważniejsze rzeczy do zrobienia. Nie pławmy się w swoich własnych – na wymiar robionych – brodzikach pełnych żółci. Kraj w sporze pada na kolana. Kraj jest w prawdziwej kulturowej ruinie. Czas to dostrzec, czas z tym skończyć, czas to opisać, czas za to wypić, czas za to przemaszerować, czas za to przeprosić?

Nasuwa się w tym miejscu spostrzeżenie Umberto Eco ([2011] 2012: 9–11), który wieziony w Nowym Jorku przez taksówkarza kojarzącego Włochy dość słabo, został zapytany o to kim są wrogowie Włochów. Eco nie potrafił od razu odpowiedzieć na to pytanie, ponieważ Włochy nie prowadzą wojny ze swoimi sąsiadami, ale po namyśle dotarło do niego, że pytanie o wrogów jest pytaniem o tożsamość, a zarazem odpowiedzią wybiegającą daleko w przyszłość, bowiem:

[p]osiadanie wroga jest ważne nie tylko w procesie określania naszej tożsamości, ale również dla zapewnienia sobie przeszkody, wobec której moglibyśmy utrwalić nasz system wartości i w konfrontacji z nią pokazać, ile jesteśmy wari. Dlatego gdy wroga nie ma, koniecznie trzeba go stworzyć. (...) Jednakże od samego początku na nieprzyjaciół wybiera się nie tyle tych, którzy bezpośrednio nas atakują (jak w przypadku barbarzyńców), ile raczej tych, których komuś oplaca się ukazać nam jako zagrożenie, nawet gdyby byli dla nas całkowicie niegroźni. Wówczas nie tyle dostrzegamy ich odmienność, bo nam zagrażają, ile sama ich inność staje się dla nas synonimem zagrożenia. (Eco [2011] 2012: 11, 13)

3 Ciekawie omawia teorię i praktykę współczesnego przekładoznawstwa Justyna Walczak w swojej rozprawie doktorskiej (UW 2013).

4 Jacek Hugo-Bader; spotkanie autorskie w Uniwersytecie Wrocławskim 20 marca 2019 r. na zaproszenie Kolegium Międzyobszarowych Studiów Indywidualnych UW oraz Instytutu Filologii Angielskiej UW.

Eco nie dodaje tylko, że kreowanie wielu papierowych wrogów – co pozwala łatwo jednoczyć się i określać swoją tożsamość wszystkim stronom konfliktu – i później zaognianie sytuacji oraz prowadzenie równocześnie wyniszczającego sporu na wszystkich liczących się dla rozwoju państwa poziomach, jest być może receptą na bardzo krótki dystans zdobywania władzy, ale nigdy nie na lata egzystencji państwa, które powinno się rozwijać i walczyć z prawdziwymi nieprzyjaciółmi. Jeden z nich podstępnie wlał się w duszę narodu i systematycznie przez całe dekady ją otępia. Z każdym sprzedanym 0,5 l dusza narodu jest coraz bardziej otumaniona i mniej podatna na wyrabianie w sobie dobrych nawyków, jak np. nawyku czytania dla przyjemności⁵... Niestety stąd już tylko jeden krok do opisywanej przez JHB białej gorączki (Hugo-Bader [2009] 2011).

A rodacy – dalej swoje, teraz tylko w partyzantce jedenastu miesięcy, bo to przecież już święta tradycja sierpniowej abstynencji z pielgrzymką za pasem... Ale za to później zstąpi duch – *spirytus* – i znowu obmyje oblicze ziemi – tej właśnie ziemi, bowiem po sierpniowej pielgrzymce następuje powrót do partyzantki. Jeszcze Bolska nie zginęła⁶! I jeszcze jeden i jeszcze raz! I za „Czerwone maki...” i za Jedwabne... i za „Pokłosie”... i tutaj już następuje kliniczna postać niemal ogólnonarodowej czkawki...

A partyzantka:

pije – bo lubi,
 pije – bo to przecież partyzantka,
 pije – bo jest odważna,
 pije – bo się boi,
 pije – bo kto nie pije, ten donosi,
 pije – bo to alkoholicy,
 pije – bo są trzeźwi,
 pije – bo to przecież wojna,
 pije – bo wszyscy piją,
 pije – bo lubi,
 pije – bo nie lubi,
 pije – bo się brata,
 pije – bo trzeba pamiętać,
 pije – bo trzeba zapomnieć,
 pije – bo to są przecież Prometeusze,
 pije – bo im jednak nie odrasta wątroba,
 pije – bo to też Polska JHB...

Santa Muerte – ora pro nobis!

5 „À propos radości: 11 listopada w stolicy, godzina wczesnopopołudniowa, skrzyżowanie ulic w centrum, na skrzyżowaniu sklep monopolowy 24 h. Przed sklepem długa kolejka spragnionych mężczyzn, każdy z biało-czerwoną opaską Polski Walczącej na ramieniu. Ojczyznę wolną racz im wrócić, Panie!” (Kłata 2019: 84).

6 „Bolska” to świadome nawiązanie do tzw. „Polski B”. Z tym, że Bolska to kategoria mentalna, nie jest to żadne dokładne miejsce na mapie i może dotyczyć absolutnie wszystkich, nawet Polaków z Warszawy, Poznania, Krakowa i Torunia, może także równie dobrze dotyczyć nie-Polaków, jak i Polaków z Żoliborza, Żar, Wrocławia, okolic Oświęcimia, Góry, Bystrzycy Kłodzkiej, Lubina, Teremisiek, czy Sycowa.

Post Scriptum

Do opracowania pozostaje jeszcze wiele wątków, czy raczej indiosynkratycznych metod tłumaczenia rzeczywistości prowadzonych przez redaktora Jacka Hugo-Badera. Należałoby pochylić się nad JHB jako, między innymi: tłumaczem obszarów geograficznych, tłumaczem ludzi etnicznie nieuprzywilejowanych, tłumaczem dynamicznie zmieniających się warunków, tłumaczem kultury, tłumaczem języka i historii, wreszcie tłumaczem inności⁷.

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7 W tym miejscu na myśl przychodzi równie interesujący sposób na tłumaczenie inności – przez obnażenie mechanizmów wykluczenia, zaproponowany przez Güntera Wallraffa ([2009] 2012).

PIOTR P. CHRUSZCZEWSKI
Uniwersytet Wrocławski

Edwardowi Szynalowi – z wyrazami sympatii

„W dziele kultury ‘elitarniej’ (...) każdy kolejny element stylu, kompozycji, ideologii dzieła stawia odbiorcę na rozstajach dróg, z których jedną trzeba wybrać, nie będąc nigdy pewnym, czy wybrało się właściwie”.

Stanisław Barańczak
„Rozrywki umysłowe”
([1975] 2017: 114)

O procesie tłumaczenia tekstu literackiego. Na przykładzie „Edzia” Brunona Schulza¹ (opis ćwiczenia)

**On the Process of Translation of a Literary Text. A Case Study of “Edzio”
by Bruno Schulz (an overview of an exercise)**

Abstract

The vast majority of texts regarding a number of issues connected with the notion of translation describe the translated text as a product – that is as another text rendered into another culture, not even mentioning another language. The idea of this exercise was based upon an attempt of having a look at how exactly the process of translation of a literary

¹ W opisywanym ćwiczeniu wzięli udział studenci Instytutu Filologii Angielskiej Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, w kolejności tłumaczenia: **Jakub Samojłowicz, Karol Witecki, Iwona Toruńska, Michał Apczyński, Bartłomiej Woźniak, Andriey Martynov** oraz **Natalia Chrzanowska**. Jestem Państwu bardzo zobowiązany za Waszą pasję! P.C.

text would proceed. All the participants of the exercise wished to see if it would be at all possible to work upon one and the same text, and continue working on it at certain randomly selected points. This short paper is just a small fragment of a much larger work devoted to the process of translation. It is a presentation of a translation exercise undertaken by seven students. Each of the six students have translated two pages, the seventh student was supposed to assemble and unify the translated texts, integrating them into a coherent narration in the target language. All students were asked to try to write down their impressions while they were working on the text, including what was the rationale behind their decisions. As it appears it was not very difficult for the students to come up with quite interesting translations, but it was much more harder for them to describe their choices as translators. As one can notice, the exercise went very well, the students entertained themselves, and at the same time perhaps they also understood a little better that the translation processes worked differently within their minds, even though after all they were working on the text of the same short literary work by Bruno Schultz.

Keywords: translation as a product vs. translation as a process, literary translation, translator education, Bruno Schulz.

Niniejszy tekst jest zapisem ćwiczenia w tłumaczeniu opowiadania pt. „Edzio”, autorstwa Brunona Schulza. W ćwiczeniu brała udział grupa siedmiorga studentów filologii angielskiej Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego. Z wyjątkiem jednej osoby studenci tłumaczyli z języka ojczystego (pierwszego) na język angielski, który jest ich drugim językiem. Ćwiczenie rozpoczęło się wiosną 2019 roku i trudno powiedzieć, żeby się zakończyło, bowiem mimo tego, że na bazie oryginalnego tekstu powstał nowy, anglojęzyczny tekst opowiadania Schulza, to część studentów biorących w tym ćwiczeniu udział cały czas wraca do jego niektórych elementów i zastanawia się, jak można by je jeszcze poprawić i czy aby na pewno to, co zostało zaproponowane w pierwszej wersji tłumaczenia, właściwie oddaje tłumaczoną rzeczywistość. Stąd, można pewnie by postawić i rozwijać hipotezę badawczą, dotyczącą tego, że na dobrą sprawę proces tłumaczenia tekstu literackiego (ale przez analogię, też innych tekstów, pochodzących z wielu innych dyskursów), może nigdy się nie skończyć, albo też może trwać tak długo, jak długo znajdują się tłumacze, którzy z różnych względów będą chcieli dany tekst tłumaczyć – to po pierwsze. A po drugie, to właśnie najczęściej ponadczasowe teksty literackie stanowią największe wyzwanie dla tłumacza, któremu przychodzi się z nimi zmierzyć, bowiem przy takim tekście, jeśli nawet jest pozornie tylko bajką na dobranoc, tłumaczowi przychodzi zmierzyć się z przełożeniem już nie tylko języka na język, kultury na kulturę, ale epoki na epokę, i to jeszcze przy uwzględnieniu różnic języka i kultury. Innymi słowy, przymierzając się do przekładu tekstu literackiego tłumacz musi się zmierzyć z przekładem obszernego habitusu literackiego przekładanego tekstu, który – podobnie jak każdy dyskurs literacki – jest koniunkcją słów, czyli tekstu oraz jego pozawerbalnego kontekstu, który nadaje mu jego charakterystyczne znaczenie w określonej kulturze, w określonym czasie oraz w określonej grupie społecznej jego odbiorców. Wydawać by się mogło, że ze zrozumieniem tekstu literackiego jest czasem tak, jak ze zrozumieniem ironii, bez pewnego przygotowania kulturowego odbiera się tekst w skali jeden do jednego, natomiast ten najciekawszy element może nam umknąć, bowiem do jego wychwycenia potrzebny jest dobrze wyposażony radar kulturowy. Stąd też wielka popularność i ponadczasowość niektórych świetnych tekstów literackich, które można interpretować na bardzo różne sposoby, i to w bardzo różnych okolicznościach politycznej przyrody².

2 Polecieć należy każdemu czytelnikowi zastanawiającemu się nad sensem „tekstu kultury” doskonały esej Stanisława Barańczaka ([1975] 2017) pt. „Rozrywki umysłowe”, który można by z powodzeniem nazwać jednym z kluczy do rozumienia

Przychodzi w tym miejscu myśl Elżbiety Tabakowskiej (2012), wyrażona w jej „Słowie-po-słowie od tłumacza” po tekście jej dziewiątego w kolejności polskiego tłumaczenia *Alicji w krainie czarów* (Carroll 1865). Otóż, trudno nie zgodzić się z Elżbietą Tabakowską (2012: 115–116), kiedy tłumaczy się z tłumaczenia kolejny raz tekstu pozornie zaczytanego i zatłumaczonego, na podstawie którego kilka lat wcześniej napisała też pracę magisterską³:

(...) tłumacz musi sobie zadać pytanie: *dlaczego jeszcze raz?* I drugie, podobne, które z pewnością zechcą postawić jego czytelnicy: *po co jeszcze raz?* Na pytanie „dlaczego?” odpowie sobie może tak, jak ów wielki himalaista, który na pytanie, dlaczego chodzi po górach, odpowiedział: bo góry są. Bo angielski oryginał *Alicji* jest, jest od niemal półtora wieku – ciągle wyzwaniem dla krytyków, reżyserów filmowych i teatralnych, grafików, kompozytorów i tłumaczy. Klasyk gatunku, nieśmiertelny obiekt miłości tysięcy czytelników. Pytanie drugie wymaga obszerniejszej odpowiedzi. No bo po co jeszcze raz? Można by je z powodzeniem zadać pani Towe Jansson, której ilustracje ukazują Krainę Czarów radykalnie odmienną od karykaturalnego wiktoriańskiego świata Johna Tenniela, przez który wędruje nieładna lalkowata dziewczynka w sukience z epoki (...). Świat Towe Jansson jest onirycznym światem wyobraźni i najczystszej fantazji, w którym tylko Alicja jest zwyczajną, współczesną nam, cały czas troszkę zdziwioną dziewczynką. Alicję wypada zaliczyć do modnego dziś gatunku *fantasy*. Jego związłą definicję znaleźć można w eseju G.K. Chestertona *The Dragon's Grandmother*. „The cosmos goes mad but the hero does not go mad” („Kosmos jest szalony, ale nie jest szalony bohater”). I to właśnie – paradoksalnie – jest odpowiedź na pytanie „po co jeszcze raz?”. (...) Mówi się, że podczas gdy mali czytelnicy koncentrują się na baśniowej fabule, ich rodzice lub dziadkowie (...) odkryją w niej głębsze pokłady znaczeń: elementy społecznej i politycznej satyry na różne aspekty życia w wiktoriańskiej Anglii, kpinę z panującego tam systemu edukacji, echa teorii filozoficznych, czy wreszcie refleksję na temat praw logiki oraz natury języka i zarządzających nim mechanizmów. Tę właśnie dwoistość odbioru starałam się oddać, tworząc powracającą falę dziewiątej Alicji.

Zdecydowana większość tekstów, których autorzy zajmują się tłumaczeniem, opisuje powstały tekst tłumaczenia jako produkt, to jest jako kolejny tekst, tyle że przełożony w realia innej kultury, o realiach innego języka już nawet nie wspominając. Zadaniem tego ćwiczenia było (jest?) spojrzenie na to, jak przebiega proces tłumaczenia w oczach samych tłumaczy; chcieliśmy wspólnie ze studentami zrozumieć nieco więcej z przebiegu procesu tłumaczenia. Niniejszy tekst jest prezentacją przebiegu ćwiczenia i zapisem wybranych myśli tłumaczy. Jak można zauważyć, nie jest specjalnie trudno przełożyć zdanie, czy nawet kilka zdań, ale niezwykle trudno jest opisać jak dokładnie się doszło do tego właśnie przekładu, jakich wyborów się dokonało oraz jakie argumenty kryją się za poszczególnymi wyborami. Każdy z uczestników ćwiczenia miał za zadanie przełożenie podobnej długości dwóch fragmentów opowiadania Brunona Schulza. Następnie jedna osoba została poproszona o scalenie i podjęcie się próby ujednolicenia powstałego tekstu, zapisanie swoich spostrzeżeń i opisanie trudności, które napotkała w czasie swojej pracy.

Każda z osób została również poproszona – jeśli zechce – o zapisywanie na bieżąco myśli i pomysłów, które pojawiają się podczas tłumaczenia. Jak można zobaczyć, ćwiczenie się powiodło nad wyraz dobrze. Uczestnicy ćwiczenia zazwyczaj wyrażali zadowolenie z tego, że nieco lepiej zrozumieli

literackiego habitusu tekstów, ale także, jak się wydaje, do sposobów ich przekładania.

3 Praca magisterska Elżbiety Tabakowskiej na temat problematyki przekładu *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland* Lewisa Carrolla została obroniona w 1964 roku (Rajewska 2016: 336).

jak trudnym do uchwycenia jest opisanie tego, co często tak lekko nazywane jest „tłumaczenie jako proces”, byli zadowoleni z wyników swoich zmagania z tekstem oraz byli jednocześnie zaskoczeni, jak trudnym i wielowymiarowym w przekazie może się okazać tekst niewielkiego objętościowo opowiadania Brunona Schulza. Ta właśnie wskazywana trudność w odbiorze, stanowi jednocześnie o istocie i pięknie niektórych tekstów literackich, ale dotyczy to tylko tych najlepszych, których habitus literacki jest najbardziej złożony i daje największe pole dla interpretacji tłumacza. To właśnie piękne teksty literackie są zawsze najtrudniejsze dla tłumacza, bowiem są najbardziej wymagające. To właśnie dla nich warto podejmować trud tłumaczenia związany z wysiłkiem odnajdowania dla nich coraz to nowych znaczeń charakterystycznych dla ich nowego domu umoszczonego najpierw wygodnie w głowie tłumacza, a zaraz potem na półkach i w e-bookach czytelników.

„EDZIO” – propozycja przekładu, wersja 2019

PAGE 1 (Jakub Samojłowicz)

In the long and narrow wing in the back of the house, on the same floor as we, lives Eddy with his family. Eddy is not a little boy for a long time now; he is a grown-up man who sometimes uses his resounding and manly voice to sing operatic arias. Eddy is a meaty man. However he is not soft and squishy type but rather athletic and muscular one. His shoulders are strong as an oak. Nevertheless, his legs are totally atrophied, shapeless and unusable. While looking at Eddy's legs it is really hard to figure out what this strange cripplehood is about. It looks as if his legs had at least two more swivels between knees and ankles than the ordinary legs. It's not surprising that these additional joints bend miserably not only sideways and forwards but also in every possible direction. Therefore, Eddy moves with the help of two beautifully crafted, mahogany sticks. He walks with them downstairs every day to buy a newspaper. This is his one and only stroll as well as entertainment.

- W celu przybliżenia czytelnikowi imienia, zmiana „Edzio” na „Eddy”.
- W pierwszym zadaniu zostaje zmieniona kolejność, ponieważ zdanie brzmi lepiej w moim odczuciu.
- Kolejność przymiotników została zmieniona przez zasady kolejności angielskich przymiotników.
- Przecinek został zastąpiony średnikiem, aby uzyskać porównanie i większą płynność zdania.
- Powtórzenie imienia zostało zastąpione zaimkiem w celu uniknięcia powtórzenia imienia, co nie jest naturalne w języku angielskim.
- Końcówka akapitu została zmieniona aby nie wprowadzać zdań złożonych, które mogłyby spowodować, że zdanie brzmiałoby sztucznie.
- Opis w akapicie drugim został zmieniony na, moim zdaniem, bardziej naturalny opis osoby, a nie cechy osobowościowej, co sprawia, że tekst jest bardziej czytelny i przystępny.
- Słowo *type* zostaje użyte jako nawiązanie do tekstu tłumaczonego.
- Jest on „silny w ramionach” zostaje sprowadzone do opisu ramion.
- „Silny jak niedźwiedź” jest zastąpione porównaniem.
- Początek trzeciego akapitu został zmieniony w celu stylistycznym.
- Kolejne zdanie zostaje połączone, aby tekst był bardziej przejrzysty
- Opis szczudeł zostaje skrócony aby był mniej zawiły.

PAGE 2 (Karol Witecki)

On these stilts he comes down every day to buy a newspaper, and that is his only journey and his only variety. One feels sorry seeing him crossing the stairs. His legs buckle sideways, backwards, refract in unexpected places, and the feet, as horses' hooves short and high, cobble like logs on the planks. But once on the horizontal plane, Edzio changes unexpectedly. He straightens up, his chest bloats splendidly, and his body takes a swing. Supporting himself on the stilts like on the rails, he throws far in front of himself his legs, which hit the ground with an uneven stamping, then he moves the stilts from their place and with a new swing he throws himself forwards. With these throws he conquers space. Sometimes, manoeuvring with his stilts outside, he may, in the surplus of strength accumulated during his long sitting, with truly magnificent passion demonstrate this heroic locomotion method to the awe of servants on the ground and first floors. Then his neck bulges, his chin becomes outlined with two creases, and on his angled face, with his lips tightened from intensity, sneakily shows up a painful grimace. Edzio has no job nor task, as if fate, burdening him with disability, instead silently freed him from this curse of the Adam's children.

PAGE 3 (Iwona Toruńska)

In the shadows of his disability Edzio fully uses the extraordinary right to laziness and with the lightness of heart enjoys his private, almost individually made deal with the fate. We are wondering many times how does this 20something-year-old boy spend his free time. He spends a lot of time reading newspapers. Edzio is a very careful reader, he won't skip any note or advert. When he is done with the newspaper, of course he is not bored for the rest of the day. This is when the real job starts, a job for which Edzio can't wait. In the afternoon, when everybody is heading for a nap, he takes out his huge, thick books and puts it on the table by the window. He prepares glue, brush and scissors and begins his interesting job of cutting the most intriguing shapes and placing them as a system into the book. His crutches are standing ready just in case, but Edzio doesn't need them because he has everything he needs. He spends his time on this job until the afternoon snack.

PAGE 4 (Michał Apczyński)

Every third day Edzio shaves his red beard. He likes it very much and everything related to it: a warm water, foaming soap and a smooth, mild razor. Smashing the soap, sharpening his razor on a strop, Edzio, taught by no-one, sings in an unskilful but unpretentious way and Adela says he has a pleasant voice. However, in his house not everything seems so pleasant. Between him and his parents can be noticed a rift of unknown origin. There is no need to repeat all the gossips and speculations, we will only focus on the facts. It happens usually at evenings, during the warm period, when we can hear some noises coming through the open window, mostly Edzio's voice that is loud enough to be heard. Unfortunately, we cannot present his opponents because we cannot hear their voices while they sit hidden in the shadow of walls. It is hard to make any conclusion for what he is blamed, but we can assume, from his behavior that it is very hurtful. It almost leads Edzio to the end of his rope. Lead by an excessive outrage, he uses violent and imprudent words, but in his voice can be heard fear and misery.

- KOMENTARZ [MA 1]: Edzio? Może zamienić na coś bardziej angielskiego? A może zostawić, ciężko będzie to przetłumaczyć. Czy jest to jakoś związane? Może o to chodziło żeby to jakoś zostawić.
- KOMENTARZ [MA 2]: A może loves? Będzie wskazywać, że bardzo to lubi...
- KOMENTARZ [MA 3]: Czy ten pasek jest taki ważny? Nie wystarczy sharpening razor?
- KOMENTARZ [MA 4]: Jak ugryźć to nie uczenie i nie kunsztownie... Czyli jak?
- KOMENTARZ [MA 5]: A może po prostu Adela likes it.
- KOMENTARZ [MA 6]: Jak przetłumaczyć rozdźwięk?
- KOMENTARZ [MA 7]: O co chodzi z tą ubikacją?
- KOMENTARZ [MA 8]: Bardzo ciężko jest oddać sens, który próbuje przekazać Schulz...

PAGE 5 (Bartłomiej Woźniak)

Eddie, under the influence of excessive indignation, speaks in an abrupt, hasty manner. Despite this anger in his voice, he remains cowardly and piteous. "Yes," he cries out desperately, "and so what? ... Yesterday? ... It's not true! ... And what if it were true? ... Then dad's lying!". It usually takes all evening during of which Eddie outrages, bangs his head, rips his own hair out – he's helpless. Sometimes – and this is something worth waiting – their wrangle goes through a phase providing a real thrill – we can hear their flat whamming, bumping, whumping and thumping, the door slamming, the furniture crashing. Then, Eddie screams and curls up in pain. Listening to that, we feel ashamed and shocked, and incredibly satisfied by the fact of abusing such a sturdy, but disabled young man. At dusk, after supper, when washing up is done, Adele sits on the porch from the side of the yard, nearby Eddie's window.

Postanowiłem nie trzymać się ściśle tekstu i nie tłumaczyłem go dosłownie. Uznałem, że przekształcenie niektórych zdań będzie korzystniejsze i bardziej odpowiednie. Tekst nasyciłem onomatopejami, dodając melodyjność do groteskowej rzeczywistości opisu, który z jednej strony wprowadza dramaturgię regularnych awantur w domu Edzia (który jest groteską samą w sobie – młodzieniec o budowie osiłka z niesprawnymi i wiotkimi nogami), a z drugiej zaś wyszydza je poprzez nasłuchiwanie sąsiadów... i tak „walenie”, „trzaskanie”, „huczenie” zastąpiłem przez użycie słów „whamming”, „bumping”, „whumping”, „thumping”, „slamming”, itd. Przez cały czas tłumaczenia fragmentu, trzymałem się również używania określeń mocno nacechowanych emocjonalnie. Dodałem również związki frazeologiczne takie jak „to provide a thrill”, „to curl up in pain”. Przy wyborze słów-odpowiedników w języku angielskim, wybierałem po prostu te, które według mnie najlepiej oddają całą sytuację. Jak już było powiedziane, nie jest to dosłowne tłumaczenie, a dokonane zmiany nie zmieniają charakteru tekstu.

PAGE 6 (Jakub Samojłowicz)

The two long, doubly collapsed, porches run around the backyard: the first one on the ground floor and the other on the first floor. The grass grows in the cracks of these wooden balconies, and in the one chasm between bars even the little acacia grows and sways above the backyard. Apart from Adela, the neighbors sit here and there in front of their doors. They wither vaguely in the dawn, hanged on the chairs and stools. They sit full of the foil of the day like tied silent sacks waiting for the dawn to untie them gently. Down below, the backyard soaks rapidly with darkness, wave after wave, but at the top the air doesn't want to renounce the light and shines the brighter the more everything chars and blackens down below – it shines bright, trembling and flickering, darkening with blurry bats' flights. Yet, the dawn starts its job at the bottom, where it swarms of these quick and ravenous ants that strip and demolish into pieces the substance of things, stow them away to the white bones, to the skeleton and the ribs phosphorescing on the miserable battleground. These white papers, rags on the dumpster, these undigested shanks of light survive the longest in the wormy darkness and cannot end. These white papers, rags in the trash, these undigested tibias of light are held longest in the rotten darkness and cannot end.

PAGE 7 (Karol Witecki)

Time and time again it seems as if they are swallowed by the twilight, yet they appear again and shine, moment after moment becoming lost by the eyes full of vibrations and ants, but one stops distinguishing between those remnants of things and ocular swarms, which just begin mumbling as

in a dream, until each one sits in their own aura like in a cloud of mosquitos, dancing with a starry swarm of pulsating brain, a whimsical anatomy of hallucination. Then, from the bottom of the backyard begin to arise little strands of winds, not yet sure of their existence, and already resigning from it, before they arrive before our face, these traces of freshness, with which bumped from the underside is a summer night, folded with a silky lining. And while the sky becomes lit with first blinking and continuously blown away stars, separated very slowly becomes this suffocating veil of twilight, woven with vibrations and ramblings, and with a sigh open becomes a summer night, deep and complete in its depth of stardust and distant frogs' rustling. Adela lays down with no light to bed into crumpled and rolled from the previous night sheet, and just as she closes her eyes, begins this pursuit on all floors and all the apartments of the house.

PAGE 8 (Iwona Toruńska)

Only for those uninitiated, the summer night is leisure and forgetfulness. When the activities of the day are finished and tired brain wants to fall asleep and forget, starts the random mess, this twisted enormous bustle of July's night. All flats in the home, all rooms and bedchambers are full of noise, travels, going in and out. Table lamps are placed on the windowsill, even corridors are brightly illuminated and doors are constantly closed and opened. One huge, rambling and half-ironic conversation is mixing and branching in the constant misunderstandings through all chambers of this hive. Those living on the floor are not sure what ones from the ground floor mean and are sending messengers with urgent instructions. Messengers are rushing through the flats, down the stairs, up the stairs forgetting during the way the instructions they were given, constantly being sent for the new instructions. There is always something to complete, there is always an unsolved case and this whole rushing through the laughs and jokes is not leading to the solution. Only the side rooms, uninvolved in this night's mess have their own time, marked by ticking of clocks, monologues of silence and deep breaths of sleeping people.

PAGE 9 (Michał Apczyński)

Right there, wet-nurses, ready to feed, sleep, snuggled to the womb of the night with blushed cheeks. Little babies with closed eyes wander through their dreams, just like sniffing animals on a blue map of veins on the white plains of these breasts. With closed eyes, gentle, looking for an open door to the dream, they find the treasure, the most desirable thing, they lapse into a quiet state during the feed time, sucking as if nothing else counts. Those who have already fall asleep, struggle to sleep as long as possible, as the dream was an angel that tries to run away. The struggle continues until the angel become weak enough to lie down with them. They snore alternately as if they were arguing or reminding their hatred. Finally, when they calm down and all that kept them awake disappear, one room after another becomes as a silent void – Leon, a merchant walks up the stairs, without any light and his shoes in one of his hands. With a key in the other hand, he looks for a keyhole in his door. With bloodshot eyes, hiccup and saliva coming out from his spread mouth, he comes back from lupanar.

KOMENTARZ [MA 9]: Pierwszy akapit na 9 stronie to jedno długie zdanie. Jest ono długie na 10 linijek tekstu. Zmienia się podmiot, jest dużo metafor, słów wyjętych z użytku. Czasem jest problem zorientować się o co dokładnie chodzi, trzeba to przeczytać kilka razy by nabrało to zdanie sensu.

KOMENTARZ [MA 10]: W polskiej wersji są wężące zwierzątka, ale nie da się tego oddać w angielskim. Można jedynie dodać przymiotnik małe, ale myślę, że nie byłoby to odpowiednie.

KOMENTARZ [MA 11]: Pypka – czy można to ująć za skarb, z jednej strony brodawka sutkowa, czyli mleko, ale z drugiej wymarzony sen.

KOMENTARZ [MA 12]: Cały drugi akapit, ok. 14 linijek, składa się z 3 zdań. Ciężko jest przetłumaczyć pierwsze zdanie na temat snu i porównania z aniołem.

KOMENTARZ [MA 13]: Subiekt – słowo już za bardzo nieużywane lub bardzo rzadko spotykane w polszczyźnie.

KOMENTARZ [MA 14]: Lupanar – prawdopodobnie zapożyczenie z innego języka, oznacza po prostu burdel.

PAGE 10 (Andrey Martynov)

A shining lamp stands on the table in Mr. Jakob's room. Hunched over the table sits Mr. Jakob, writing a **long long** letter to Christian Siepel & Sons, spinning mills and mechanical weavers. A whole stack of paper covered in writing already lies on the floor, yet the letter is far from over. Every now and then he jumps up and starts running around the room with hands in dishevelled hair, and when he does he may even run up the wall flying along the wallpaper like a large blurry mosquito, hitting the arabesques on the walls, only to run down to the floor continuing his **inspired** circling. Adele is sound asleep, her mouth half open, her face **stretched out** and absent, but her closed eyelids are transparent and on their thin parchment the night draws up its pact, half text and half images, full of crossing outs, corrections, scribbles. Eddie stands half naked in his room exercising with dumbbells. He needs to have strong arms, two times stronger than a normal person, because they substitute his useless legs. That is why he trains, relentlessly, every night in secret. Adele is flowing backwards into nothingness and **cannot shout, cannot call, cannot stop** Eddie from climbing out of the window.

(Andrey Martynov)

Changed the names to English versions.

Last sentence repeated cannot for emphasis.

PAGE 11 (Bartłomiej Woźniak)

When Eddie hobbles on the porch without his crutches, Adele observes him with a great doubt and horror if he can walk on his own, but it appears that he doesn't even try. Like a huge white dog, Eddie approaches Adele's window, jumping and rumbling in the same time. Like every night, he sticks his pale and fat face, with a aching grimace on it, to her window reflecting the moonlight. While doing it, he says tearfully and insistently that they always take his crutches away till morning and he has to crawl like a dog on four legs. But Adele is out of awareness, devoted to the flux of deep sleep which flows through her. She's not even able to cover her naked thighs with a quilt, and, all the more, she's not able to fight bedbugs, armies of bedbugs walking around her body. Those thin, light creatures run through her so gently that she doesn't feel anything. Bedbugs – flat blood containers with no eyes and no faces – march in large clans divided into different generations and houses. They run and run from smallest to largest – moth-sized ones with thin legs and vampire eyes.

PAGE 12 (Andrey Martynov)

And when the last remaining bedbugs have come and gone, an enormous one followed by one more – the silence falls and while the rooms are absorbing the greyness of the dawn a deep sleep consumes the empty rooms and corridors. In all the beds people lie with their knees pulled up, with faces violently turned to the side, deeply focused, immersed in the sleep and devoted to it fully. When someone had caught the sleep, they hang onto it with an ardent face, while their breath wanders on its own somewhere on faraway roads. This is in fact one great story divided into parts, chapters, fragments between the sleepers. When one of them stops and falls silent the other takes up the mantle and so the story goes on in broad epic zigzags while they lie in the rooms of this house like the seeds of a poppy in a large shut down poppy-head growing under the sun.

Natalia Chrzanowska (*ujednoczenie tekstu „Edzia”, komentarz*)

Podczas zbierania tłumaczeń jednego opowiadania od sześciu osób napotkałam kilka trudności oraz dylematów, z którymi musiałam sobie poradzić. Po pierwsze, i chyba najważniejsze, sam wybór imienia głównego (i tytułowego) bohatera przysporzył mi sporego kłopotu. Z sześciu osób połowa przetłumaczyła imię a druga – nie. Co więcej, w pierwszej grupie pojawiły się dwie wersje: *Eddy* oraz *Eddie*. Mając na względzie demokrację, większością głosów zdecydowałam się na oryginał imienia – Edzio – który to pojawił się w trzech tłumaczeniach. Sprawa skomplikowała się jednak wraz z pojawieniem się postaci pana Jakuba, który (według mnie jak najbardziej słusznie) został przełożony na *Mr Jacob*. Z oczywistych względów tłumaczenie tej nazwy własnej zgrabniej wpisuje się w anglojęzyczny tekst aniżeli polski pan Jakub. W związku z tym, aby tekst ujednoczyć każdy Edzio został przechrzczony na *Eddie* (ta wersja pojawiła się dwukrotnie, podczas gdy druga propozycja – *Eddy* – pojawiła się tylko u jednej osoby). Konsekwentnie każda polska Adela została *Adele*. Wszystkie te kroki zostały podjęte po to, by każde imię pojawiające się w opowiadaniu miało swój anglojęzyczny odpowiednik.

Kolejnym sporym dylematem było ujednoczenie słowa „szczudła”, które w opowiadaniu służyły Edziowi do pomocy w chodzeniu. Otrzymałam trzy tłumaczenia: *sticks*, *stilts* oraz *crutches*. Po sprawdzeniu wszystkich trzech wyrazów w słowniku oraz korpusie zdecydowałam, że najlepszym wyborem, w tym kontekście, będzie jednak słowo *crutches*. Słowo *stilts* w zdecydowanej większości zdań wyszukiwanych przez <https://www.english-corpora.org/iweb/> pojawia się w towarzystwie słów takich jak *house*, *cottage* czy *room* – wskazuje ono bardziej znaczenie pali aniżeli wspomagaczy chodzenia. Z kolei wyrażenie *walk with sticks* pojawia się na wyżej wymienionej stronie, jednak zdecydowanie częściej odnaleźć można frazę *walk with crutches*. Czasami zdarzało się, że otrzymywałam jedno zdanie przetłumaczone przez dwie osoby. Wówczas starałam się połączyć oba tłumaczenia, gdyż zazwyczaj połączenie dwóch propozycji było najtrafniejsze.

PRZYKŁAD 1:

- ORYGINAŁ O tych szczudłach schodzi codziennie na dół kupować gazetę i to jest jedyny jego spacer i jedyne urozmaicenie.
- TŁUMACZENIE #1 He walks with them downstairs every day to buy a newspaper. This is his one and only stroll as well as entertainment.
- TŁUMACZENIE #2 On these stilts he comes down every day to buy a newspaper, and that is his only journey and his only variety.
- FINAL VERSION On these crutches he comes down every day to buy a newspaper, and that is his only stroll and his only variety.

Z racji tego, że w oryginale mamy jedno zdanie, to w przekładzie jedno zdanie również brzmi lepiej. Jednak słowo *stroll* w kontekście zejścia na dół i kupna gazety wydawało mi się odpowiedniejsze niż *journey*, które jest kojarzone raczej z jakąś dłuższą podróżą niż ze spacerem. Również słowo *variety* brzmiało lepiej jako tłumaczenie słowa *urozmaicenie* niż propozycja *entertainment*. W tym przypadku wzięłam prawie całe zdanie z drugiego przekładu ale dwa słówka wydawały mi się dużo odpowiedniejsze z tłumaczenia #1.

PRZYKŁAD 2:

- **ORYGINAŁ** Te białe papiery, szmaty na śmietniku, te niestrawione piszczele światła ostają się najdłużej w robaczywej ciemności i nie mogą się skończyć.
- #1 These white papers, rags on the dumpster, these undigested shanks of light survive the longest in the wormy darkness and cannot end.
- #2 These white papers, rags in the trash, these undigested tibias of light are held longest in the rotten darkness and cannot end.
- **FINAL VERSION** These white papers, rags in the trash, these undigested shanks of light survive the longest in the wormy darkness and cannot end.

Tutaj niewiele zmian, gdyż oba tłumaczenia były dość do siebie podobne. Po raz kolejny postanowiłam zaczerpnąć *in the trash* z jednego tłumaczenia a *shanks of light* z drugiego. Generalnie nie ingerowałam w przetłumaczony tekst. Nie czułam się na tyle kompetentna, by to robić. Poza tym, chciałam aby to wciąż były teksty moich kolegów i koleżanki, a nie moje. Moją edycję (poza warstwę techniczną i estetyczną) ograniczyłam do korygowania literówek, popraw błędów gramatycznych, które rzuciły mi się w oczy (na szczęście były one nieliczne) lub zmiany szyku zdania (jeśli wynikało to z ogólnych zasad języka angielskiego). Poza jednym przypadkiem nie zmieniałam zawartości tłumaczeń, tj. doboru słów.

Wyjątkiem zmiany słowa było wyrażenie *flats in the home*, które zmieniłam na *flats in the house*, gdyż słowo *home* nie może odnosić się do budynków. Ogólnie rzecz ujmując, nie spodziewałam się, że tłumaczenie jednego tekstu przez sześć osób – i to tak wymagającego tekstu jakim jest opowiadanie Brunona Schulza – wyjdzie dobrze. Wydawało mi się, że różnica w stylu, gramatyce oraz doborze słownictwa będzie tak duża, że zwyczajnie tekstu nie będzie czytało się dobrze. Jednak tekst tłumaczenia czytało mi się płynnie i nie odczułam przepaści, czy różnic między fragmentami opowiadania. Myślę, że fakt, iż tłumacz zmieniał się niejednokrotnie w środku akapitu odwraca nieco uwagę od jednoczesnej zmiany stylu. Sądzę, że gdyby tłumacz zmieniał się regularnie lub wraz z końcem danej myśli czy opisu, to te różnice byłyby dużo bardziej widoczne. W otrzymanych tłumaczeniach były oczywiście rzeczy, które bym zmieniła – użyła innego słowa, innej struktury gramatycznej czy zmieniła kolejność zdania. Od czego się oczywiście powstrzymywałam, bo tak jak wspomniałam wcześniej: nie jest to moje tłumaczenie lecz moich kolegów. A fakt, że czyjś pomysł na tłumaczenie jest inny, nie oznacza, że jest gorszy czy lepszy od mojego. Ale na tym chyba właśnie polega piękno przekładu – każdy wytwarza w swojej wyobraźni i umyśle, za pomocą dostępnych sobie narzędzi, swój własny obraz i w swój własny, unikalny sposób tworzy i opisuje rzeczywistość na podstawie rzeczywistości już stworzonej i opisanej przez kogoś innego.

Tekst po ujednoczeniu
“Eddie” by Bruno Schulz

I

In the long and narrow wing in the back of the house, on the same floor as we, lives Eddie with his family. Eddie is not a little boy for a long time now; he is a grown-up man who sometimes uses his resounding and manly voice to sing operatic arias. Eddie is a meaty man. However he is not a soft and squishy type but rather an athletic and muscular one. His shoulders are strong as an oak. Nevertheless, his legs are totally atrophied, shapeless and unusable. While looking at Eddie's legs it

is really hard to figure out what this strange cripplehood is about. It looks as if his legs had at least two more swivels between knees and ankles than the ordinary legs. It's not surprising that these additional joints bend miserably not only sideways and forwards but also in every possible direction. Therefore, Eddie moves with the help of two beautifully crafted, mahogany crutches. **[[1] J. Samojłowicz]** On these crutches he comes down every day to buy a newspaper, and that is his only stroll and his only variety. One feels sorry seeing him crossing the stairs. His legs buckle sideways, backwards, refract in unexpected places, and the feet, as horses' hooves short and high, cobble like logs on the planks. But once on the horizontal plane, Eddie changes unexpectedly. He straightens up, his chest bloats splendidly, and his body takes a swing. Supporting himself on the crutches like on the rails, he throws far in front of himself his legs, which hit the ground with an uneven stamping, then he moves the crutches from their place and with a new swing he throws himself forwards. With these throws he conquers space. Sometimes, manoeuvring with his crutches outside, he may, in the surplus of strength accumulated during his long sitting, with truly magnificent passion demonstrate this heroic locomotion method to the awe of servants on the ground and first floors. Then his neck bulges, his chin becomes outlined with two creases, and on his angled face, with his lips tightened from intensity, sneakily shows up a painful grimace. Eddie has no job nor task, as if fate, burdening him with disability, instead silently freed him from this curse of the Adam's children. **[[2] K. Witecki]** In the shadows of his disability Eddie fully uses the extraordinary right to laziness and with the lightness of heart enjoys his private, almost individually made deal with the fate. We are wondering many times how does this 20something-year-old boy spend his free time. He spends a lot of time reading newspapers. Eddie is a very careful reader, he won't skip any note or advert. When he is done with the newspaper, of course he is not bored for the rest of the day. This is when the real job starts, a job for which Eddie can't wait. In the afternoon, when everybody is heading for a nap, he takes out his huge, thick books and puts them on the table by the window. He prepares glue, brush and scissors and begins his interesting job of cutting the most intriguing shapes and placing them as a system into the book. His crutches are standing ready just in case, but Eddie doesn't need them because he has everything he needs. He spends his time on this job until the afternoon snack. **[[3] I. Toruńska]** Every third day Eddie shaves his red beard. He likes it very much and everything related to it: a warm water, foaming soap and a smooth, mild razor. Smashing the soap, sharpening his razor on a strop, Eddie, taught by no-one, sings in an unskilful but unpretentious way and Adele says he has a pleasant voice. However, in his house not everything seems so pleasant. Between him and his parents a rift of unknown origin can be noticed. There is no need to repeat all the gossips and speculations, we will only focus on the facts. It happens usually at evenings, during the warm period, when we can hear some noises coming through the open window, mostly Eddie's voice that is loud enough to be heard. Unfortunately, we cannot present his opponents because we cannot hear their voices while they sit hidden in the shadow of walls. It is hard to make any conclusion for what he is blamed, but we can assume, from his behavior that it is very hurtful. It almost leads Eddie to the end of his rope. Lead by an excessive outrage, he uses violent and imprudent words, but in his voice fear and misery can be heard. **[[4] M. Apczyński]** Eddie, under the influence of excessive indignation, speaks in an abrupt, hasty manner. Despite this anger in his voice, he remains cowardly and piteous. "Yes," he cries out desperately, "and so what? ... Yesterday? ... It's not true! ... And what if it was true? ... Then dad's lying!" It usually takes all evening during of which Eddie outrages, bangs his head, rips his own hair out – he's helpless. Sometimes – and this is something worth waiting – their wrangle goes through a phase providing a real thrill – we can hear their flat whamming, bumping, whumping and thumping, the door slamming, the furniture crashing.

Then, Eddie screams and curls up in pain. Listening to that, we feel ashamed and shocked, and incredibly satisfied by the fact of abusing such a sturdy, but disabled young man.

II

At dusk, after supper, when washing up is done, Adele sits on the porch from the side of the yard, nearby Eddie's window. |[5] **B. Woźniak** || The two long, doubly collapsed porches run around the backyard: the first one on the ground floor and the other on the first floor. The grass grows in the cracks of these wooden balconies, and in the one chasm between the bars even the little acacia grows and sways above the backyard. Apart from Adele, the neighbors sit here and there in front of their doors. They wither vaguely in the dawn, hanged on the chairs and stools. They sit full of the foil of the day like tied silent sacks waiting for the dawn to untie them gently. Down below, the backyard soaks rapidly with darkness, wave after wave, but at the top the air doesn't want to renounce the light and shines the brighter the more everything chars and blackens down below – it shines bright, trembling and flickering, darkening with blurry bats' flights. Yet, the dawn starts its job at the bottom, where it swarms of these quick and ravenous ants that strip and demolish into pieces the substance of things, stow them away to the white bones, to the skeleton and the ribs phosphorescing on the miserable battleground. These white papers, rags in the trash, these undigested shanks of light survive the longest in the wormy darkness and cannot end. |[6] **J. Samojsłowicz** || Time and time again it seems as if they are swallowed by the twilight, yet they appear again and shine, moment after moment becoming lost by the eyes full of vibrations and ants, but one stops distinguishing between those remnants of things and ocular swarms, which just begin mumbling as in a dream, until each one sits in their own aura like in a cloud of mosquitos, dancing with a starry swarm of pulsating brain, a whimsical anatomy of hallucination. Then, from the bottom of the backyard begin to arise little strands of winds, not yet sure of their existence, and already resigning from it, before they arrive before our face, these traces of freshness, with which bumped from the underside is a summer night, folded with a silky lining. And while the sky becomes lit with first blinking and continuously blown away stars, separated very slowly becomes this suffocating veil of twilight, woven with vibrations and ramblings, and with a sigh open becomes a summer night, deep and complete in its depth of stardust and distant frogs' rustling. Adele lays down with no light to bed into crumpled and rolled from the previous night sheet, and just as she closes her eyes, begins this pursuit on all floors and all the apartments of the house. |[7] **K. Witecki** || Only for those uninitiated, the summer night is leisure and forgetfulness. When the activities of the day are finished and tired brain wants to fall asleep and forget, starts the random mess, this twisted enormous bustle of July's night. All flats in the house, all rooms and bedchambers are full of noise, travels, going in and out. Table lamps are placed on the windowsill, even corridors are brightly illuminated and doors are constantly closed and opened. One huge, rambling and half-ironic conversation is mixing and branching in the constant misunderstandings through all chambers of this hive. Those living on the floor are not sure what ones from the ground floor mean and are sending messengers with urgent instructions. Messengers are rushing through the flats, down the stairs, up the stairs forgetting during the way the instructions they were given, constantly being sent for the new instructions. There is always something to complete, there is always an unsolved case and this whole rushing through the laughs and jokes is not leading to the solution. Only the side rooms, uninvolved in this night's mess have their own time, marked by ticking of clocks, monologues of silence and deep breaths of sleeping people. |[8] **I. Toruńska** || Right there, wet-nurses, ready to feed, sleep snuggled to the womb of the night with blushed cheeks. Little babies with closed eyes wander through their dreams, just like sniffing animals

on a blue map of veins on the white plains of these breasts. With closed eyes, gently looking for an open door to the dream, they find the treasure, the most desirable thing, they lapse into a quiet state during the feed time, sucking as if nothing else counts. Those who have already fallen asleep, struggle to sleep as long as possible, as the dream was an angel that tries to run away. The struggle continues until the angel becomes weak enough to lie down with them. They snore alternately as if they were arguing or reminding of their hatred. Finally, when they calm down and all that kept them awake disappear, one room after another becomes a silent void – Leon, a merchant walks up the stairs, without any light and with his shoes in one of his hands. With a key in the other hand, he looks for a keyhole in his door. With bloodshot eyes, hiccup and saliva coming out from his spread mouth, he comes back from lupanar. |[9] **M. Apczyński** | A shining lamp stands on the table in Mr. Jakob's room. Hunched over the table sits Mr. Jacob, writing a long long letter to Christian Siepel & Sons, spinning mills and mechanical weavers. A whole stack of paper covered in writing already lies on the floor, yet the letter is far from over. Every now and then he jumps up and starts running around the room with hands in dishevelled hair, and when he does he may even run up the wall flying along the wallpaper like a large blurry mosquito, hitting the arabesques on the walls, only to run down to the floor continuing his inspired circling. Adele is sound asleep, her mouth half open, her face stretched out and absent, but her closed eyelids are transparent and on their thin parchment the night draws up its pact, half text and half images, full of crossing outs, corrections, scribbles. Eddie stands half naked in his room exercising with dumbbells. He needs to have strong arms, two times stronger than a normal person, because they substitute his useless legs. That is why he trains, relentlessly, every night in secret. Adele is flowing backwards into nothingness and cannot shout, cannot call, cannot stop Eddie from climbing out of the window. |[10] **A. Martynov** | When Eddie hobbles on the porch without his crutches, Adele observes him with a great doubt and horror if he can walk on his own, but it appears that he doesn't even try. Like a huge white dog, Eddie approaches Adele's window, jumping and rumbling in the same time. Like every night, he sticks his pale and fat face, with an aching grimace on it, to her window reflecting the moonlight. While doing it, he says tearfully and insistently that they always take his crutches away till morning and he has to crawl like a dog on four legs. But Adele is out of awareness, devoted to the flux of deep sleep which flows through her. She's not even able to cover her naked thighs with a quilt, and, all the more, she's not able to fight bedbugs, armies of bedbugs walking around her body. Those thin, light creatures run through her so gently that she doesn't feel anything. Bedbugs – flat blood containers with no eyes and no faces – march in large clans divided into different generations and houses. They run and run from smallest to largest – moth-sized ones with thin legs and vampire eyes. |[11] **B. Woźniak** | And when the last remaining bedbugs have come and gone, an enormous one followed by one more – the silence falls and while the rooms are absorbing the greyness of the dawn a deep sleep consumes the empty rooms and corridors. In all the beds people lie with their knees pulled up, with faces violently turned to the side, deeply focused, immersed in the sleep and devoted to it fully. When someone had caught the sleep, they hang onto it with an ardent face, while their breath wanders on its own somewhere on faraway roads. This is in fact one great story divided into parts, chapters, fragments between the sleepers. When one of them stops and falls silent the other takes up the mantle and so the story goes on in broad epic zigzags while they lie in the rooms of this house like the seeds of a poppy in a large shut down poppy-head growing under the sun. |[12] **A. Martynov** |

Zamiast wniosków

Powyższe ćwiczenie jest tylko zapisem pewnego wycinka procesu tłumaczenia, czy też dokładniej, jak pewnie tego by chciał Konrad Klimkowski, nie tylko wycinka procesu tłumaczenia, ale przede wszystkim wycinka procesu nabywania kompetencji tłumaczeniowej (ang. *translation competence*), która sama w sobie nie jest łatwa do zdefiniowania, bowiem jest przede wszystkim procesem wieloskładnikowym (Pym 2003: 6, cyt. za Klimkowski 2015: 20). W swojej monografii poświęconej „*Propozycji współtworzonego programu edukacji tłumaczy pisemnych i ustnych [Towards a Shared Curriculum in Translator and Interpreter Education]*” Klimkowski (2015) zwraca uwagę, że jedna z najbardziej prominentnych grup badawczych w zakresie badań nad tłumaczeniem, grupa PACTE (2008: 106, cyt. za Klimkowski 2015: 23–24) zbudowała swój własny, udoskonalany co kilka lat, model kompetencji tłumaczeniowej. W uproszczeniu, wersja tego modelu zasadza się na kilku głównych elementach składających się na pełną kompetencję tłumaczeniową, takich jak:

- a) kompetencja dwujęzyczna – głównie wiedza proceduralna potrzebna do komunikowania się w dwóch językach (w tym, m.in., znajomość gramatyki, leksyki, pragmatyki funkcjonowania obu języków);
- b) kompetencja pozajęzykowa – głównie wiedza deklaratywna o świecie w ogólności i o przedmiocie opisywanym w szczególności (dotyczy też wiedzy encyklopedycznej i kulturowej);
- c) kompetencja zawierająca wiedzę o tłumaczeniu – głównie wiedza deklaratywna, meta-wiedza o tłumaczeniu i różnych z tym związanych aspektach (zawierająca też, m.in., regulacje związane z rynkiem tłumaczeniowym, zarządzaniem tłumaczeniem, kodami etycznych zachowań tłumacza, itp.);
- d) kompetencja instrumentalna – głównie wiedza proceduralna związana z zarządzaniem i koordynowaniem przepływu zdobywanych informacji w trakcie procesu tłumaczenia, umiejętnościami korzystania z baz danych, czy technologicznymi pomocami tłumacza;
- e) kompetencja strategiczna – wiedza proceduralna, gwarantująca skuteczność procesu tłumaczenia. Jest kluczowym elementem kompetencji tłumaczeniowej, bowiem wpływa oraz w dużej mierze kontroluje każdy z elementów wymienionych powyżej. Funkcją tej kompetencji jest zaplanowanie procesu tłumaczenia, przeprowadzenie całego zadania tłumaczenia oraz oszacowanie jego efektów.

Kolejnym etapem opisywanego ćwiczenia w tłumaczeniu tekstu opowiadania Brunona Schulza mogłoby być przeanalizowanie po kolei każdego z elementów składających się na jednostkową (jeśli taka istnieje?) kompetencję tłumaczeniową potrzebną do odpowiedniego przekładu opracowywanego tekstu i, przy okazji, określenie czy grupa badawcza PACTE faktycznie miała rację opisując tak szczegółowo części składowe swojego modelu. Zadanie mogłoby polegać, m.in., na rozłożeniu na elementy pierwsze informacji o wiedzy (włączając w to również pozajęzykową wiedzę o epoce) potrzebnej do wykonania takiego tłumaczenia i ponowne wykonanie tłumaczenia tego tekstu, lub tekstu podobnego do opowiadania pt. „Edzio”.

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ALICJA CIMAŁA
Uniwersytet Wrocławski

Grammar, Semantics and Dialects in Architecture

Abstract

Many aspects of architecture (style, ornaments, urban planning etc.) are symbolic in nature, resulting in similarity between the art of erecting structures and language understood as the relationship between *signifié* and *signifiant*. Hence, architecture has its own grammar, semantics and dialectic variants. The grammar is expressed in the context of articulation form and pattern language. The semantics can be found in the relatively more superficial aspects like metaphors likening this branch of art to books or the owners of specific buildings in their appearance or demeanour. Such an approach is shared across centuries and can be found for example in ancient and Victorian texts. Additionally, the message conveyed by buildings and structures might serve as a form of propaganda while many elements like styles, ornaments and locations depend on the ideas expressed by the architects and the founders. This aspect is common to various ideas, beliefs and societies, whether consciously or subconsciously. Moreover, the realisation of different styles of architecture varies depending on the times and the specific needs of the community in which a particular building is erected in the same way language may vary depending on similar factors. Thus, architecture presents the same qualities that are expressed by various dialects.

Keywords: architecture, propaganda, semantics, grammar, dialects, language, metaphor, pattern language, form language, Gothic style, Nazi Germany, Jesuits

Even though the relationship between language and architecture has been explored, the context of actual linguistic theories is often ignored. Yet, many aspects of architecture—including ornaments, styles and urban planning—are symbolic in nature. The meaning incited by specific decorations, styles or locations is arbitrary and can be understood in a given context which means the relationship between such features is similar to the relation between *signifié* and *signifiant*. Hence, different messages can be deciphered from the buildings and their meaning depends on the ability to read their contexts, forms an iconography. This means that architecture has its own grammar and semantics and, what is more, different realisations of a particular style found within various communities may be perceived as a form of dialects.

Grammar in architecture may be understood in several ways. Each and every building consists of specific elements including walls, roofs, windows, entries, ornaments, articulation or floors. The more complex a building is, the more elements it requires—similarly to phrases and sentences within a particular

language. It is then possible to create a metaphor combining these two domains. A building consists of specific materials like stones, bricks, wood, steel concrete, etc. in a similar way to sentences consisting of various morphemes. Then there are whole elements creating an actual structure like walls, ceilings, roofs, windows, entrances and other fixtures which can be likened to lexemes. The way these elements are put together and the choice of ornamentation determine the architectural style of a building. Different types of such elements, different kinds of ornamentation and the general locations of such elements influence the architectural style of a building whereas different words, terms and phrases might change the language style. Yet in both domains such variants require certain rules in order to ensure a proper structure, clarity and stability.

There are two complimentary sets of rules and solutions used as guides in architectural design which are referred to as languages: a form language and a pattern language. Salingaros and Mehaffy ([2006] 2008: 220–239) wrote that a form language in the context of architecture refers to putting materials according to geometrical rules while building a structure. This aspect is visual and arises from materials which are available within a specific environment. The materials themselves may indicate in what climate a specific structure was erected. A building constructed of wattle and daub suggests an environment with specific types of plants with twigs that could be intertwined with each other and an igloo suggests that it was made in a cold environment with a large quantity of snow. A form language also depends on a particular architectural tradition or a style to which it corresponds.

According to Christopher Alexander (1977: X–XII), a pattern language is a method of describing good design practices or patterns of useful organization within a field of expertise. Alexander (1977: X–XII) noted that pattern language is a type of language which the author distilled from his experience in building and planning and it is suggested that such language may be used by everyone. The language is divided into entities known as patterns and each of these describes a specific recurring problem in a specific environment. These entities also include the solution to the mentioned problem so that one may use it each and every time the problem occurs. Each and every pattern consists of:

- a picture of an archetypical example of the pattern;
- an introductory paragraph with a specific context of the said pattern and an explanation how it is supposed to help with the completion of larger patterns;
- a headline emphasizing the essence of the said problems (in a sentence or two);
- the body of the said problem with the empirical background of a pattern while showing why it is valid, and the range of manifestation of the described pattern;
- the solution (understood as the heart of the described pattern) describing the area of social and physical relationships which are a requirement for solving the described problem;
- a diagram;
- a paragraph which shows the relationship between the pattern with all smaller patterns required to complete the said pattern.

This specific order helps with maintaining clarity while showing the connections between the used patterns and presenting them as a whole.

in short, no pattern is an isolated entity. Each pattern can exist in the world, only to the extent that is supported by other patterns: the larger patterns in which it is embedded, the patterns of the same size that surround it and the smaller patterns which are embedded in it (Alexander [1977: XIII]).

Salingaros and Mehaffy ([2006] 2008: 220–239) also mentioned that not each and every form language may be adapted to human sensibilities and in such situations it will not be able to connect with a pattern language. The lack of connection between pattern and form language results in an environment considered as alien.

Another aspect shared by both language and architecture is articulation. In language articulation is the manner in which words and phrases are articulated and sounds are produced whereas in architecture articulation revolves around distinguishing spaces in order to emphasise different functions of particular parts. Articulation may refer to the distinction (or lack of thereof) of rooms within a building—whether said rooms are clearly defined and separated from each other—or to walls and the ways they are divided through their architectural elements. In other words, all the rules that have to be implemented in order to erect a building are similar in function to those required by languages—hence architecture indeed is guided by architectural grammar.

Architecture can be also studied in the context of semantics since it has been used to express ideas, attitudes and values of founders and benefactors throughout centuries. Different styles, ornaments, compositions have been attributed to different phenomena and ideas since the antiquity—for example Marcus Vitruvius Pollio ([30–15 BC] 1874: 11) in his work *The Architecture in Ten Books (De architectura)* elaborated on the architectural orders in the context of temples. Hence, temples of the Doric order are built for Mars, Minerva and Hercules because they denote valour and are associated with masculinity. Hence they lack delicate ornaments. The Corinthian order is then intended for Proserpine, Venus, Flora, and Nymphs of Fountains because they are more slender, elegant and rich in their decoration. Vitruvius ([30–15 BC] 1874: 11) noted that the leaves constituting to their decorations are analogous to the dispositions of the deities. The Ionic order is a medium between these two and used in temples built for Diana, Juno, Bacchus and similar gods and goddesses. The decoration is less rough and more slender and delicate than the one in the Doric order but does not match the richness of ornamentation of the Corinthian order. In the presented example certain ornaments then are associated with femininity and masculinity—hence they are believed to carry a specific meaning and therefore should be used in a suitable context, similarly to gendered nouns in certain languages.

Yet some researchers claim that buildings might be able to carry deeper meaning. According to Kaufmann (1987: 30–38), Victorian theoreticians believed that buildings were able to convey a meaning directly and precisely, similarly to books, paintings or even orators. Such meanings referred to elements beyond a building itself and architecture was recognised as a representative form of art. In the Victorian period the concept of Truth was also important which was often mentioned in the debates on the medieval churches or the designs of railway stations. Such notions could be found in Ruskin's "Lamp of Truth" or Pugin's "True Principles". Kaufman (1987: 30–38) claimed that the concept of Truth reverberated throughout the whole period with obsessive intensity. Yet it could also be a manifestation of a deeper concern of architectural meanings which could differ from each other, depending on the society, time, architect, dwellers, materials, or the building's function. Kaufman (1987: 30–38) also noted that according to the theoreticians and architects from the Victorian period a metaphor was one of the best ways to convey a meaning and the most common metaphor used in such context was the one suggested by Victor Hugo—a building as a book. G.R. Lewis (1842: 1), who was an advocate of extreme forms of ecclesiastical symbolism, claimed that in the times when Christianity did not have any form of press assisting its promotion, there was a need to convey the Word of God quickly through a language created

for this specific purpose. Therefore churches were designed with intelligence, as books in which the community could read the Law and the Gospel. Lewis (1842: 1) assumed that if architects would follow his advice, the churches of England would become the tools for communication with God, as they were intended to be.

It is also believed by some researchers that a building might reflect its owner. Ruskin (1903: 79) extensively elaborated on different types of ornaments. In his book he noted on three different windows with different frameworks and mentioned that they suggested what kind of person may dwell in a building which contains a particular kind of windows. Thus, according to Ruskin (1903: 79), the first window indicated that the building was a habitation of the man of imagination, the second one the man of intellect and the third one the man of feeling. However, the author suggested that there is a set principle that would help evoke a specific association since everything depends on imagination and perception of a specific person. Ruskin (1903: 79) also wrote that a villa in the Elizabethan era is a humoristic, odd, distorted, independent entity with a large quantity of mixed, obstinate and sometimes absurd originality which presented the satirical capture of the English national traits. However, Kaufman (1987: 30–38) noted that such similarity is not mimetic but it is in fact a specific abstraction based on stereotypes. Such phenomenon might be observed in the context of the analogy to the theory of physiognomy—one's nature can be reflected on their facial features (a known motif typical for Victorian novels). If a human face is then replaced by a facade of a building, then the metaphor can be also understood as the beginning of an architecture theory. In this case Ruskin's facade of a villa represents its owner in the same way he or she is represented by his or her face—not mimetically but according to an established lexicon of such equivalents. Kaufman (1987: 30–38) also mentioned that Ruskin often emphasised the value of representation within buildings also in relation to their structure. For example, a pillar needs a base since otherwise its structure would not look safe even though in fact the pillar would not need a base. Ruskin claimed that it is important for a building to appear as safe since safety is one of the most crucial parts of good architecture.

The examples mentioned rely more on metaphors and relatively superficial associations. Yet the concept of Truth leads to another layer of semantic interpretations of architecture, relating to subtle forms of propaganda. According to Watkin (1979: 154–178) Pugin (1843: 6) in his publications claimed that the Gothic style was in fact not a style but a principle and the Gothic architecture was one of the invariable truths of the Catholic church. The architect also debated on the possibility of architecture being true or false, morally good or evil and the need to show its structure and function and use natural materials. Such doctrine had a great influence on other architects like Carpenter, Street or Butterfield—as well as a larger part of the Anglican Church—and was used in the restoration of the Gothic style with the specific, intellectual force in the 19th century. At the same time Pevsner (1976: 385) wrote that Pugin (1843: 6) changed the equation between the Gothic style and Christianity into an architectural theory and practice and wanted to create an ideal Christian society. For him erecting structures in the medieval forms was a moral obligation. Since a medieval architect was a reliable worker and a faithful Christian and the medieval architecture is good architecture, one has to be a reliable worker and a faithful Christian in order to be a good architect. Another metaphor typically used in the context of architecture was recognising the surface of a wall as the elementary basis of architecture just like canvas is a basis for a painting. According to Lewis (1842: 1), a building should be both intelligent and truthful. At the same time he assumed that

architects should focus mainly on including truth in their designs instead of the absurdity which has been distorting churches and chapels throughout the last centuries.

An interesting example of religious propaganda might be found in Wrocław—the University Church of the Holy Name of Jesus (built between 1689–1698) which accompanied the edifice of the University of Wrocław. The style of the building itself is telling when it comes to semantic value of the building since it is a typical Baroque church—and the Baroque style is known for its Counter-Reformative message. Lec (1995: 21) wrote that during the times both buildings were erected the city remained under the German occupation and the city dwellers were mostly Protestant. Hence there was no Catholic church within the centre of the city until the Jesuits were allowed to erect their buildings. Apart from the architectural style and the historical context its location itself carries a message as well. According to Dziurla (1997: 32–33), it is an expression of the Jesuit *commoditas* revolving around their missionary activity. The main entrance of the temple is located in the south-western corner which closes the main route. Consequently, the church is clearly visible from the centre of the city and serves as an invitation.

One of the most popular examples propaganda deeply rooted within the very design of buildings and structures is the Nazi Germany architecture which derived its forms and meanings from Ancient Rome. The Nazi buildings were supposed to convey the sense of strength and permanence throughout their monumentality and the connotations with the Roman Empire which used to spread throughout the whole continent in its peak. Robert R. Taylor (1974: 1) wrote that the idea of German or National Socialist architecture emerged decades before the Second World War. After the unification of Germany in 1871 the right-wing radical nationalists wanted to strip German culture and society from either modern or foreign aspects. Such concepts became more prevalent during the times of the Weimar Republic. The nationalistic views influenced architects and writers like Paul Schultze-Naumburg, hence instead of applying modern designs they focused on the more traditional and German building types. Later, they decided that the stark and geometrical styles were the most suitable for the beginning of the twentieth century. Heavy decoration and neoclassicism were dismissed by Walter Gropius and the Bauhaus school since they assumed that such styles only imitated structures from the past while completely ignoring new materials developed during the later centuries. Even though later in the century the avant-garde architecture was more accepted, it was disliked by some nationalists and seen as ugly, impractical, cold and inhuman. What is more, according to them this architectural style had connotations of revolution which was found threatening for Germany as a whole. Some nationalists assumed that blank facades and stark lines were much more German than the style proposed by Bauhaus. Alfred Rosenberg promised then that the return to German standards of female behaviour and lack of foreign influence in the field of art would result in developing a German style. The architects leaned strongly towards the traditional styles and often accepted commissions from the newly established Nazi government, especially in the face of massive unemployment being a result from economic failures of the Weimar period. The Nazi buildings were monumental and were supposed to impress the masses. The new buildings were supposed to show the society that the thousand-year Reich just begun and the styles that were associated with other ideologies were denounced as undesirable. The most typical aspects of the Nazi architecture—despite its eclectic nature—were “neoclassical colonnades, enormous porticoes, horizontal lines and rectilinear appearance emphasised with heavy cornices and rows of thickly framed windows” (Taylor [1974: 12]). Apart from the monumental and stark structures a specific symbolism was also present in the form of eagles with wreathed swastikas, free-standing sculptures and heroic friezes, along with quotations from *Mein Kampf*.

The Nazi architecture was then supposed to be didactic and theatrical while the masses—the *Volk*—were supposed to be a unified part of the great theatre constructed by the government through the architects. One of the architectural aspects that aimed at teaching the idea of community were also half-timbered cottages which suggested the times that passed yet were considered as better than the present. Each and every building was erected in order to emphasise the importance of the German values and power.

It can be assumed that the architectural propaganda is still present within our times. Various cities and countries aim to present the best buildings designed by the best artists in order to show the prosperity. Burj Khalifa in Dubai serves as an example—it is known as the tallest building in the world and therefore it suggests vast richness of the city and the country in which it was built and the wealth of its dwellers.

Architecture may be understood as a form of dialect as well. Even though certain styles tend to be universally spread throughout countries and even whole continents, the architects from particular areas tend to incorporate their own ideas or transform the existing ones in order to adjust them to the needs and values of their communities. Hence, genuine, individual subcategories of particular styles had emerged. Gothic architecture, a style developed during the High and Late Middle Ages serves as an example. It emerged in France and was spread in Europe thanks to the Cistercians. Typically, the Gothic architecture was very vertical in nature—the buildings were slender, lean and soaring. Yet the English version of the style put more emphasis on the horizontal aspect of the buildings faces of which were screen-like in comparison. Crazy vaults are the other notable example of a feature distinguishing the English Gothic buildings from their continental counterparts. Usually, the European building used cross-ribbed vaulting and its other variants but the English architects usually introduced construction supports known as crazy vaults. The style had been adapted so well that according to some researchers its influences can be traced throughout centuries after the end of Middle Ages. According to Toman ([1988] 2000: 118), the wars with France influenced England in the way that the rivalry could be also seen in the Gothic architecture. Since the very introduction of the style the English chose to be independent and knowing the value of tradition they were trying to maintain their Anglo-Norman methods of building which were developed from the Anglo-Saxon architecture in the 10th and 11th century, and the Norman architecture since the year 1066. The only elements taken from the French architecture were the ones which could be adapted to the Anglo-Norman rules. The French Gothic had never been accepted as a whole as it happened for example in Germany in the case of the cathedral in Koln. Hence the English variant of the style had developed. In Toman ([1988] 2000: 121) it was also mentioned that almost all new chancels built in England featured right angles. Another typical features are: a thicker wall and smaller buildings in comparison to the French counterparts, lesser amount of flying buttresses (or lack of thereof), longer structures, more detail-oriented (Toman [1988] 2000: 134). The English architects were trying to create the greatest architecture with as many spans as possible. It is also rare for the English churches to have a western facade with a pair of towers (which is typical for French buildings). More typical are simple transverse facades with wide frontons also known as screen facades. Towers are then usually placed on its sides or beside a facade. Western portals are rare in the English variant since in England the main entrances are usually placed on the usually northern side of a church Pevsner (1978: 48) noted that not many things are as prominently English as the large English churches erected during the Middle Ages, under the rule of Henry V, Henry VI and Henry VII. The ones which were either built from scratch or almost from scratch are recognisable for their broad naves and aisles, high proportions, narrow vein-like and soaring pillars, large clerestory and side windows with beautiful grooves, long angle roofs (instead of vaults), long angular transepts and chancels

as well as wide windows in transepts and chancels and the Western part. The churches from this period can be considered as glasshouses. They are clean, bright, vast and mysterious. The impression they created was supposed to be always the same. At the same time the author added that this description is correct but one-sided since the vastness and clarity are not the defining features of the Perpendicular style with its interior. The ornaments were very repetitive but it created a contrast with the angularity of the later Gothic period, claimed to be the most English of the all Gothic variants. It was conservative; chancels were clearly separated from the main body of the churches and flat-ended. The separation of particular parts of a building was typical for English architecture as well. The differences in styles may be also noted between buildings created in different centuries since it is common for architectural styles to develop further. For example, the high Gothic buildings (the perpendicular style in England and the flamboyant style in France) are typically much more decorative and sophisticated with their refined tracery than the buildings from the early Gothic period. Thus the differences mentioned reflect the needs and mindsets of more local communities in the same way dialects reflect such phenomena.

In other words, there is no doubt that architecture has its own grammar, semantics and dialectal variants. It consists of pattern and form languages, includes articulation, carries several layers of meaning and displays different style variants in different cultural contexts making it akin to dialects. This phenomenon exists in various locations, cultures and time periods.

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MARK Ó FIONNÁIN
The John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin

Orange Lemons, Yellow People, Brown Oranges: Language Contact and Changes in the Basic Irish Colour Term *Buí*

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to look at the changes currently taking place in regards to the Basic Colour Term *buí* in Irish. Irish, a Celtic language, is, along with English, one of the official languages of Ireland although it is very much a minority one, with an overwhelming number of L2 speakers of varying linguistic ability. As a result of this, and the fact that the language itself is surrounded by a sea of English, English syntax and vocabulary—and its way of perceiving the world—is constantly being brought to bear on the language, and L1 speakers are continually being exposed to this and coming under its influence. One illustration of this is the Basic Colour Term *buí*. Traditionally, this term had its focus on ‘yellow’ but also covered ‘orange’ through light brown or ‘tan’. However, it is nowadays most frequently understood by L2 speakers as a one-to-one equivalent for the English term ‘yellow’, with *oraíste* ‘orange’ and *donn* ‘brown’ being used, as in English, to cover those other shades that would traditionally be part of *buí*. To this end, I present results from field-work carried out amongst L1 native speakers of Irish to see how far this change has taken place in their own understanding of the language and how much the traditional Irish colour system is yielding to that of English.

Keywords: Irish, English, basic colour terms, language contact, native speakers.

Introduction

The aim of this paper is to present some field research into the current status of the Basic Colour Term *buí* in the Irish language.¹ Irish is a Celtic language and one of the official languages of Ireland, alongside English, but it is very much a minority one. Currently, fewer than 74,000 people claim to speak the language in a day-to-day setting out of a population of approximately 4.5 million and this number includes

¹ The reader is directed to Berlin and Kay (1969: 5–7) for a detailed definition of what a Basic Colour Term is. In short, it must be monolexic, not covered by any other colour term, must not be restricted in use and must have a stability of reference across informants and occasions of use.

both native and second-language speakers. As such, Irish is falling more and more under the influence of English and the English-language way of perceiving the world and this is putting the native system of Basic Colour Terms, for example, under a lot of pressure to conform to the majority English-language colour spectrum.

Irish-language speakers

The Irish language is one of the two official languages of Ireland and has been ever since the founding of the Irish Free State in 1922. However, Irish is nowadays very limited in its geographical range. When the native Gaelic order fell to the English in the early 1600s Irish speakers ended up being dispossessed, excluded from the realms of business, education and politics and had their language linked with poverty and illiteracy. Whilst these blows were bad for the prestige of the language and it was thus already somewhat on the retreat, the biggest blow came in the form of the Great Famine (1845–1852) and the mass emigration which followed. The number of Irish speakers before the Famine was approximately four million out of a population of eight million, but fifty years later, by 1891, this figure had fallen to just under 665,000, of which there were less than 40,000 monoglots and somewhat less than 31,000 children under the age of ten being raised as Irish speakers. This decline has continued, albeit to a lesser degree, into modern times, but the language has now been reduced to a community language in remote scattered areas along the country's western seaboard, and even though it is a mandatory subject in school less than 74,000 people returned themselves as using it daily in and outside of the *Gaeltachtaí* [Irish-speaking areas] in the latest (2016) census.²

What this amounts to is the fact that only in fairly isolated or remote areas along Ireland's coast is it possible to be an L1 speaker of Irish in a community of other L1 speakers. Although there are L1 and L2 speakers scattered throughout the whole of the country they are lost in a sea of English, and if one does happen to meet an Irish speaker they are most probably an L2 speaker and thus, subconsciously or not, bring with them their English-language worldview—including that of interpreting colour. As the sociolinguist Fergal Ó Béarra—a native speaker himself—states (Ó Béarra 2007: 265)

In 1893, when *Conradh na Gaeilge* [The Gaelic League] was founded [with the aim of preserving the language], native Irish speakers made up over 90% of the Irish speaking population with the remaining 10% coming from the rest of the population. Today, the situation is the opposite with 90% non-native speakers and 10% native.

Ó Béarra goes on to make the point that, even if one is a member of that dwindling band of native speakers, there is a distinction to be made between the older speakers and those younger ones who are more exposed to English (Ó Béarra 2007: 261–62):

2 For details of the numbers of Irish speakers in all of the censi since 1861 see the first three entries at <http://www.cso.ie/en/census/census2006reports/census2006-volume9-irishlanguage/> (accessed 30/09/18). These numbers are, of course, debatable as they depend on self-assessment. Of the 1,761,420 people (39.8% of the population) who claimed to be able to speak some Irish in 2016 (<http://cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/ep/p-cp10esil/ilg/> accessed 05/09/18), for example, only 73,803 people claimed to actually speak Irish daily outside of the educational system and the statistician Donncha Ó hÉallaithe worked out that, overall, only 20,586 (21.4%) of people living in the official *Gaeltachtaí* use it daily (Ó hÉallaithe 2017a, b)

By Traditional Late Modern Irish, I mean that language which was not only *spoken* in the Gaeltacht by both young and old up until about the 1960s, but that was also *passed on* to the next generation. This language, while still spoken, is now mainly limited to those who are in their 50s or older [...] The influence of English on this type of Irish is minimal and is limited to lexicon. There is little, if any, English influence on the phonology, morphology or syntax. It is as if English never existed. The same cannot be said of the type of Irish spoken today.

As this was written more than ten years ago, such speakers of Traditional Late Modern Irish would now be in their 60s or older and their unique way of seeing the world—including that of classifying colours—is in danger of passing away with them. This paper thus takes a look at the current state of one Basic Colour Term in Irish, that of *buí*, in the light of the increasing dominance of English and the retreat of Traditional Late Modern Irish.

The Basic Colour Term *buí*

The Irish Basic Colour Term *buí* has as its focus the English colour ‘yellow’ but *buí* traditionally shaded into both ‘orange’ and ‘tan’/‘light brown’. This can be seen in the Irish language’s historic refusal to adopt or invent an equivalent term for colour words such as ‘orange’ (English, French, German), ‘pomarańczowy’ (Polish), ‘naranja’ (Spanish), ‘oren’ (Welsh), ‘oranje’ (Dutch) or ‘оранжевый цвет’ (Russian). Most European languages, prior to the introduction of the fruit to Europe, had dealt with the orange colour, if at all, by describing it as a mixture of red and yellow, giving rise to colour terms such as *geolurēad* (English) *gelbrot* (German) and *melyngoch* (Welsh). With the introduction of the fruit, however, the name of the fruit itself began to be applied to the colour.

This did not occur in Irish. Although the name of the fruit was adopted into the language’s orthography and phonetics as *oráiste* /ora:ʃt’ə/,³ the colour remained stubbornly unneeded. Thus, a carrot, if we ignore the English borrowing *cairéad*, was traditionally called *meacan dearg*, lit. ‘red tuberous root’, where the use of *dearg* ‘red’ covered the shade of orange. The political entity from Northern Ireland, the Orangeman, is referred to in Irish as *fear buí* ‘yellow man’ where *buí* covers the reference to orange. Indeed, a look at older dictionaries shows that ‘orange’ either tended to be ignored as a colour⁴ or else given as a combination of ‘red’ and ‘yellow’,⁵ as was the tradition in other European languages.⁶

3 This transcription is based on that of *Foclóir Póca* (1986: 433), although /ʃ/ has been used in place of /s’/.

4 For example, Ó Beaglaioich and Mac Cruitín (1732), Connellan (1814), O’Neill-Lane (1904), McKenna (1911), Ó Dúirínne and Ó Dálaigh (1922).

5 For example, Lhuysd (*ruadhbhuidhe* 1707: 402), O’Brien (*ruadhbhuidhe* 1768: 408), Shaw (*ruadhbhuidhe* 1780: 306), O’Reilly (*ruadhbhuidhe* 1817: 410, 1864: 430), De Vere Coneys (*ruadhbhuidhe* 1849: 295), Foley (*dearg-bhuidhe*, *buidhe*, *oráisdeach* 1855: 250), Fournier d’Albe (*deargbhuidhe*, *oráiste* 1903: 206), O’Neill-Lane (*ruadh-bhuidhe* 1917: 1121), Dinneen (*ruadh-bhuidhe* 1904: 580).

6 For a more detailed discussion of the translation of ‘orange’ and some of the issues that arose, see Ó Fionnáin (2017).

Buí as ‘orange’

An effort was made, however, to come up with a precise one-to-one equivalent for the Irish language version of the 1937 constitution. Article 7 of the English text of *Bunreacht na hÉireann* (2012: 8) states that “The national flag is the tricolour of green, white and orange” and the Irish version is “An bhratach trí dhath .i. uaine, bán, agus flannbhuí, an suaitheantas náisiúnta”. Here, the word *flannbhuí* has been coined, a combination of *flann* ‘[blood-]red’ and *buí*, thereby giving a meaning of ‘[blood-]red-yellow’ but a look at the same dictionaries shows that *flann* itself was a rare word to begin with and hardly common in everyday speech.⁷ This term did gain a certain measure of acceptance as a one-to-one equivalent for ‘orange’ as it does make an appearance in the two major Irish-language lexicographical works of the last century, namely de Bhaldraithe’s *English-Irish Dictionary* (1959) and Ó Dónaill’s *Foclóir Gaeilge-Béarla* (1977), and also in various modern pocket dictionaries. However, it never totally ousted *buí*, as can be seen in *An Foclóir Beag* (1991), the small Irish-Irish dictionary published by the Irish Government, where the orange is described as follows: “toradh súmhar milis agus craiceann buí air a fhásann i dtíortha teo” ‘a sweet juicy fruit with a *buí* skin which grows in hot countries’.

This traditional use of *buí* to cover ‘orange’ can also be seen in the following line from a song celebrating a local Connemara *Gaeltacht* man, Seán Ó Mainnín, who made a name for himself boxing in America in the 1980s. In a song composed in his honour from the same decade there is the following line regarding the colours of the Irish flag (Mac Con Iomaire 2014: 14):

Ó, ghnóthaigh sé an cath ag troid do na datha uaine, bán is buí
‘Oh, he won the battle fighting for the colours green, white and *buí*’

Buí as ‘tan, light brown’

References to *buí* in the sense of ‘tan’, aside from dictionary definitions, are mostly to be found in saying and proverbs, for example the following two (*Fios Feasa*):

a) Má táimse buí, tá croí geal agam
‘Even if I am dark-skinned, my heart is bright’

b) Más peaca bheith buí tá na mílte damanta
‘If it is a sin to be dark-skinned, thousands are damned’

These two sayings both relate to that time when the destitute Irish speaker was toiling away in the fields under the sun whilst the rich pale-skinned English speaker was sitting at home in his Big House, and

7 It is worth noting that other suggested words for the Irish-language text of the Constitution were *cróchda* ‘saffron’ and *órdha* ‘golden’. No-one seems to have suggested *ruadhbhuidhe* even though it was the most common term offered in the dictionaries, as noted previously (Ó Cearúil 1999: 3).

they both mean the same thing in essence: that there is nothing wrong with being tanned, i.e. poor and working hard in the fields out in the midday sun. This did not stop some translations of these sayings using the very English-oriented colour ‘yellow’, for example Ua Muirgheasa (1907: 140–41) who translates the first example above as “Although I am yellow I have a bright heart”.

This traditional use of *buí* to cover tanned skin can also be seen in the following anecdote as related in recent times by the author Tadhg Mac Dhonnagáin (2009):

Tá scéal cáiliúil sa taobh seo tíre faoi fhear a chuaigh ar saoire chun na Spáinne. D’fhill sé ar an mbaile faoi cheann coicíse agus dath breá gréine air. Casadh duine dá chomharsana air cúpla lá théis dó leandáil ar ais sa mbaile. “Ar éigean go n-aithneoinn thú,” arsa a chomharsa leis. “Tá tú chomh buí le bleaic!”

“There is a famous story in this area of the country about a man who went on holidays to Spain. He returned home after a fortnight with a great colour from the sun. One of his neighbours met him a few days after he came back home. “I’d hardly recognise you,” his neighbour said to him. “You’re as *buí* as a black person!”

If *buí* is understood here as meaning ‘tanned’, then the anecdote is amusing. If it is understood, especially by an L1 English speaker, as meaning ‘yellow’ then it merely becomes ridiculous.

Field work

Initial field work in colours⁸ with native speakers of Irish was carried out in July 2017 with more than 30 speakers in various sized groups of mixed ages (later divided according to the ages 25–34, 35–44, 45–54, 55–64, 65+). Since then, various individual speakers have also responded, bringing the total number of respondents currently to 37. This number may change over the coming time but it is unlikely to substantially alter the initial results presented in this paper. The respondents were shown various pictures and asked to write down the colour of the object shown. In the case of ‘orange’ they were shown a) an orange b) the Irish flag c) traffic lights (Figure 3) (green, amber, red) d) fire e) a tanned woman sunbathing and f) a darker-skinned Indian man.

As can be seen in Figure 1, in the case of the orange all but one of the speakers used the word *oráiste* to describe the colour of the fruit. Only one, who is aged 65+, used the traditional term *buí* although there was another respondent in the same age group who admitted that even older speakers would indeed refer to it as *buí*. One of the respondents in the 56–65 age group also admitted that her father does not distinguish ‘yellow’ and ‘orange’ as separate colours in Irish, although she herself put down *oráiste* despite being aware that it is not the ‘correct’ traditional way of naming the colour.

8 This research into the colour ‘orange’ is part of a wider research project into the current status of the whole native Irish colour system.




Figure 1: The Orange




Figure 2: The Irish Flag.

In the case of the Irish flag the results are given in Figure 2 and again *oráiste* is the most common choice, even amongst those in their 50s and 60s. It should be noted that there was no use of the word *flannbhúí* to describe the orange colour, even though that is the specific one-to-one word that was chosen for the Constitution.⁹

⁹ Interestingly, some speakers chose *órga* 'golden' which was one of the words rejected by the framers of the Irish-language version of the Constitution.




Figure 3: Traffic Lights.

It is also worth noting that the older generation, i.e. those over 65 and thus more likely to be speakers of Traditional Late Modern Irish, all used *buí* to describe the colour whereas the overwhelming majority of all other speakers opted for *oráiste*, a fact which would clearly support Ó Béarra's theory of older speakers being more likely to speak a form of Irish uninfluenced by English and the English-language way of thinking.




Figure 4: Fire.




Figure 5: Sunbathing woman

As regards the traffic lights and the colour of the middle light, *oráiste* was still the main choice for most speakers over all the age groups but, again, *buí* was the choice for the speakers of more Traditional Irish and it did make an appearance in the responses from all age groups. This may be because the middle traffic light is not necessarily of an obvious ‘orange’ colour or even referenced as such in English, as it can also be referred to as ‘yellow’ or even ‘amber’, and thus possibly not all of the respondents associated the colour of the traffic light with the orange colour itself.

In the case of the fire (Figure 4), which consisted mainly of orange but tinged with some yellow and red, *buí* was barely used at all to describe the colour of the flames although a small minority of speakers did give it as one of the colours they saw,¹⁰ but it is worth noting here that whilst *oráiste* was popular with the younger generations it tailed off as the respondents increased in age and *dearg* ‘red’ became the common choice to describe the orange colour. In the same way as the carrot—*meacan dearg*—was traditionally described as a ‘red’ root, so ‘red’ was used to cover the orange colour of the fire. In this case, however, fire is a natural phenomenon and therefore more likely to be covered by the traditional colour system than a newer import such as oranges or traffic lights or even the national flag. Furthermore, whilst all of the groups under 65 had respondents who saw *dearg* and *oráiste* (the younger speakers seeing it more as *oráiste*), and a small minority who also included *buí*, in the 65+ group the answers were exclusively *dearg* with no other colours offered.

Whereas the above four examples all contained the colour orange and thus might be expected to return results containing the Irish equivalent *oráiste*, the next two examples were pictures of tanned people and thus had no obvious link to the colour orange. In the case of the sunbathing woman (Figure 5), whilst *donn* ‘brown’ was used, the most obvious colour term chosen was *buí*, especially amongst the younger

¹⁰ Some respondents gave two colours in their answers, some three.




Figure 6: Indian man.

speakers. Of interest here is the fact that the use of *donn* actually increases the older the respondents get, whilst its use is least amongst the youngest speakers. This would seem to go against the grain of Ó Béarra's comments on the speakers of Traditional Late Modern Irish, in that one might expect the younger, more-exposed-to-English speakers of the language to opt for *donn* as a one-to-one equivalent of English 'brown' and the older speakers to ignore it and choose *buí*, but even amongst the 65+ speakers there is a division in the choice of words. Of more interest is the fact that the one speaker who chose *donn* (more correctly *cnódhonn* 'nutbrown') was the same speaker who described the orange as being *buí*.

In the final picture of the darker-skinned Indian man there was a lot more variety in the answers on offer, including *dubh* 'black', *dorcha* 'dark', *crón* 'swarthy' and *gorm* 'blue, shiny black' alongside *buí* and *donn*. It is interesting again to note how well *buí* is holding up in all of the age groups in relation to the other colour terms that were suggested. Of course, as exemplified by the 25–34 age group, there is a much more widespread use of *donn* as the person in question was clearly much darker than the previous tanned woman and possibly some of the respondents felt that *buí* did not cover his particular dark skin tone. Also of interest is the fact that, in the group most likely to speak Traditional Irish, i.e. the 65+ group, there was a three-way split between *donn*, *buí* and *crón*. In addition, there were three speakers in the 55–64 age group who described the sunbathing lady on the beach as *buí* but who described this darker skinned gentleman as *bláthbhúí* (defined in Ó Dónaill as 'sallow-complexioned' whilst *buí* itself is merely 'sallow' (1977: 114, 155)). These three speakers thus clearly saw some kind of distinction in the two different skin tones and a marked difference between *buí* and *bláthbhúí*.

Conclusions

Regarding the orange colour, it would seem to be fairly common now for native Irish speakers to ignore *buí* and opt for *oráiste* as a one-to-one equivalent for the English Basic Colour Term ‘orange’, even amongst the older speakers questioned. As such, *oráiste* can probably now be safely considered one of the Basic Colour Terms in Irish as well, and the fact that it has been accepted to a large degree by the older generations would suggest that this change must have been in progress for quite a while and cannot be blamed on the growing influence of English in recent times. As can be seen, there are still small remnants of the use of *buí* to cover ‘orange’ amongst some of the older speakers but little evidence of this was noted amongst the younger generations. Where the colour orange is not so obvious, as in the case of the traffic light, there is still some reliance on *buí* even amongst younger speakers. In well-established items, such as the Irish flag and fire it can be seen from the older speakers that the traditional system, that which covered these ‘oranges’ by referring to them as *buí* (in the case of the flag) or *dearg* (in the case of fire), is still alive, although the overwhelming choice amongst the younger generation is, again, *oráiste* as a one-to-one equivalent. Finally, where there is no ‘orange’ colour at all, as in the case of tanned, dark skin, *buí* seems to be holding up quite well in the face of other colour terms, especially *donn*.

The Irish-language translator and commentator Antain Mac Lochlainn (2015), in commenting on the recent acceptance of *oráiste* as the colour, alongside the invisible *flannbhuí*, in the new official, State-sponsored dictionaries, does feel some sympathy for those who up to now have had to rely on *buí* to describe both ‘yellow’ and ‘orange’. He accepts that this is not the way it was traditionally and that some ‘purists’ might be upset, but he philosophically notes “d’imigh sin is tháinig seo” ‘this went and that came’, i.e. things have changed. Whilst this may be so in the case of one-to-one equivalents of ‘orange’, such as the fruit and the Irish flag, it would seem that the use of *buí* to cover shades that are not strictly ‘yellow’, however, has not yet totally run its course.

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PAWEŁ GIWOJNO
Committee for Philology, Polish Academy of Sciences, Wrocław Branch

Mao Zedong and Chinese Rhetoric. A Brief Outline of Sources and Inspirations

Abstract

This paper aims to sketch out key rhetorical motifs produced by the Chinese propaganda machine under Mao Zedong (1893–1976). In particular, the dominant themes of the 1950s and 1960s are discussed through the prism of both communist ideology and links with Chinese tradition and culture. To achieve this goal, key features of the Chinese language, a brief outline of distinctive features of Chinese rhetoric correlated with European tradition as well as the principles of Maoism as an ideology are presented. In the main section of this paper, an overview of five selected rhetorical themes, based on their popularity in everyday propaganda, is discussed. The final section contains research conclusions. One of the distinctive features of Maoist rhetoric is the fact that both ancient Chinese traditions and the authoritarian language of communist ideology were inherently interlinked. This paper is intended to better understand this unique connection and to gain an insight into the specific nature of the Maoist perspective on rhetoric and communication.

Keywords: Mao Zedong, Chinese rhetoric, Maoism, Chinese language, Chinese propaganda

Introduction

The subject matter of this paper is focused on Maoist rhetoric, its specific nature and sources of inspiration. Mao's school of thought was undoubtedly embedded in the ideology of Marxism–Leninism while the language of class struggle was typically used on many occasions. However, the specific nature of Maoism lies in its ability to combine both communist and traditional Chinese themes in order to create a new approach. This research perspective rests upon a rhetorical analysis of collected excerpts of speeches and slogans considering the context in which they were delivered in order to elicit the multilayered structure of Maoist rhetoric. The research material is taken from officially published English versions of Mao's speeches available online, as well as from the excerpts quoted by multiple authors and available historical sources.

This article is divided into seven sections. In the introduction, the general outline and structure of the paper are discussed. Next, attention is focused on two specific features of the Chinese language, namely its pronunciation and writing system. In the following section, a brief presentation of the specific nature of Chinese rhetoric is discussed. Directly afterwards, selected types of Maoist rhetorical themes and their sources of inspiration are outlined. The intention of this paper is to show that both communist and traditional Chinese references were present in Maoist rhetoric. Finally, a conclusion is reached based on the research while a list of references and sources is added.

On the specific nature of Chinese language

There is a long tradition of using characters to note down words in China (Morton & Lewis [2005] 2007: 21–24). In the ancient era, there was a large number of Chinese characters and reaching perfection in the field was a great challenge. In contemporary Chinese, there are four main variants of the language, namely: *pǔtōngguà* (common speech) prevails in mainland China; *guóyǔ* (national language) dominates in Taiwan; *huáyǔ* (Chinese language) basically used by Chinese minorities in Southeast Asia; and *hànyǔ* (language of the Han people) which is the broadest term and describes two separate phenomena: either standard Chinese or all the available variations of Chinese. Moreover, there are two transcriptions of Chinese words into the Roman alphabet (Fenby [2008] 2009: 11). The first was developed by Thomas Francis Wade (1818–1895) and Herbert Allan Giles (1845–1935), appearing in 1892 and is commonly known as the Wade–Giles transcription, while the second was introduced by the Committee for the Reform of the Chinese Written Language in 1956 as *hànyǔ pīnyīn*. In this paper, all Chinese terms are written using *hànyǔ* system.

There are two main differences between Chinese and European languages in regard to pronunciation and writing. Spoken Chinese consists of four tones. Different tones of the same syllable are used to mark completely different words (Gluchowski & Kaśków 2016: 17). To illustrate, when the syllable *mā* is pronounced in the first tone, it means “mother”; as *má* (second tone)—“hemp”; as *mǎ* (third tone)—“horse” and as *mà* (fourth tone)—“to swear”. What is more, Chinese characters also consist of about 200 smaller particles, known as radicals (Sussman 1994: 43). Although the meaning is specified, when seeing a character one unintentionally also evokes the meaning of these smaller elements. One example is the character 好 (*hǎo* = good). It consists of two different characters: 女 (*nǚ* = woman) and 子 (*zǐ* = child). Whenever a Chinese speaker sees the word “good”, the picture of a mother and a child, an image which is the Chinese idea of well-being, is evoked in the mind. This shows that even though in Chinese the tradition of public speaking is not present in European meaning of the world (Morton & Lewis [2005] 2007: 24), Chinese rhetoric can also be particularly revealed in both texts and the interpretation of tones and characters. In the following section, the idea of Chinese rhetoric is explored at a deeper level.

On rhetoric in China

The traditional approach to rhetoric identifies the term with ancient Greece and the art of persuasive speaking. However, this phenomenon was not only present in the European tradition—being rhetorical

is a universal concept and, therefore, various types of rhetoric can also be identified in every speech community. In light of the above-mentioned observation and referring to the Far East, it is justified to say that: "(...) the Chinese had early reached an impressive level of sophistication in what is readily recognized as rhetorical thinking" (Liu 2004: 147). A large number of rhetorical devices have been uncovered in ancient Chinese texts, including references to authority, wisdom, examples from history, anecdotes, metaphors, proverbs, along with ethical, emotional and social appeals (Lu 1997: 7). This list proves the view concerning the similarities between rhetoric in different civilizations.

The rules of Chinese rhetoric are, undoubtedly, different from those in the European tradition. In terms of methodology, the term *xiūcí* is commonly used which is literally translated as "language care" (Kraus 2014: 243). As Liu explains (2004: 144): "[n]othing can be accomplished if the speech does not sound agreeable". This view reflects the main idea of Chinese rhetorical tradition, namely the careful selection of words used in a speech in order that it is possible to esthetically enchant the audience. In other words, at the centre of Chinese rhetoric is a desire to embellish rather than convince. The term *shuì*, which is translated as "persuasion", was coined by Hǎn Fēi (280-233 BC), an ancient philosopher and politician (Lu 1997: 7). Interestingly, persuasion is a side-effect—not a direct result of a speech—while the beauty of language may convince listeners to follow the advice expressed. This "secret influence" of a speaker is understood in the context of a time when Chinese rhetoric flourished, namely the Warring States Period (475–221 BC). Particular Chinese rulers were ambitious and impulsive. Therefore, giving any advice was a hazardous task. A typical image of that period is depicted by the following statement:

"A Chinese proverb (...) says, 'Being close to a king is like being close to a tiger,' meaning that in serving a king, one must carefully weight situations and measure his or her words for survival. Gaining the ruler's favor, the persuader would obtain power and wealth (...). When out of favor, the persuader would jeopardize his or her life, loss or credentials for the future, or live in poverty." (Wu 2016: 13)

The above-presented observations allow one to identify the key differences between European and Chinese rhetoric. Ancient Greek rhetoric was fundamentally based on arguments and aimed at convincing or dominating the other speaker and/or the listeners. Persuasion was the main objective. The beauty of an oration was a tool to reach the supreme aim. On the contrary, in China "(...) dialog (...) is characterized by an incessant effort to maintain consensus among the participants and their subordination to the commonly recognized authorities, to respect their hierarchy, to suppress the contradictory stances" (Kraus 2014: 243). Traditional rules, derived from Confucianism and Buddhism, exerted great influence on the Chinese art of speaking. Beauty seems to be dominant over power, while the language is subtle and full of allusions in order to convince the audience, but not to create an impression of victory or to impose the speaker's will. Perhaps the shortest conclusion referring to differences between the two rhetorical traditions may be expressed in the observation that whereas European rhetoric is focused on the speaker's victory, the Chinese school of speaking primarily appreciates harmony and balance.

Mao Zedong and his political concepts

Mao Zedong is one of the most recognizable and influential political thinkers of the 20th century. His ideas were popularized in many countries and by multiple political groups. It is worth noticing that Mao began

his political career early having involvement with the anti-imperialist May Fourth Movement (1919), the nationalist Kuomintang of China (1924), and, finally, as a leader of the Communist Party of China (Roux [2006] 2009: 138). Although during Japanese invasion Chinese communists and nationalists did not attack each other, after the end of the Second World War civil war and internal unrest broke out. Supported by the Soviet Union, the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army effectively took control of mainland China and on 1st October 1949 the People's Republic of China was established. A great transformation of the country was initiated.

The dominant ideology of that era was Maoism—defined as a Chinese movement derived from Marxism–Leninism which was based on ideas developed by Mao Zedong and his interpretation of Communism within Chinese frameworks (Cabestan [2006] 2009: 139). One unique characteristic of Maoism is that while Marxism–Leninism places the emphasis on workers as the vanguard of revolution, Mao's thought gives primacy to peasants as key supporters of social transformation (Buckley–Ebert [1996] 2002: 287–288). Maoism is, hence, strongly correlated with the Chinese mentality and folk tradition. An interesting observation is noted by Lu (1997: 18): “[a]lthough Mao and his Communist Party made great effort to eradicate the influence of Chinese traditional culture (...) it was necessary for Mao and his comrades to employ and appropriate these classical Chinese rhetorical forms in order to achieve their purposes.” Particular examples of Maoist references to classical rhetorical themes are presented in the following section.

Further features of Maoism are mainly a reflection of communist ideology including the brutality of life, mass purges, massive political events and indoctrination conducted through different channels. The last two are particularly interesting from a linguistic perspective as language was a key tool in order to shape new mentality while rhetoric played a prominent role in this process. What is more, ubiquitous propaganda excessively used language to transmit ideological content and to build a new attitude. The strategy discussed above proved to be an excellent one during communist China's great public campaigns including the Hundred Flowers Campaign (*bǎihuā qífàng*), addressed to intellectuals; the Great Leap Forward (*dà yuèjìn*) aimed at developing high-scale industrialization; and the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (*wúchǎnjiējí wénhuàdàgémìng*), focused on removing any form of tradition. Some samples of rhetoric used during these campaigns are discussed in the following section.

The scope of Maoist rhetoric

When Mao proclaimed the birth of the People's Republic of China in 1949, he initiated almost three decades of unprecedented changes in order to introduce and strengthen new ideology. Language was an important weapon in this battle, maybe even more than physical force, and played a crucial role in Mao's dream to create a new Chinese society. The spectrum of propaganda tools was broad. However, it is safe to say, as Liu (2004: 184) has done, that there were two main strategies, namely direct borrowings from the totalitarian practices of the Soviet Union, as well as those from Chinese imperial traditions. The influence of communist ideology in the sphere of Maoist rhetoric is obvious due to their similarities and common origin based on Marxism–Leninism. An illustration of this is the practice of publicly developed declarations of self-criticism. This psychological tool, which was one of the commonly used “persuasive methods” (Morton & Lewis [2005] 2007: 239), was focused on the strictly ideological use of language

which proved to be incredibly effective against individuals as well as selected groups within society. Surprisingly, classical Chinese culture also exerted its influence on Maoism, an ideology which officially claimed to be against ancient rules. The exemplification of this is the cult of personality, a practice developed to an extreme degree in traditional Chinese history, where an emperor and his family were believed to have a special “Mandate of Heaven” (*tiānmìng*). In the case of communist China, Mao was identified as such a deified person and, consequently, blind faith in his policies was promoted. Rhetoric was one of the key tools to support and develop this practice, an aspect which is more broadly discussed below.

The two above-mentioned factors, namely communist and Chinese traditional influences, were the cornerstone of Maoist rhetoric, creating its paradoxical and unique form. Communist Chinese rhetoric is regarded as extremely important in order to promote the values of Maoism. A brief analysis of language used during massive political campaigns, allows one to distinguish five themes fundamental for the rhetorical style of ideological struggle. According to Liu (2004: 184) this group includes: (1) reference to moral values; (2) mythmaking; (3) conspiracy theories; (4) dehumanization; as well as (5) radicalization. A brief outline of these key subjects and selected examples of their use are presented below.

Moral values are a popular theme in rhetoric. In the case of Chinese tradition, commonly accepted values included *inter alia* loyalty, hard work, bravery and respect for others (Buckley–Ebrey [1996] 2002: 42–43). Mao’s rhetoric points to the vicious attempts of his opponents, namely domestic exploiters and supporters of Western powers, to wreck “a new deal” based on communist values. Those two groups of enemies were perceived as immoral, eager to restore barbarian exploitation of the people:

“[t]he Chinese have always been a great, courageous and industrious nation; it is only in modern times that they have fallen behind. And that was due entirely to oppression and exploitation by foreign imperialism and domestic reactionary governments (...). From now on our nation will belong to the community of the peace-loving and freedom-loving nations of the world and work courageously and industriously to foster its own civilization and well-being and at the same time to promote world peace and freedom. Ours will no longer be a nation subject to insult and humiliation. We have stood up. Our revolution has won the sympathy and acclaim of the people of all countries. We have friends all over the world.” (Mao Zedong 1949a)

On another occasion, Mao observed:

“[y]ou have many good qualities and have rendered great service, but you must always remember not to become conceited. You are respected by all, and quite rightly, but this easily leads to conceit. If you become conceited, if you are not modest and cease to exert yourselves, and if you do not respect others, do not respect the cadres and the masses, then you will cease to be heroes and models. There have been such people in the past, and I hope you will not follow their example.” (Mao Zedong 1945)

These excerpts show that rhetorical reference to moral values always arouses strong emotions. National pride and placing emphasis on the greatness of the Chinese people are overwhelmingly dominant in the above excerpts (hyperbole). Simultaneously, the fundamental role of moral values for the Chinese people in order to create a peaceful policy and maintain freedom is contrasted with clandestine actions taken by imperialists (contrast). There is also a warning (apostrophe) against going down the devious route offered by the traitors of revolutionary ideas. Although the excerpts contain communist ideology,

they are—interestingly—also based on traditional values (courage, industriousness, pacifism) which are highly respected by ordinary people in China.

Mythmaking is a popular rhetorical theme. One of the types of myths revolves around a leader. It is enough to mention the ideological position of Joseph Stalin (1878–1953) in the Soviet Union. Similarly, in traditional Chinese society the place of a leader was always respected. In Maoist rhetoric, both factors contributed to this. Surprisingly, Mao in his early years as a communist leader was perceived as a humble and devoted activist. Such an image is depicted by the American correspondent Edgar Snow (1905–1972) in his famous book: *Red Star Over China* (1937: 83). As time went on, the situation changed dramatically. In 1972, the same author wrote about his impressions on arriving from China after the Cultural Revolution: “[g]iant portraits of him [Mao Zedong—PG] hung in the streets, busts were in every chamber, his books and photographs were everywhere on display” (Snow 1972: 68). The Chinese leader was at the centre of public admiration and both types of rhetoric: spoken and visual contributed to promote Mao’s cult of personality. As it has been observed: “(...) Mao was mythologized as a living god, a savor of China. Mao Zedong’s Thought was revered as the guiding principle of every aspect of life. Millions of Chinese participated in the use of symbols and symbolic practices characterized by a strong religious flavor” (Lu 2004: 186). Not surprisingly, in Chinese official media Mao was compared (metonym, metaphor) to “(...) the Red Sun in people’s hearts” (Fenby [2008] 2009: 599). Overwhelming admiration and devotion to the leader were definitely one of the key themes of Maoist rhetoric whose origins were in both communist and Chinese imperial traditions.

Another theme present in Maoist propaganda was focused on **revealing conspiracy theories**. The specific nature of communist discourse was to emphasize the permanent threat allegedly created by Western reactionaries. Similar motifs were present in Maoist rhetoric. Interestingly, Mao showed how to fight and win against foreign powers, being full of hope while saying:

“[a]ll reactionaries are paper tigers. In appearance, the reactionaries are terrifying, but in reality, they are not so powerful. From a long-term point of view, it is not the reactionaries but the people who are powerful.” (Mao Zedong 1946)

The inevitable end of efforts to destroy communism in China was proclaimed by Mao during many occasions, for example when he stated:

“[I]fting a rock only to drop it on one’s own feet’ is a Chinese folk saying to describe the behavior of certain fools. The reactionaries in all countries are fools of this kind. In the final analysis, their persecution of the revolutionary people only serves to accelerate the people’s revolutions on a broader and more intense scale. Did not the persecution of the revolutionary people by the tsar of Russia and by Chiang Kai-shek perform this function in the great Russian and Chinese revolutions?” (Mao Zedong 1957)

Giving his advice for future, Chairman Mao concluded:

“[j]ust because we have won victory, we must never relax our vigilance against the frenzied plots for revenge by the imperialists and their running dogs. Whoever relaxes vigilance will disarm himself politically and land himself in a passive position.” (Mao Zedong 1949b)

All the above examples show how futile—according to the speaker—attempts to destroy Chinese revolution were. An oxymoron (“paper tigers”) and contrast (“terrifying”—“not so powerful”) are used to illustrate the illusion of power held by Western countries. However, the appeal to maintain vigilance is

also mentioned (apostrophe) while the permanent threat is highlighted not only by evoking imperialists, but also by animalization used to describe their supporters (animal metaphor). It is worth noticing that in Chinese history many groups accentuated the threat from outside, for example, during the Boxer Rebellion (1899–1901) when an atmosphere of being under siege was heightened (Esherick 1987: 323). In the case discussed here, one can again uncover a reference to communist ideology, as well as to Chinese political traditions from the beginning of the 20th century.

One more theme of Maoist rhetoric was focused on **dehumanization**. In particular, references to animals were made. Typical language in the media, as well as during political meetings, invoked animal metaphors, selecting those with negative connotations in Chinese culture. The range of insults (animalization) included “cows”, “snakes”, “monsters and demons”, “parasites”, “vermin”, “pigs”, “dogs”, and even “vampires” (Lu 2004: 190). Considering the fact that Chinese people are perceived as a collective nation, such an accumulation of metaphors indicates the decline of traditional bonds. It may suggest that a new, brutal ideology seemed to dominate in mutual relations. Paradoxically, to be fully aware of the negative meaning encoded in such metaphors, it is necessary to plunge into Chinese culture. This proves that Maoist rhetoric seems to combine the aggressive language of class struggle with commonly understood cultural traditions.

This observation leads to another type of Maoist rhetoric—focused on the **radicalization of language**. One example is revealed in Mao’s early work:

“[a] revolution is not a dinner party, or writing an essay, or painting a picture, or doing embroidery; it cannot be so refined, so leisurely and gentle, so temperate, kind, courteous, restrained and magnanimous. A revolution is an insurrection, an act of violence by which one class overthrows another.” (Mao Zedong 1927)

This is a manifesto of brutality. A comparison with commonly known trivial activities (contrast) intensifies one’s use of surprise and influence on the audience. Although Maoism had always used and developed sharp linguistic forms, by the time of the Cultural Revolution the rhetoric of hatred had reached its peak. One of the slogans coined by Mao claimed: “(...) all the truths of Marxism can be summed up in one sentence: to rebel is justified” (Huang 1996: 75). On the one hand, this showed the acceptance of violence as a necessary element in order to introduce changes, while on the other hand, the result was observed at a cultural level. Radicalism had also reference to language in which old customs and oral traditions were eradicated. As Lu (2004: 193) has concluded: “[t]he rhetorical landscape of the Cultural Revolution lends support to the Sapir–Whorf hypothesis that language influences or determines thought and affects human perception of reality.” The language of political campaigns showed how emotionally charged words can influence physical relations causing brutality, aggression and violence. However, the Cultural Revolution was not an unprecedented example of brutality in Chinese history. A similar campaign was also launched by the first Emperor of China—Qin Shi Huang (259–210 BC)—who cruelly ordered the eradication of all pre-imperial traditions (Morton & Lewis [2005] 2007: 53–54). This is another reference to show that Maoism evoked a link between communist cruelty and past examples from Chinese history.

All the rhetorical themes discussed above show how powerful and efficient Maoism was as an ideology of social enslavement. People completely immersed in daily propaganda could not resist it, and, in the majority, followed the aggressive path of the campaign launched, or became passive. To sum up, it is important to identify the sources of this great success of Maoist rhetoric. According to Powers (1997:

155), there were several practices commonly used to escalate tension, including the cult of the leader, creating divisions between the people and groups categorized according to ideologically created criteria, as well as the overwhelming presence of messages, posters and the other verbal and non-verbal reminders of ideological slogans which seemed to replace critical thinking. When political regression, the lack of stability, uncertainty and the degradation of administrative, social and cultural institutions are taken into consideration, a complete image of destruction appears. On the one hand, this picture shows the great devastating power of unpredictable Maoist rhetoric, while on the other hand, it displays the great impact of words which can completely reorganize even the longest-lasting and seemingly most stable institutions of human life.

Conclusion

In this paper the focus is on the analysis of the selected themes and main sources of inspiration in Maoist rhetoric. The Chinese approach to public speaking is different from that in the European tradition and appreciates, primarily, embellishments and, secondly, persuasion. However, "(...) Chinese philosophers valued speech as much as the ancient Greeks, and (...) they were eloquent speakers and rhetoricians" (Lu 1997: 30). The specific nature of the Chinese view on rhetoric is discussed in this paper in relation to the Maoist approach. It is justified to state that in his political campaigns, Mao Zedong combined both the communist ideology borrowed from the Soviet Union and Chinese traditions with references to historic events. At first, this may seem to be a surprising conclusion, as Maoism is identified with a powerful ideology opposed to any forms of tradition. After consideration, however, it seems to be beyond doubt that the fundamental role in the Maoist revolution was given to Chinese peasants, namely the people in whom Chinese customs, traditions and old practices were deeply embedded. On the one hand, the ideological language of Maoism proclaimed a new world based on communist ideology and was propelled by a Chinese interpretation of Marxism-Leninism. On the other hand, the delivered speeches and coined slogans referred to well-known and easily recognized images from traditional Chinese culture. This is a significant feature of Maoist propaganda in which new forms of ideological transmission were combined with old ideas and well-known facts from the past to make the message both more understandable and stirring for its Chinese audience.

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ISAIAH (YESHAYA) GRUBER
Israel Study Center

“I, child of a Jewish family... was born on the Day of Atonement...”
— Edith Stein (Teresa Benedicta of the Cross), b. Breslau 1891—d. Auschwitz 1942

“Perhaps even Hebrew might be necessary—at least the alphabet and a few roots—in order to arrive at the core of things, and judge soundly on the social duties of the Christian.”
— Mary Anne Evans (George Eliot), *Middlemarch*, 1871-72

Languages of the Bible and Polish—Jewish Relations

Abstract

This paper brings together two phenomena not commonly regarded as closely connected: linguistic patterns in ancient Biblical transmission, and Jewish-Christian relations as manifest in Polish-Israeli dynamics. After summarizing the nature of Jewish-Greek language in the Septuagint (LXX) and related texts, the discussion proceeds to an explanation of the “bifurcation of meaning” that arose between Jewish and Christian interpreters who read the same words. This exegetical and translational reality exerted a strong real-world effect on Jewish-Christian interaction throughout history. Medieval and modern Polish-Jewish and Polish-Israeli relations continue to bear the stamp of such ancient linguistic and theological reconfigurations. Today a renaissance of Jewish cultural life in Poland has energized Christians as well as Jews, opening up new possibilities for collaboration and mutual understanding. At the same time, political tensions related to conflicting versions of the past—particularly the Holocaust and its memory—have laid bare fundamental contradictions between and within Israeli and Polish self-perceptions. The paper argues that study of Biblical languages and early Judeo-Christian traditions is of great relevance for the current situation and for prospective future progress in fellow feeling and inter-national understanding.

Keywords: Jewish Greek, Hebrew Bible, Jewish-Christian relations, linguistic and cultural interaction, Poland, Israel.

In Poland, the complexities of Jewish-Christian relations cannot be avoided. A long shared history, with highlights and lowlights too numerous to list, has left an indelible stamp that continues to exert a powerful influence on mentalities, behaviors, and even international relations right down to the present day. In recent years connections between the peoples and governments of Poland and Israel have both flourished and floundered, exposing both mutual aspirations and searing wounds, common pasts and conflicting memories.

Beneath all the conflict and connection lies an oft-hidden, yet fundamental question of language. Throughout history, the Judeo-Christian heritages have engendered the warmest of affinities and the deepest of antagonisms, thanks in no small part to conflicting interpretations of ancient Biblical language. The theological animus that has usually reigned between Judaism and Christianity, and among their many varieties, lives off the sap of mutual and yet mutually incomprehensible conceptions. Even the most “basic” of shared terms—such as *faith, law, Messiah/Christ, salvation*—have conveyed and often still convey completely different, even diametrically opposed meanings and connotations within the Jewish and Christian religious traditions.

Poles and Jews are simultaneously bound together and torn apart by their common reliance on ancient Biblical texts as a foundational element of their respective national cultures, as well as by their inextricably linked and fraught national histories. Evidently neither the centrifugal nor the centripetal force can be overcome at the present time. While this paper makes no attempt to treat all the multidimensionality of either Biblical languages or Polish-Jewish relations, each of which represents an enormous field of study in itself, it will propose a peculiar understanding of ancient linguistic patterns as relevant for contemporary cultural contacts. Even abstruse academic debates about multilingual blending and fragmentation in the distant past have proven pertinent for new relations developing in our day between Jews and Christians, Poles and Israelis.

Ancient Jewish-Greek Language

The Jewish Tanakh, known to Christians as the Old Testament, comprises a library of diverse texts written over centuries or millennia and transmitted in Hebrew and Aramaic. The terminology and phraseology of these Semitic books, both narrative and poetic, do not lend themselves easily to translation. Already in the second century BCE, one translator famously drew attention to this dilemma, remarking (in Greek), “The same things uttered in Hebrew, and translated into another tongue, have not the same force in them... the law itself, and the prophets, and the rest of the books have no small difference, when they are spoken in their own language” (Brenton 1851: 2.74). A more recent interpreter has accused modern Bible translators of having “placed readers at a grotesque distance from the distinctive literary experience of the Bible in its original language,” while lamenting that even the best-intentioned translator must sometimes “abandon the admirable principle of lexical consistency” when confronted with the “bewildering diversity of meaning” inherent in many Biblical Hebrew key words (Alter 2019: xiv, xxx-xxxix).¹

The result of translating the Tanakh into Greek, the *lingua franca* of the eastern Mediterranean world in the Greco-Roman period, was the creation of a special form of language commonly known as

1 Note that lexical consistency is a particularly important issue when translating from Biblical Hebrew, which makes frequent and extensive use of wordplay, *Leitmotifs*, and similar literary devices. For a recent linguistic study of “the translation equivalence delusion,” including with regard to Biblical texts, see Krzeszowski 2017.

“Jewish Greek.”² This adaptation of Koine Greek appropriates Hellenistic concepts for Hebraic purposes, while also adding some new vocabulary (e.g., σάββατον/σάββατα [*sabbaton/sabbata*] from Hebrew/Aramaic שַׁבָּת (א) [*shabbat(a)*], “Sabbath”). Thus, the Jewish-Greek Septuagint translation (LXX), produced in the third and second centuries BCE, employs Greek χριστός (*christos*) “oil-smeared” to stand for Hebrew מָשִׁיחַ (*mashiach*) “anointed, Messiah.” The literal, physical connection between the words is obvious, though the specific messianic overtones of “anointing with oil” would not have been evident to a Hellenistic reader uninitiated in Hebraic thought. Similarly, the Septuagint frequently translates the Hebrew verb נִחַם (*nicham*), which has a range of meaning including “sigh deeply, pity, be comforted, repent” as μετανοέω (*metanoēō*) “change one’s mind, rethink, repent.” Again the translators’ rationale is not difficult to detect, but the Hebraic connotations and connections of the Biblical concept would be decipherable only if read specifically as this peculiar Jewish Greek, rather than as Common Greek. The Septuagint’s use of Greek νόμος (*nomos*) “custom, law” for Hebrew תּוֹרָה (*torah*) “[divine] instruction”—another famous example—has been enormously consequential historically (on which, more below). With the benefit of a couple millennia of hindsight, the modern Jewish thinker Abraham Joshua Heschel (1955: 325) called this translation choice “a fatal and momentous error,” while also conceding that it had been made for the usual reason of “lack of a Greek equivalent.”³

Not only the lexicon, but also the syntax, idiom, and grammar of Jewish Greek reflect and incorporate Hebraic and other Semitic structures. As noted by the Jewish historian and language scholar Nicholas de Lange ([2001] 2007: 641), “These constructions echo in Greek common features of Biblical Hebrew,” sometimes to an extreme degree. With regard to a later revision of the Septuagint, the same scholar remarks, “It is hard to imagine that Aquila’s version was comprehensible to a Greek reader who had not been specially trained to read it” (de Lange [2001] 2007: 641). The linguist Jan Joosten (2015: 137; cf. 2016: 246-256) asserts that systematic peculiarities in the Septuagint itself “indicate the development of a Jewish-Greek sociolect.”

First-century Jewish apocalyptic and messianic writings, including the collection known to Christians as the “New Testament” (NT), echo, imitate, and develop the Jewish-Greek language of the Septuagint. Bruce Metzger, a principal editor of the United Bible Societies critical edition of the Greek NT, spoke of the “Semitic coloring” of these texts, asserting that to understand their language requires a greater knowledge of the Hebrew Bible than of classical or Koine Greek. Quoting “the pregnant phrase of Albrecht Ritschl, ‘the [Hebrew-Aramaic] Old Testament is the lexicon of the [Greek] New Testament,’” Metzger explained that “most of the religious terminology of the New Testament can be understood only as it is read against the background of the Hebrew Old Testament and its Greek translation, the Septuagint” (Metzger 1951: 46, 55). The Qumran scholar Jean Carmignac (1982-1985: 1.xi) went so far as to assert, “Whoever has not read the Gospels in Hebrew has not truly read them,” since one must

2 The term “Jewish Greek” designates the special style or form of language that is characteristic of much ancient Jewish literature composed and/or preserved in Greek. As explained below and in the cited studies, ancient Jewish authors writing in Greek often employed vocabulary in non-standard ways, introduced borrowings from Hebrew and Aramaic, and reflected the influence of Semitic idioms and constructions. Collectively such peculiarities indicate a distinct sociolect/ethnolect or (so to speak) literary patois. Joosten (2005) describes the Jewish Greek of the “New Testament,” for instance, as consisting of three main elements: 1) Hellenistic Greek; 2) Septuagintal Jewish Greek; 3) a Semitic substratum.

3 For a recent survey of the concept, see Brague [2005] 2008.

“savor the Semitic fragrance they exude.”⁴ The modern French translator André Chouraqui (1989: 2059) remarked, “The genius of John [regarded as the author of the Gospel] consists also in using the Greek to express the mystery of a Hebrew vision. He has succeeded in creating a new language, a kind of Hebrew-Greek in which the Hebrew sky is reflected in the Hellenic mirror.... The linguistic substratum of John is essentially Hebrew... This reflection is valid, to varying degrees, for all the books of the New Testament.”⁵

If one adds in the thoroughly intertextual nature of the content itself, the deep connection to the Hebrew Tanakh becomes all the more evident. The opening sentence of NT—Βίβλος γενέσεως Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ υἱοῦ Δαυὶδ υἱοῦ Ἀβραάμ (Matthew 1:1)—already testifies to an absolute dependence on the earlier literary and cultural tradition. The first two words (*biblos geneoseōs*) appear in exactly that form in LXX Genesis 2:4 and 5:1, where they translate Hebrew תולדות (ספר) (*[sefer] toldot*) “(book of) generations/origins,” and closely related forms may be found in several other places. With this in mind, the typical translation of Matthew’s opening line as “The book of the genealogy” appears not only insipid, but also inaccurate. In its Hebraic intertextual context the phrase actually signifies something more like “An account of the origins and outcomes (of some major figure or reality).” Every other word in the opening statement is similarly bound to specific, preeminent notions from the Tanakh. Read as a specifically Jewish-Greek (rather than merely Greek) announcement, this opening line virtually screams with attention-grabbing meaning—a fact that is completely lost to many readers today. Practically every verse in the corpus can be analyzed along similar lines.

Even passages that in modern translations may sound particularly Christian (and non-Jewish) in fact bear witness to the utter dependence of the language of these originally Jewish messianic writings on the special semantic universe created via the Septuagint. As an example, consider this fragment from Revelation 1:5: “...καὶ ἀπὸ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, ὁ μάρτυς ὁ πιστός...,” traditionally translated as “...and from Jesus Christ, the faithful witness...” Today it would be hard to imagine this phrase as anything but Christian. Yet in its vocabulary and non-standard syntax, this fragment precisely imitates the language of the Jewish-Greek Septuagint. The choice of words is identical: Ἰησοῦς (*Iēsous*) as a Hellenized transcription of יהושע/ישוע (*Yehoshua, Yeshua*) “Joshua, Jeshua, Jesus”; χριστός (*christos*) as a marker for משיח “anointed, Messiah”; μάρτυς (*martus*) as a translation of עד (*ed*) “witness”; and πιστός (*pistos*) as a near equivalent for נאמן (*ne’eman*) “reliable, trustworthy.” The reader or hearer who recognized these Hebraic associations would have been immediately transported to a whole network of meaning associated with these concepts in the linguistic and literary traditions of the Tanakh.

The Reconfiguration of Meaning

Regarding Jewish-Greek language in the NT, Joosten (2005: 56) has noted: “Theologians are perhaps relatively unaware of the problem [of the difference between Jewish and Koine forms of Greek]. The lexicon of Walter Bauer teaches them that ἀγαπάω [*agapaō*] means ‘to love’ and δόξα [*doxa*] means ‘glory.’ One needs to read other [non-Jewish] Greek texts to discover that the first word is not the usual one to express the meaning ‘to love,’ and that the normal meaning of the second one is not ‘glory.’” In fact, most

4 And this despite the fact that no ancient Hebrew versions of the Gospels are known!

5 For additional studies, see (e.g.): Hill 1967; Friedrich 1976; Sjölander 1979; Joosten 1996; Walser 2001; Drettas [2001] 2007; Edwards [2001] 2007; Janse [2001] 2007; Joosten 2009; Joosten and Kister 2010; Joosten 2013; Joosten 2018.

translators and interpreters make a double error when confronted with the peculiarities of Jewish Greek: historically they have tended to read this language not even as Common Greek, but rather through the prism of specifically *Christian* Greek (a later development, in which Greek terms came to be imbued with yet another type of religious signification). If one wishes to understand NT texts in their original historical, social, linguistic, and cultural context, this situation does indeed pose a serious “problem.”

The case of Hebrew *torah* and Greek *nomos* is instructive in this respect. Largely as a result of the Greek translation, the Jewish *Torah* has long been regarded as “the Law.” In traditional Christian theology, this “Law” was portrayed as fundamentally opposed to “Grace”—a contradiction practically impossible, even linguistically, in the Hebrew semantic universe. In the Hebrew Bible and Judaic traditions, the *torah* (“instruction”) from God explicitly represented a manifestation of “grace” or great loving mercy (Heb. חסד *chesed*). Moreover, such a rereading of Hebraic concepts—once they had been extracted from their original contexts—entailed an extreme fragmentation and reconfiguration of meaning. How many English or Polish readers of the Bible today could recognize that the “teaching of kindness” (Pol. *nauka miłosierdzia*) which rests on the tongue of a virtuous woman translates the very same Hebrew words as King Josiah’s “good deeds according to the Law” (Pol. *dobroczynności jego według tego, jako napisane w zakonie*)?⁶

To a certain extent, this issue of translation is familiar and unavoidable: Biblical Hebrew words cover ranges of meaning so different from those of modern languages that a translator must select only a particular slice of the relevant semantic area, while consciously disregarding other aspects (which may be very important!). Yet an additional systemic bias—undergirded for nearly two millennia by a self-reinforcing cycle of continual (mis)reading, theological (mis)interpretation, and (mis)translation—exacerbated the problem significantly, particularly in the case of Jewish-Greek texts. One of the clearest examples concerns the consistently skewed translation of the word συναγωγή (*sunagōgē*), as attested already in the Latin Vulgate and followed ever since by the vast majority of translations in all languages of the world. In the first century the word meant “an assemblage (of persons or things)”;⁷ it did not by itself connote anything specifically Jewish.⁷ Yet in textual contexts with negative implications such as Revelation 2:9, Christian translations almost universally translate this word by the markedly Jewish “synagogue” (Lat. *synagoga Satanae*)—even though the immediately preceding words explicitly state that the people in question are “not Jews.” By contrast, in perceived positive textual contexts—even when

6 Proverbs 31:26: תורת חסד (*torat chesed*) “the *torah* of *chesed*”; 2 Chronicles 35:26: חסדיו ככתוב בתורה... (*chasadav ka-katuv be-torat...*) “his *chesed* [pl.] according to what is written in *torah*.” The two key words here are *torah* and *chesed*. The Polish translation given above follows the Biblia Gdańska; the Biblia Tysiąclecia has instead *mile nauki* and *czyny pobożne, zgodne z tym, co napisane jest w Prawie*. Typical Polish translations of *torah* include *prawo, zakon, nauka, pouczenia*, etc.; traditional renderings of *chesed* include *laska, miłosierdzie, życzliwość*, etc.

7 In ca. the first century CE at least eighteen different Greek terms designated the institution commonly known today as the Jewish “synagogue” (Runesson 2001: 171-173). The word *sunagōgē* (one of these terms, alongside *ekklēsia* and others) was used in Greek literature for various kinds of assemblies, including, of course, those unrelated to Jews/Judaeans. Hence, the term was generally qualified when intended to indicate a specifically Jewish/Judaeen congregation. This can even be observed in the Jewish-Greek NT, where the Jewish/Judaeen context is usually obvious or already assumed; e.g.: εἰς τὰς συναγωγὰς τῆς Ἰουδαίας (“into the *sunagōgē* [pl.] of Judaea,” Luke 4:44); εἰς τὴν συναγωγὴν τῶν Ἰουδαίων (“into the *sunagōgē* of the Jews/Judaeans,” Acts 14:1). Compare the abundance of other (Jewish and non-Jewish) Greek usages of *sunagōgē*, e.g.: συναγωγῆς τῶν λογιστῶν (“of the *sunagōgē* of the auditors,” Attic inscription, Böckh 1828: 116-117 [no. 76, l. 9]); καὶ συνήχθη τὸ ὕδωρ... εἰς τὰς συναγωγὰς αὐτῶν (“and the waters gathered together... into their own *sunagōgē* [pl.],” LXX Gen. 1:9, Brenton 1851: 1.1).

the Jewish nature of the specified group is clear—the translations resort to neutral (i.e., not specifically Jewish) terms like “assembly” or “congregation” (see esp. Jacob/James 2:1, despite the fact that verse 1:1 names the addressed audience as “the Twelve Tribes in Diaspora”).

Such apparently biased interpretations and translations played a significant role in associating the Jewish synagogue with demonic evil in the medieval Christian mindset.⁸ The translation situation with regard to the synonymous contemporary term ἐκκλησία (*ekklēsia*) is a mirror image: most modern versions systematically render this word by the markedly Christian “church” in perceived positive contexts, but as neutral “assembly” or “congregation” in perceived negative instances (e.g., Matt. 16:18; Acts 12:5, 19:32, 19:39-40/41, despite the fact that the Latin Vulgate uses *ecclesia* in imitation of the Greek).

From a linguistic perspective, the result has been a bifurcation (at least) of originally unitary concepts. Christians and Jews came to mean rather different things when they used identical or originally equivalent Biblical terms. Thus, the Hebrew concept ברית (*brit*), rendered into Jewish Greek as διαθήκη (*diathēkē*), fractured into the Jewish or Ancient Near Eastern “covenant” and the new Christian “testament.” Hebrew משיח (*mashiach*), translated into Jewish Greek as χριστός (*christos*), splintered into Jewish “Messiah” and Christian “Christ.” These bifurcated offspring could even stand in direct opposition to each other, like the siblings Cain and Abel or Jacob and Esau, already in early Christian Greek. The fourth-century archbishop John Chrysostom preached: “This is what happened to the Jews: while they were making themselves unfit for work, they grew fit for slaughter. This is why Christ said: ‘But as for these my enemies, who did not want me to be king over them, bring them here and slay them.’”⁹ Even at this early stage, then, the Christian “Christ” had become the destroyer of Israel, whereas Jewish “Messiah” (supposedly an equivalent term) meant precisely the opposite—the King-Redeemer of Israel.¹⁰

Much the same could be shown for numerous other Biblical concepts. It is no exaggeration to say that this reconfiguration and bifurcation of meaning played an immense role in creating the long and deep chasm between Jews and Christians evident throughout history.

The Paradox of Polish-Jewish Relations

The little Jewish museum at the White Stork Synagogue (Synagoga pod Białym Bocianem) in Wrocław features an exhibit on a horrific event that occurred in this city in the year 1453. In what was then Breslau in Bohemia, the Catholic inquisitor John of Capistrano arrested dozens of Jews on the pretext of a host desecration libel. In the words of one witness, “He commanded to bring four cauldrons filled with glowing coals. He then ordered that they be stripped and each strapped tightly to a board, naked and face up. Then at his command four executioners ripped out pieces of their flesh with atrocious iron spikes and threw the pieces into the cauldrons to burn there.”¹¹

8 For an overview, see Trachtenberg 1943.

9 St. John Chrysostom, “Against the Jews,” in Harkins 1979: 8.

10 The reader should note that some Christian traditions preserved *both* meanings (termed here the “Jewish” and the “Christian” senses of the words), at least to some degree. The situation is more complex than can be expressed in a very brief summary. However, the existence of a pattern of bifurcated meanings of Biblical concepts should be evident from these examples.

11 Wojciech Kętrzyński (ed.), “De persecutione Iudaeorum Vratislaviensium A. 1453,” in Malecki et al. 1884: 1–5 (quote on p. 5). Cf. Szymański (ed., trans.), “O prześladowaniu Żydów wrocławskich w roku 1453,” in Tokarska-Bakir 2008: 689–691.

On that day John of Capistrano reportedly killed forty-one Jews in this gruesome manner. Subsequently all Jews were barred in perpetuity from residing in Breslau (a ban that would remain in force for about two centuries).¹² Such religiously motivated anti-Jewish actions were by no means rare in late medieval Europe, but nonetheless they did not meet with universal approval among contemporary Christians. The city scribe and chronicler Peter Eschenloer closed his own description of the slaughter with the following words: “Whether this is godly or not, I leave to the discernment of spiritual teachers. If, according to the Gospels, Christ said that this Jewish race shall not cease until the end of the world, then they will yet have a shepherd and a sheepfold.”¹³

Across the border in Poland, the equally Catholic King Kazimierz IV Jagiellon was already taking steps in that direction. In the same fateful year of 1453, he ratified and reissued the Statute of Kalisz (originally granted by Bolesław Pobożny in 1264) regarding Jewish rights and privileges in his realm. Along with his confirmatory signature, King Kazimierz added a fuller explication of a concept already present in the original version: “And desiring that the Jews themselves, *whom we preserve as a special treasure for ourselves and our kingdom*, should acknowledge that in the time of our happy reign they were benefited by us...”¹⁴

Any substantial treatment of Polish-Jewish history necessarily lies outside the scope of this paper. However, it may not be entirely pointless to note briefly a few of the important moments along this path. Jews as well as Christians saw Poland as a land of refuge for a people persecuted and cast out of many other lands of Europe. In the sixteenth century the famous Rabbi Moshe Isserles of Kraków wrote, “In this country there is no fierce hatred of us as in Germany.... Had not the Lord left us this land as a refuge, the fate of Israel would have been indeed unbearable. But by the grace of God, the king and his nobles are favorably disposed toward us.”¹⁵

The traditional favor granted by the Polish king and nobility did not always endear Jews to the rest of the local population. In the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth Jewish agents frequently served as middlemen between the magnates and an oppressed peasantry, an economic circumstance that could exacerbate already existing religious anti-Jewish sentiment. And alongside the privileges noted above, the Crown and Church also imposed disabilities and restrictions on the Jewish population.

The remarkable Polish Constitution of 3 May 1791 that appeared during the age of Enlightenment-inspired revolutions aimed to change the prevailing national realities and move toward republican ideals. The Polish and American revolutionary hero Tadeusz Kościuszko viewed this pioneering accomplishment as a major step in the right direction, but nonetheless criticized its failure to deliver full equal rights for Jews and peasants (who together represented more than 80% of the population) alongside the nobility and burghers. Kościuszko also sponsored, as part of his Polish revolutionary movement, “the first wholly Jewish brigade formed since biblical times.”¹⁶ In the midst of the 1863 Polish revolt against Russian rule,

12 See Graetz [1853-1878] 1894: 260–263; Miller 2008: 82–83.

13 Eschenloer 2003: 168–169 (quote on p. 169). Cf. Eschenloer 1827: 12–14; Eschenloer 1872. Eschenloer first wrote his briefer Latin chronicle and then the expanded German version: see Mrozowicz 2013: 459.

14 Pogonowski 1993: 39–58 (pt. 1, no. 2; quote on p. 57). *Emphasis* added. Cf. Exodus 19:5; Deuteronomy 7:6, 14:2, 26:18; Psalm 135:4; Pogonowski 1993: 54; Linder 1987: 157–158 (no. 13). The phrase may have had an economic significance, but that need not be its only meaning.

15 Quoted in Weinryb 1973: 166.

16 See Storozynski 2009: 135-136, 140-141, 148-150, 153, 201-203, 248, *passim*.

many Jews and Poles again joined forces, inspired by a common patriotic sentiment. Yet Magdalena Opalski and Israel Bartal (1992) have provided an apt summary of the dénouement of that affair—and, perhaps, of the entire paradoxical relationship between these two nations through history—by titling their study *Poles and Jews: A Failed Brotherhood*.

It needs hardly be stated that the events of the twentieth century transformed the Polish-Jewish situation utterly. Before World War II, about three million Jews lived in Poland—and almost all of them vanished in an instant. The Polish nation suffered inexpressibly much at the same time. How is one to deal with historical traumas of such magnitude? Today both Israel and Poland are still finding their ways of coming to terms with this devastating past. And perhaps each needs something from the other in order to move forward.

Poland and Israel Today

Is there an “answer” or “solution” to the complex, painful, persistent question of Polish-Jewish relations? Can the “brotherhood” be resurrected and flourish?

Some steps have already been taken in this direction. A remarkable—some might say, miraculous—renaissance of Polish-Jewish cultural life has occurred over the last couple decades. Numerous Jewish cultural organizations have been revived; significant groups of Christians have partnered with them in a major upsurge of interest in Jewish themes in Poland. Leading cities like Warsaw and Kraków now regularly host festivals of klezmer, Jewish folk dance, Israeli cinema, and the like. Some Polish universities have recently established departments of Jewish Studies. Multiple organizations of Polish Christians volunteer to restore destroyed and long-abandoned Jewish cemeteries throughout the country. Jewish-Christian dialogue and joint Bible study groups have become commonplace.

This revival has happened very quickly. The White Stork Synagogue in Wrocław reopened only nine years ago, in May 2010, with a permanent exhibition on local Jewish history going back to the twelfth century. In 2014 the first ordination of rabbis and cantors in the city since World War II took place in the same synagogue-museum (JTA 2014). The massive POLIN Museum of the History of Polish Jews opened in Warsaw in 2013-14, with the expressed goal of showcasing a thousand years of Jewish life in Poland. A new Jewish Community Center in Warsaw also carries out a range of activities.

In 2015, during the so-called “Knife Intifada,” a leading Polish security firm sent a team of experts to Israel at its own expense in order to help prevent and defend against attacks (JTA 2015). In 2016 local sponsors in Kraków launched the now-annual March of Remembrance and Life (*Marsz Pamięci i Życia*). At the inaugural event the Israeli ambassador to Poland, Anna Azari, remarked in a voice trembling with emotion, “I am sure that the majority of my colleagues working in the embassies of Israel in other European countries would very gladly switch countries with me” (Fundacja Polania 2016).

Most or all of these events have included significant *non-Jewish* initiative and participation. They join ongoing programs like the March of the Living, which bring thousands of Jewish young people to Auschwitz and other sites in Poland every year. Travel and tourism between the two countries has risen dramatically and continues to increase every year (e.g., Liphshiz 2018). When Israel opened a new airport in Eilat in March 2019, the first flight to land was from Poland (Lewis 2019). Events including

the academic conference that occasioned the writing of this paper regularly count both Polish and Israeli institutes among their sponsors. And so on and so forth.

The recent growth and visibility of Polish-Israeli ties also explains some, though certainly not all, of the intensity surrounding the international conflict that erupted over Poland's recent "Holocaust law," i.e., the 2018 amendment to the Act on the Institute of National Remembrance (*Ustawa o Instytucie Pamięci Narodowej—Komisji Ścigania Zbrodni przeciwko Narodowi Polskiemu*). While criticizing the Polish legislation, the Simon Wiesenthal Center also observed that similar or even more problematic laws had been passed in other East European countries without provoking anything like the same outcry in Israel or around the world (Ahren 2018a).

The ostensibly legal and diplomatic conflict centers around differing perceptions of the historical roles played by Poles during the Nazi Holocaust. It has generated heated reactions in the Israeli and Polish presses, statements by leaders on both sides that have been judged highly offensive, public spats between historians and politicians, and the cancelation of an international summit of the Visegrad Group that was to have been held in Jerusalem (e.g., Ahren 2018b; Bielecki 2019; Gera and Heller 2019).¹⁷ In the opinion of this writer, the intensity of national feeling manifest throughout the conflict—combined with the absence of similar reactions in parallel cases—bears witness to the depth of historical, cultural, and psychological ties that still bind Israel and Poland together. In the Israeli mindset, the very word *Polin* raises associations with the entirety of the Ashkenazi Jewish experience in Eastern Europe, including (especially) the Holocaust.

It is therefore perhaps not surprising that a 2019 poll commissioned by the Polish government found that about half of Israelis view Poland negatively (Ahren 2019). Meanwhile, other surveys show that approximately a quarter of Poles hold traditional antisemitic beliefs, and well over a half subscribe to anti-Jewish conspiracy theories (Snyder 2014; cf., e.g., Liphshiz 2019; TOI 2019). Clearly some work remains to be done before true fraternity can be reached.

Concluding Thoughts: Ancient Languages and Current Relations

An underacknowledged motive and feature of the recent Jewish cultural renaissance in Poland consists in a marked upsurge of Christian interest in Jewish traditions and Biblical interpretations. A wide variety of Catholic (and other) groups now regularly participate in Jewish-Christian dialogue, host informational gatherings about Jewish history and culture, help to restore Jewish monuments, and march in solidarity with Israel. This author has been privileged to witness, participate in, and hear reports of many such activities in recent years.

An undercurrent within this new movement explores the nature of Biblical language, its historical interpretation, and the poignant real-world effects of the bifurcation of meaning that took place in the Jewish and Christian traditions. An increasing acknowledgment has developed to the effect that ancient misunderstandings and mistranslations lie behind much of the historical antipathy—and even

¹⁷ On the academic side, a conference entitled "In Dialogue: Polish Jewish Relations" sponsored jointly by Columbia University, Fordham University, and the YIVO Institute for Jewish Research has been scheduled for May 2019 and aims to examine the historical background and contemporary conflicts related to "a controversial law making it an offense for anyone to accuse Poland of participating in the Holocaust or other Nazi crimes" (YIVO 2019).

contemporary tensions—between Jews and Christians, Poles and Israelis. From a certain perspective, the brotherhood and the antagonism, the entanglement and the conflict began already then. The modern countries of Israel and Poland have both inherited ancient traditions as part of their core identities; they are, to a certain extent, sibling children of that long-past era when distinct religious traditions and divergent linguistic understandings were being forged out of a common repository of shared texts.

It is therefore no coincidence that the new renaissance of Jewish-Christian activity in Poland has been taking place at a time when academic scholars are engaging in a thoroughgoing reexamination of all aspects of early Rabbinic Judaism and Christianity. Key misconceptions of history and language, passed on for centuries in both traditions, have been weakening as the new scholarship increasingly dismantles “what everyone knows.”¹⁸ New understandings of ancient texts and traditions open up new possibilities for mutual understanding in today’s world. Today Poland and Israel remain inexorably bound together by history—and manifestly incapable of indifference toward the other’s interpretations of the shared past. One hopes and devoutly believes that continued joint study of Biblical language, early Jewish and Christian traditions, medieval and modern Jewish and Polish history, and indeed the Nazi occupation and Holocaust can play a major role in creating that healthy, successful brotherhood yet to be fully seen between the nations of Poland and Israel.

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¹⁸ See, e.g., Fredriksen 2002; Boyarin 2004 (among a now vast literature).

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PAULINA KŁOS-CZERWIŃSKA
Akademia im. Jakuba z Paradyża w Gorzowie Wielkopolskim

„Society of control. Discursive practices in ‘Discipline and Punish’ by Michel Foucault”

Abstract

According to Michel Foucault cultural patterns in discursive practices differ and reflect the discursive apriori, or episteme, of a given epoch. Episteme is a notion introduced by Foucault in order to explain changing systems of thought, it indicates “the underlying orders, or ‘conditions of possibility’ which regulate the emergence of various scientific or pre-scientific forms of knowledge during specific periods of history. These ‘epistemological fields’ give rise to ‘diverse forms of empirical science’” (Foucault 2009: 168). The work titled “Discipline and Punish” is the example of such an empirical approach to history, where all the rules, scientific or pre-scientific forms of knowledge are revealed. The book written by Foucault is a systematic and specific analysis of discursive practices that work in societies of control. Foucault analyzes many such practices starting from severe punishment of the convicted Damiens in 1757, through the hierarchic supervision and normative sanction at the turn of XVIII and XIX century, and ending with the explanations of the workings of contemporary discipline societies with its oppressive rigor in schools, hospitals and prisons.

In my presentation I would like to describe these different discursive formations and practices that have been in use in the past or present societies and to present them as certain cultural patterns characteristic to various cultures and societies on different levels of development.

Keywords: subject, discipline, punishment, control, docile bodies

Introduction

The first scene from Foucault’s book *Discipline and Punish* presents the execution of Damiens on the 2 March of 1757 (Foucault [1975] 1991: 3). This horrendous scene is a metaphor for the treatment of all convicted in these times and for punishment in general. The purpose of such treatment is not only to give the condemned a lesson to teach them how to be better people. Nor is it directed at the humiliation of their souls or degradation before their comrades. The main objective of this kind of approach is not even to kill. So Foucault ([1975] 1991: 3–31) asks what the objective is. A few lines later we receive an elaborate answer to this question, an answer that amazed not only philosophers of these times but also specialists

from other branches of knowledge, biologists, sociologists, or specialists on the subject of confinement, prison and rehabilitation. Foucault claims ([1975] 1991: 3–10) that the aim of such treatment as that experienced by Damiens was to produce a kind of spectacle. It was instituted to repeatedly remind the audience of the power of the sovereign.

In the elaboration concerning the problematic of discursive practices and the subject Foucault reveals ([1975] 1991) the whole history of systems of punishment, starting from the most repressive ones, through disciplining systems, ones that we are accustomed to, and ending with the so-called most enlightened form of punishment, namely prison, though, Foucault does not explicitly state whether this is the best option out of all the forms of punishment. The following pages present what different forms of punishing practices have revealed since the most representative form of the spectacle disappeared. Foucault starts by stating ([1975] 1991: 8–9) that “by the end of the eighteenth century (...) the gloomy festival of punishment was dying out. (...) The first was the disappearance of punishment as a spectacle. (...) Theatrical elements (...) were now downgraded as if the functions of the penal ceremony were gradually ceasing to be understood.” One of the arguments for the disappearance of the spectacle of punishment was that it repeated the crime of the convicted but with the hands of the punishers. Foucault states ([1975] 1991: 9), that in this case “the murder that is depicted as a horrible crime is repeated in cold blood, remorselessly,” by a person who is intended to punish not to harm. Thus, paradoxically, we are left with two crimes, not one. Since then, however, the situation of criminals has changed diametrically. The description of punishment as a form of spectacle reveals that the understanding of punishment has changed throughout the ages. With its effectiveness increasingly “seen as resulting from its inevitability, not from its visible intensity, it is the certainty of being punished and not the horrifying spectacle (...) that must discourage crime” (Foucault [1975] 1991: 9). The abandonment of the outward presentation of punishment is represented as “slackening of the hold on the body” (Foucault [1975] 1991: 10), which means that punishment since then wants to reach not only what is visible—the body, but “something other than the body itself” (Foucault [1975] 1991: 11). In this way “[f]rom being an art of unbearable sensations punishment has become an economy of suspended rights” (*ibid.*). Thus in the following ages we can see “the emergence of a new strategy for the exercise of the power” (Foucault [1975] 1991: 81–82), a strategy based rather on the inevitability of the punishment and amounting to the preference for making the punishment “a regular function (...) [authorities since then do not want] to punish less, but to punish better (...), to punish with more universality and necessity” (Foucault [1975] 1991: 82). At this point Foucault starts his description of the changing forms of punishment, trying to grasp all the elements that take part in systems called *dispositifs*, which are the machines that organize the group of rules in such a way as to be able to launch the process of a given practice, in this case, the process of punishing. Foucault in his book tries to follow and investigate all those hidden mechanisms of power and punishment. He wants to “[l]ay down new principles for regularizing, refining, universalizing the art of punishing. (...) [He wants] to constitute a new economy and a new technology of the power to punish” (Foucault [1975] 1991: 89). Thus, he approaches them not only as forms of punishment, but also as forms of different discursive practices used to order the surrounding reality.

Discursive practices: definition

According to Michel Foucault cultural patterns in discursive practices differ and reflect the discursive a priori, or episteme, of a given epoch. Discursive a priori is “what in a given period, delimits in the totality of experience a field of knowledge, defines the mode of being of the objects that appear in that field, provides man’s everyday perception with theoretical powers, and defines the conditions in which he can sustain a discourse about things that is recognized to be true” (Foucault [1966] 1970: 158 cited in: O’Farrel 2005: 63). Episteme, on the other hand, is a notion introduced by Michel Foucault in order to explain changing systems of thought, it indicates “the underlying orders, or ‘conditions of possibility’ which regulate the emergence of various scientific or pre-scientific forms of knowledge during specific periods of history” (O’Farrel 2005: 63). These “epistemological fields’ give rise to ‘diverse forms of empirical science’” (Foucault [1966] 1970: XXII cited in: O’Farrel 2005: 63). The work titled “Discipline and Punish” is an example of such an empirical approach to history, where all the rules and scientific or pre-scientific forms of knowledge are revealed. The term “discursive practice” depends mainly on these understandings of the notions of episteme and a priori, because “the underlying orders, or ‘conditions of possibility’” (O’Farrel 2005: 63) constitute the background for the appearance of a given practice. The meaning of the term “discursive practice” can best be described by resorting to the statement that “to speak is to do something” (Foucault [1969] 1972: 209 cited in: O’Farrel 2005: 79), because discursive practice relates more to practice than to discourse. These are rather the rules of pre-given a priori that have discursive character, while a practice is the practical realization of this epistemic condition. Discursive practices “operate according to rules which are quite specific to a particular time, space, and cultural setting. It is not a matter of external determinations being imposed on people’s thought, rather it is a matter of rules which, a bit like the grammar of a language, allow certain statements to be made” (O’Farrel 2005: 79). These statements are the practical configurations that are made possible on the condition of their previous, a priori given regularities. It is worth observing that discursive practices, as well as the earlier mentioned machines called *dispositifs* or apparatuses, are the result of the working of this historical a priori. *Dispositif* is the mechanism which organizes diverse elements like “discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions” (O’Farrel 2005: 66) in one, determined regime of truth. Its working guarantees that a certain discursive practice will appear. In an article titled “On the Archeology of the Sciences: Response to the Epistemology Circle” Foucault states that unities of discourse from which discursive practices come

are not the laws of intelligibility but the laws of the formation of a whole set of objects, types of formulation, concepts, and theoretical options which are invested in institutions, techniques, collective and individual behavior, political operations, scientific activities, literary fictions and theoretical speculations. The set thus formulated from the system of positivity, and manifested in the unity of a discursive formation, is what might be called a knowledge [*savoir*]. (Foucault [1994] 2000d: 324)

Foucault tries here to grasp the workings in which the individual may take part, and this individual is taken as an object of knowledge—he can be explained “through practices such as those of psychiatry,

clinical medicine, and penalty” (Foucault [1994] 2000e: 461). Following this line of thought we can understand that all the elements that are enumerated in the descriptions of the punishment practices are organized on the basis of a certain system of rules, which is given in advance. This very helpful system of rules, called *dispositif*, is taken as a mechanism responsible for the organization of these practices. They thus resemble the order that is imposed by this mechanism. Finally, we can state that the ways of realizing different forms of punishment may be regarded as the consequence of the working of a given *dispositif*, and further also of a given historical *a priori*. These ways are certain discursive practices about which the book on disciplining and punishing by Foucault ([1975] 1991) speaks extensively and in a detailed way. The book describes punishment in different epochs, different forms of disciplining, different rules on the basis of which the individual perceived its punishment and according to which he worked. Here, *dispositif* governed the ways individuals talk, learn, are cured. All these activities were formed by drills, coercion, discipline. So, when Foucault talks about punishment, he doesn’t talk only about the criminals, he talks about each individual who constitutes a part of the different institutional activities. All this power exerted on the individual may be seen like a form of punishment, because we live—as Foucault proves in his elaboration—in a society of control. It doesn’t matter whether we are in a school, hospital or church—we are kept in a submission to the greater sovereign power, which is constantly revealed in the forms of discursive practices of everyday routines.

Discursive practices: examples

Different parts and chapters of the book “Discipline and Punish” report on various forms of discursive practices used in the practice of punishing. Foucault dedicates several chapters to the description of such rules and categories connected with this penalty discourse: the rule of “perfect certainty,” the category of “docile bodies,” the rule of “great confinement” or “enclosure,” the rule of distribution of bodies, the rule of coercion or regulation of the working bodies, the timetable rule. All these rules constitute elements of the discursive machine, the machine called after Foucault *dispositif*, that has governed the workings of the individual and the social body throughout the centuries. It introduces a discipline in which the body should be controlled so that each individual will conduct himself properly. Foucault’s chapters on different forms of punishment are in this way various descriptions of the mechanisms responsible for the practices, specific for each epoch, of maintaining an individual within a productive regime. The mechanisms mentioned function according to historical *a priori* or episteme given in advance and consisting of a certain paradigm for particular practices of behavior.

I would like to recapitulate some arguments for sustaining different behavioral patterns that are revealed in the following chapters by Foucault. I will start with a description of the discursive practice governed by the rule of “perfect certainty,” which is presented in the chapter “Generalized Punishment” (Foucault [1975] 1991: 73–103). Foucault assumes (*ibid.*) here that certain rules have to be obeyed where the treatment of criminals is concerned. When the discourse on punishment was initiated, the rule of “perfect certainty” (Foucault [1975] 1991: 95) was the first to be introduced and obeyed. This rule states that “[t]he laws that define the crime (...) must be perfectly clear, so that each member of society may distinguish criminal actions from virtuous actions” (Foucault [1975] 1991: 95). Foucault adds also that “like a mathematical truth, the truth of the crime will be accepted when completely proven” (Foucault

[1975] 1991: 97). Following from this is the rule of optimal specification. It states that all illegal actions “must be clearly classified and collected into species from which none of them can escape” (Foucault [1975] 1991: 98). These changes in the laws for punishment were remarkable because they changed completely the rigour of the spectacle that was present in the culture in the previous centuries. The new rules initiated the formation of the book of law that was to be obeyed by everybody and assumed that everybody would be treated according to them equally, no matter what his rank, birth or status. The same punishment for the same crime—this was the main assumption of this jurisprudence and it represented a great step toward the modern treatment of convicts.

However, the way to the modern understanding of the law was still long and fraught with difficulty, because its main element was not just punishment that was visible and discernible, but also discipline instigated invisibly, but with more punishing results.

The chapters on discipline start with the definition of docile bodies. This category rules over the vast spaces of society and its important institutions. To explain what this means when Foucault refers to a docile body, he recalls the posture of a soldier. First, he describes (Foucault [1975] 1991: 135) the bodily rhetoric, the signs by which an observer can recognize this profession: these are, according to him: “an alert manner, an erect head, a taut stomach, broad shoulders, long arms, strong fingers, a small belly, (...) he has to march in step in order to have as much grace and gravity as possible” (*ibid.*). It appeared in these times that these features could be gained simply by training. Foucault explains: “by the late eighteenth century, the soldier has become something that can be made, (...) the classical age discovered the body as object and target of power” (Foucault [1975] 1991: 135–136). The example of the soldier is very apt, because the attributes of the soldier may be gained by strict obedience to prescribed rules. In order to become a soldier, the body is trained. It is submitted to a regime, because military skill can be achieved by drill, thus the body can be “manipulated, shaped, trained, (...) [it] obeys, responds, becomes skillful and increases its forces” (Foucault [1975] 1991: 136). The body here becomes part of the technico-political register, which was “constituted by a whole set of regulations and by empirical and calculated methods relating to the army, the school and the hospital, for controlling or correcting the operations of the body” (Foucault [1975] 1991: 136). To be a docile body means here: “a manipulable body. A body (...) that may be subjected, used, transformed and improved” (*ibid.*). This body is sometimes called “the celebrated automata” (Foucault [1975] 1991: 136), which refers not only to the body of the soldier, for such correcting and controlling operations that produce what is intended to be achieved are not only characteristic of the production of the submissive body of the soldier. It is the kind of discipline that will be used in all other processes of production of the eligible subject. It is a body “in the grip of very strict powers, which imposed on it constraints, prohibitions or obligations” (*ibid.*) that can be transformed into whatever is desired by these powers. Thus we can observe the regularities according to which the systemic power produces planned and scheduled society members, all in accordance with the rules of the society of control in which authorities exert power over their subjects, using coercion, and exercise, to obtain the posture and attitude that should be achieved. Authorities catch hold of their subjects, they want to have their subjects to be part of a certain mechanism that will behave and function according to the rules prescribed to it, authorities want to produce certain “movements, gestures, attitudes, rapidity” (Foucault [1975] 1991: 137). It is the overall power of discipline over the active body which is visible not only in the military troops, but also in other institutions not necessarily connected with simple physical training. The body may become the “object of control” (*ibid.*) when it is analyzed from the point of view of economy

or for example, from the point of view of educational institutions where “efficiency of movements, their internal organization” (*ibid.*) may help in producing a docile body. The new rules that have to be obeyed by the body imply “an uninterrupted, constant coercion, supervising the processes of the activity rather than its result” (Foucault [1975] 1991: 137). These rules thus refer not only to the army but to all institutions that started their career in XVIII century in the form submitted to the coercive sovereign. Foucault focuses on the “meticulousness of the regulations, the fussiness of the inspections, the supervision of the smallest fragment of life and of the body [that] will soon provide, in the context of schools, the barracks, the hospital or the workshop, a laicized content, an economic or technical rationality” (Foucault [1975] 1991: 140). We can say finally, that the body of the soldier was only an example of the training that was later to be imposed on other subjects making them completely docile as if they were troops of soldiers. Children in schools, the sick in hospitals, the faithful in churches—they all are the docile bodies ready to be exploited and managed for the sake of the benefits that can be gained.

An important aspect of the creation of docile bodies is achieved through the distribution of their work, distribution and segmenting into rooms, factories, particular benches, particular barracks. It is also usual that discipline requires “enclosure” (Foucault [1975] 1991: 141). Foucault talks here about the “great confinement” (*ibid.*) of the vagabonds, paupers or beggars: “There were the colleges, or secondary schools [that contributed to this confinement]: the monastic model was gradually imposed” (Foucault [1975] 1991: 141), the “educational regime” (*ibid.*) was introduced, military treatment was launched. Apart from schools and the army “great manufacturing spaces [developed, they were] homogeneous and well defined,” (Foucault [1975] 1991: 142) and “the work of the factories” (*ibid.*) started to play an overwhelming role in the working of a society submitted to control: “[I]t was also a new type of control (...) compared with the monastery, the fortress, (...) [t]he aim [here was] to derive the maximum advantages and to neutralize the inconveniencies, (...) to protect materials and tools and to master the labor force” (Foucault [1975] 1991: 142).

Different workshops also underwent these rules of the distribution of space and of the work of their participants. In a workshop “it was possible to carry out a supervision that was both general and individual: to observe the worker’s presence and application, and the quality of his work; to compare workers with one another, to classify them according to skill and speed” (Foucault [1975] 1991: 145)—the worker was observed and therefore “computed and related to the individual” (Foucault [1975] 1991: 145).

Foucault writes also extensively about the regimes that were encountered or introduced in schools. The method of hierarchization involves the pupil occupying a certain position in the hierarchy according to his age, his “performance, his behavior, (...) he moves constantly over a series of compartments” (Foucault [1975] 1991: 147). This hierarchization marks his position on a scale that values his knowledge and abilities, his merits are assessed on the basis of their distribution within ranks. The organization of space was a great technical achievement:

By assigning individual places it made possible the supervision of each individual and the simultaneous work of all. It organized a new economy of the time of apprenticeship. It made the educational space function like a learning machine, but also as a machine for supervising, hierarchizing, rewarding. (...) The spatial distribution might provide a whole series of distinctions at once: according to the pupils’ progress, worth, character, application, cleanliness and parents fortune. (Foucault [1975] 1991: 147)

Distinction, on the other hand, made the bodies still more docile and subjected them to further manipulation and exploitation. Control becomes not only a part of the working system of prisons or military institutions, but also part of everyday life in schools, hospitals, offices. Thus, Foucault mentions a variety of other operations of discipline imposed in these areas of social activity. One of them is the well-known process of including and creating the labour force into timetables. Thanks to timetables the work may be much more effectively organized, and the authorities may “observe, supervise, regularize the circulation of commodities” (Foucault [1975] 1991: 148). The timetable was “both a technique of power and a procedure of knowledge. It was a question of organizing the multiple, of providing oneself with an instrument to cover it and to master it” (Foucault [1975] 1991: 148). The timetable “establish[es] rhythms, impose[s] particular occupations, regulate[s] the cycles of repetition” (149). It is used in schools, factories and hospitals. A good example is the introduction of the timetable into “mutual improvement schools” (Foucault [1975] 1991: 150), where the general discipline achieved by using a timetable cuts a day into small parts in which the activities, one after another, are realized. The regime decides when to sit, when to start the task, when to have a break. No individual, independent decision can be undertaken. Individuality is not a desirable form of behavior; it is not desirable where obedience and submission are required. The timetable organizes activities in such a way as not to allow the slightest movement of independence and decision to appear. The school day looks like this: “8.45—entrance of the monitor, 8.52—the monitors summons, 8.56—entrance of the children and prayer, 9.00—children go to their benches, 9.04—first slate, 9.08—end of dictation, 9.12—second slate, etc.” (Foucault [1975] 1991: 150).

Foucault in his books mentions three forms of correct training of subjected individuals, they are: hierarchical observation, normalizing judgment and the examination. The punishment was treated differently here from that established in the XVII and at the beginning of the XVIII. Now it was no longer desirable to punish the body, but to punish in such a way that it would make the subject better without using external strength. Thus, punishment was intended to be simply invisible. Punishment referred to all those things that were capable “of making children feel the offence they have committed, everything that is capable of humiliating them, of confusing them: a certain coldness, a certain indifference, a question, a humiliation, a removal from office” (Foucault [1975] 1991: 178). However, the aim was not to totally humiliate the children. They had to have the power to correct their behavior. The measures used must be “essentially corrective” (Foucault [1975] 1991: 179)—as Foucault says. So, the task of punishment was to correct the children by showing them the truth of their behavior. This truth had to make them ashamed in order to achieve its corrective power. In order to come to know this truth they were forced to repeat several times the same occupations, the same activity in order to be familiarized with their fault. The teachers “favour punishments that are exercise—intensified, multiplied forms of training, several times repeated” (Foucault [1975] 1991: 179). Repetition and drill were the main forms used to instill certain habits, and habits were more desirable than independent decisions. In this way individuals become controlled, submissive automata. This could be used to support the working of the system. In fact, it was a part of this system, a part of this dispositif. Another form of assessing pupils and showing them the truth of their behavior and progress is examination. Foucault explains that it “combines the techniques of an observing hierarchy and those of a normalizing judgment. It is a normalizing gaze, a surveillance that makes it possible to quantify, to classify and to punish. It establishes over individuals a visibility through which one differentiates them and judges them” (Foucault [1975] 1991: 184). In order to realize these assumptions the examination is ritualized: it combines “the ceremony of power, (...) the deployment of

force and the establishment of truth” (Foucault [1975] 1991: 184). Examination introduces competition among pupils, which makes them compete among themselves, and in this way punishment did not need to be based on external law. The power of external law was no longer necessary to induce the desirable response in the subjects. Examination made the power of the system increasingly internal and intensified because from the introduction of examinations it was up to the pupils to punish themselves when they did not live up to the rules. Punishment thus became a sort of feeling, a feeling of shame, of humiliation. It was no longer external power that disciplined the working of the individual. It was the rule of hierarchization itself that made pupils discipline themselves. They became their own disciplining power. No other, external, disciplining power was necessary. In this way, the society becomes its own oppressor, it can be controlled from inside with the help of its own mechanisms of oppression.

In the case of examinations we are dealing with a change in the character of punishment. Originally it was “what was seen, what was shown and what was manifested” (Foucault [1975] 1991: 187). “Disciplinary power, on the other hand, is exercised through its invisibility: at the same time it imposes on those whom it subjects a principle of compulsory visibility. In discipline, it is the subjects who have to be seen. Their visibility assures the hold of the power that is exercised over them. It is the fact of being constantly seen, of being able always to be seen, that maintains the disciplined individual in his subjection” (Foucault [1975] 1991: 187). We can conclude here that this kind of punishment changes the subjected individual into the object—this objectification assumes depersonalization—as can be seen in the character of the hospital machine where the patients are called by numbers—it also assumes domination that is invisible. The child is offended and punished by humiliation not by physical punishment, and what is more, in this way it is punished more severely, it not only feels pain in the body, but also pain in his soul. He feels guilty, not only before his sovereign, but before the judgment of the whole society: he is punished by, and on behalf of, this society. So, we can say that in the moment of being punished he discovers the truth about himself, and this truth is that he behaved wrongly, and that is why, he has to face the truth—and he feels ashamed. Humiliation is here the most oppressive and coercive force of punishment.

The final machine that can be put in motion to punish subjects without being seen by them is panopticon, introduced into the penitentiary system by Jeremy Bentham. It assumed the principle on which it was based:

at the periphery, an annular building; at the center, a tower; this tower is pierced with wide windows that open onto the inner side of the ring, the peripheric building is divided into cells. (...) All that is needed, then, is to place a supervisor in a central tower and to shut up in each cell a madman, a patient, (...) a worker, a schoolboy. (...) [this mechanism makes] it possible to see constantly and to recognize immediately. In short, it reverses the principle of the dungeon: or rather of its three functions—to enclose, to deprive of light and to hide, it preserves only the first. (...) Full lighting and the eye of a supervisor capture better than darkness, which ultimately protected. (Foucault [1975] 1991: 200)

The final statement of the chapter on panopticon, where Foucault says that “visibility is a trap” (Foucault [1975] 1991: 200), is well-known and often cited. The main rule at work in this form of punishment and prison is that the supervisor or the authority must “avoid those compact, swarming, howling masses that were to be found in places of confinement” (*ibid.*). Here each individual is in one cell, he can be seen “from the front by the supervisor; (...) He is seen, but he does not see; he is the object

of information, never a subject in communication” (Foucault [1975] 1991: 200)—e.g. with his mates from the surrounding cells. He has no access to them, he is alone, observed and supervised. Foucault points out that “this invisibility is a guarantee of order” (*ibid.*). Like the controlling oppression instilled in pupils, here the place of the controlling power is changed from its position on the outside of the system to the inside of the prisoner. He alone is the subject of his own oppression. He thinks that he might be observed and this is enough to make him behave in the way that is desired by the oppressor. There is no need to exert a power over the body, no need for drill, examination or physical punishment. The feeling of being subjected to an invisible eye is enough to make the prisoner obedient. He himself becomes a part of the machine that controls his behavior. He becomes an element of dispositif. In this way we can see that internalization of oppressive powers is the most oppressive kind of punishment. This process of internalization is also very well explained on the example of the internalization of the powers that govern human sexuality—Foucault described this in his works on sexuality (Foucault [1976] 2010, [1994] 2000a, [1994] 2000b, [1994] 2000c) where he showed that the individual is increasingly deprived of its own privacy even in the case of sexuality, which should be the most private and intimate area of the subject. The intervention of external powers in this subject area means that the subject’s last space of privacy and independence is lost. Foucault showed the mechanisms that deprive the individual of this internal space, where he could be himself and not pretend to be anybody else. As a result, the subject of sexuality, the child submitted to the internalized power of examination or the prisoner of invisible coercion, they are all the examples of the workings of the most dangerous power of control because it is instilled in their minds and does not concern only their bodies.

Summary

Imprisonment developed over time as a ‘more civilized’ form of punishment than spectacular executions. This is connected with new rules concerning punishment and the new assumptions about discipline. Foucault states that “at the turn of the century, a new legislation defined the power to punish as a general function of society that was exercised in the same manner over all its members. (...) It introduced procedures of domination characteristic of a particular type of power. A justice that is supposed to be ‘equal’” (Foucault [1975] 1991: 231–232) and refers to every individual in the same way. Nobody can escape it. Thanks to this assumption potential criminals are aware that for each crime there is a severe punishment. Prison in this way is treated as the deprivation of a value that is guaranteed to all members of society, namely freedom. Freedom is a kind of feeling accessible to all, so if you are deprived of it, you feel thrown onto the margins of society. Understanding freedom in this way initiates the most egalitarian form of punishment. The penalty is quantified here “exactly according to the variable of time” (Foucault [1975] 1991: 232). The more serious your crime the longer you have to spend in prison. Here appears the idea that “the offence has injured, beyond the victim, society as a whole” (*ibid.*). The idea underlying this form of the punishment was the idea of the transformation of the subject. Prison was intended to play a role in the transforming machine, because it was dedicated to the transformation of the individuals from being rejected to accepted. Since then, punishment has been predicated on the idea of regenerating the convicts and its role is not only to punish their bodies or their souls but also to reappropriate them back into society. So, it is intended to be a lesson for them, not the end of their lives. Thus, here, apart

from the internalizing power of examination or oppression, the power of correction was introduced on the scene of punishments and control. The reappropriation of the individual back into the society was now the main goal of the punishing system, not the elimination of its degenerated body. With the change in the historical a priori based on the emphasis on the power of the sovereign, the situation of a member of the society has changed. More and more the accent has been put on the creation of the desirable attitude of the subjects, before they degenerate into prisoners, because of the lack of corrective mechanisms. There is more emphasis on education or rehabilitation; however this is also achieved with the help of coercing mechanisms. Apart from the changing situation of individuals with regard to the disciplining and controlling systems, the main problem has not changed at all. Individuals are still under full control and every abuse is severely punished as a lapse from normality. Individuals are still produced and formed by subjection to manipulation and exploitation. Their talents and abilities are transformed in such a way as to serve the main developmental tendencies present in societies. Individuals' own creativity is stifled and only their exploitative potential is used and strengthened. Hence, our society can still be called a society of control. Apart from the change from a society of punishment as a spectacle to a society of examination and prisons, we continue to create societies that control many different areas of individual enterprise and functioning. We are still very far from a society that provides opportunities for each individual to follow what is best for them, or a society that helps to create new ways of life, new modes of living—as is especially visible in the works of Gilles Deleuze ([1972] 2014, [1987] 2014, [1995] 2012), a friend and epigone of Foucault, to whom he dedicated one of his works. They both share the conviction that a society should not control its members by looking for ways of exploiting, but should help in their independent creativity. Freedom to be creative and the encouragement to individual independence could be an alternative to the coercive mechanisms of the society of control. To be able to provide opportunities for freedom of development should be the priority of such a society. Thus, this line of development that follows from the physical oppression of the bodies to an enterprise not based on prescribed rules, but on free creation, should be extended in the direction shown by Foucault. A society that equips its members with such opportunities to create themselves freely would certainly be a place of development and progress, not a place of control and submission. Foucault's presentation of the changes in the formation of docile bodies, and its mechanisms of coercion, may be helpful in revealing the dangers hidden behind what seems on the surface to be potential progress. The process of society's transformation as presented by Foucault may increase the knowledge and consciousness necessary for its further development.

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DOMINIKA KOVÁČOVÁ, PHD CANDIDATE
Masaryk University, Brno, Czech Republic

Hashtagging on Instagram: Functions of Hashtags as Employed by #Instagirls

Abstract

Hashtagging, similarly to tagging, has become an inseparable part of online communication and users' motivation for employing hashtags—especially on the platform of their origin, i.e. Twitter—has attracted the attention of scholars from various fields, including linguistics. In reference to previous studies, this paper aims to expand existing knowledge regarding the role and functions of hashtags by examining Instagram posts, which are, in contrast to tweets, predominantly visual and remain an insufficiently researched area. The analytical data consisting of posts uploaded by three Instafamous personalities, also known as Instagirls, were scanned for the presence of hashtags to determine their frequency and their characteristic traits. The qualitative analysis of posts shows that on Instagram, hashtags are employed to fulfil one of two opposing goals: 1. to serve as a tool for aggregating posts of similar content; 2. to serve as a resource for creative self-expression. Furthermore, since hashtags are often designated as a means of promoting one's visibility, their role as a self-presentation strategy in the construction of micro-celebrity on Instagram is also discussed.

Keywords: hashtags, Instagram, content analysis, functions, micro-celebrity, multimodality

1. Introduction

A significant part of our daily communication has moved online and is mediated via social media platforms. While originally largely asynchronous, online communication is becoming increasingly instantaneous thanks to new developments in the field of information technology. Because of this, users are accustomed to sharing updates from their life in real time and “have developed a number of conventions in order to keep track of the talk that emerges” (Page 2012: 183). Such conventions are, for example, the use of ‘@’ in combination with a username that developed into the practice known as ‘tagging’ and the use of ‘#’ followed by a word (or a phrase) called ‘hashtagging’. Even though these conventions are adopted by social networking sites to various degrees, communication on social media in general demonstrates that metadata (e.g. tags and hashtags) is now able to “work seamlessly inside social media texts [...], subverting its traditional role in separating meta-information from primary content” (Zappavigna 2015:

287). Incorporating metadata into a text is, however, not regulated by any strict guidelines and thus presents a significant challenge which users confront in their daily communication online.

After the introduction of the hash ‘#’ to the social media environment in 2007 by Twitter user Chris Messina¹, users were not equipped with any instruction manuals on how to use it and the practice of hashtagging thus evolved—and is still evolving—organically through the online behaviour of users. A number of studies have been conducted to delineate what hashtagging is and to determine the functions of hashtags on social media platforms, especially on Twitter. Zappavigna (2011), for example, examined a cultural shift to more ‘searchable’ talk and the potential of hashtags on Twitter for establishing ‘ambient affiliation’ which unites not only those users who are interested in the same topics but also those adhering to the same values. Furthermore, in Zappavigna (2015), three communicative functions of hashtags—experiential, interpersonal and textual—were explored in a corpus-based analysis. Page (2012) studied the frequency, role and grammatical context of hashtags in tweets posted by three distinctive groups of users—corporate, celebrity and ‘ordinary’ users—while considering hashtags as a tool for self-branding and promoting one’s visibility. In addition, from the perspective of relevance theory, Scott (2015: 19) demonstrated that hashtags can be employed “to activate certain contextual assumptions [and thus guide] the reader’s inferential processes”.

While both qualitative and quantitative research of hashtagging on Twitter abound, only a small number of linguists have examined hashtags on other social media platforms even though their position there is likewise very influential. Amongst these scholars, China (2018), for example, explored the hashtag #Beyoncé as used on three platforms, namely Twitter, Tumblr and Pinterest, and adopting a social semiotic approach, identified multiple meaning-based identities for Beyoncé. Her study is instrumental and differs from other analyses of social media as it does not limit itself to textual data but takes into account a possibly multimodal character of posts on all three platforms. Also paying attention to the visual content of posts, Matley (2018) examined the pragmatic function of the hashtag #sorrynotsorry on Instagram. While exploring “a range of both face aggravation and mitigation strategies” which users employ when using this hashtag, Matley (2018: 70) demonstrates that #sorrynotsorry functions as a non-apology marker. Furthermore, a notable example of multimodal discourse analysis is Caple (2019), which focuses on the strategies of expressing voter preference in Instagram posts. In light of these studies, the present research recognizes the significant role of hashtags on social media platforms other than Twitter and aims to contribute to the understanding of hashtagging on Instagram, whose interface is predominantly visual.

On Instagram, which is a mobile-based social networking site, users are encouraged to share photos and short videos with their followers in real time on the go—hence the name Instagram where ‘insta’ stands for ‘instant camera’ (Lang 2014). In contrast to Twitter and other networking sites, a photo/video is always required for a successful upload of the post (or the ‘gram’) on Instagram and the preponderance of the visual content is thus likely to influence the arrangement of the textual element, of which hashtags are a part. As a consequence, it would be wrong to automatically assume that hashtags are employed in the same manner and to fulfil the same functions on Instagram as on Twitter, which is textually richer. Therefore, following the tradition of earlier studies, the present research refers to and further develops previously identified functions of hashtags and outlines new implications for their use on Instagram.

Particularly interesting in the context of Instagram is the discussion of celebrity construction as ‘Instafame’ started to play a significant role in areas such as modelling (Djafarova & Rushworth 2017). In

1 <https://chrismessina.me/>

order to achieve popularity online, the user is required to develop an original public image through the process of self-branding and to actively promote it. By following strategies of personal branding and self-presentation, users known as ‘micro-celebrities’ treat their followers—irrespective of their number—as fans and put to use the celebrity demeanour as they know it from the offline world of traditional celebrities (Senft 2008, Marwick 2016). As previous studies of communication on Twitter have shown that hashtags are frequently employed to promote one’s visibility (e.g. Page 2012), it would be interesting to see if hashtagging on Instagram has similar implications and can strategically be used by micro-celebrities for self-branding purposes. This paper therefore also aims to investigate if hashtags are employed consistently by Instagram users with large following and if hashtagging could be considered a characteristic trait of their social media behaviour.

2. Data and methodology

The present analysis deals exclusively with posts published on the photo-sharing social media platform Instagram. Since one of the aims of this paper is to expand the understanding of the concept of ‘micro-celebrity’ while concentrating on the practice of hashtagging as a strategy for self-promotion, the analytical data were extracted from public profiles of three Instafamous personalities. The choice of the profiles was random but chosen specifically to represent one particular group of Instagram users referred to as ‘Instagirls’. The term *Insta-girls*² was originally coined by *Vogue* magazine (Testino 2014) to designate female users of Instagram whose presentation online is carefully curated to emphasize their physical appearance and their model-like lifestyle. It is also important to note that while the term denotes a certain demographic of users active on a specific social media platform, its first use is reported in traditional media outlets (e.g. *Vogue*) and is now commonly employed in other online and offline contexts as well.

As far as their fandom and visibility is concerned, a large percentage of Instagirls earned their fame outside of social media (e.g. in the fashion or film industry, modelling, through family or a close relationship with a celebrity) but their presence and engagement on social media, in particular on Instagram, has helped them increase their popularity and provided them with new career opportunities. Current research in celebrity studies underscores the importance of ‘Instafame’, showing that it has become “the latest criterion for models” as model agencies nowadays take the user’s online presence into consideration before casting them (Djafarova & Rushworth 2017: 3). The other group of Instagirls has, on the other hand, gained popularity solely through their original social media presence and the successful practice of self-presentation and self-branding. Instagram and other social media networks are thus to be considered here as both the tool for and the driving force behind their recognition and celebrity. In order to be successful, users apply a number of ‘micro-celebrity’ practices that have been inspired by celebrity culture and adapted to the Web 2.0 environment (Marwick 2016). Owing to this, the paper primarily focuses on the first group of Instagirls who already have some experience with celebrity culture outside of social media. We suggest that these are the users who provide an unwritten norm of the social media behaviour and to whom aspiring Instagirls turn and are inspired by. This class of Instagirls is currently

2 The word-formation process of the term *Instagirl* is in line with other denominations of women in the context of their media presence. Note, for example, *cover girl* for magazines (traditional media) and *Camgirls* (Senft, 2008) for webcamming and weblogs (Web 2.0).

represented by Gigi and Bella Hadid, Kendall Jenner, Hailey Baldwin, Emily Ratajkowski among others (Okwodu 2016). It is argued that comprehending and mastering communicative strategies of this group of Instagram users will cast valuable light on the celebrity construction on Instagram, represented by the second group of Instagirls.

For the present analysis, Instagram profiles of three Instagirls with a varying number of followers (from several million to more than one hundred million followers) were closely examined and their posts were scanned for the presence of hashtags. Having assessed the nature of Instagirls' online behaviour—and in order to meet the needs of qualitative research—posts published in three different months (November 2016, February 2017 and May 2017) were collected and stored with the accompanying data, i.e. images and videos, and metadata such as tags. To avoid manipulation with the data by other users of Instagram and the Instagirls themselves (e.g. the deletion of the post or the inclusion of new comments and likes), posts published in November 2016 were originally selected for the analysis as it is deemed unlikely that the poster would delete an older post or followers would engage with other than up-to-date posts. Since the first collection of data did not yield a sufficiently large sample, posts published in two other months were added to the sample (February 2017 and May 2017). The two-month interval between the sampling time frames was chosen strategically to achieve a higher thematic diversity of posts. The collection of the data took place in June 2018 with an update of all figures in February 2019. Altogether, 227 posts were collected and studied in detail.

While focusing on the practice of hashtagging, the examination of the data showed that hashtags had been employed in 87 posts (38% of posts). In this sample of 87 posts, 115 hashtags were identified, giving an average of 1,3 hashtags per post.³ When compared to other studies of hashtagging (e.g. Page 2012, Matley 2018, China 2018), it is essential to note that the present analysis does not limit its data exclusively to posts containing a pre-defined hashtag and identified using the Search option directly on the platform. On the contrary, hashtags are considered to be organically produced in the user's behaviour on social media and are thus studied in the context of the accompanying posts in the user's profile. Even though the present analysis does not study hashtags as employed by the general usership, it provides valuable insights into their appropriation and usage by a specific group of users called Instagirls. Adopting the content analysis approach, the role of hashtags and their functions in the given context are reviewed and the implications of hashtagging are proposed. Moreover, since Instagram posts contain elements of two different modes, i.e. textual and visual, the relationship between the caption and the image is also taken into account. For the purposes of transparency and due to privacy reasons, any specific names (usernames, brand names, product names, etc.) have been omitted and replaced by general labels, e.g. *username*, *hashtag*.

3. Hashtags on Instagram: Their frequency and functions

3.1 Product posts

As discussed above, 115 hashtags distributed among 87 posts have been detected in the collected data. A considerable number of these hashtags (45 hashtags, i.e. 39%) were used in a group of posts that are

³ The overall frequency of hashtags in the present data is 0,5 hashtag per post.

to be termed here ‘product posts’. Such posts—while published on Instagram—resemble traditional forms of advertisements such as magazine advertisements (if static) or TV commercials (if containing a moving image or a short clip) in which a product or service is promoted. The majority of hashtags employed in these posts correspond either with the name of a specific product, the name of a company, their collections or slogans. Specifically, 76% of hashtags employed in product posts assume this form. This confirms the findings by Page (2012: 198) in her study of the role of hashtags within the practices of self-branding and micro-celebrity on Twitter: “hashtags are used most frequently by corporations and celebrity practitioners, who use these hashtags to make visible company names, slogans and products”. Hashtags of this kind, however, are not employed merely as a marketing tool as they also enable the retrieval of similar content through search directly on the social media platform. This use of hashtags traces back to the grassroots initiative to use the symbol ‘#’ followed by a word or a phrase to denote groups of tweets with a similar content (Heyd & Puschmann 2017), making it the primary function of hashtags. As evidenced by the present data, using hashtags as “a hyperlink, allowing users to search for any content that includes the same tag” (Scott 2015: 12) still remains a very common and influential practice.

The remainder of the hashtags employed in product posts is mostly comprised of #spon and #ad hashtags which social media influencers use to signal sponsored content—see (1) below.⁴ These hashtags serve as context clues since they supply information on the nature of the post and enable the audience to identify the type of brand endorsement⁵ (sponsored vs. non-sponsored).

(1) [video clip of the user dipping an ice lolly into chocolate] Now watch me dip 🍦 😊 ... #
hashtag1 #hashtag2 #hashtag3 @username #spon

In (1), the three hashtags—the first one being the name of an ice-cream-producing company, the second one naming their promotional event and the third one being their campaign slogan—are strategically employed towards the end of the post in the rhematic position. The rheme, according to the Functional Syntax Perspective theory (Firbas 1992), provides new information and thus stands in opposition to the theme, which orients the reader towards what is being communicated (cf. Zappavigna 2015 for her discussion of Theme and New information). As a consequence, hashtags in this position gain greater prominence and simultaneously draw the attention of the audience to the product and the company.

3.2 Hashtags as topic markers and context clues

If focusing solely on its form, the post can be divided into three parts - beginning, middle and end—and hashtags can be employed in either one of these locations, termed specifically *infix*, *prefix* and *suffix*

4 According to Instagram policies, the user is required to tag a business partner in the post if there is an exchange of value involved between the two parties (*Instagram.com* 2019). The Committee of Advertising Practice in the UK has furthermore issued the Influencer’s Guide which provides guidelines for influencers on how to indicate sponsored content in their posts. Using #ad and/or #spon is considered essential to make clear that the post is sponsored (Source: <https://www.asa.org.uk/resource/influencers-guide.html>).

5 In the present data—albeit in a marginal number of cases—Instagirls were also observed to endorse a particular awareness-raising cause through employing hashtags such as #equalmeanequal, #withrefugees, #womeninfilmm in their posts. Devoting posts to such topics indicates what particular cause the user endorses and promotes and in what ways constructs her identity online.

positions (Tsur & Rappoport 2015). Previous research has shown that besides being used as the marketing tool as shown above, hashtags in the suffix position are often employed to define the “topic” of the post (Zappavigna 2015: 287). This topic-defining function—elsewhere also termed the “aboutness” of the posts (Kehoe & Gee 2011)—was also recorded in the Instagram data—see (2) and (3).

(2) [**video clip of the user having a pillow fight with her dad**] When you gotta put your dad to 🤪. Lol! #pillowfight #nightnight @username

(3) [**video clip of a pole dancing lesson**] Breaking the workout routine with my fiery chica @username #stripclass Part I 😊

Similarly to hashtags that are used for the purposes of brand promotion, this type of hashtag enables users to aggregate posts of the same topic through search, e.g. #pillowfight assembles posts that denote content related to the pillow fight, even though they have been uploaded by various users from different locations around the world. Interestingly, the data shows that toponyms are also employed as hashtags in the suffix position (e.g. #Paris, #Bahamas, #PuertoRico) where they simultaneously fulfill two functions: a) they aggregate posts of similar content, i.e. #Bahamas for breath-taking seaside photos; b) they geolocate the post and make public the information on where the photo/video was taken. In addition, names of various events and occasions are often used in a similar vein—see (4) where #vsfashionshow is used to denote the post that concerns a famous fashion show and (5) where #NYFW stands for New York Fashion Week. Altogether, 28 hashtags in the dataset function as topic markers.

(4) [**photo of models**] Backstage Madness with these beauties! 📸 @username #vsfashionshow

(5) [**photo of the user having her hair styled**] Back at it #NYFW

As previous research (Zappavigna 2015, Scott 2015) emphasizes, hashtags are often used in the suffix position to provide contextual information that is necessary for the desired interpretation of the post. To illustrate this, by relying solely on the caption ‘Just stating the obvious’ in (6), one would not be able to arrive at a complete interpretation of the post even though the user claims it is ‘obvious’. The hashtag #backtowork and the accompanying photo thus supply additional contextual information necessary for the interpretation of the post.

(6) [**photo of the user in the car**] Just stating the obvious @username #backtowork

Using hashtags to provide necessary contextual information has become a common practice especially on Twitter due to its 280-character tweet limit. “This function of hashtags [thus] offers an efficient and effective way to manage communication in the impoverished mediated context” (Scott 2018: 59). Interestingly, such use of hashtags is also frequently⁶ documented on Instagram—for example, in (6) above—even though the character limit of the caption is more generous (2,200 characters) and the post is always accompanied either by a photo or a video, which provides additional contextual information. It is, therefore, argued that employing hashtags that contain further contextual clues on Instagram should not be understood as a way of confronting the character-limit challenge but as a creative resource for expressing the desired interpretation. While Instagrammers are likely to have appropriated this use of hashtags to ensure clear and effective communication on the basis of the model they are familiar with from

6 Approximately one third of hashtags in the dataset function as context clues.

Twitter and other social networking sites, the role of hashtags in clarifying the meaning of the Instagram post is less integral than in a tweet which is mostly devoid of any visual cues. It is also essential to note that the Instagram caption can be composed of hashtags only, i.e. without any non-hyperlinked text, which would serve as a mediator between the visual element and hashtags—see (7) and (8).

(7) [**photo of the beach**] #nofilter

(8) [**photo of the user with untidy hair**] #Messy

Analysing the relationship between the two modes in (7) and (8), each hashtag performs a different function with regard to the image. According to Barthes's (1977) analysis of the linguistic message and its relation to the image, #nofilter in (7) performs the function of *relay* while #Messy in (8) the function of *anchorage*. In (7), #nofilter and the photo of the beach both provide complementary information equally important for the interpretation of the post. On the other hand, (8) contains a close-up photo of the user whose interpretation is supported by the accompanying hashtag #Messy and thus emphasizes the untidy hair. Owing to their role in clarifying the meaning of the photo, hashtags can be regarded as “very good predictors of the visual topic of the Instagram post” (Cagle 2019: 17-18). Nevertheless, Cagle's analysis (2019) also revealed several instances where the visual element of the post either does not correspond to what the hashtag describes, or offers its alternative (often humorous) reading. This finding, however, was not confirmed in the present analysis as all Instagram posts here use hashtags which comply with the visual element and the rest of the caption. While it cannot—due to the size of the dataset—be categorically dismissed that Instagirls do not use hashtags in ways that do not comply with the post type, we argue that this practice is disfavoured by Instagirls. The possible explanation is that since they use their posts to build their public image, they would not like to be simultaneously seen as disruptors of their online behaviour and their own personal brand.

3.3 Hashtags as identity labels and metacomments

The Instagirl's personal brand—as is the case of every Instagrammer—is constructed alongside her online identity through her front stage behaviour on social media (Goffman 1959). Hashtags fulfil a very important role here as they can be exploited by users to specifically label their self-proclaimed identity. Even though hashtags used as identity labels form the least numerous category in the dataset, they represent a very creative tool for self-branding. See, for example, (9) where the Instagirl explains that her identity of the #IslandBaby—evidenced by the accompanying photo—is reinforced by the fact that she was born under Cancer (replaced by the symbol ☾ ☐).

(9) [**photo of the user on a jet ski**] ☾ = ♀ #IslandBaby

Moreover, the present data shows that in order to become synonymous with the product/brand they promote, users creatively construct and employ hashtags as identity labels in formats similar to the following: #**BRAND**Model⁷, #**BRAND**Ambassador, #**BRAND**Club. It is also possible that the use of these hashtags is required by individual sponsors to track the activity of the Instagram users they collaborate with. Nevertheless, examples of posts such as (10) below demonstrate that hashtags can also be employed “to build a minimal self-praising pattern and to authenticate claims to status” (Dayter 2014: 101).

7 The highlighted section ‘BRAND’ is to be exchanged for any name of a brand, product, collection, etc.

(10) [**photo of the user wearing a stylish dress**] NYC w @username #BRANDModel

Besides the roles described above, hashtags are further demonstrated to function as tools for expressing the user's attitude and opinion on the topic discussed in the post (Scott 2015, Scott 2018, Zappavigna 2015, Page 2012). Despite being less frequent,⁸ this practice of employing hashtags to "provide information about the speaker's attitude towards the main proposition" (Scott 2018: 61) has been attested in the present dataset, e.g. #soproud in (11) and #bloated, which indicates that the user considers the situation unnecessarily exaggerated, in (12). It is also important to note that the user's attitude is emphasized in these posts by the inclusion of flashy emoji such as 🖐️ for middle finger.

(11) [**photo of four users wearing medals**] ❤️ 🗲 Well done ladies ❤️ 🗲 So sad I couldn't take part this year @username1 #soproud @username1 @username2 @username3 @username4

(12) [**photo of a public announcement**] 🖐️ 🌀 🖐️ it's shameless to discuss women's bodies just to sell papers #bloated ❤️ 🗲 @username

Hashtags in situations like (11) and (12) are hence regarded as a form of metacomment (Scott 2015, Scott 2018) or meta-evaluation (Zappavigna 2015). While hashtags #soproud and #bloated name a specific emotion that the user experiences, in other cases the user's feeling "must be inferred from the content of the hashtag" (Scott 2018: 61). See, for example, (13) where the Instagirl's excitement is deduced from #ItsgonnabeEpic.

(13) [**close-up of models**] These faces ❤️ 🗲 #ItsgonnabeEpic

As Zappavigna (2015) notes, hashtags conveying the user's emotion can sometimes become too specific and verbose and thus risk never being replicated by other users. Consequently, the aim of such idiosyncratic uses of hashtags is not to aggregate as many posts of the same content as possible, but the exact opposite—to differentiate one particular post from the other ones and to emphasize its originality. Supported by previous studies and the present analysis, hashtags thus operate in two opposing directions on Instagram: 1. as a tool for aggregating posts of similar content (i.e. primary function); 2. as a tool for creative self-expression, highlighting the individuality of the post (i.e. secondary function).

Conclusion

While the practice of hashtagging is not native to Instagram but was gradually incorporated into the platform according to the model functioning on other social networking sites, in particular Twitter, it is evident from the analysis that the use of hashtags has been fully embraced by Instagrammers and that they themselves have propelled its further development. The fact that hashtagging on Instagram thrives can be additionally illustrated by two interesting examples of hashtags, namely #repost and #regram, that were also identified in the present data. These two hashtags have been modelled after #retweet but since sharing posts of other users is not intrinsic to Instagram, their function here differs. While the function of #retweet (alternatively #RT) on Twitter is to encourage others to tweet the user's post and hence share it with one's audience (Zappavigna 2015), #repost and #regram on Instagram are used to label any

⁸ Hashtags functioning as metacomments represent 7% of the dataset.

content that originates either outside of the user's profile (e.g. when sharing someone else's post, usually in the form of a screenshot) or outside of Instagram as such (e.g. when sharing a screenshot of the user's Facebook update). Another interesting group of hashtags represented by #TBT (Throwback Thursday), #FBF (Flashback Friday) or #WBW (Way back When/Wednesday) is employed in posts to show the user's participation in various trends popularized by social media. While Instagram plays a very influential role in promoting such trends, their detailed analysis is beyond the scope of this paper and these hashtags were therefore preliminary subsumed under the category of context clues.

The present research into the communicative practices of Instagirls confirms that hashtagging forms an inseparable part of their social media behaviour. Users wishing to gain higher following and to achieve a celebrity-like status should, therefore, take into account the power of hashtags and grasp the rules of hashtagging as set by the more successful fellow Instagrammers. The analysis has shown that hashtags perform a number of functions that are never arbitrary and their meaning is always dependant on the context of the whole post. Furthermore, a detailed examination of the data proved that hashtags are employed in Instagram posts on the basis of one of two opposing motivations: 1. the motivation to assign the post to an existing aggregate of posts that are of similar content; 2. the motivation to separate the post from other existing posts and thus highlight its individuality. The first motivation was observed in product posts which aim to promote certain products, services or causes. In addition, using hashtags as topic markers and identity labels is also incited by the underlying purpose to group similar posts together and a quick search on Instagram confirms that, for instance, #stripclass and #IslandBaby—both documented above—aggregate posts of similar content. On the contrary, the second motivation was evidenced in posts with hashtags that function as metacomments. When used in the search query, these hashtags (e.g. #Itsgonnabeepic, #soproud) bring together posts of diverse content and, as a consequence, make each post distinctive and unique. Concerning hashtags that function as context clues in Instagram posts (e.g. #backtowork, #nofilter), the motivation for their use is not consistent throughout the data, especially due to the size of the present dataset, and cannot be objectively determined at this point. In order to confirm what the dominant motivation for their use is, the analysis of a large dataset is required.

Moreover, the analysis of the data showed that context is instrumental in distinguishing between the functions performed by hashtags, especially if a large number of hashtags is employed in one post. In such cases, it is important to consider all hashtags both individually and collectively as each brings new insights into the interpretation of the post. One should also keep in mind that functions which hashtags assume are dynamic and a hashtag that started as a mere form of creative self-expression might with time turn into, for example, a promotional slogan replicated in millions of posts. Research into the evolution and lifespan of hashtags thus presents an intriguing study of the online environment and could provide valuable findings for further discussion of hashtagging.

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TOMASZ PAWEŁ KRZESZOWSKI
University of Social Sciences, Warsaw

Now strange words simply puzzle us;
ordinary words convey only what we know already;
it is from metaphor that we can best get hold of something fresh.
(Aristotle, *Rhetoric*)

Metaphor Saves¹

Abstract

What is said about metaphor in the present paper will mainly concern the Christian Bible as directly or indirectly translated from the original languages (mostly Ancient Hebrew and New Testament Greek). However, unless otherwise indicated, all biblical quotations are based on *New International Version* of the Bible. Metaphor is conceived as a cognitive-conceptual device rather than a merely rhetorical ornament, which is consistent with basic tenets of cognitive linguistics. Among conceptual metaphors the metaphor MENTAL REALITY IS PHYSICAL REALITY stands out as one of the most productive metaphors as it generalizes the cognitive process of creating and understanding *abstract* concepts in terms of *concrete, physical* entities. The subject of religious thinking, contemplation and discourse cannot be experienced through senses, because such things are “What no eye has seen, what no ear has heard, and what no human mind has conceived” (1 Corinthians 2:9). Thus, metaphor is a kind of hyper-sense allowing us to perceive what our senses cannot perceive in all domains of our knowledge. According to the New Testament Christ himself explained to his disciples why he used parables (i.e. metaphors) in his teachings (Matthew 13:10-13). Conceptual metaphors appearing in the Bible are like a kind of a road, or a kind of a bridge, or a kind of a ladder—all leading man to God. The corruption of language connected with the original sin and manifested in using language as an instrument of deception and lying rather than as an instrument of communication with God, was overcome by Jesus Christ as the Word (*Logos*) offered by God to annihilate the consequences of the original sin. As Christ saved Man from sin and death, metaphor frees language from its corruption, which is also a consequence of the original sin. Understood as the hyper-sense metaphor allows man to re-establish and maintain contact with God. Metaphor will not be needed when we see things as they *really* are. We shall also see God as He really is.

Keywords: Bible, conceptual metaphors, senses, corruption of language.

¹ The paper is a slightly extended version of the plenary lecture delivered at the International Conference *Ways to Religion*, Wrocław, 6–7 June 2015.

In consonance with basic tenets of cognitive linguistics it is necessary to specify the domains in which whatever is said and/or written is profiled. In the case of my present concerns the principle domain is the Christian Bible. Thus, whatever I say about metaphors will directly refer to this particular source as translated from the original languages (mostly Ancient Hebrew and New Testament Greek). More specifically, all biblical quotations will be based on *New International Version* of the Bible.²

Among conceptual metaphors the metaphor MENTAL REALITY IS PHYSICAL REALITY stands out as one of the most productive metaphors as it generalizes the cognitive process of creating and understanding abstract concepts in terms of concrete, physical entities. A detailed survey and analysis of more specific metaphors coherent with this general metaphor was presented by Johnson and Lakoff in their often quoted, though also often criticized book *Metaphors we live by* published in 1980. However, this cognitive function of metaphor had been recognized much earlier by a number of other authors that Johnson and Lakoff did not refer to. Whenever we say something about matters and things that cannot be directly perceived through our senses we are forced to use metaphors, as was aptly observed by C. S. Lewis:

The truth is that if we are going to talk about things which are not perceived by the senses, we are forced to use language metaphorically. Books on psychology or economics or politics are as continuously metaphorical as books of poetry or devotion. There is *no other way of talking*, as every philologist is aware. (Lewis 1947:77).

For example, if we wish to express the idea that somebody quickly understands something we may say “he catches everything in no time,” and when we fail to understand what somebody is saying we are likely to express it as “I don’t follow you.” We may not realize that these are metaphorical expressions since they do not at all mean that someone really caught a certain three dimensional object, or that somebody is walking behind somebody else without lagging behind. Mark Johnson and George Lakoff—with literally hundreds of examples—demonstrate the extent to which metaphors are present not only in our language but above all in our thinking and in conceiving reality. Moreover, metaphors force us to perceive reality in a particular way and *to act* accordingly. In other words, we live by metaphors. For example, there are many metaphors through which we understand the concept “love.” This plurality is grounded in the fact that people have different notions of what love is, which is reflected in the ways they behave and act. Thus, we may conceive love as a physical force, as a disease, as madness, as magic, and as war. Therefore, talking about love we use such metaphorical expressions “something attracted him to her” “I feel magnetic attraction to her” “he is crazy about her” “he has gone mad about her” “he is madly in love with her” “she threw a charm on him” “she completely bewitched him” “she is his recent conquest” “he won her hand” „he won her after a long fight.” Which of these expressions we accept as appropriate reflects how we conceive the concept “love” (See Lakoff and Johnson 1980).

Numerous other examples of this sort from many abstract domains can be quoted. This is so because metaphor is not only a matter of language, but, above all, it is a means of understanding and

2 The *New International Version* (*NIV*) is an English translation of the Bible first published in 1978 by Biblica (formerly the International Bible Society). The *NIV* was published to meet the need for a modern translation done by Bible scholars using the earliest, highest quality manuscripts available. Of equal importance was that the Bible be expressed in broadly understood modern English.[...] The *NIV* is published by Zondervan in the United States and Hodder & Stoughton in the UK. The *NIV* was updated in 1984 and 2011, and has become one of the most popular and best selling modern translations. (*Wikipedia*).

conceiving those elements of reality which cannot be directly perceived by means of senses (vision, touch, hearing, taste, smell) and by motor-experience (interaction of our bodies with physical reality). According to Johnson and Lakoff (1980) “The essence of metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another” (Johnson and Lakoff 1980: 5). This other “thing” or phenomenon is usually more accessible to our motor-sensory experience than the thing which we attempt to understand by means of metaphor. For example, physical force, effects of magic and of madness are more tangible than the abstract concept “love.”

Thus, metaphor is a kind of hyper-sense allowing us to perceive what our senses cannot perceive in all domains of our knowledge:

It is as though the ability to comprehend experience through metaphor were a sense, like seeing or touching or hearing, with metaphors providing the only ways to perceive and experience much of the world. Metaphor is as much a part of our functioning as our sense of touch, and as precious. (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 239)

Scientists are well aware of the role that metaphors play in their thinking, whenever they talk about limits of our senses. This is what Hoimar von Diturth writes in his *Wir sind nicht nur von dieser Welt*:

The area of reality grasped by our colloquial language is much narrower than we think. As a result of this, on top of other things, as soon as we leave the everyday sensory experience, we are forced either to invent an artificial language or to resort to language images originating in our everyday world in order to describe a reality which we find beyond the limits of this world. (von Dithfurt [1981] 1985: 203)³

In view of this it is not surprising that the domain of religion also inevitably requires metaphors. In his commentary on Aristotle’s *Poetics* Cardinal John Henry Newman expressed it very succinctly saying:

With Christians, a poetical view of things is a duty — we are bid to color all things with hues of faith, to see a Divine meaning in every event, and a superhuman tendency.” [...] Revealed religion should be especially poetical — and it is so in fact. (Newman 1907:6).

The subject of religious thinking, contemplation and discourse cannot be experienced through senses, because such things are “What no eye has seen, what no ear has heard, and what no human mind has conceived” (1 Corinthians 2: 9). Therefore, the necessity to use metaphors in order to be able to reach beyond sensory perception and get some insights into things that conceptually transcend material reality was very early recognized by Christian theologians. Notably, Thomas Aquinas begins his *Summa Theologica* with the question “Utrum sacra Scriptura debeat uti metaphoris” [Should the Holy Scripture make use of metaphors] (I, 1: 9) and immediately answers:

Conueniens est sacrae Scripturae divina et spiritualia sub similitudine corporalium tradere. Deus enim omnibus providet secundum quod competit eorum naturae. Est autem naturale homini ut per sensibilia ad intelligibilia veniat; quia omnis nostra cognitio à sensu initum habet. Unde conuenienter in sacra Scriptura traduntur nobis spiritualia sub *metaphoris* corporalium. (I, 1.9)

Unfortunately, in one of English versions of this text the word *metaphoris* has been replaced with *likeness*:
-- (delete)

³ Translation from the Polish edition (1985) is my own.

It is befitting Holy Scripture to put forward divine and spiritual truths by means of comparisons with material things. For God provides for everything according to the capacity of its nature. Now it is natural to man to attain to intellectual truths through sensible things, because all our knowledge originates from sense. Hence in Holy Scripture spiritual truths are fittingly taught under the *likeness* of material things. (St. Thomas Aquinas *The Summa Theologica*. Benziger Bros. edition, 1947. Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province).

However, there is no doubt that continuing the ancient tradition dating back to Aristotle, and long before Johnson and Lakoff, Thomas Aquinas argued in favour of the fundamental cognitive function of metaphor. But the first and the best justification comes from Christ himself, who explained to his disciples why he used parables in his teachings. His words are the quintessence of all that has afterwards been written about the cognitive function of metaphors:

The disciples came to him and asked, “Why do you speak to the people in parables?” He replied, “Because the knowledge of the secrets of the kingdom of heaven has been given to you, but not to them. Whoever has will be given more, and they will have an abundance. Whoever does not have, even what they have will be taken from them. This is why I speak to them in parables: Though seeing, they do not see; though hearing, they do not hear or understand. (Matthew 13:10-13).

These words uttered by Christ provide a very compelling justification for the presence of metaphors in the discourse about the divine reality addressed to the people with dull senses and hardened hearts. Moreover, long before Johnson and Lakoff, Christ provided a detailed *explication* of one of His metaphors, viz. the metaphor of the sower.

The parable of the sower

Then he told them many things in parables, saying: “A farmer went out to sow his seed. As he was scattering the seed, some fell along the path, and the birds came and ate it up. Some fell on rocky places, where it did not have much soil. It sprang up quickly, because the soil was shallow. But when the sun came up, the plants were scorched, and they withered because they had no root. Other seed fell among thorns, which grew up and choked the plants. ⁸Still other seed fell on good soil, where it produced a crop—a hundred, sixty or thirty times what was sown. Whoever has ears, let them hear.” (Matthew 13:3-9).

Christ enumerated the following “ontological correspondences” (Lakoff 1987: 387) obtaining in the SOWER metaphor (Matthew 13:18: 23):

The explication

Listen then to what the parable of the sower means: When anyone hears the message about the kingdom and does not understand it, the evil one comes and snatches away what was sown in their heart. This is the seed sown along the path. The seed falling on rocky ground refers to someone who hears the word and at once receives it with joy. But since they have no root, they last only a short time. When trouble or persecution comes because of the word, they quickly fall away. The seed falling among the thorns refers to someone who hears the word, but the worries of this life and the deceitfulness of wealth choke the word, making it unfruitful. But the seed falling on good soil refers to someone who hears the word and understands it. This is the one who produces a crop, yielding a hundred, sixty or thirty times what was sown.

According to Frankowski (1983), the range of metaphors appearing in the Bible is very broad and varied. The metaphors represent great wealth and freedom characterizing poetic language. The Bible contains a number of metaphors which contribute to our understanding of the concept “God.” Among them are:

GOD IS A JUDGE—*It is the Lord who judges me (1 Corinthians 4:4); Now there is in store for me the crown of righteousness, which the Lord, the righteous Judge, will award to me on that day (2 Timothy 4: 8); Don't grumble against one another, brothers and sisters, or you will be judged. The Judge is standing at the door! (James 5: 9); God will judge those outside. (1 Corinthians 5: 13); "The Lord will judge his people." (Hebrews 10: 30); You have come to God, the Judge of all (Hebrews 12: 23).*

GOD IS A FATHER—*And do not call anyone on earth „father,” for you have one Father, and he is in heaven. (Matthew 23: 9); [...] you may be children of your Father in heaven. He causes his sun to rise on the evil and the good, and sends rain on the righteous and the unrighteous. (Matthew 5: 45); But when you pray, go into your room, close the door and pray to your Father, who is unseen. Then your Father, who sees what is done in secret, will reward you. (Matthew 6: 6); Our Father in heaven, hallowed be your name, (Matthew 6: 9).*

GOD IS A SHEPHERD—*The LORD is my shepherd (Psalm 23); he will separate the people one from another as a shepherd separates the sheep from the goats. (Matthew 25: 32); I am the good shepherd. The good shepherd lays down his life for the sheep. (John 10: 11); I have other sheep that are not of this sheep pen. I must bring them also. They too will listen to my voice, and there shall be one flock and one shepherd. (John 10: 16).*

GOD IS A TEACHER—*Jesus answered, “My teaching is not my own. It comes from the one who sent me. (John 7: 16); “But you are not to be called „Rabbi,” for you have one Teacher, and you are all brothers. (Matthew 23: 8).*

Some biblical metaphors are what Frankowski calls “technical,” and they include the so-called **redeeming** metaphors, which describe what Christ has done for human beings. Thus, the word “purification” is said to represent a ritual metaphor, “redemption” is allegedly a case of commercial metaphor and the word “justification” of a legal metaphor (Frankowski 1983: 172).

What has been said so far suggests that conceptual metaphors appearing in the Bible are a kind of a road (or perhaps a bridge or a ladder) leading man to God. However, there is no doubt that conceptual metaphors, necessary and helpful as they are in establishing links between people and God, are expressed through language. More specifically, the cognitive mechanisms inherent in conceptual metaphors can only be accessed through language, or to be more precise, through some specific ethnic languages such as Hebrew, Greek, Latin, English, Polish, Chinese, etc. This necessary involvement of some language as a specific product of some specific culture enormously complicates the issue and may hinder rather than facilitate communication between people and God. Christians, notwithstanding some important differences between particular Christian denominations, believe that the Bible is the “Word of God” revealed to Man, through which God communicates with people. Being originally written in Ancient Hebrew it is completely inaccessible to a preponderant majority of people, except in translated versions in hundreds of languages deeply grounded in respective cultural contexts, which to a large extent mould their understanding. In this way every language as a product of a specific culture constitutes a communication barrier rather than an instrument of communication between God and people. Still, from the theological

point of view, language can be viewed as a gift which Man received from God to establish and maintain contact with Him in a conscious process of cognition. However, the curse of the original (ancestral) sin, as described in the Book of Genesis, corrupted the human nature and *eo ipso* language. One usually associates the original sin with the story concerning the events in the Garden of Eden described in Genesis 3: 1–24. One does not associate the original sin with the corruption of language described in another biblical story, the one about Babel (Genesis 11: 5: 8). The myth about Babel must also be associated with the original sin. Both the expulsion from Eden and the confusion of tongues are a punishment for Man's disobedience manifested in eating from the forbidden tree and in attempting to build a heaven's high tower. The justification of both these punishments is remarkably similar:

And the LORD God said, "The man has now become like one of us, knowing good and evil. He must not be allowed to reach out his hand and take also from the tree of life and eat, and live forever." So **the LORD God banished him from the Garden of Eden to work the ground from which he had been taken.** (Genesis 3: 22–23)

But the LORD came down to see the city and the tower the people were building. The LORD said, "If as one people speaking the same language they have begun to do this, then nothing they plan to do will be impossible for them. Come, let us go down and confuse their language so they will not understand each other. **So the LORD scattered them from there over all the earth, and they stopped building the city.** That is why it was called Babel—because there the LORD confused the language of the whole world. (Genesis 11: 5–9)

The myth of Babel is an extension of the myth of Eden. It is also the tale of the fall told by means of a different image. When Man received the gift of language from God, language was to serve the purpose of bringing Man closer to God. Because of the corruption rooted in the original sin of yielding to the diabolical temptation, Man began to use language to *distance* himself from God. Erasmus and his followers kept asking "why are the Gospels so understandable to everybody except those whose minds have been *corrupted* by theological speculation?" (quoted after Kołakowski 1982: 170). Jesus knew why when he prayed:

I praise you, Father, Lord of heaven and earth, because you have hidden these things from the wise and learned, and revealed them to little children [νηπίους]. (Matthew 11:25).

Note that the original Greek word *νηπίους* /*nepiois*/ denoted a simple-minded, immature person and that the word "maluczcy" used in most Polish versions more accurately expresses the intension of the Greek word. The same idea and the sense of the story of Babel has thus been grasped by a contemporary verse-monger:

BABEL

wtedy nic nie trzeba było mówić
bo wszystko powiedział On

ale ja miałem własne zdanie
więc wprowadziłem w ruch język

METAPHOR SAVES

ja wiedziałem lepiej
więc wynalazłem nowe słowa

flirtowałem z wężem
więc odkryłem przekleństwa

poprawiałem rajską krainę
więc wypociłem język sztuki

nawymyślałem doktryn ideologii manifestów
upstrzyłem je barwnymi wieloizmami

teraz trzeba zatrudnić legion tłumaczy i lingwistów
żeby wytłumaczyli się za mnie przed Nim

żeby On zrozumiał

BABEL

At that time nothing had to be said
since He had said everything

But I had my own view
so I set my tongue in motion

I knew better
so I invented new words

I flirted with the serpent
so I discovered swear words

I improved the land of paradise
so I exuded the language of art

I contrived doctrines, ideologies and manifestos
I labeled them with dapple polyisms

Now a legion of linguists and translators
must be employed to beg Him pardon on my behalf

So that he could understand

The gist of the original sin in the domain of language is the fact that language has become an instrument of deception or even lying. Since then lying has been one of the most, if not the most outstanding function of language. Here, too, the Satan appears to be responsible. It is significant that the first lie that is referred to in the Bible comes from the serpent-tempter:

“You will not certainly die,” the serpent said to the woman” (Genesis 3: 4).

Since then language has been corrupted by its deceptive function, which may serve as a barrier separating man from God. The sin of lying like a buckle braces together the Bible conceived as the story of redemption: the last words of Revelation, immediately followed by the Epilogue, concern the ultimate encounter with lying:

Outside are the dogs, those who practice magic arts, the sexually immoral, the murderers, the idolaters and everyone who loves and **practices falsehood**. (Revelation 22:15)

or in King James Bible:

For without *are* dogs, and sorcerers, and whoremongers, and murderers, and idolaters, **and whosoever loveth and maketh a lie**.

The corruption of language was overcome by Jesus Christ as the Word (*Logos*) offered by God to annihilate the consequences of the original sin. As Christ saved Man from sin and death, metaphor frees language from its corruption which is also a consequence of the original sin. Understood as the hyper-sense metaphor allows man to re-establish and maintain contact with God. This is why the Bible as “a book about God and supernaturality” (Frankowski 1983: 172) is written in the language of metaphors through which human beings can return to the biblical Eden, and can be reunited with their celestial Father. Moreover, Jesus Christ Himself said to his Apostle Thomas: “I am the way and the truth and the life. **No one comes to the Father except through me**” (John 14: 6). Thus, as our allegedly only way to God Jesus appears to be the Metaphor of Metaphors. This is indeed how God speaks to Man, first through the Old Testament prophets, who used language full of metaphors (See Frankowski 1983), and finally through Jesus Christ:

In the past God spoke to our ancestors through the prophets at many times and in various ways, but in these last days he has spoken to us by his Son, whom he appointed heir of all things, and through whom also he made the universe. (Hebrews 1–2)

Metaphors are also relevant when it comes to the understanding of miracles, in which the Bible (especially) the New Testament, abounds. Every miracle consists in materializing a particular metaphor in the act of faith. Thus, in every miracle some metaphor is made real (see Krzeszowski 2002) in the act of faith. True miracles, unlike magical tricks, always have this metaphorical dimension, in which God’s grace operates. The healing of the blind (Mark 8: 23) in the material (physical) dimension means regaining sight, *i.e.* opening one’s eyes as the sense of visual perception, but in the metaphorical dimension it means

opening a person to God's grace. The change of water into wine (John 2: 11 ff) in the material sense means the change of an inferior liquid into a better liquid, while in the spiritual dimension, it means a transformation (conversion) towards being good, whereby a sinful person becomes holy under the influence of God's grace. The miracle of the tongues resulting in the "speaking in tongues" is a harbinger of the eventual total annihilation of the consequences of Babel. The miracle consisted in the fact that the Apostles, filled with the Holy Spirit, began to use languages of which they normally did not have any command. Moreover, not only the Apostles but also their listeners, in their own languages, understood what the apostles said. (Acts 2:1-13). In this way the "confusion of tongues," which took place at Babel, was at least there and then terminated. Yet, the majority of people remain linguistically confused and perhaps they yearn for redemption:

Yet the myth of Babel is deeply rooted in our linguistic consciousness; we want to recover the lost, original God-given speech in which things are called *their* names, their celestial proper names. (Kołakowski 1982: 184)

In other words we yearn for the return to the linguistic Eden.

In brief, metaphor is not only a linguistic device but a cognitive device that grows beyond and above language into the domain of entities directly inaccessible through the five senses but accessible through metaphor. Thanks to metaphor Man can rise to higher levels of reality, because God in His grace allows Man to do so, by descending to Man from higher levels of reality to the concrete, material level of human existence, making Himself directly accessible through Jesus Christ. The situation is well depicted in Michaelangelo's fresco "The Creation of Adam," in which God-Father stretches His hand to Adam from the heights of heaven. Adam, in turn, raises his own hand to God. The lowering of God's hand and the raising of Adam's hand is an image of the function, which metaphor performs in linking Man and God. God lowers himself to the level of Adam, Adam strives to raise himself to the level of God, which is metaphorically represented by Adam's raised hand, slightly higher than God's hand. This scene anticipates what was to happen later, when God, in the materialized body of Jesus Christ, God-Word-Man, who descended from heaven to lower himself to the level of human beings. Metaphor will not be needed when we see things as they *really* are. We shall also see God as He really is:

Dear friends, now we are children of God, and what we will be has not yet been made known. But we know that when Christ appears, we shall be like him, for we shall see him as he is. (1 John 3:2).

Presumably, at that time Christ, the Archimetaphor, after having completed his saving mission of redemption, will remain—as the Second Person of the Holy Trinity—the only Son of God. Finally: "[...] then the Son himself will be made subject to him who put everything under him, so that God may be all in all." (1 Corininthians 15: 28) . Man will return to Eden as the City of God, in which human beings will live for ever in the state freed from any sin, including the original sin with its fatal consequences. Language (the word) will regain its pure, uncorrupted state, not to divide people but to link the creation with its Creator. Before all this happens people have to become like God, which means that in order to see God face to face people have to become holy because God is holy:

For now we see only a reflection as in a mirror; then we shall see face to face. Now I know in part; then I shall know fully, even as I am fully known. And now these three remain: faith, hope and love. But the greatest of these is love. (1 Corinthians 13: 12–13)

This is so because $\acute{\omicron}$ Θεος ἀγάπη ἐστίν /ho theos agape estin/ – – God is love.

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MARCIN KUDŁA,
ALEKSANDRA R. KNAPIK

Expressing Ethnic Stereotypes from the Perspective of Anthropological Linguistics on the Basis of Attributive Ethnonyms

Abstract

This article aims at analyzing the linguistic aspect of ethnicity from the perspective of anthropological linguistics (Fedorak 2017). We interpret an ethnic stereotype as an idealized cognitive model (ICM) consisting of metonymic submodels containing properties stereotypically attributed to a given ethnic group. Each of the subset models can serve as a basis for creating an attributive ethnonym, *i.e.* an ethnic name that refers to a particular attribute assigned to the target group. Although contemporary attributive ethnonyms are mostly seen as dysphemisms, it is ultimately context—taking into account situational, social and cultural determinants—that determines their axiological charge.

Keywords: anthropological linguistics, context, ethnicity, metonymy, stereotype.

Introduction

There is nothing new in the statement that foreign cultures evoke certain associations. For example, in the collective consciousness of Poles and Americans, Arabs are associated with camels, Italy is seen as the homeland of pasta, while the name *Ivan* is seen as typically Russian. Such stereotypes may find their way to language and take the form of attributive ethnonyms, *i.e.* ethnic names whose structure alludes to a specific attribute associated stereotypically with a given target group (see Kudła 2010, 2012, 2016). Thus, members of the aforementioned groups may be described—respectively—by the Polish *wielbłąd* (lit. “camel”), *makaroniarz* (lit. “pasta-eater”) and (Stomma 2000) *Ivan* and by the American English *camel driver*, *macaroni* and—similarly to Polish—*Ivan* (Dalzell, Victor 2008). Such terms may be easily dismissed as ethnic slurs or ethnophaulisms, yet in order to understand why they are perceived as derogatory a wider perspective is needed—a perspective that reaches beyond language. This is where anthropological linguistics may prove useful, as it explores the relationship between language, humans (society), reality and culture (Anusiewicz 1995: 10, Fedorak 2017). Transferring the above postulate into

linguistic research, Alessandro Duranti (2003) enumerates three major paradigms: **documentational**, **cultural-linguistic** and **transformational**, to which Piotr P. Chruszczewski (2011) adds another one—**communicational-discursive**. The last two paradigms are most relevant in the study of linguistic manifestations of ethnic otherness because they highlight the importance of socio-linguistic phenomena (such as for instance Halliday's (1976) notion of anti-languages) and context, respectively.

It should be noted that the notion of context, which is crucial for the analysis of attributive ethnonyms, does not refer merely to situational factors, but also to social and cultural ones (Dijk 1997). In particular, the first type is embedded in the second, which—in turn—is embedded in the third type (Chruszczewski 2011: 216-217). There is another element that binds the rest. As Franciszek Grucza (1992: 41) observes, culture is an “intellectual construct”. In other words, everything that surrounds us must be processed in the mind before it is described in words. Thus, before moving to the analysis of individual examples of attributive ethnonyms, along with their contexts, it is instructive to take a closer look at the role that the mind plays in the perception of ethnicity.

A cognitive approach to stereotypes

Stereotypes are commonly defined as simplified perceptions of other people judging them through the prism of the group they belong to. Contemporary research in the field of social psychology shows that stereotypical thinking is embedded in the human mind, and consequently ethnic stereotypes may to some extent be seen as natural to humans. Specifically, they fulfill important cognitive functions—thanks to them, the complexity of the world is reduced to a size that is accessible to the human mind (see Hogg, Vaughan 2002: 60). Thus, stereotypes are mental shortcuts which enable us to categorise and make sense of the environment. In other words, they function as energy-saving devices (McGarty *et al.* 2002: 3-5), especially in situations of being “under pressure of time or information load” (Perry R. Hinton 2000: 69). Yet stressing the cognitive aspects of stereotypes does not belie their social functions. Thus, McGarty *et al.* (2002: 2) add that stereotypes function as “aids to explanation” and that they are “shared group beliefs”. The former means that categorisation is not a neutral process. In particular, Tajfel's (1981) analysis proved that people categorize and separate themselves from other groups by accentuating those differences and similarities which are relevant. This self-categorization includes the creation of linguistic elements such as specific vocabulary, expressions, slang words *etc.* to distinguish the in-group from other speech communities. As far as the third above-mentioned principle is concerned, McGarty *et al.* stress that the more the stereotype is shared, the more fixed it becomes and thus “(...) useful for predicting and understanding the behavior of members of one group to another” (2002: 5).

As has already been stated, social categorisation involves the selection and accentuation of certain group characteristics. This, in turn, leads to the consolidation of one's own group (see Stangor, Schaller 1996, Blaine 2017). The key element in this process, which constitutes the basis of stereotypes (not only ethnic ones), is the division into “us” and “them”. In social sciences this division was noticed for the first time at the beginning of the previous century in the work of the American anthropologist, sociologist and historian William G. Sumner (1906), who coined the term **ethnocentrism** to describe the natural tendency of human communities to divide the world into “us” and “them” and at the same time to treat the in-group as a benchmark for judging the norms and traditions of other groups. As a consequence, any

foreign habits that differ from one's own are, by definition, suspicious and may not only be perceived as surprising but also silly, sometimes shocking or even abhorrent.

Frequently, language users want to express their attitude towards others by creating attributive ethnonyms. It seems that among the various linguistic schools, cognitive linguistics (Langacker 1987, Lakoff 1987, Geeraerts 2010) has the best conceptual apparatus to describe the phenomenon we are interested in. In particular, the mentalist approach to language, the dynamic, usage-based model of language, the encyclopedic concept of meaning, and finally the appreciation of the role of metaphor and metonymy in perceiving and describing the world (see, for example, Evans and Green 2006, Geeraerts 2010, *etc.*) mean that cognitive linguistics can draw on the contemporary sociological, psychological and anthropological research on stereotypes supplementing them at the same time.

Particular attention should be paid to the theory of **idealized cognitive models** (ICM) by George Lakoff (1987) and the theory of **conceptual metaphor** (most often including metonymy), initiated by Lakoff and Johnson (1980). According to the former, the categories which language-users form in their minds which do not reflect reality accurately. Rather, they display **prototype effects**, which can be seen in the fact that individual categories are dominated by prototypical members, that is, those that are most numerous or most perceptually salient (Lakoff 1987: 70-71). This is very well illustrated by the example of ethnic stereotypes, which ignore the diversity of a particular community, reducing it to the prototypical representative¹. The cognitive mechanism that is evident here is the metonymy of SUBCATEGORY FOR CATEGORY. This, in turn, leads us to conceptual metaphor theory (CMT), which assumes that metaphor and metonymy are not only stylistic means; they are cognitive mechanisms that help us to better understand the world around us, and which may assume a linguistic form (see Ungerer, Schmid 1996: 117–118).²

Thus, Lakoff (1987: 84–85) suggests that a stereotype is a type of idealized cognitive model. In principle, given the complexity of the concept of ethnicity, it is possible to interpret ethnic stereotypes as a cluster of metonymic submodels, each of which may provide access to the whole model (see M. Kudła 2012, 2016). Based on this interpretation, M. Kudła (2016) has identified fourteen submodels of the ETHNICITY model which led to the development of a number of attribute ethnonyms in the history of English.³ Those are: LANGUAGE, NAME, PARAGON, BODY, CLOTHING, OCCUPATION, RELIGION, CUISINE, GEOGRAPHY, CHARACTER, INSTRUMENT, EMBLEM, SOCIAL STATUS, and NATURAL ENVIRONMENT. The above sub-models may be illustrated with the following examples, from different periods and variants of English: *oui-oui* (“French person”, from Fr. “yes yes”), *Taffy* (“Welshman”, diminutive of the name *David*), *Zorba* (“Greek”, from a fictitious character taken from a novel), *redshank* (“Celt”), *kilt* (“Scotsman”, from the traditional Scottish outfit), *cotton-picker* (“African-American”), *Red Sea pedestrian* (“Jew”), *bean-eater* (“Mexican”), *wop* (“Italian, Southerner”, probably from It. *guappo* “bold”), *Nordman* (“Viking”, lit. “man from the north”), *bow and arrow* (“Native American”), *harp* (“Irish”), *hick* (“Puerto Rican”, literally “rural dweller with limited horizons”) and *sand hopper* (“Arab”).⁴

1 In social psychology, it is referred to as the so-called outgroup homogeneity effect, which operates according to the principle: “we are diverse, they are the same” (Myers 1993: 400).

2 Cf. Black (1962: 37).

3 Cf. Fedorak (2017: 159–160).

4 Details concerning these examples as well as bibliographic information can be found in Kudła (2016).

Attributive ethnonyms and context

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As we have mentioned above, ethnocentrism is a general tendency to perceive out-groups negatively. However, two important observations are worth making at this juncture. Firstly, ethnocentrism is not an inescapable principle; in some situations it will be more noticeable than in others. Secondly, foreign traditions may actually be viewed as attractive by a given group, which may even imitate them. Thus, ultimately it is the context, with its cultural, social and situational aspects, that decides which attribute surfaces in an ethnonym and what its range and axiological load is. Let us take a look at some of the already-mentioned examples.

There are three basic conditions which have to be met in order for an attributive ethnonym to develop (cf. Kudła 2016: 261):

1. the awareness of the existence of a given ethnic group
2. the emergence of a stereotype of the out-group
3. the need to emphasize the differences by referring to an attribute

As we have seen, both for Poles and for the Americans Italy is stereotypically associated with pasta. The connotation, shared also by the British and other European cultures, dates back to the sixteenth century, when the foodstuff in question was not common outside Italy (Długosz-Kurczabowa 2008). Yet while in Polish, apart from the term *makaroniarz*, in use since the nineteenth century, we can only find the less richly attested twentieth-century *spageciarz* (Peisert 1992),⁵ English has witnessed the appearance of eight pasta-based ethnonyms in its history. The terms in question are: *macaroni*, *spaghetti*, *spaghetti head*, *spaghetti-bender*, *spaghetti-eater*, *spaghetti-strangler*, *spag/spaggie* and *pasta breath* (see Spears 1991, Dalzell, Victor 2008, Simpson, Weiner 2009). Interestingly, only the originally nineteenth-century *macaroni* and the twentieth-century *spaghetti* are attested in British English. The remaining terms, all of which come from the twentieth century, are predominantly American English. The reason for the differences is that the United States, in contrast to Britain and Poland, witnessed a mass migration of Southern Europeans towards the end of the nineteenth century. Thus, it was most probably direct contact that inspired the creation of such a number of terms for a single ethnic group. Incidentally, this may also be the reason why the Americans no longer appear to use those terms. Indeed, nowadays—in the age of political correctness—Western civilization nurtures diversity, at least in public discourse⁶. Hence, attributive ethnonyms can now be found primarily in dictionaries of colloquial speech, slang, or insults⁷, as well as on the Internet and as graffiti. This suggests that such terms belong to the lower registers of language, or even to something that Michael A.K. Halliday (1976) describes as **anti-language**, or the way of communicating within the **anti-society**, *i.e.*, people who feel excluded, rejected, or misunderstood by their fellow citizens or the authorities. In that case, the role of attributive ethnonyms would be to reinforce or replace physical aggression. We may therefore classify such terms as **dysphemisms**, words that, contrary to euphemisms, aim to aggravate an utterance (Allan, Burrige 1991).

However, this explanation does not account for the occurrence of all examples. An important clue about the context is the comment in one of the American dictionaries for the term *dothead* (“a person

5 Lit. “spaghetti-eater”.

6 Time will tell if the current migration crisis weakens political correctness.

7 See Spears (1991), Stomma (2000), Dalzell, Victor (2008), *etc.*

from India”), *macaroni* (“Italian”, from the name of the type of pasta in the form of tubes), *spear-chucker* (“African American”) and *taco* (“Mexican”, from the name of a dish⁸). The comment reads: “intended as jocular, perceived as offensive” (Spears 1991). While this thirty years old explanation may no longer be valid for the Americans, it seems to hold true for many Polish people, at least in the context of *makaroniarz*, a possible reason being the fact that for most Poles direct contact with people of Italian descent is limited and thus they can hardly ever experience the reaction of the target group. What is more, the inhabitants of Poland do not harbour any resentment towards Italians, in which case bad intentions would be more likely. To conclude, while referring to the axiological load of attributive ethnonyms it is vital to distinguish between how such items are interpreted by source group and by the target group.

Obviously, this does not mean that the users of attributive ethnonyms always have pure intentions. In many (if not most) cases they are well aware of the negative connotations the use of such a term is bound to evoke in the target group. As a matter of fact, they may deliberately strengthen the term’s derogatory load by modifying it. For example, while an air of scorn can be sensed in the above-mentioned twentieth-century Polish term *wielbłąd*, which alludes not only to the natural environment of the Middle East, but also to the alleged lower level of technology, it is not a match for the Am.E. *camel driver*, *camel jockey* and—especially—*camelfucker*, all of which developed in the last three decades of the twentieth century, when the U.S. got involved in the Middle Eastern affairs (Dalzell, Victor 2008). The latter term appears particularly offensive, since it adds a swearword and an innuendo suggesting a perverse sexual behaviour.

All of the above-mentioned ethnonyms have (or have had) their neutral, official counterparts. What happens, however, when two cultures that do not know each other meet? It turns out that in the lexicon of each of them is a gap that should be filled with an ethnonym describing the newly met community. Sometimes it is an attributive ethnonym ascribed consciously by a given group to the target group. A good example of this is the Slavonic ethnonym referring to Germany, which in the Polish language is *Niemcy*. There is no clear evidence concerning its origin, which may be the reason why it has an official status today. However, according to one of the most popular theories, the word was derived from the proto-Slavic **němь*, which originally meant a mute person (see Boryś, 2005). Thus, from the point of view of ancient Slavs, Germans—originally Germanic people and perhaps foreigners in general—are those who do not speak (a comprehensible language). By contrast, Slavs would be those who use (comprehensible) words. While this interpretation of the origin of the latter ethnonym, which derives from the proto-Slavic *slovo* (ultimately from the Proto-Indo-European **kleu-* “hear, glorify”) is not unanimously accepted (see Dove 2004: 257-263, Boryś 2005), it corresponds to the “us” vs. “them” opposition. Yet it may also happen that a culture takes ethnonym from another culture without being aware of its attributive origin. This happened in the case of the term which is the source of the Polish *Eskimos* and English *Eskimo*, which reached Europe in the sixteenth century thanks to Danish travellers. Interestingly, it does not come from the target group, but probably from one of the Algonquian languages, in which—according to the dominant theory—it meant “raw meat eaters” (Simpson, Weiner 2008). It was only in the 1970s that Canadian and American Eskimos, or *Inuit* as they call themselves, managed to replace the foreign term with their own in public discourse.

8 This one has also sexual associations.

Conclusions

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Language is a multi-faceted phenomenon and it seems that only an interdisciplinary approach allows for a better understanding of its functioning within a society. This is evident in the case of linguistic manifestations of ethnic otherness. Of course, this article contains only a handful of examples. They are, however, sufficient to show the role of cultural, social and situational aspects of context, without which it is impossible to make a comprehensive description of the analyzed phenomenon.

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MARLENA OLEKSIUK
University of Wrocław

Minorities in South Korea

Abstract

This case study explores the situation of foreigners living in South Korea. The aim of the article is to show how many foreigners live in South Korea and why they choose this country for their destination as well as how they are perceived by the Koreans. Today's homogeneous Korean society is the result of a long period of isolation as well as the Korean mentality, characterised by a sense of superiority grounded in a pride in the people's origins and traditions. Researchers today show that there is an increasing number of foreign residents in Korea, a country which attracts foreigners with its cultural richness, wide range of development opportunities and disposable income relative to tax. However, due to the Korean attachment to culture, people coming to the Korean Peninsula have difficulties adopting and developing careers and making friends with the natives. One important turning point in Korean history is the end of the Korean War, when the American army was stationed in various parts of the country for many years. It was the first time the Koreans had been forced to live with such a large group of foreigners from outside of Asia. It is estimated nowadays that about 96% of population of the Republic of South Korea are native Koreans. About two million foreigners make up the remaining 4%.

Keywords: South Korea, foreigners, immigrants, intercultural marriages, homogeneous society, assimilation.

1. Introduction

Although South Korea is still largely considered a demographically homogeneous country, it has one of the highest rates of increase in the number of people born abroad. Every year about thirty thousand foreign nationals obtain Korean citizenship. The population of South Korea is over fifty million people and despite that it is one of the most ethnically homogeneous countries in today's world (G.-S. Han, 2007). Furthermore, the vast popularity of marriage between Korean men and Asian women from other countries creates a field for discussion about the obviousness of nationality for younger generations of Koreans. Until the end of the nineteenth century, Korea had remained a closed kingdom and a need to open up to the West was brought about during the Japanese occupation in the early twentieth century; contact with the West was systematically intensified during the stationing of American troops within the state. It was not until the late 1980s that the country independently opened itself to the economic and cultural influences of the West, and in 1989 allowed unlimited emigration of the Korean people (K.-K.

Han, 2007). However, the immigrant population of Korea was still not perceived as a part of society, but only as tourists not planning to settle. Koreans are classified as an isolated nation, the Korean population being probably one of the most ethnically and linguistically uniform in the world. Part of Korean society believes that they are almost completely an ethnically pure nation, something which has visibly changed in recent years. The subject of foreign nationals is not always a welcome one: there are also opinions that foreigners are dangerous and even spread disease. However, with an increasing number of foreigners in Korea, these opinions, especially among younger generations, are in decline, giving Korean society the chance to become more diverse in terms both of nationality and perhaps also language (Seol, 2010).

A more interesting question might be who is coming to South Korea and why immigrants have started coming to Korea. It is worth pointing out that it is usually not easy for a foreigner to live in Korea without being perceived as an 'alien'. Koreans often use the word 'alien' instead of foreigner, so for immigrants it sounds unfriendly. In spite of the word alien being a legal term in English, there are various definitions of this word. The Oxford dictionary describes alien as:

1. Belonging to a foreign country
2. Unfamiliar and disturbing or distasteful
3. Supposedly from another world (The Oxford Dictionaries, 2018).

For people who do not come from countries where English is the mother tongue, the word alien could be associated with an unfriendly meaning. Koreans are the island among nations, but in their culture there is a certain distance from people from abroad as a result of the country being closed to other nations for many years (Kim, 2007; H.-K. Lee, 2008).

2. Minorities in South Korea: Background and Today's Situation

Nowadays, the populations of national minorities in South Korea are growing systematically. In May 2009, the number of foreign residents exceeded a million, at 1 106 884, according to research carried out in cooperation with the Ministry of Justice and Ministry of Public Administration and Defence. The majority are immigrants from China, with 71% of them being people of Korean origin who have Chinese citizenship. In general, the Chinese with Korean ethnicity make up 40.1% of foreigners in Korea and 41.4% of people with non-Korean nationalities, including those who have Korean citizenship, but not by birth. By 2013, the number of foreigners permanently residing in South Korea increased to 1 576 034 and in 2005, according to Statistics Korea, about 373 000 foreigners came to the country, of which 41.4% for economic reasons, 19.8% planned to stay for several months, 6.4% for permanent residence, and 5.2% intended to study in Korea. In September 2015, according to the Korean Ministry of Government Administration and Internal Affairs, the number of foreigners, including seasonal employees, exceeded 1.8 million people, and thus 3.4% of the population. Research conducted in August 2017 shows that the number of foreigners in South Korea dropped from 3.4% to 2.8%, half of whom were Chinese citizens, in a large part of Korean ethnicity. A significant group nowadays consists of immigrants from Vietnam—9.4% of foreigners in Korea. Thailand is in third place and Thai immigrants comprise 5.8% of foreigners living in Korea. The fourth largest national minorities in Korea are the Americans and the Filipinos. As a response to the rapid growth in South Korea's migrant population, academic and policy-related

discussions on multiculturalism are becoming increasingly significant. According to the Korea Times, the number of foreigners surpassed 1.76 million people in 2016 (The Korea Times, 2017).

3. Minorities in South Korea: Numbers and Professions

The structure of the Korean population underwent significant changes after the Second World War with its division, and then after the conclusion of a mutual defence agreement entered into by South Korea and the United States under which American armed forces were stationed in the country. South Korea's opening to immigrants from all over the world coincided with rapid economic and democratic development and far-reaching socio-political change. Since then, the number of foreigners has been constantly increasing. South Korea, one of the most economically developed countries, attracts people from all corners of the world (Lim, 2010). Although these are predominantly immigrants from Asian countries, a significant proportion also includes such nationals as Americans and Canadians. According to the data from worldatlas.com there are 69 000 foreigners from Central and Eastern Asia. The population of Russians is large, amounting to around 15 000 people. The largest group of foreigners in Korea, however, has always been the Chinese. In 2005, the Chinese population of South Korea amounted to 697 000, which brought them close to 55 % of all foreigners in the country (Korean Ministry of Justice, 1993; 2013). This value has showed a clear downward trend in recent years, caused by both emigration and a very low local native Korean birth rate, as well as increasing immigration on the part of foreigners. A large proportion of the Chinese population in Korea are labourers, occupying mainly Seoul, but resident also in many other parts of the country where they can count on facilities such as Chinese schools. The second largest group of foreigners are equally Americans and Vietnamese (each group over 7%). The purpose of stay of Americans in South Korea may have a very different character—some of them are in military service, others work in specialist positions, others are simply tourists (Kim, 2011). The American population, despite extremely strict restrictions regarding non-Asian immigrants, amounts to 150 778. There are 28 500 military personnel and civilian employees from the United States throughout the country, of which more and more are settling in Korea along with their families. (Statistics Korea, 2013). Most of them have come to Korea to teach English as native speakers of the language. Vietnamese men are primarily unskilled workers, while

Vietnamese women come to Korea to marry, according to the Chosunilbo, one of the most famous newspaper in South Korea (The Chosunilbo, 2007). The fourth largest group of foreigners are Thai, who constitute about 5 % of the foreign population. Next in order are other Asian nationalities, such as Filipinos or Japanese. Men from South Asian countries often come to South Korea to perform the so-called 3-D jobs (dirty, dangerous and demeaning) (Lee, 2008).

This is because the majority of residents have moved to urbanised areas seeking employment in corporations, leaving behind a shortage of workers in factories or construction companies. They are mainly residents of Vietnam, the Philippines and Thailand. They find employment mainly in the industrial suburbs of Gyeonggi-do in Ansan (Kim, 2011). The most numerous non-Asian minorities apart from Americans are Canadians and Australians, and groups from Europe—the British and the French. There is also a group, albeit not a large one, of immigrants in South Korea from Poland (Lim, 2010). According

to OECD report *Trend in International Migration* this minority in Korea can currently be numbered at around 5 000 to 6 000 (OECD iLibrary, 2004). The presence of Poles may be indicative of the fact that they have somewhat opened themselves to Poland. They are certainly a group of people whose reasons for emigrating to Korea could be numerous. One could be economic, as Korean companies have entered the stage of expansion and have been successful in European markets, making huge investments in Poland, as did for example LG and Samsung. Most Polish immigrants seem to have another reason to migrate—their Korean spouse. Some couples constantly travel between Poland and Korea, living a few years alternately in each country. The largest group of foreigners in Korea live in Seoul. They have their streets or housing estates there. The most recognisable of them are: Filipino Street, Chinatown, Japanese village, French village, Nigerian street, Islamic street, German Society, Mongolian Tower, Nepalese street or people from Central and Eastern Asia. In these places there are many restaurants with food from their native countries, coupled with numerous institutions where the personnel speak these languages. The communities of foreigners usually try to assimilate into Korean society, simultaneously maintaining their own cultural heritage. Ties within the community are strong; members help each other and help those who are just starting life in Korea (Seol, 2010). Such mini-towns ease immigrants' adaptation to life in Korea. Many communities establish Korean schools for children from their mini-cities to help them better assimilate into society by learning the Korean language, history, traditions and culture and prevent them from being isolated. These communities, however, also organise events and performances to cultivate their cultures and traditions (G.-S. Han, 2007).

Like many other countries before it, Korea has woken up to the fact that in order to keep social cohesion strong, there needs to be some process to assist new arrivals with integration. To that end, the Korea Immigration Service Foundation was established to, among other aims, assist citizens of other countries residing in Korea to feel at home here, which includes plans to develop better understanding of immigrant by Koreans and vice-versa.

The Korean Immigration and Integration Program (KIIP) is part of that plan. This program is designed and implemented by the Ministry of Justice, through its Social Integration Division. The program consists of two halves: Korean language training and Understanding Korean Society (Korean Ministry of Justice, 2013).

Koreans claims that assimilation into society is achieved not only through learning about language and culture, but also through marriages between foreigners and Koreans. The number of marriages between foreigners and Koreans has been steadily increasing over the past few years. In 2005, 14% of all marriages in South Korea were marriages with foreigners, totaling about 26 000 marriages. Most of them were between Korean men with other Asian women from poorer backgrounds. The number of immigrants who come to Korea to teach English has grown from less than 1 000 people in 1988 to over 20 000 at the beginning of the 20th century (Ministry of Employment and Labour, 2010).

As a response to the rapid growth in South Korea's migrant population, academic and policy-related discussions on multiculturalism are becoming increasingly significant. However, the term is used in a rather different way than in Australia, Canada or Europe. It refers to a specific category of people, namely marriage migrants, rather than expressing a social value or a foundation of government policy (Castles *et al.*, 2012).

4. Minorities in South Korea: Korean Immigration Law

Korean immigration law is very strict, especially for non-Asian people. Koreans also have reservations about marrying people from outside of Asia, as can be seen in the stricter provision regarding the granting of citizenship through marriage. The government has imposed regulations on people applying for citizenship by introducing, inter alia, two prerequisites: the first is taking a language exam and passing it with a high score; the second condition concerns the financial situation of a person applying for citizenship after obtaining the marriage certificate (Watson, 2010). A foreign spouse must earn at least \$14 000 annually. These measures are designed to prevent the main causes of conflicts of such mixed marriages, such as communication problems and low income. A significant proportion of immigrants come to Korea for the prospect of a well-paid job, both blue collar workers and those considered to be white collar workers lured by the opportunity to develop promising careers (Korean Ministry of Justice, 2013). The Guardian published an article, which states that

South Koreans workers have some of the longest weeks among members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, behind only Mexico. South Koreans still work about 400 more hours a year compared with workers in the UK and Australia, about 10 additional standard work weeks. (The Guardian, 1 March 2018).

The immigrants are often unaware of the Korean work ethic, which is hard to understand for people from a different culture. This leads to an inability to adapt to and meet the high expectations. Discrimination against employees from abroad is a common occurrence. The lack of legal regulations guaranteeing the equality of foreign and Korean employees is still visible (Ministry of Employment and Labour, 2010). A frequent problem is the disrespectful attitude of employers and supervisors towards employees of other nationalities, which in extreme cases may even manifest in non-payment of wages.

In 2008, South Korea introduced the Act on Support for Multicultural Families, designed to form the basis of support for 'stable family living' (Article 1 of Support for Multicultural Families Act).

This Act is indeed the only law that provides a legal definition of *the multicultural* in the South Korean legal system by defining *a multicultural family* as a family comprised of a Korean national and a foreigner (or a Korean national naturalised through marriage) who has a marital relationship with the former (Article 2).

At present, marriage migration seems to be declining, and fewer local authorities are subsidising it. Marriage migration gives rise to 'multicultural families', which are seen as problematic by many Koreans, because they go against their belief in ethnic homogeneity. A central policy problem is thus to ensure that foreign mothers are able to bring up their children to speak the Korean language and to conform to Korean cultural values (Bélanger *et al.*, 2010).

5. Minorities in South Korea: Korean Perception of Foreigners

Due to its Confucian roots Korean society still has problems with accepting immigrants, which means that people from other cultural backgrounds, raised to respect other values, have problems with adapting to the local lifestyle (K.-K. Han, 2007). At the same time, the manner in which Koreans classify foreigners,

dividing them primarily according to skin colour, and secondarily according to nationality, which together with subjective assessment based on stereotypes is the basis of their attitude and behaviour towards foreigners, is clearly visible (Kim, 2007). Fortunately, the young generation of Koreans

(...) seems to be characterized by a much greater openness and gives hope' for changes in relation to foreigners in their country in the coming years. Many saunas or public pools and even bars do not allow foreigners, for which the only given reason is lack of Korean citizenship (Watson, 2012).

Korean employers openly admit that they prefer to give a job to a Korean, rather than a person from abroad with the same qualifications. A person without a good education, knowledge of English, Korean and at least the basics of Korean culture may have problems finding employment. Discriminatory behaviour often does not result in any legal consequences and public awareness of such behaviour is very limited. Foreigners living in South Korea try to highlight the problem to the government, but their efforts to push legislation have so far failed. On the other hand, it is worth mentioning that Koreans, despite this, do not hate foreigners; their reluctance towards immigrants is rooted in the Korean cultural and national identity rather than anything else. Many foreigners find Koreans very polite and welcoming (Amnesty International, 2009).

6. Minorities in South Korea. Conclusions.

This case study explores the situation of minorities living in South Korea. Although living in South Korea is not easy for a foreigner, many of them find this country very interesting. South Korea became an even more attractive after the World Cup was held there in 2002. The country invested in intense self-promotion, expanded its touristic appeal, as well as being home to a burgeoning Korean pop culture. A country with a strong economic standing is an attractive destination, as it provides high standards of living and many opportunities for development on the labour market as well as on a personal level. Moreover, many media and government initiatives are being developed with the aim to show the value of other nationalities in Korean society and to tackle the problem of Korean citizens' behaviour towards foreigners, an example of which are movies with foreign actors and talk-shows with guests from outside Korea. Foreigners willingly come to Korea for a variety of reasons, ranging from tourism to employment. According to many researchers and sources the number of foreigners in South Korea is still increasing and will soon reach 2 million people.

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MONIKA PIECHOTA

Committee for Philology, Polish Academy of Sciences, Wrocław Branch

A Socio-Cultural Aspect of Anti-language

Abstract

The article has been devoted to the phenomenon of anti-language and the focal point of the paper refers to the analysis of socio-cultural processes involved in the formation and reception of anti-language. The analysis has been aimed at defining the circumstances of the occurrence of anti-language as well as determining its role and functions at both individual and collective levels. My general approach to the study of anti-language outlines the social functions which govern the emergence of anti-languages with the explicit reference to language, context and text. Kenneth Burke (1966) defines man as a symbol-using animal. In his “Definition of Man”, Burke draws attention to the concept of negativity when he argues that negatives do not occur in nature and they are solely a product of human symbol systems. According to Burke, “(...) language and the negative ‘invented’ man (...)” (Burke 1966: 9). The study has begun with the premise that anti-language permanently depicts an antagonistic attitude towards the official language, whereas the negative attitude towards anti-language translates directly into stigmatisation of its users. The negativity of the affix *anti*—in anti-language has been culturally and socially structured as antithetical to language. Nevertheless, language and anti-language do not necessarily forge a typical antithesis in a polar sense. Victor Turner (/1969/ 1975) employs the affix *anti*—for his term *anti-structure* and explains that the affix has been used strategically and does not imply radical negation. This paper seeks to revise the one-dimensional attitude towards anti-language and fortify its social significance with a new quality. The basis for the study of anti-language has been its multi-functionality and multifaceted character. A small corpus of anti-languages has been analysed in order to illustrate a complex and polysemic nature of this phenomenon.

Keywords: anti-language, pragmatics, sociolinguistics, stigmatisation, multi-functionality, polysemy, the negative, symbol, culture, taboo.

The study of anti-languages, which I undertook two years ago while collecting research material for my M.A. thesis, has embraced the social and cultural facets of this linguistic phenomenon. The study began with the premise that anti-language permanently depicted an antagonistic attitude towards, what I conventionally termed, the norm language, and that the negative attitude towards anti-languages translated directly into stigmatisation of its users. As a result, my first and foremost priority was to revise the one-dimensional attitude towards anti-language and distinguish a typology of anti-languages according to their functional features.

The concept of anti-language was first defined and researched by Michael Alexander Kirkwood Halliday (1978), who employed the term to describe the *lingua franca* of an anti-society. Halliday (1978) argues that anti-language and anti-society are a matter of choice, “conscious alternative” (Halliday 1978:

164) to conventions and standards imposed and exercised in the norm society. What anti-language and the norm language share in common is their social DNA, although, as Halliday asserts, “[i]n all languages, words, sounds, and structures tend to become charged with social value; it is to be expected that, in the anti-language, the social value will be more clearly foregrounded” (Halliday 1978: 166). Anti-language, due to its low social affiliation, may not have seemed an attractive object of interest to linguists who often reduced its linguistic diversity to merely a secret code developed and sustained only to insulate a marginalised community. The biased tone may have been the result of a preconceived approach to anti-language, the approach preserved both in culture and language. Bronisław Geremek (1980) argues that the mere fact of selecting a secret code for communication is immediately perceived as suspicious, and a potential threat to the social stability and *status quo*. Obscurity and ambiguity of language may activate a negative attitude and suspiciousness on the verge of taboo. Daniel Heller-Roazen (2013) isolates a divine element in the special (i.e. secret) uses of language when he employs a narrative in which both gods and men used to denote the same things in a different manner:

The truth, however, is that within the terrain circumscribed by a grammar, obscure expressions can always be invented. They can, moreover, proliferate without end, for the parts of speech can be recomposed in infinitely new ways. The oldest literatures of the Indo-European traditions suggest, in striking unison, that the true masters of such obscure expressions are divine. A corpus of ancient sources leads one to believe that the gods of the ancient Greeks, Celts, Norsemen, Indians, and Anatolians, in particular, employed a set of special terms and phrases that were at once similar in form to those commonly recorded in human tongues and noticeably distinct from them. (Heller-Roazen 2013: 84)

Secret language, being attributive to gods, might also be useful as a kind of smoke screen through which poets could skillfully avoid or camouflage words and expressions identified in society as taboo. Presumably, one of the methods to avert the danger and to avoid the punishment was to employ a ciphered code, which had the effect of a ritual protecting communities and individuals from the unavoidable consequences in case of breaching the taboo, although, at the same time, the code could have become the source of taboo itself. The desire to maintain secrecy and conceal the true significance of signs whilst retaining the faculty of communicating messages lay behind the creation of *nomina sacra*. In his essay, titled “The Origin of the *Nomina Sacra*: A Proposal,” Larry Hurtado (1998) defines *nomina sacra* as: “(...) a collection of words (...) written in special abbreviated forms in Christian sources to indicate their sacred character” (Hurtado 1998: 655). The origin of the Christian *nomina sacra* can be traced to Jewish scribal practice. Hurtado refers to Jewish scribal approach to the *Tetragrammaton* as to the name which should be preserved from uttering. The four-letter abbreviation was often replaced by other signs or simply avoided, which expressed the great devotion of the scribes. As Heller-Roazen (2013) notices, the Christian *nomina sacra* “(...) illustrate[s] a linguistic phenomenon that is by all accounts more general” (Heller-Roazen 2013: 105). Heller-Roazen (2013) refers to lexical taboos which are strictly prohibited, and yet, since the imposed silence surrounding such words and phrases cannot be fully guaranteed, “(...) a set of substitutions is also required” (Heller-Roazen 2013: 105). These substitutions may be classified as linguistic euphemisms for the unexpressed taboo words through which social order is being maintained. Certainly, the purposes for which secret codes are applied can be of strictly pragmatic provenience. Daniel Heller-Roazen (2013) recalls the examples of Julius Caesar’s cipher and its simpler version used by Caesar’s nephew, Augustus, as the instances of encryption techniques

employed to protect messages of military significance against their decoding by the enemies. Another example provided by Heller-Roazen (2013) is the practice of *atbash* which rests upon a similar principle as the Caesar's cipher. Richard C. Steiner (1996) mentions two editions of the *Book of Jeremiah*, namely the Masoretic text and the Old Greek version, indicating that the *atbash* code-words may illuminate the milieu of the two editors. The analysis of the two *atbash* code-words for Babylon sheds light not only on historical and social background of the text but it also indicates different function of this kind of anti-language. On the one hand, it is employed for fear of repression; on the other hand, it serves as a tool for deriding the old ruler and legitimising the new one. The above examples may suggest that secrecy in anti-languages operates at multiple levels. According to Michael Alexander Kirkwood Halliday (1978), "(...) secrecy is a necessary strategic property of anti-languages, yet, it is unlikely to be the major cause of their existence" (Halliday 1978: 166).

Anti-language has earned the status of a social dialect, a distinctive linguistic category which tells the history of a community that has developed it. The notion of anti-language complements the notion of a speech community by incorporating social dialects, taboo phrases, imprecatory passages as well as sacred names or poetic signs and by suggesting a heterogeneous world-view embedded in both language and community. Language relates common experiences and different backgrounds and it reflects modes of thinking and ways of living. Florian Coulmas (2013) postulates to view languages as resources dependent on the reference group as well as the functional potential of language. The use of slang, for instance, as being one of the anti-language types, is no longer restricted to confined sub-groups of teenagers, soldiers or inmates. Slang has won approval among world-famous trendsetting musicians as well as in the unrestrained realm of global communication facilitated through social networks. Anti-language, or rather its elements smuggled in the mainstream literature, may provide diversity and contribute to individuals' development as well as broaden their intellectual awareness. Novels such as *White and Red* by Dorota Masłowska (2002), *Pigeon English* by Stephen Kelman (2011) or *Orange Is the New Black: My Year in a Women's Prison* by Piper Kerman (/2010/ 2014) introduce their readers to the microcosm of a large city, gang-ruled estate and a federal prison through anti-language indeed. Applying anti-language to portray certain national or local vices and stereotypes may be convincing, genuine and helpful in emotional and symbolic confrontation with understatements and euphemisms. Once spoken language of the social outcasts and underclass, the status and prestige of anti-language have become upgraded by adopting it into the written form. It seems justified to point out the fact that the concept of prestige is a subjective criterion based on value-laden determinants. Socrates¹, a classic Athenian philosopher, perceived writing as a record of ignorance and a source of obscurity as written words were deprived of a crucial propriety of dialogue and discourse which features speech. Daniel Heller-Roazen (2013) describes the procedure of guarding secret messages in the Vedic religion in which knowledge is intended to be communicated to memory through hearing. Therefore, it appears that great prestige is granted to sounds and oral transmission. The knowledge of Druids, highly regarded members of Celtic communities, was not intended for the masses and it would be against the law to commit it to writing. Nonetheless, in certain circumstances, only a written record could reinforce the anticipated power. In this context, it is worth mentioning curse tablets which constitute a distinct instance of anti-language employed to prevent anticipated future defeats. It should be clearly indicated that the main motivation

1 *The Phaedrus* by Plato. [In:] "Plato in Twelve Volumes," Vol. 9 [274c-277a] translated by Harold N. Fowler. Retrieved on 1 May, 2018 from: <http://www.perseus.tufts.edu>

of the *defigens*² was to restrain or inhibit the victim and not to destroy them. The curse tablets address gods and the deceased as well as provide valuable information concerning ordinary provincial citizens from different parts of the Greco-Roman world. Christopher A. Faraone (1997) provides an analysis of the function and social context of the curse tablets (which he refers to as *defixio* to mean “binding spells”) in early Greek society. According to Faraone (1997), it is possible that the early *defixiones* were purely verbal and had a form of recited formulae performed during a ritual. As literacy gradually spread in the classical period, the verbal spells became transformed into more sophisticated written formulae. Although functioning in the underground (literally and metaphorically), curse tablets constituted a vital part of cultural and religious life of the ancient Greek society. Faraone (1997) interprets secrecy as a part of the traditional social ritual procedure which accompanied communication with gods. However, neither magic nor religion ably assisted in evaluating the cultural phenomenon of early Greek *defixiones*. Faraone (1997) argues that the rationale for this kind of ritual is based on “(...) strong belief in the persuasive power of certain kinds of formulaic language” (Faraone 1997: 8). The formulae employed in the case of curse tablets prove it difficult to distinguish magic from religion. Obviously, the language of curse tablets constitutes not so much a secret language, although “(...) the addition of any and all foreign-sounding deities, epithets and *voces magicae* was thought to increase the efficacy of every ‘magical’ operation” (Faraone, 1997: 6), but a fixed form which guarantees success of the spell. Faraone (1997) suggests that the text of the binding formulae was stripped of unnecessary supplements in order to render the message more effective.

People use their language in order to achieve different aims and, for that reason, “[a]ll use of language has a context” (Halliday [1985/1989: 45]) One of the most vivid instances of functional language is a text. Halliday (1985/1989) refers to a text as to any example of living language which is made of meanings set in the context of situation and culture. A literary text is an exceptional form of language exchange between an author—a character—and a reader. This form of exchange is of a dialogical nature and thus furnishes the interaction between the participants. In order to summarise the function of a literary text in the sociolinguistic and cultural development of a human being, it seems justified to apply Pinker’s (1999/2000) definition of speech in the reference to literature: when we commune with a literary text, “(...) we can be led to think thoughts that have never been thought before and that never would have occurred to us on our own” (Pinker 1999/2000: 1). Moreover, Roger Fowler (1981) postulates to “(...) relocate literary discourse within semiotic resources of their society” (Fowler 1981: 199) and return literature to the community. In order to do so, it is necessary to emphasise the communicative aspect of literature and relate the literary texts to the experience of readers. For Mikhail Bakhtin ([1975] 1981), a novel can be defined as diversity of languages which internally interweave and translate into social dialect. Roger Fowler (1981) views literature as a discourse and, thus, as a process of communication. In accordance with Roger Fowler’s attitude to literary discourse, my aim has been to emphasise the synergistic dimensions of texts: “[t]o treat literature as discourse is to see the text as mediating relationships between language-users: not only relationships of speech, but also of consciousness, ideology, role and class. The text ceases to be an object and becomes an action or process” (Fowler 1981: 80). My objective has been to re-determine the concept of anti-language in the light of literary dialogue and social imaginaries. The term *social imaginary* has been introduced by Charles Taylor (2004) to explore the structure of modern life in the West as well as multiple modernities around the world. Through the concept of social imaginaries, Taylor accounts

2 “The *defigens*—lit. “the one who binds” (Faraone [1997: 5]).

for the differences among modernities. The Western social imaginaries are animated by different orders whose imposition is justified by means of mutual benefits. Wojciech Burszta (2008) refers to the concept of a culture trap or a culture dictate which compels people to form their identities in collective ideas, clear signs and symbols. According to Burszta, all traditional senses ascribed to culture have become gorgonised by social imaginary (Burszta 2008: 156). Nonetheless, literary discourse provides a platform where prevalent meanings and common denotations can be negotiated in an active way. It was Bakhtin ([1975] 1981) who claimed that “[a] passive understanding of linguistic meaning is no understanding at all, it is only the abstract aspect of meaning (...). In the actual life of speech, every concrete act of understanding is active (...). Understanding comes to fruition only in the response” (Bakhtin [1975] 1981: 281–282). The material subjected to the analysis in the context of a typology of anti-languages encompasses two novels:

- *Room*, a 2010 novel by an Irish-Canadian author, Emma Donoghue;
- *Pigeon English*, a 2011 novel by an English author, Stephen Kelman.

Both novels constitute an accurate example of literature which is preoccupied with language as an evolving process by contrast to literature which reinforces an already established idea of what language should be. Jacob Mey (/1993/ 1994) speaks of “wording the world” when he maintains that words are not merely designations of things but they are interaction with the speaker’s environment (Mey /1993/ 1994: 301). Emma Donoghue adopts a child’s language to de-charm the anti-language, re-context it and render it more penetrable and less esoteric to the reader. The process of de-charming involves an experiment with language, which is an infrequent procedure in literary fiction. Reference may be made to Irvine Welsh and his novel *Trainspotting* (1993) narrated in Scottish English with dialogues transcribed phonetically or Anthony Burgess and his novel *A Clockwork Orange* (1962) written in a fictional argot, Nadsat. Obviously, in each case slang performs different roles and fulfils different functions. Yet, what integrates the linguistic experiments is an attempt to explore the relationship between language and authenticity. Roger Fowler (1981) determines anti-language to be a process rather than a code (Fowler 1981: 157). Language, thus, becomes comprehensible through the functions it fulfils, the same as the nature of language can be defined through the interactions it enables. The meaning is derived not merely from what people say, but, first and foremost, how they say it, when they say it, where they say it, and why they say it. Hence, language can be understood and acquired through the functions it serves and through the cultural and social milieu in which it is applied. Stanisław Grabias (/1997/ 2001) recognises not only the social character of language but also its interpretative nature towards reality, both at the collective and individual levels. Jean Piaget ([1927] 1971) determines speech as “a collective institution” and Adam Heinz (1978) maintains that words enable thinking in the same way as numbers enable counting. Language, from such perspective, does not reflect reality but it creates it. The process of denoting reality may be analysed from different perspectives. Daniel Heller-Roazen (2013) mentions the medieval performers of Old Occitan lyric poetry, the troubadours,³ whose secret language involved *senhals*, by which their identity was concealed. The term *senhal* was forged by a group of the fourteenth-century poets from Toulouse, who documented the troubadour poetic verses, and it denotes “(...) the troubadour procedure of substituting one name for another” (Heller-Roazen 2013: 49). In the same

3 “(...) poets of the eleventh, twelfth, thirteenth, and fourteenth centuries who, (...), called themselves “troubadours”: according to the most accepted etymology, “finders” or “inventors,” named after the Old Occitan verb trobar, “to find.” (Heller-Roazen, 2013: 45–46)

way as contemporary poets and composers, troubadours possessed the skill and ability to manipulate reality. Hence, they could compose, transform and, finally, invent a convincing picture of reality in order to support different needs and expectations. The prime device, by means of which it could have been achieved, was language. Due to their peripatetic lifestyle, troubadours had an opportunity to witness the numerous disparate realities and the applied *senhals* functioned as indicative marks of their experiences. Heller-Roazen (2013) defines the function of *senhals* as of “founders” of unnamed reality. By naming what has been unnamed, a *senhal* becomes equally an addressee and an addresser of the reality. Stephen Kelman (2011) employs social stratification in his novel by means of language. Kelman places his main character in a relatively clichéd environment for immigrants in London. The social status of the newcomers is limited and, simultaneously, clarified by the descriptions of their physical milieu. Yet, Kelman’s protagonist is not a voiceless anonymous outlander but he is granted viewpoints capable of challenging the reader’s ideology. Although Stephen Kelman applies linguistic mechanisms to reproduce and consolidate differences and stereotypes, his main character displays in anti-language authentic naivety, vivid imagination and unconstrained faith in the power of words. The anti-language of slang is used as a tool employed to negotiate systems and hierarchies. Furthermore, the concept of anti-language may determine a reversed situation—from the incomprehensible children to confusing messages of adults. The situation of such reversal is perceptible in the narration of Jack, the protagonist of Emma Donoghue’s *Room*. The transition from being incomprehensible to adults is reversed into the situation when the language of adults turns out to be at variance with the child’s code. Emma Donoghue juxtaposes two linguistic worlds: the world of a child and the world of adults. For Jack, the language of adults does not make much sense, thus, it can be perceived by the boy as anti-language because it does not denote things and situations as clearly and directly as his language does, hence, it does not fulfil its elementary function of being communicative. Childhood may be perceived as a primitive, savage stage in the development of a human being. The stage implies experiments and challenges. Underprivileged languages, such as slang, become an expression of social tension and deprivation, yet, a vigorous deformation of the norm language can be perceived and experienced on the verge of poetry. Muriel Saville-Troike (/1982/ 2003) draws attention to the fact that “(...) language attitudes are acquired in the process of enculturation in a particular speech community, and are thus basic to its characterization” (Saville-Troike /1982/ 2003: 183). In the Dark Ages, secrecy and the procedure of deliberate language enciphering constituted a discernible domain of law-breakers of various types. In regard to common frauds and tricksters, secrecy was employed to conceal illegal activities and to evade justice. Nonetheless, in case of the Burgundian vagabonds, known under the name Coquillars,⁴ a secret jargon was devised as a remarkably efficient technique employed to commit unremarkable crimes. Anti-language, as a hermetic form of speech, may oscillate between blasphemy and poetry, evidence of which can be submitted through the character of François Villon for whom the rogue tongue became the medium of verse. Thus, the linguistic decipherment is inevitably followed by the social recognition. The interrelation of language and its societal context is consistent with Mey’s (/1993/ 1994) interpretation of pragmatics as: “(...) the science of language inasmuch as that science focuses on the language-using *human* (...). [P]ragmatics is interested in the process of producing language and in its producers, not just in the end-product, language.” (Mey /1993/ 1994: 35). Bronisław Geremek (1980) delineates a literary mode for the anti-language of beggars and vagabonds in the medieval Arabic literature

4 It was a company of bandits and wrongdoers, who prowled the streets of the Burgundian capital in the fifteenth century of Common Era.

from the tenth century of the Common Era. Michael Alexander Kirkwood Halliday (1978) points out to an entertaining effect of particular anti-languages and evokes Gobbledygook, a secret comic tongue of the Victorian working-class. Daniel Heller-Roazen (2013) argues that cant shares something with poetry and can be perceived as a form of art. The significance and pleasure of the practice referring to encrypting texts was recognized and explored by the seventh-century grammarian, Virgilius Maro Grammaticus (quoted in Heller-Roazen [2013: 96]):

Virgilius listed, in didactic terms, at least three reasons for such practices: “First, so that we may test the ingenuity of our students in searching out and identifying obscure points; second, for the ornamentation and reinforcement of eloquence; third, lest mystical matters, which should be revealed solely to the initiated, be discovered easily by base and stupid people.” (Heller-Roazen 2013: 96)

Additionally, it is worth noticing a peculiar status of dialects which, on the one hand, provide a sense of community to a group and, on the other hand, they can prevent communication between groups. From the societal point of view, it is profoundly important to acknowledge and elucidate this capacity of human beings to use the same device in order to communicate, consolidate and co-operate as well as to conceal, confuse and obfuscate the message.

In summary, my aim has been to contra-pose the formulaic confidence that anti-language solely corrupts standard language, values and perceptions. Although, an apparent purification of colloquial vernaculars into literary languages may be perceived as a treacherous attempt to standardise them, the truth is that a common fate for slang words is their assimilation into standard speech. Since humans learn language in a social environment, not in isolation, it can therefore be assumed that people use their languages in order to achieve different aims. Ultimately, the functions of language derive directly from social interactions and, therefore, language becomes a mode of behaviour by which a speaker evolves from a mere proprietor of language into its active user and communicator⁵. The act of attaching and detaching meaning to selected types of language is a socially-constituted process, which means that any boundaries imposed on language derive directly from the social structure. Vernacular speech, similar to race, gender and age, is a social marker that gives rise to discrimination. A low or high status is assigned to a language on the basis of ideology, current politics, fashion and other social factors whose meaning can be defined in relation to time and history. Florian Coulmas (2013) draws attention to the fact that the vector of dependence is oriented from speakers to language and not from language to speakers. The significance and efficacy of anti-language should not be indisputably devaluated on the premise that it is reserved exclusively to socially marginalised people. Halliday (1978) employs the notion of metonymy to explain the anti-society relation towards society. Anti-society is a metonymic extension of society within the social system whereas structurally both anti-society and anti-language remain metaphors for the society and language. Dawid, one of the characters in the Polish drama film titled “Symmetry,”⁶ when asked by his fellow inmate to legitimise an inconsistent and precarious character of law and order of the world, replies that the world does not make any sense and people have to provide the meaning by themselves.

5 The word communication is derived from Latin *communicare* ‘to share, divide out (...)’ and literally it means ‘to make common’, ‘to make public’—from the *Online Etymology Dictionary*, retrieved 15 March 2018.

6 *Symmetry* is the Polish drama film from 2004, directed by Konrad Niewolski and produced by SPI International Polska Em Studio in 2003.

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MAŁGORZATA SANKOWSKA-JACKIEWICZ
Escuela Superior de Filología de Wrocław

Análisis contrastivo de la selección modal en las oraciones subordinadas afirmativas introducidas por los verbos creer/*credere* y pensar/*pensare* en español e italiano en los periódicos en línea

Abstract

Contrastive analysis of mood selection in affirmative subordinated sentences following verbs *creer/credere*, *pensar/pensare* (to think) in Spanish and Italian language in online newspapers.

The use of moods in Spanish and Italian is one of the most problematic issues for learners, particularly for those who study these two languages at the same time. They will encounter numerous similarities and differences between the use of subjunctive and indicative which can lead to linguistic mistakes. What's more, mood selection is a concept which they need to know not only from grammatical point of view, but they also have to understand its semantic, pragmatic and cultural aspects. The objective of this paper is to compare and contrast the alternation between subjunctive and indicative moods in affirmative sentences following verbs *creer*, *credere*, *pensar*, *pensare* (to think) in Spanish and Italian language in articles from online newspapers. The choice of examples to analyse from articles from online press will enable us to draw conclusions about shifting moods in the contemporary language and to observe presumed crisis of subjunctive mood in these two languages. We have confined the analysis to these two verbs of thinking and opinions, as they seem to play the same pragmatic role in Spanish and Italian, but they influence differently on the mood selection in these two languages.

Keywords: subjunctive, indicative, mood selection, verbs of thinking and opinions.

1. Introducción

El objetivo del presente artículo será llevar a cabo un análisis contrastivo entre la alternancia de los modos indicativo y subjuntivo/congiuntivo en las oraciones subordinadas sustantivas en español e italiano

introducidas por dos verbos de pensamiento: creer/*credere* y pensar/*pensare*, basándonos en los ejemplos de la prensa actual.

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En primer lugar, hay que destacar la particularidad y, asimismo, la necesidad de los estudios contrastivos entre español e italiano, que en muchos aspectos, como por ejemplo el uso de los modos, parecen lenguas muy afines, ya que, de hecho, se pueden observar muchas similitudes. Sin embargo, esta aparente afinidad puede llevar a muchos errores de los italianos que estudian español y viceversa. Vale la pena añadir que hoy en día muchos alumnos estudian dos lenguas extranjeras o más y con frecuencia eligen español e italiano simultáneamente, al ser unos de los idiomas más populares en Europa. Por lo tanto, por ejemplo los ingleses o polacos que estudian español e italiano al mismo tiempo, van a encontrarse con similitudes y diferencias sorprendentes, que pueden constituir la causa de errores lingüísticos. Además de la utilidad didáctica, los estudios contrastivos entre estas dos lenguas pueden arrojar la luz sobre la evolución de las lenguas, su situación actual y, de este modo, permitir las previsiones en cuanto al futuro de ciertos fenómenos lingüísticos.

Uno de los aspectos más problemáticos para los estudiantes de español y/o italiano resulta ser la alternancia de los modos indicativo y subjuntivo/congiuntivo. Es un concepto que deben conocer no solo desde la perspectiva de la gramática, sino también tienen que familiarizarse y entender sus aspectos semánticos, pragmáticos e incluso socio-culturales. Para los fines de este artículo, hemos decidido concentrarnos solo en la alternancia modal en las oraciones de pensamiento, ya que es un campo donde se pueden notar muchas diferencias interesantes entre español e italiano, desde el punto de vista gramatical, semántico, pragmático y conceptual.

2. Modo y modalidad. Las definiciones del subjuntivo/congiuntivo en español e italiano

Como vamos a analizar la alternancia modal, primero cabe marcar la diferencia entre el modo y la modalidad. Tradicionalmente se solía distinguir entre el *dictum*, entendido como el contenido del enunciado, y el *modus*, es decir la actitud del hablante (RAE 2010: 793). Hoy en día, la lingüística moderna discierne entre el modo y la modalidad. Siguiendo a Nowikow y Pamies Bertrán (2015: 15), “los modos son determinadas conjugaciones verbales que solo se dan en ciertas lenguas, mientras que las modalidades son significados que expresan tipos de vinculación entre una acción y su realización”. Entonces, el modo es un concepto de naturaleza morfosintáctica, a diferencia de la modalidad, que es un concepto semántico. Además, la modalidad, como subraya Malinowska (1996: 35), es un requisito semántico indispensable para cada intento comunicativo y la comunicación no puede ocurrir sin él. La autora (*ibid.*, 39) explica la diferencia entre estos dos términos basándose en los siguientes ejemplos:

- a) “Voglio che Carlo guarisca presto.”
- b) Credo che Carlo guarisca presto.”

Ambos ejemplos presentan el mismo *dictum*, pero es la modalidad la que difiere: en el a) se refleja la modalidad deóntica, mientras que en el b) la epistémica (*ibid.*). Nótese que en la lengua española en el enunciado b) no se emplearía subjuntivo, como en italiano, lo que analizaremos más adelante.

Para comprender la diferencia entre indicativo y subjuntivo/congiuntivo recurrimos a las gramáticas del español e italiano. Se puede notar que en la lingüística tradicional, a la hora de describir las características del subjuntivo, predomina el aspecto sintáctico, es decir la subordinación de este modo.

Salvá (1847: 167), por ejemplo, destaca la dependencia del subjuntivo y la independencia del indicativo: “el indicativo expresa la idea del verbo sin dependencia del otro mientras que el subjuntivo tiene que ir unido a otro verbo, bien explícito, bien sobreentendido, que lo determina y con el cual se enlaza por medio de una partícula conjuntiva.” No obstante, sabemos perfectamente que tanto en español como en italiano existen situaciones en las que usamos el subjuntivo/*congiuntivo* en las oraciones independientes y el indicativo en las oraciones subordinadas, pues el concepto de subordinación no es suficiente para describir la naturaleza del modo subjuntivo. Obsérvese:

- a) Quizás lo haga. (subjuntivo en la oración independiente)
- b) Non lo avessi mai detto. (congiuntivo en la oración independiente)
- c) Piensa que es fácil. (indicativo en la oración subordinada)
- d) Dice che no ha tempo. (indicativo en la oración subordinada)

Según Dardano y Trifone (1995: 364): “(..) l’indicativo è il modo della realtà, il congiuntivo è il modo della possibilità. L’uso del congiuntivo è frequente nelle proposizioni subordinate, queste ultime infatti esprimono spesso non certezze, ma opinioni e ipotesi. (...) In ogni modo, le subordinate con indicativo sono numerose.” Entonces, no podemos desdeñar el aspecto semántico y pragmático de los modos, y efectivamente es el planteamiento semántico que prevalece en las gramáticas modernas.

La mayoría de los lingüistas tiende a describir la naturaleza de alternancia de subjuntivo e indicativo basándose en las dicotomías semánticas, como por ejemplo: Certeza/Incertidumbre, Realidad/Irrealidad (RAE 2010:474), (Alarcos Llorach [1994] 1999:153) Objetividad/ Subjetividad o Aserción/ No aserción (RAE, 2010: 474), (Nowikow 2001:18), (Terrell y Hooper 1974). Esta dualidad se refleja particularmente en las oraciones que vamos a analizar en la parte posterior de este artículo.

Hablando de la oraciones sustantivas, Borrego et al. (1985: 33) indican que el subjuntivo va introducido por los verbos que expresan deseo, necesidad, mandato, prohibición, permiso, consejo, sentimiento, apreciaciones, juicio de valor o probabilidad. Encontramos un punto de vista semejante acerca del *congiuntivo* en la gramática de Patota y Della Valle (2009: 98): “Si ha l’indicativo dopo verbi, nomi, aggettivi che esprimono certezza e obiettività. Si ha il congiuntivo dopo verbi, nomi, aggettivi che esprimono opinioni, sentimenti, desideri e volontà personali.” También Mancini y Marani (2013: 9) hacen hincapié en la actitud del hablante hacia lo que comunica: “Se si usa l’indicativo, chi parla presenta, in linea di massima, un fatto nella sua realtà. (...) Con il congiuntivo chi parla esprime un certo distacco dalla realtà o dall’obiettività di quello che afferma, sottolineando che il contenuto della propria affermazione è possibile, sperato, temuto, desiderato etc.”

Es de recalcar la mencionada propuesta de Terrell y Hooper (1974) que se basa en describir los modos a través de las nociones de aserción, no aserción y presuposición. Se trata, en palabras simples, de comprometerse o no a la veracidad del enunciado. De ahí que los autores asociaran la presuposición de que algo es verdadero con subjuntivo y la aserción con indicativo. Véase:

- a) Me alegro de que vengas./ Sono contento che venga. (la presuposición)
- b) Es verdad que llueve. /È vero che piove. (la aserción)
- c) No es verdad que llueva. /Non è vero che piova. (la no aserción)

Además, tenemos que tener presente que existen grados de aserción, ya que “las oraciones asertivas abarcan semánticamente desde una fuerte insistencia hasta una creencia débil” (Bybee y Terrell 1990: 149). Pues, en español los autores asocian indicativo tanto a la aserción fuerte como a la aserción débil. Sin embargo, esto no resulta tan válido para los modos italianos, como veremos más adelante. Obsérvese:

- a) Sé que me entiendes. /So che mi capisci. (aserción fuerte – indicativo)
- b) Creo que me entiendes. / Credo che mi capisca. (aserción débil – indicativo español, congiuntivo italiano)

Para concluir, vale la pena citar a Carrera Díaz (2004: 351), quien bien plantea la diferencia entre el subjuntivo español y el congiuntivo italiano:

“El subjuntivo es el modo por excelencia de la subjetividad, de la irrealidad, de lo no experimentado, de lo hipotético y eventual, de la posibilidad, de la voluntad. Su uso y valores en italiano y español difieren notablemente, estando su aparición en la frase más determinada por factores mecánicos en nuestra lengua (español), mientras que en italiano tiene mayor intervención en su selección la subjetividad del hablante.”

3. ¿La crisis del *congiuntivo*? Situación actual

Dado que vamos a investigar los textos de prensa contemporánea, no se pueden pasar por alto las tendencias lingüísticas actuales, a sabiendas de que la lengua está siempre evolucionando y modificándose. ¿Cómo funcionan subjuntivo y *congiuntivo* en la lengua de hoy en día? Pues, por lo que concierne la lengua italiana, ya desde hace bastante tiempo, los lingüistas hablan de la crisis o de la paulatina muerte del *congiuntivo*. En las gramáticas para los extranjeros se nos da a entender que el *congiuntivo* se usa cada vez menos en la lengua hablada, coloquial o informal y que en estos registros se puede emplear indicativo (Mancini, Marani 2015: 48,), (Patota, Della Valle 2011: 111).

Sin embargo, no todos están de acuerdo con la opinión presentada arriba. Encontramos también afirmaciones que aseveran que el *congiuntivo* italiano está en muy buena condición y seguramente no está muriendo, como por ejemplo Chiappini y De Filippo (2014: 7): “Nonostante le frequenti polemiche sullo stato di salute del congiuntivo o sulla sua presunta morte, i numerosi studi sull’argomento rivelano che l’uso del congiuntivo si è diffuso, a partire dalla seconda metà del 900 (...)” Sieroñ (2013: 86), basándose en los datos numéricos, confirma que el *congiuntivo* aparece más en la lengua escrita comparando con la lengua hablada. No obstante, la autora llega a la conclusión de que el *congiuntivo* no está en desuso, pues no se puede hablar de su muerte (ibid.).

En cuanto a las causas de la presunta crisis del *congiuntivo* italiano, se pueden enumerar varias razones, tanto pragmáticas como estilísticas y de economía lingüística. En primer lugar, Malinowska (1996: 44-48) enfatiza las tendencias generales a simplificar la lengua hablada, lo que no favorece el uso del *congiuntivo*, puesto que es una forma morfológicamente complicada. Además, según ella, no es siempre necesario utilizar el *congiuntivo* para marcar la diferencia semántica, por lo que su uso puede resultar redundante (ibid.). Se ve el predominio de las formas del indicativo en la segunda persona singular, por el hecho de que la forma del *congiuntivo* presente en la primera, segunda y tercera singular es la misma, de ahí que sea más cómodo para el hablante usar la forma del indicativo para marcar bien la diferencia (ibid.), que podemos ejemplificar con las frases:

- a) Credo che abbia ragione.
- b) Credo che hai ragione.

No es solo por la complejidad de la forma, sino también por el intento del hablante de acortar la distancia o evitar la impresión de superioridad (ibid.). No son de menos importancia las influencias de otros idiomas, dialectos de italiano y variedad lingüística.

Respecto al español, las gramáticas no muestran premisas de que el uso del subjuntivo esté descendiendo de tal forma como en italiano. En los manuales de español para extranjeros se le dedican capítulos enteros que explican profundamente su empleo en castellano moderno. Es verdad que se nota más libertad gramatical, como en todas las lenguas hoy en día, pero esto no quiere decir que el subjuntivo vaya desapareciendo. Esperamos que el estudio de los textos de la prensa contemporánea nos permita también sacar más conclusiones al respecto.

4. Análisis

Para llevar a cabo el análisis contrastivo de la selección modal después de los verbos *creer/credere*, *pensar/pensare* en español e italiano, hemos elegido los textos de prensa virtual, basándonos en artículos de “El País” (www.elpais.com) y “La Repubblica” (www.repubblica.it) en sus versiones en línea. Con el objetivo de encontrar oraciones subordinadas introducidas por dichos verbos, hemos analizado aproximadamente cien artículos de los periódicos mencionados, del periodo de tiempo entre enero y diciembre de 2017. A continuación, hemos escogido unos ejemplos¹ para resumir nuestras observaciones y reflejar nuestras conclusiones acerca del tema estudiado. Hemos elegido este tipo de material para el análisis mayoritariamente por dos razones. En primer lugar, a nuestro modo de ver, los textos de prensa nos permiten ver la muestra de la lengua viva, contemporánea, que trata de temas candentes. En segundo lugar, este tipo de corpus nos da la oportunidad para ver la alternancia modal desde el punto de vista discursivo-informativo, en un contexto más amplio. Como ya hemos indicado anteriormente, hemos optado por limitarnos a las oraciones subordinadas introducidas solo por dos verbos de pensamiento, que son sinónimos, ya que nos parece que son los más representativos de los verbos de pensamiento y, asimismo, son los que más diferencias y problemas dan en cuanto a la selección de modos en español en comparación con el italiano.

Como ya hemos indicado anteriormente en palabras de Carrera Díaz (op.cit.), la mayor diferencia entre el subjuntivo español y el congiuntivo italiano reside en el hecho de que en español la selección modal tiene que ver con los mecanismos de la lengua, mientras que en italiano se ve más condicionada por la subjetividad del hablante. Esta diferencia va a reflejarse también en las oraciones introducidas por los verbos de pensamiento y opinión, como *creer/credere* y *pensar/pensare*.

En español, según Borrego et al. (1985: 82) “los verbos 1 de percepción física o mental, cuando van en forma afirmativa piden indicativo en el V2. Solo una lista muy limitada de ellos (parecer, admitir, (...) creer) admiten el subjuntivo junto al indicativo. El empleo del subjuntivo produce, en la mayoría de los casos, resultados inaceptables. En los verbos que lo admiten, la aparición de uno u otro modo, da lugar a alteraciones del significado más o menos ostensibles según los verbos.” Pues, vemos que en cuanto al verbo *creer* y *pensar* la regla acepta al uso tanto de indicativo como del subjuntivo. Sin embargo, los autores (ibid.) ponen de relieve que en caso de afirmación atenuada, la que tiene lugar después del verbo *creer* o *pensar*, cuando el hablante quiere decir “en mi opinión”, el uso del subjuntivo les va a sonar mal a la mayoría de los hispanohablantes. Igualmente, en el Manual de RAE (2010: 479) encontramos el verbo *creer* y *pensar* en el apartado que presenta alternancias modales. En cuanto al pensamiento, se explica que “con el indicativo, el contenido de la oración subordinada manifiesta lo que se cree o se piensa

¹ Véase la lista de artículos.

(...); con el subjuntivo, por el contrario, expresa una toma de postura o una decisión” (íbid). Entonces, según esta fuente, el subjuntivo después de creer o pensar se expresa para manifestar la intencionalidad o incluso la influencia, pero en el caso de expresión de opinión, se debe emplear el indicativo. También Lebeña Manzanal y Coli (1994: 12) subrayan que tras verbos de actividades mentales, entre los cuales enumeran creer y pensar, se exige el uso del indicativo, puesto que “el hablante se limita a constatar un hecho y no influye en el sujeto de la frase dependiente.” Por lo tanto, podemos sacar la conclusión de que en las oraciones afirmativas con creer y pensar en español prevalece el modo indicativo, lo que puede resultar sorprendente, dada la naturaleza del subjuntivo que parece mejor instrumento para marcar la subjetividad. Es interesante la explicación de Matte Bon (2001: 171), quien asocia la necesidad de utilizar aquí el indicativo a la teoría de relevancia, diciendo que se usa el indicativo porque el hablante presenta los datos como nuevos. Debemos recordar que estas reglas se aplican si se trata de oraciones afirmativas, ya que la negación cambia totalmente la perspectiva.

Respecto al italiano, casi cada definición general del *congiuntivo* hace hincapié en su función para expresar las opiniones (Dardano, Trifone 1995: 363), (www.treccani.it), (Carrera Díaz 2004: 363-364). Por lo tanto, la mayoría de gramáticas impone el uso del *congiuntivo* tras los verbos de opinión y pensamiento como *credere* y *pensare*, excluyendo las oraciones que se usan con infinitivo o futuro. Por ejemplo, siguiendo a Patota y Della Valle (2011: 101) “il congiuntivo si ha dopo i verbi o nomi che esprimono un’opinione o una convizione personale (...)”. No obstante, algunos lingüistas, como Storni (1993: 138) enfatizan la posibilidad de emplear el indicativo en vez del *congiuntivo*, dependiendo de la intención comunicativa del hablante. Es decir, se usa el *congiuntivo* con los verbos de pensamiento u opinión, cuando se quiere introducir una dosis de incerteza, mientras que si expresamos la certeza, se debe usar el indicativo, especialmente en el caso de los verbos *credere* y *pensare* (íbid.,139). Además, otros también admiten el uso del indicativo en la lengua hablada o informal (Mancini, Marani 2015: 56), (Chiappini, De Filippo 2014: 56-57), (Malinowska 1996: 61-62). Según Mancini y Marani (íbid.) “normalmente con i verbi di opinione l’uso del congiuntivo è tipico di una lingua più elevata e controllata; sottolinea il valore di riflessione, di valutazione soggettiva, di opinione frutto di un’argomentazione complessa”. A pesar de esto, no se puede desdeñar que el *congiuntivo* es obligatorio en las oraciones introducidas por el verbo *credere* o *pensare* en el pasado, o cuando se omite la conjunción *che* después del verbo de opinión (íbid.). Se señala que el uso del indicativo disminuye el valor de la incerteza o la subjetividad, lo que también atenúa el carácter argumentativo de la frase (íbid.).

Para empezar, debemos recordar que la primera asimetría entre español e italiano aparece cuando hay identidad de sujetos. Pues en tal caso, en italiano se prefiere la forma implícita, introducida por *di*+infinitivo, a diferencia del español (Lebeña Manzanal y Coli 1994: 57). Veamos los ejemplos:

- 1) *Ahora estoy aquí en el país, y creo que soy libre para meditar más sobre este asunto, para explorarlo, salir a la calle y hablar con la gente (...)*.(El País, 5.12.17)
- 2) *Sono molto contenta della gara. Credo di averla interpretata in maniera intelligente, senza strappare, tenendo il passo giusto.* (La Repubblica, 2.12.17)

Si se trata de las oraciones con sujetos diferentes, en primer lugar vale la pena decir que la mayoría de ejemplos que hemos encontrado en los artículos analizados, está de acuerdo con las reglas presentadas arriba, o sea, en las oraciones afirmativas con creer y pensar en español se usa el indicativo, mientras que en italiano se usa el *congiuntivo*. Obsérvese:

- 3) *Noruega está exportando literatura. La calidad media de las letras del país es muy alta y creo que se debe en gran parte a ese apoyo que ha prestado el Estado durante muchos años (...).* (El País, 10.08.17)
- 4) *„Creo que en lo esencial pensamos lo mismo y creo que debemos ir juntos” (...).* (El País, 7.08.17)
- 5) *Yo personalmente creo que se puede incidir mucho desde fuera, planteando políticas donde sea visible el buen hacer del PSOE, como en el caso de la mesa para la limpieza.* (El País, 30.07.17)
- 6) *Io credo che la prima scommessa da vincere sia quella di far nascere nuovi soggetti non bancari di raccolta di risparmio e di finanziamento all'economia.* (La Repubblica, 9.10.17)
- 7) *Penso che questo abbia a che fare con i modi in cui la mascolinità è stata interpretata.* (La Repubblica, 8.10.17)
- 8) *Ma credo che solo una campagna persuasiva possa cambiare il corso delle cose.* (La Repubblica, 8.10.17)

Los ejemplos 3-8 nos dan la oportunidad para notar la diferencia destacable entre español e italiano. Aunque todas las frases desempeñan un papel bastante semejante, es decir, expresar la opinión personal, se usan modos diferentes, lo que hace que las frases en italiano parezcan más subjetivas que las españolas. En el ejemplo 5, a pesar de presencia de la palabra “personalmente”, que ya da a entender que no se trata de una verdad general, sino de opinión individual, se usa el indicativo.

En la prensa italiana, encontramos frecuentemente la omisión de conjunción *che*, lo que no hemos visto en en los artículos analizados de la prensa española, a pesar de que la regla también lo permite en español: “En el lenguaje administrativo, jurídico y epistolar es bastante frecuente prescindir del ‘que’ introductor de una oración subordinada de complemento directo. (...) La omisión de la conjunción (...) es posible porque el modo subjuntivo del verbo es suficiente para indicar la subordinación de esa oración (...). También se admite omitir la conjunción cuando en una misma oración confluyen dos ‘que’ muy próximos (...)” (Martínez García 2005: 145). Sin embargo, en el material investigado hemos encontrado la omisión de ‘que’ en la prensa española solo cuando la subordinada contenía el modo subjuntivo (el ejemplo 11). En italiano, según Treccani (treccani.it), es para evitar la acumulación de las conjunciones en una frase:

- 9) (...) *penso sia anche più entusiasmante se non vince sempre la stessa squadra (...).* (La Repubblica, 9.10.17)
- 10) *Credo sia bello — spiega il direttore generale del brand — accomunarsi ad altri prodotti e comunicare ad altri mondi.* (La Repubblica, 9.10.17)
- 11) *¿He dicho Uruguay?... Le ruego me perdone. Yo me refería a Paraguay.* (El País, 16.11.17)

En italiano, tras los verbos *credere* y *pensare*, aparte del *congiuntivo*, en muchas frases se aprecia el uso de futuro de indicativo y el condicional simple o compuesto, lo que tampoco discrepa de la norma. Siguiendo a Serianni (1988: 470-471) “qualunque verbo o qualunque costrutto che richieda il congiuntivo può costruirsi con l'indicativo futuro (o, se è un passato, con condizionale composto) quando l'oggettiva indica azione posteriore rispetto alla reggente (...)”. Cabe añadir que el uso del futuro del indicativo no disminuye significativamente el valor de la subjetividad del enunciado, puesto que no puede, a diferencia del presente del indicativo, indicar la certeza. En español, como el modo que prevalece es el indicativo, se notan igualmente diferentes tiempos verbales, como futuro y también el modo condicional, de acuerdo con las reglas de la concordancia de los tiempos. Veamos los ejemplos:

- 12) *De hecho, los ahorradores encuestados creen que la subida de la renta variable continuará en los próximos semestres.* (El País, 28.07.17)
- 13) *Creo que no ayudaría el que yo atribuya culpas.* (El País, 5.12.17)
- 14) *Penso che punterà piuttosto sul codice penale e la legislazione d'emergenza.* (La Repubblica, 10.10.17)
- 15) *Pensavo che mi avrebbe licenziata.* (La Repubblica, 10.10.17)
- 16) *Pensavo che in un anno e mezzo di mandato avesse capito (...).* (La Repubblica, 4.10.17)

En los ejemplos 15 y 16 el verbo introductorio es el mismo, aparece en el mismo tiempo verbal, pero en el 16 se ha optado por el uso del *congiuntivo*. Por lo tanto, podemos concluir que todo depende de la intención del hablante, ya que cuando se trata solo de indicar la posterioridad de la acción, como en el 15, se emplea el condicional compuesto. No obstante, cuando la intención es introducir una dosis de duda o incerteza, como en el 16, se usa el *congiuntivo*.

En cuanto al uso menos normativo, es decir el uso del indicativo tras *credere* y *pensare* en italiano, y el uso del subjuntivo tras creer y pensar en español, nuestras observaciones son las siguientes: en italiano se pueden encontrar ejemplos con el uso del indicativo (véase los ejemplos), aunque en el material analizado parece mucho menos frecuente, más típico para las citas de las entrevistas orales. Seguramente será por el carácter del material, que son textos escritos, cuyo lenguaje debe ser más formal, culto, que el lenguaje oral.

- 17) *Poi sulla mancata qualificazione dell'Italia al Mondiale: „E' la fine di un ciclo, penso che tutto il movimento deve risolverlo”.* (La Repubblica, 3.12.17)
- 18) *Penso che certe scelte bisogna prenderla da solo.* (La Repubblica, 2.12.17)
- 19) *Non voglio agganciare troppo queste due cose perché penso che se ci hanno tolto qualcosa con la maglia azzurra, è con quella che ce lo riprenderemo.* (La Repubblica, 9.10.17)

En cambio, en los textos españoles que hemos investigado, no hemos encontrado ejemplos con subjuntivo con los verbos creer y pensar en las oraciones afirmativas. Se aprecia que si el hablante quiere introducir más incerteza o vacilación, recurre al uso del futuro, pero no del subjuntivo.

Al final, debemos mencionar que no presentamos aquí la selección modal en las oraciones negativas ni interrogativas, ya que no ha sido el objeto del presente estudio. La influencia de la negación en la selección modal es un tema muy amplio e interesante, pues podría ser objeto de un artículo aparte; sin embargo hay que recordar que la negación actúa como el inductor del subjuntivo (RAE 2010: 480), por lo que cambia considerablemente el uso de los modos.

5. Conclusiones

En cuanto a la selección modal en las oraciones subordinadas afirmativas introducidas por los verbos de pensamiento *creer/credere* y *pensar/pensare*, se pueden notar diferencias significativas entre español e italiano. A pesar de que las oraciones tienen la misma función, es decir, expresar la opinión, en muchos casos se usan modos diferentes, lo que hace que su tono sea también diferente. Se prueba que en español en las oraciones afirmativas predomina el modo indicativo, lo que causa que la frase parezca más objetiva que la misma frase con el *congiuntivo* en italiano. En el material analizado, no hemos encontrado ejemplos con el uso del subjuntivo en las oraciones afirmativas en español, aunque esto no quiere decir que en la

lengua hablada, más espontánea, este tipo de discrepancia de la norma no aparezca. Seguramente podemos concluir que los hispanohablantes optan por el indicativo a la hora de expresar la opinión. En el caso de que quieran darle a su enunciado más dosis de incerteza, prefieren recurrir al futuro simple o condicional, por ejemplo, pero pocas veces al subjuntivo. En cambio, los hablantes italianos con frecuencia escogen el *congiuntivo* para la expresar el punto de vista personal, de ahí que las oraciones de pensamiento en italiano parezcan más subjetivas, ya que el hablante no se compromete a la veracidad del enunciado. No obstante, en los artículos investigados hemos observado que en italiano se pueden encontrar también ejemplos de oraciones en las que se usa el indicativo, aunque eran menos frecuentes, probablemente por la naturaleza del material, que eran los textos escritos. Se usaba el indicativo sobre todo en las citas del habla oral, más espontánea, lo que lleva a pensar que en italiano hay más casos de alternancia modal en este tipo de oraciones. A pesar de que la gramáticas imponen el *congiuntivo* tras los verbos *credere* y *pensare*, mucho depende de la intención del hablante y se observa más libertad en la selección modal, frente al español.

Cabe subrayar que, basándonos en los artículos analizados, podemos concluir que el *congiuntivo* italiano seguramente no está muerto, los ejemplos de su uso son muy numerosos, aunque, como hemos indicado, se nota más variación en la selección modal.

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MGR. MARIA ŠIMKOVÁ
Masaryk University

Hegemonic and Inclusive Masculinities in American and Czech YouTube Vlogs

Abstract

This paper examines discursive means of the construction of hegemonic and inclusive masculinities in American and Czech YouTube vlogs. The vlog is a relatively young new media genre, which has developed primarily in the context of YouTube (the second most visited website and the second highest ranking social media platform in the world) and is a curious object of study as a platform of identity construction. The two types of masculine identities are analyzed in terms of two-level indexicality realized by means of positioning of self and others in the context of YouTube vlogs. The author outlines the most salient strategies of performing the two types of masculinities and shows how differently they are employed by young male Americans and Czechs. The extent and means of constructing these gender identities by Czech and American YouTubers diverge: both masculinities were constructed more prominently in American vlogs, whereas Czech YouTubers exhibited more neutral patterns. Moreover, American vloggers proved to resort to inclusive masculinity considerably more frequently than their Czech counterparts and tended to co-construct the two masculinities in such a way that they appear blended (for instance, by clustering affectionate homosociality with address terms indexical of cool solidarity). In Czech YouTube vlogs, on the other hand, the instances of inclusive masculinity were significantly less abundant and more isolated, which is in line with a less intensive construction of masculine identity in Czech vlogs overall.

Keywords: gender identity, hegemonic masculinity, inclusive masculinity, social media, YouTube, vlog, micro-celebrity, indexicality, positioning

1. Introduction

1.1 The notion of gender identity

The focus of the paper is a comparative study of the discursive means of masculinity construction, specifically two types of masculinities in American and Czech YouTube vlogs. Masculinity studies is one of the branches of gender studies encompassing a wide range of scientific frameworks, including

sociolinguistics, pragmatics and discourse analysis. Post-modern social sciences are investigating gender in the context of social constructionist theory of identity, which posits that gender as an aspect of identity is discursively constructed and is complex, dynamic and context-sensitive. Bucholtz and Hall (2003: 376) define identity as “the product of situated social action” and “an outcome of language” highlighting the principal role of linguistic interaction in identity construction processes. In addition to that, a social constructionist approach dismisses the structuralist idea of a purely dichotomous nature of gender and proposes to explore a wide range of various femininities, masculinities, gay and queer gender identities.

1.2 YouTube vlogs as a platform for gender identity construction

It is especially interesting to explore the discursive construction of gender identities in the context of new media, which transform traditional ways of social interaction and generate new environment for the construction and negotiation of identities (Van Dijck and Poell 2013: 3; Jones et al. 2015: 1-17).

YouTube (sometimes referred to as “post-television” (Dynel 2014: 39)) is the second most popular video sharing platform and a social networking service in the world as well as the most popular social media platform in the U.S. (Global social media ranking 2018, 2019; Hills 2018). YouTube is often referred to as an unprecedented media discourse phenomenon made possible only in the environment of dynamic, interactive and multimodal Web 2.0., the user-generated Internet, as we know it today.

YouTube vlogs are a multimodal hybridized genre of new media, which exhibits the features of a number of genres ranging from informal spontaneous face-to-face interaction to some television genres (such as reality shows, advertising etc.). The parallel between YouTube vlogs and television is often suggested due to key characteristics they share: multimodality, public character and asynchronicity. The content of YouTube vlogs is presented via multiple modes, purposefully uploaded to a video sharing website and made accessible to an infinite number of potential viewers, who (unlike television viewers) can actively participate in the quasi-interaction initiated by the vlogger by evaluating the video or commenting on it.

Early vlogs were typically recorded by a single person in domestic environment by means of a web-cam (Burgess and Green 2009:28) and often exhibited low quality. Nevertheless, due to the rapid technological development as well as the development of users’ digital literacy, present-day vlogs are not limited to featuring a talking head in a bedroom producing a monologue but often present a number of events that happened in the course of the vlogger’s day or a longer period of time and include a wide range of communicative situations in an unlimited number of places, often edited in such a way that the original sequential order of the recorded material is modified and amplified with additional multimodal elements. In addition to that, vlogs are highly hybridized and often incorporate elements of other YouTube genres, such as reactions, pranks, Q&A, challenges, food tasting, gaming etc., embedding them into the main casual “behind the scenes” theme of the video. All of the abovementioned peculiarities of the genre make YouTube vlogs a curious platform for the analysis of the ways gender identities are constructed and negotiated.

Given the drastic differences between Czech and American political histories and current sociocultural environments, it is expected that, on the one hand, the main patterns of gender identity construction as well as the range of gender identities should be divergent, whereas on the other, there should be observed a similar tendency preconditioned by global trends dominant in today’s social media (specifically, YouTube) and globalized popular culture in general.

2. Methodology

The corpus compiled for the analysis of the discursive means of masculinities construction in YouTube vlogs is a collection of transcriptions of personal vlogs recorded and uploaded by top-ranking American and Czech YouTube users featuring elements of quasi-interaction with the viewers and interaction with other participants of the video.

There were selected 5 channels of top white young male heterosexual vloggers from the U.S. and the Czech Republic. The channels' names and popularity rates, as well as the age of the vloggers are presented in Table 1:

American Youtube Channels			Czech Youtube Channels		
Channel name	Subscribers	Age	Channel name	Subscribes	Age
Logan Paul Vlogs	18 102 885	23	MenT	1 256 483	21
Tanner Fox	8 005 526	19	Jirka Král	1 117 832	28
Mark Dohner	2 125 034	25	Kovy	756 032	21
Brennen Taylor	1 973 656	23	Stejk	736 696	26
Sam Golbach	1 047 934	22	Jmenuju Se Martin	563 810	20

Table 1: Basic information about the selected channels of young male heterosexual American and Czech vloggers—channels names, the number of channels subscribers, vloggers' age.

Five vlogs uploaded over the past three years (2015-2018) were randomly selected on each of the channels amounting to 50 vlogs in total (see Appendix A and B), transcribed and re-watched iteratively in order to conduct the analysis of the constructed masculinities. The videos were chosen in thematic vlog playlists, which are usually created by YouTube users on their channels to distinguish them from other types of videos, or on separate vlogging channels. Since nowadays the vlog is a highly hybridized genre incorporating a wide range of other YouTube genres mentioned above (reactions, pranks, Q&A etc.) and featuring a great variety of participants and communicative situations, no further selection is applied to single out the "pure" samples of the genre. The only important criterion was the centrality of unprepared, spontaneous interaction with other participants of the vlog and quasi-interaction with the audience.

The strategies of constructing gender identities in the selected vlogs were explored in terms of the following social constructionist theories:

- 1) Judith Butler's *performativity theory* (1999), challenging the conceptualization of gender as static and pre-given, while suggesting that it is constructed (or performed) in discursive practices;
- 2) Ochs's *indexicality theory* (1992), which refutes the idea of a direct correlation between language forms and gender and posits that indexicality is realized on two levels: first, language forms are associated with particular interactional stances, which in their turn (on the second level) come to be associated with certain social groups typically assuming such stances and positions;
- 3) Davies and Harré's *positioning theory* (1990), which highlights the complex and dynamic process of constituting speakers and hearers in discursive practices via foregrounding what is interpreted as relevant in the context.

Thus, gender identity is seen as discursively constructed and is analyzed in terms of two-level indexicality, realized by means of positioning of self and others in discursive practices.

As was pointed out earlier, in post-structuralist social sciences, gender identities are primarily looked at not as a strict dichotomy of masculinity and femininity, but as a spectrum, as a multiplicity of identities some of which can be constructed simultaneously or overlap in seemingly inconsistent ways. This paper focuses on two types of masculine gender identity, namely hegemonic masculinity and inclusive masculinity.

Hegemonic masculinity is the cornerstone of gender and masculinity studies and refers to the most dominant traditional “patriarchal” type of masculinity in American and European societies, characterized by whiteness, heterosexuality, homophobia, homophobia (the fear of being perceived as gay by others), rationality, emotional restraint as well as misogyny and racism. *Inclusive masculinity*, on the other hand, is a relatively recent concept referring to an alternative masculine identity mostly constructed by contemporary young men (Millennials and Post-Millennials). It is described as soft and attenuated (Roberts 2013: 672), eschewing homophobia, homophobia, misogyny and embracing emotional intimacy and once-feminized artefacts, thus undermining hegemonic masculinity. It is important to mention that hegemonic and inclusive masculinities are so-called large identities, which function as the background for small, situational micro-identities, which include other types of masculinities related to specific context.

According to recent research, American male YouTube gamers (Morris & Anderson 2015: 1212) and British male vloggers (Maloney et al. 2018: 1710) tend to actively co-construct the two types of masculinities. The aim of the analysis was to verify the accuracy of these findings for American male vloggers and examine the extent to which hegemonic and inclusive masculinities are constructed by Czech male vloggers.

The identities constructed in the vlogs were analysed at the first and second *levels of communication on YouTube* (Dyrel 2014: 40-45):

- 1) the level of interaction in the video (between the vlogger and other individuals); and
- 2) the level of interaction between the vlogger and the audience (also called “mediated quasi-interaction” due to the spatial and temporal gap between the utterer and the interpreters (Dyrel 2014: 37; Chovanec 2010: 235 and Talbot 2007: 83).

The level of written comments was not taken into account.

The analysis focused on the identification of salient linguistic and multimodal clusters of features indexing the categories having semiotic associations with the two types of masculinities, as is summarized in Table 2:

The study was based on the following hypotheses:

- 1) Similarly to American YouTube gamers, American vloggers are expected to co-construct hegemonic and inclusive masculinities;
- 2) There should be observed similar tendencies in constructing the two types of masculinities in American and Czech vlogs (due to global trends in social media and popular culture);
- 3) The main patterns of masculinities construction in American & Czech vlogs should be divergent (due to different political histories and sociocultural environments).

Hegemonic Masculinity	Inclusive Masculinity
Heterosexuality Homophobia and homophobia Misogynistic attitudes Emotional restraint Aggressive behaviour	Eschewing homophobia and homophobia: Affectionate homosociality Ironic heterosexual recuperation (positioning self and others as homosexuals in order to affirm one's heterosexuality)

Table 2: sociological categories associated with the construction of hegemonic and inclusive masculinities.

3. Results

The analysis proved the relevance of the previously mentioned research on British vloggers and American gamers for American vloggers: all of them actively resorted to parallel co-construction of both hegemonic and inclusive masculinities. In addition to that, both types of masculinities constructed by top-ranking American male vloggers proved to be articulated in a much more prominent manner than those of Czech male vloggers. The discursive strategies used by both groups are discussed below.

3.1.1. Hegemonic masculinity in American vlogs

According to the analysis results, American YouTubers (especially those with the highest number of subscribers—Logan Paul and Mark Dohner) resorted to the performance of highly stereotypical hegemonic masculinity in 22 out of 25 vlogs; the construction of this type of gender identity mostly relied on the following strategies:

- 1) self-positioning as powerful heterosexual males via positioning women as an object of their sexual interest (“I know *my girls* like wine so I said put a cellar in the house!” or “Yo Blue [dog] is gonna get me so many girls”) or projecting femininity onto cars and digital devices, which are stereotypically seen as an area of men’s interest (“It’s kinda *sexy*” referring to speakers or “*my baby*” referring to a car);
- 2) self-positioning as emotionally detached and reckless indirectly indexing young careless and energetic masculinity by using legal discourse in potentially dangerous situations to create a humorous effect (“It’s a liability. Sign the waiver.” repeatedly uttered by Logan Paul and other males in a number of his vlogs in a careless and sarcastic manner when engaged in potentially dangerous activities, such as riding a bike on a steep roof).

3.1.2. Hegemonic masculinity in Czech vlogs

Hegemonic masculinity constructed by the Czech vloggers appeared much more reserved and neutral: it was detected only in 4 vlogs and was mostly indexed by emotionally detached joviality and the communicative situations involving self-positioning and positioning of others as having expertise in cars and software by means of using characteristic vocabulary clustered with evaluative adjectives and interjections (“Tady ta M dvojka—ty krá:::so wow:::” (That M2 model—wow!) referring to a car or “Erik to

zvladl na vybornou! Dobra zatáčka! (Erik handled it perfectly! Good turn!) as a comment on a friend's skill in driving in Jirka Král's vlogs).

No allusions to misogyny or homophobia were detected in any of the vlogs.

3.2.1 Inclusive masculinity in American vlogs

The extent to which inclusive masculinity was constructed in American vlogs turned out even more curious. Elements of inclusive masculinity were obvious in 20 out of 25 American vlogs; micro-celebrities openly and readily resorted to the following discursive strategies:

- 1) affectionate homosociality by using emotionally expressive affectionate language addressing other males, which explicitly indexed emotional intimacy (“*Bro, I love you*”, “*I missed you Evan!—I missed you too!*”);
- 2) ironic heterosexual recuperation by means of positioning self and others as homosexuals in order to affirm their heterosexuality, which is achieved via sexually suggestive language (“*I’ve never touched men’s hands like this before! I’m getting excited!*”, “*I want your fingerprints on my body*”) and other para—and extra-linguistic means such as prosody, timbre and pitch, moaning, gaze and even kisses.

3.2.2 Inclusive masculinity in Czech vlogs

Czech vloggers, as was expected, were considerably less prone to constructing inclusive masculinity (it was spotted only in 3 vlogs): there were no uses of language indicative of affectionate homosociality and only three instances of ironic heterosexual recuperation based on self-positioning as gay (“*A soutěž o nejvíc gay café vyhrává... ja:*” (and the winner of the gayest coffee contest is... me)) and involving other males in positioning as homosexuals (“*Já si jdu dát páru.—A já si jdu dát tebe.—[lowering pitch] ... prosím, dej si mě [moving with his hips imitating a sexual intercourse]*” (I’m going to take a sauna.—And I am going to take you.—[lowering pitch] Please, take me. [moving with his hips imitating a sexual intercourse])).

4. Discussion

In all the instances in both American and Czech vlogs all the elements of inclusive masculinity were accompanied by linguistic and non-linguistic means of creating a humorous effect. At the same time, whereas in Czech vlogs the rare instances of inclusive masculinity naturally co-exist with the dominant context of hegemonic masculinity, in American vlogs inclusive masculinity is practically infused with hegemonic masculinity: almost every instance of affectionate homosociality or positioning as gay is clustered with elements indexical of heteronormativity such as forms of address “bro” and “dude”.

The analysis findings prove the abovementioned hypothesis that, firstly, American YouTube vloggers co-construct and blend hegemonic and inclusive masculinities; secondly both American and Czech vloggers exhibit similar tendencies resorting to the performance of trendy inclusive masculinity; finally, the extent and means of constructing masculinities by American and Czech vloggers diverge: American masculinities are considerably more salient and much more extensively performed, whereas Czech masculinities are noticeably more neutral and employ less diverse and fewer means.

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APPENDIX A—American vlogs

Logan Paul Vlogs	WE GOT A NEW ROOMMATE IN THE MAVERICK HOUSE! (Published on 23 Oct 2017)
	I JUST BOUGHT A PUPPY! **not clickbait** (Published on 8 May 2017)
	FALLING IN LOVE WITH MY ROMMATE... (Published on 20 Mar 2018)
	THE WORLD WASN'T MADE FOR HIM... (Published on 5 Sep 2017)
	KSI RECEIVED HIS MAVERICK MERCH AND HE'S IN THE LOGANG! (Published on 21 Mar 2018)
Tanner Fox	700HP GTR VS TESLA P100D STREET RACE! (Published on 13 Aug 2017)
	Webisode 9: He will NEVER be a FATHER after this... (OMG)(Published on 13 Aug 2017)
	OUR NEW \$15,000,000 MANSION!! *EXCLUSIVE TOUR* (Published on 13 Jul 2018)
	this RUINED the tour... (Published on 10 Jan 2018)
	DON'T PLAY WITH GUNS! (Published on 10 Jan 2018)

Mark Dohner	REACTIONS! THIS MAGIC TRICK WILL BLOW YOUR MIND! (Published on 10 Sep 2017)
	REAL LIFE FRUIT NINJA VS EMOJI FRUITS! *Dangerous Mess* (Published on 12 Dec 2017)
	MY FRIENDS TOLD ME NOT TO DO IT! 25 ft JUMP into 6ft POOL! (Published on 22 May 2017)
	Our NEW HOUSE Tour! *EXCLUSIVE LOOK* (Published on 5 Jun 2018)
	Meet Our NEW ROOMMATE! You'll NEVER GUESS Who! (Published on 22 May 2017)
Brennen Taylor	WHO DID THIS TO MY CAR?!?! WTF! (Published on 22 Nov 2016)
	WE SHOULD NOT HAVE DONE THIS!! (Published on 27 Nov 2016)
	Our big secret revealed... Don't hate us... :((Published on 4 Dec 2016)
	GOODBYE FOR NOW... (Published on 21 Dec 2016)
	I GRABBED HIS... ??? (Published on 11 Jan 2017)
Sam Golbach	LIVING IN MY NEW HOUSE IS HORRYFYING (Published on 3 Mar 2017)
	LOST IN A DESERT (Published on 30 Mar 2017)
	WAKING ROOMMATE UP IN A POOL PRANK WARS (Published on 12 Apr 2017)
	EXPLORING FLOODED CAVES IN NEW ZEALAND (Published on 17 Mar 2017)
	"CASH ME OUTSIDE" OFFICIAL DANCE VIDEO!! (Published on 10 Feb 2017)

APPENDIX B—Czech vlogs

MenT	Hong Kong Adventure! #2 – Hondě schodů! (Published on 16 Dec 21015)
	Hong Kong Adventure! #4 – Taipei adventure? (Published on 21 Dec 2015)
	Hong Kong Adventure! #6 – Las Vegas i Benátky za den? (Published on 6 Jan 2016)
	Hong Kong Adventure! #7 – Chillujem, tak ako chcem (Published on 15 Jan 2016)
	Hong Kong Adventure! #5 (Published on 25 Dec 2015)
Jirka Král	Nové auto – výlet do Maďarska s Erikem [VLOG-] (Published on 19 Sep 2017)
	Výlet za MenTem – Koupil jsem si Yeezy [VLOG] (Published on 5 Feb 2018)
	Na nákupu s trenérem a nová spolupráce s LEGEM [VLOG] (Published on 2 Mar 2018)
	IEM KATOWICE – Nejlepší finále CS:GO [VLOG] (Published on 7 Mar 2018)
	Prěkvapení pro Expl0iteda – Liga Mistrů [vlog] (Published on 29 Apr 2018)
Kovy	Týden v Japonsku w/MenT KOVY (Published on 12 Dec 2016)
	USA TRIP – Začínáme w/Martin, Pedro, House KOVY (Published on 19 Jun 2016)
	USA TRIP #2 – Umím létat! w/Martin, House, Pedro KOVY (Published on 26 Jun 2016)
	USA TRIP #3 – Medvěd a a vykradené auto KOVY (Published on 10 Jul 2016)
	USA TRIP #4 – New York a konec výletu KOVY (Published on 20 Jul 2016)
Stejk	ORGIE NA UTUBERINU /Vadak, Kovy... (Published on 3 May 2018)
	MYSLÍ SI ŽE NÁS PRANKUJE – WEEK #101 (Published on 14 Apr 2018)
	V PEVNOSTI S YOUTUBERAMA WEEK #99 (Published on 31 Mar 2018)
	SOUBOJ GLADIÁTORŮ – WEEK #87 (Published on 6 Jan 2018)
	MOJE PRVNÍ TETOVÁNÍ NA TÁBOŘE – WEEK #62 (Published on 15 Jul 2017)
Jmenuju Se Martin	Skočil Jsem Z Letadla! – USA TRIP #3 Martin (Published on 20 Jun 2016)
	USA TRIP #2 – Poprvé Na Surf! Martin (Published on 22 Jun 2016)
	PRVNÍ TŘÍDOU DO RIA! Martin (Published on 16 Dec 2017)
	USA TRIP #4 – VidCon & Výhra 1000\$ V Las Vegas! Martin (Published on 30 Jun 2016)
	USA TRIP #1 – Přílet Do Los Angeles! Martin & Youtubeři (Published on 19 Jun 2016)

RAFAŁ SZUBERT
Uniwersytet Wrocławski

Metafora prawna osoby w koncepcji prawa Hansa Kelsena

A Legal Metaphor of a Person in the Concept of Hans Kelsen's Law

Abstract

In my article, I present the person metaphor as the constitutive term for the theory of artificial persons. We have been dealing with various manners of reading the nature of the legal person, and consequently of law in general, especially private law (*Privatrecht*), since Roman times to this day. The point of departure for my deliberations, in which I try to demonstrate the nature of metaphorical expressions used in building legal theories, is a statement by Paul Kirchhof, who demanded that metaphorical expressions be eradicated from positive (statutory) law. I ask if the demand can also be applied to theoretical deliberations of lawyers on the nature of law. Based on examples from legal discussions on the nature of the legal person, I formulate the claim that Paul Kirchhof's demand should be applied only to positive law texts. Metaphorical expressions have no *raison d'être* in such texts, especially if they are meant to serve as terms. A different situation occurs where a metaphorical expression is the basis for building a legal system and relations among its components. At this phase of developing law, metaphorical expressions give rise to similarities on which its functions depend. Therefore, at the stage of structuring the meanings of legal terms, corresponding to the vagueness of the metaphor are the important processes of defining and then using legal terms.

Keywords: Kelsen, languages for special purposes, legal languages, legal metaphors as a pillar of legal theories, legal person, metaphors, semantics, terminology.

Przedmiotem niniejszego tekstu nie jest przekład w tradycyjnym rozumieniu tłumaczenia, ale coś, co po łacinie również nosi to miano. Kwintylijan mówi o przenoszeniu (*translatio*) znaczeń w sensie metaforycznym (por. Quintilian (1986 [1921]), 1975; Jäkel ([1997] 2003: 91). Tytuł mojego wystąpienia może wywołać protest u osób, które uważają, że metafora i języki specjalistyczne są zjawiskami nie

mającymi ze sobą związku, lecz wręcz wzajemnie się wykluczają. Niejednokrotnie bowiem, na konferencji, czy podczas wykładu, spotykałem się z opinią, że metafora i termin to dwa odrębne, różne fenomeny, i że nie sposób ich łączyć. Takie stanowisko można spotkać jeszcze dość często nie tylko wśród lingwistów, ale także wśród prawników. Jest to związane z wymogiem jakościowym stawianym tradycyjnie językowi prawnemu. Świadectwem tego, z jakim zaangażowaniem i metodologiczną konsekwencją zwalczana jest metafora w języku prawnym przez część prawników niemieckich, może być opinia Paula Kirchhoffa, niemieckiego profesora prawa, konstytucjonalisty, sędziego Federalnego Trybunału Konstytucyjnego w latach 1987–1999:

Die Rechtssprache der Gegenwart verwendet den *Verstandes-*, den *Gedankenstil*. Sie ist einfach, knapp, klar und bestimmt, um den Rechtssatzer zur disziplinierten Diskussion und Entscheidungsbildung zu zwingen und den Inhalt des Rechtssatzes dem Adressaten verlässlich zu überbringen. Die Sprache des Gesetzes ist *abstrakt, schematisch verallgemeinert* und dient damit der materiellen Gleichheit. Sie ist nüchtern und sachlich, erreicht dadurch möglichste Eindeutigkeit der Aussagen. Das Gesetz sucht den Sachverhalt unmittelbar tatbestandlich zu erfassen, die Beweiserhebung der Wahrheit möglichst nahezubringen und die Rechtsfolge unausweichlich vorzugeben, vermeidet deshalb die bildhafte, gleichnishafte Sprache, die das Gemeinte nicht unmittelbar ausdrückt, sondern in der Metapher vermittelt (Kirchhoff 1987: 19).

(Współczesny język prawa charakteryzuje się *stylem racjonalnym, stylem myślowym*. Język ten jest prosty, jasny i określony, aby zobligować prawodawcę do zdyscyplinowanej dyskusji i do sformułowania orzeczenia, oraz aby przekazać adresatowi treść przepisu prawnego w sposób pewny. Język ustawy jest *abstrakcyjny, schematyzujący, uogólniający*, dzięki czemu służy równości materialnej. Jest rzeczowy, dzięki czemu umożliwia sformułowanie jednoznacznej wypowiedzi. Celem ustawy jest to, aby umożliwić bezpośrednie pojęcie danej sytuacji z punktu widzenia zespołu znamion czynu przestępczego, aby możliwie jak najbardziej zbliżyć przeprowadzenie dowodu do prawdy i aby nieodzwrotnie podać skutek prawny. Dlatego ustawa unika języka obrazowego, parabolicznego, który nie wyraża stosownego znaczenia w sposób bezpośredni, lecz przekazuje je w formie metafory. [tłum.: R. Sz.]

Moje stanowisko odnośnie jakości konstytutywnych dla metafory i jej związku z terminologią specjalistyczną jest odmienne od przywołanej tu powyżej opinii niemieckiego prawnika. Można nie tolerować metafory w określonych rodzajach tekstów, można dążyć do jej wyrugowania z tekstów ustaw, ale nie sposób nie zauważyć faktu, że ustawy zapisane w języku niemieckim, podobnie jak ustawy polskie, pełne są wyrażeń metaforycznych. Ich usunięcie skutkowałoby pozbawieniem tychże znaczącej części istotnych dla systemu prawnego informacji jak i dla nich samych, wraz z ich tłem kulturowym, etymologicznym i epistemologicznym. Podkreślić należy, że wyrażenia metaforyczne – co jest paradoksalne w kontekście wypowiedzi Paula Kirchhoffa – stanowią określenia fundamentalnych dla prawa pojęć abstrakcyjnych, jak na przykład pojęcia *podmiotu praw i obowiązków*, którego niemieckiej nazwie – *Träger von Rechten und Pflichten* (tragarz/nośnik praw i obowiązków) – nie sposób odmówić charakteru metafory. Podobnie rzecz ma się z jednym z kohiponimów nazwy *podmiot praw i obowiązków*, to znaczy z *osobą prawną* (die juristische Person).

Wyrażenia metaforyczne, które służą reprezentacji pojęć prawnych, występują nie tylko w języku prawnym (*la langue de loi*; por. Wróblewski 1948: 51-135), lecz także w języku prawniczym (*la langue*

juridique; por. Wróblewski 1948: 136-183)¹. Moim celem jest ukazanie części dyskursu prawniczego dotyczącego między innymi znaczenia wyrażenia metaforycznych, który znajduje wyraz w koncepcji prawa zarysowanej przez Hansa Kelsena, szczególnie w jego pracy podstawowej, to znaczy w Czystej Teorii Prawa (*Reine Rechtslehre*). Skoncentruję się na metaforze osoby prawnej (*juristische Person*), którą Kelsen eksplikuje na przykładzie państwa.

Kelsen i Czysta Teoria Prawa

We wstępie do *Czystej Teorii Prawa* (*Reine Rechtslehre*) Hans Kelsen zawarł swoiste credo, którego fragment przytaczam *in extenso* ze względu na istotę sformułowanej w nim myśli:

Czysta nauka prawa jest teorią prawa pozytywnego – prawa pozytywnego w ścisłym tego słowa znaczeniu, a nie jakimś specjalnym porządkiem prawnym. Jest ogólną nauką prawną, nie jest interpretacją szczególnych narodowych czy międzynarodowych norm prawnych. Daje jednak teorię interpretacji. (Kelsen [1992] 2014: 55).

Warto zwrócić uwagę na podkreślone wyrażenia w przywołanym powyżej fragmencie. Obydwa te wyrażenia, to znaczy wyrażenie *ogólna nauka prawa* i wyrażenie *teoria interpretacji* sytuuje Kelsen w relacji wzajemnego warunkowania. To wzajemne warunkowanie jest uniwersalnym kluczem otwierającym dostęp do ogólnej teorii interpretacji norm prawnych, niezależnie od ich pochodzenia. Kelsen formułuje następujące twierdzenie:

Będąc teorią, chce ona tylko poznać swój przedmiot. Próbuje odpowiedzieć na pytanie, czym i jakie jest prawo, a nie na pytanie, jakie być powinno lub jak powinno być tworzone. Jest ona nauką prawa, nie jest polityką prawa. (Kelsen [1992] 2014: 55).²

- 1 Taksonomia Bronisława Wróblewskiego budzi współcześnie pewne wątpliwości co do jej pragmatycznej wartości. Z drugiej strony jest bardzo mało znana poza Polską. Mogłem się o tym przekonać, kiedy kilka lat temu na zaproszenie Redaktionsstab Rechtssprache [Sztabu Redakcyjnego Języka Prawa] wygłaszałem w Federalnym Ministerstwie Sprawiedliwości w Berlinie referat o lingwistyce języka prawa w Polsce. Podział zaproponowany przez Wróblewskiego w 1948 wzbudził zainteresowanie słuchaczy, którzy pytali o dostępność niemieckiego tłumaczenia książki Bronisława Wróblewskiego. Krytycy takiego spolaryzowanego binarnego podziału języka prawa wskazywali na jego upraszczający charakter i być może również wynikającą stąd niedokładność. Moim zdaniem wartość taksonomii zaproponowanej przez Bronisława Wróblewskiego tkwi właśnie w jej pozornej prostocie. Ta prostota jest pozorna, ponieważ stanowi ujęcie modelowe, którego wypełnienie i / lub rozbudowanie pozostaje już zadaniem badaczy języka prawa a także samych prawników zainteresowanych tą problematyką. Warto w tym kontekście przypomnieć, że niemal sto lat wcześniej niemiecki prawnik Ernst Zitelmann zaproponował podobne ujęcie, w którym wskazywał na dwa wyraźnie odrębne zakresy aktywności językowych związanych z fenomenem prawa: *konstrukcje legislacyjne* („eine legislative Konstruktion”; por. Zitelmann 1873: 3-4) i *indywidualne konstrukcje naukowców prawników* („eine von einem Einzelgelehrten ausgehende Konstruktion”; por. Zitelmann 1873: 3-4). Sytuację, którą relacjonuje Zitelmann, można zinterpretować również w kontekście modelowego rozwiązania zaproponowanego przez Wróblewskiego. Zitelmann wskazuje na znaczące różnice pomiędzy prawem stanowionym sformułowanym w formie ustaw i rozporządzeń a prawem konstruowanym przez prawnika – naukowca (*der Rechtsgelehrte*). Podczas, gdy autorzy tego pierwszego prawa stawiają sobie za cel określenie, że coś być powinno takie to a takie, celem prawników-naukowców jest określenie tego, jak jest. (Por. Zitelmann 1873: 3).
- 2 Nie sposób pozostawić bez komentarza słowo *teoria*, które w omawianym tu dziele Hansa Kelsena stanowi fundament jego rozważań o istocie prawa. Stosunek między myśleniem a rzeczywistością, do której owo myślenie nawiązuje, jest faktycznie bardziej złożony niż zwyczajny stosunek zgodności. W badaniu naukowym realizuje się przeważająca część naszego myślenia

W tym fragmencie na podkreślenie zasługują wyrażenia *poznanie przedmiotu* i *pytanie o istotę prawa*. Następnie Kelsen wyjaśnia, co rozumie pod pojęciem *czystości nauki prawa*:

Nazywa się „czystą” nauką prawa dlatego, że chce ona uchwycić poznanie skierowane ku prawu i dlatego że chce wyodrębnić z poznania wszystko, co nie przynależy do określonego dokładnie jako prawo przedmiotu. (Kelsen [1992] 2014: 55).

W dążeniu do zbudowania czystej teorii prawa, wolnej od wszystkich elementów, które są jej obce, nie można jednak wykluczyć pewnych elementów, jak na przykład języka, dzięki którym prawo staje się komunikowalne. Stąd teza, że między prawem a językiem istnieje pewna relacja, którą podkreślają w swoich rozważaniach Friedrich Carl von Savigny³ i Hermann Weck (1913). Savigny twierdził, że „*jurysprudencja jest nauką filologiczną*” (por. Savigny 1802: 15). Hermann Weck sformułował na początku XX wieku myśl o istocie komunikowalności prawa jako syntezy prawa i języka. Mówił on:

Język to prawo i jednocześnie niezbędny środek wyrazu całego prawa. Tylko to, co jesteśmy w stanie wyrazić słowami, staje się dla nas jasne; tylko to jesteśmy w stanie objaśnić także innym ludziom. Z tego tylko wynika, jak wielkie znaczenie musi mieć język dla prawa. (Weck 1913: 9; tłum. R.Sz.).

W związku z powyższym nasuwa się pytanie, czy postulowana przez jurystów zasada rzeczowości języka prawa (*Grundsatz der Sachlichkeit der juristischen Sprache*, por. Gast 2006: 418) nie jest sprzeczna z cechami wyrażen językowych, które wynikają z zasady konwencjonalności języka. Pytanie to wydaje się być zasadne szczególnie tam, gdzie w tekstach pojawiają się wyrażenia metaforyczne, np. wyrażenie *osoba prawna*, *ciężar dowodu*, *podmiot praw i obowiązków* czy np. *ponoszenie odpowiedzialności*. O związkach konwencjonalnych pisze Leon Zawadowski:

Jedną z głównych tez językoznawstwa funkcjonalnego jest twierdzenie, że język jest to zbiór klas elementów tekstowych (*T*) służących do komunikowania fragmentów pozatekstowych (*R*). Komunikowanie jest to umożliwienie słuchaczowi poznania takich fragmentów dzięki związkowi konwencjonalnemu zachodzącemu między *T* a *R*. Związek konwencjonalny jest to związek istniejący nie mocą praw zawsze i wszędzie ważnych, lecz mocą zwyczaju społecznego (Zawadowski 1966: 28-29).

Na tak postawione pytanie można odpowiedzieć, że wiele wyrażen języka prawa ma tzw. specjalistyczne znaczenia, tzn. znaczenia przyjęte w danej koncepcji danej dziedziny prawa i że owe znaczenia różnią się od znaczeń odpowiednich wyrażen tzw. języka potocznego (języka standardowego czy ogólnonarodowego). Należy podkreślić, że te wyrażenia (terminy) nierzadko nie są definiowane w ścisłym sensie. Ich znaczenie ujawniane jest (*sie wird erschlossen*) dopiero na podstawie analizy sformułowań danego tekstu prawnego lub na podstawie interpretacji podawanej w orzecznictwie

w formie teorii. Słowo *teoria* wywodzi się od greckiego słowa *theoria*, którego pierwszy człon występuje także w niemieckim słowie *Theater*, które z kolei nawiązuje do słowa *thea*, które oznacza *pogląd, wizję, punkt widzenia*, podczas gdy druga część tego słowa wywodzi się od słowa *horaein* – „widzieć”. Można więc powiedzieć, że teoria jest przede wszystkim *po-glądem (o-glądem)*, to znaczy sposobem postrzegania (oglądu) świata, ale nie jest formą *wiedzy* o tym, jak skonstruowany jest świat. Por. Bohm 2018: 235. Powyższe, sformułowane przez Hansa Kelsena, twierdzenie jest identyczne w wyrazie i w znaczeniu z twierdzeniem sformułowanim niemal sto lat wcześniej przez niemieckiego prawnika i uczonego, Ernsta Zitelmanna. Por. Zitelmann 1873: 3.

3 Założyciel Historycznej Szkoły Prawa w Niemczech XIX wieku.

(*Rechtsprechung*) (por. Roelcke 2013: 143).⁴ Nasuwa się także pytanie, czy przy pomocy metafory można wyjaśnić lub objaśnić coś czytelnikowi tekstu. Moim zdaniem można. Jednak należy najpierw uściślić, co chcemy rozumieć poprzez pojęcie *wyjaśnić* i/lub *objaśnić*.⁵ Początkowo wyrażałem sceptycyzm wobec możliwości objaśniania pojęć abstrakcyjnych (takich jak np. pojęcie *osoby prawnej*) za pomocą metafory. Być może opierałem się na potocznym mniemaniu, że metafory preferowane są w zdaniach lub w wyrażeniach o charakterze ekspresywnym lub estetyzującym (por. Loughlan 2016, Jäkel ([1997] 2003: 20), Szubert 2011: 150), ale nie w takich, którym można przypisać wartość logiczną⁶. Przez prawdziwość

- 4 Za kluczowe przyjmuję w mojej analizie rozróżnienie między słowami używanymi konwencjonalnie a słowami używanymi niekonwencjonalnie, przy czym istotne jest tutaj uzupełnienie, do jakiej konwencji się w danym przypadku odnosimy, tzn. czy odnosimy się do konwencji języka potocznego, czy np. do konwencji jakiegoś innego języka, np. języka specjalistycznego (prawa, filozofii itd.). Taki porządek oglądu rzeczywistości językowej wynika z założenia, że o znaczeniu słów można mówić tylko w ramach konkretnej wypowiedzi (zdania, tekstu), na podstawie której można określić i stwierdzić, czy dane słowo użyte jest w znaczeniu konwencjonalnym czy niekonwencjonalnym, tzn. czy odnosi się do desygnatu konwencjonalnego czy nie (lub tradycyjnie rzecz ujmując: czy pojawia się to słowo w znaczeniu *właściwym* lub *przenośnym*). Stanowisko przyjęte przeze mnie bliższe jest tradycji Kantowskiej oraz Fregeowskiej, zgodnie z którą „zdania i wyrażane przez nie sądy są właśnie uznawane za podstawowe nośniki znaczenia.” (Kublikowski 2019: 38-39). Należy tu podkreślić istotny fakt, że wyrażenia inne niż zdaniowe – takie jak nazwy (np. *osoba prawna*, *podmiot prawa*, *wola*, *ciało*) – nie odgrywają bezpośredniej roli w grze językowej. „Nie mogą bowiem funkcjonować jako przesłanki czy wnioski w rozumowaniach. Odgrywają one jedną pośrednią rolę poprzez występowanie jako części składowe zdań.” (Kublikowski 2019: 39). Wyniki moich badań tekstów dziewiętnastowiecznych teoretycznych rozpraw prawnych wykazują zbieżność z przytoczonym stanowiskiem Roberta Kublikowskiego i Roberta B. Brandoma. Sama nazwa jest jedynie znakiem, któremu znaczenie kontekstualne, to jest znaczenie obowiązujące w obrębie danego porządku prawnego czy doktryny, nadawane jest w tekście. W tekście przypisywane systematycznie jest temu znakowi i innym w strukturze tego znaku istotnym znakom z nim koabitującym znaczenie. Można też powiedzieć, że w ten sposób dokonuje się tekstowa eksplikacja znaczenia danego znaku. Można nawet powiedzieć, że nie tyle znaczenie to jest przypisywane, co nadpisywane, ponieważ eksplikacja nie jest w pewnych rodzajach tekstów czynnością replikacyjną. Jest czynnością kreatywną. I dlatego określenie *nadpisywanie znaczenia* jest bardziej adekwatne do semantycznej operacji nadawania znakowi językowemu znaczenia. Nadpisywanie jest aktem refleksyjnym i twórczym.
- 5 Powołując się na uwagę pani profesor Elżbiety Tabakowskiej, za którą chciałbym Jej w tym miejscu jeszcze raz wyrazić moją wdzięczność, zrezygnowałem w tym zdaniu z czasownika *objaśnić*, ponieważ uznałem, że w szczególności w odniesieniu do sytuacji ontologicznie niezgłębionych właściwszym będzie określenie *wyjaśnić*. Różnicy znaczeniowej pomiędzy *wyjaśnić* a *objaśnić* nie podaje Słownik Języka Polskiego pod redakcją Szymczaka (1995), traktując oba wyrazy jako formy synonimiczne. Zgadzając się z punktem widzenia Elżbiety Tabakowskiej wychodzę jednak z założenia, że *wyjaśniamy* coś, kiedy oświetlamy to coś od zewnątrz, kiedy wydobywamy je z ciemności, *objaśniamy* natomiast wówczas, kiedy chcemy ukazać wnętrze tego czegoś, to znaczy jeden aspekt lub kilka aspektów tego, co wyjaśnione już zostało. Zamiast słów *objaśnić* lub *wyjaśnić* Longchamps de Berier używa określenia *wyświetlić istotę danego zjawiska* (por. Longchamps de Berier 1911: v).
- 6 W oryginale czytamy: *The insights of cognitive science into the role of metaphor in our linguistic and conceptual functioning have resulted, over the past two decades, in a significant shift in general scholarly understanding of the nature and function of metaphor. The traditional view of metaphor is one of a decorative, figurative use of language in which one thing is described in terms of another, an addition to literal language that takes place in statements or phrases which are expressive and aesthetic but not truth-baring.* (Loughlan 2006: 213). Stanowisko Patricii Loughlan odrzuca zdecydowanie Lakoff: *Metaphor is the main mechanism through which we comprehend abstract concepts and perform abstract reasoning. Much subject matter, from the most mundane to the most abstruse scientific theories, can only be comprehended via metaphor* (Lakoff 1993: 244). Niektórzy autorzy zawężają użycie metafor w języku prawa do określonych typów dyskursu: użycie metafor w praktyce prawniczej zależy od tego, czy mamy do czynienia z postępowaniem przed sądem czy z rozmową obrońcy z jego klientem. Jednym z powszechnych stanowisk reprezentowanych w środowisku prawników jest, że w przypadku wypowiedzi ustnych skierowanych do sądu, nie jest ważne to, jak się mówi, ale to, co się mówi. Adam Stefaniak podkreśla, że istotnym jest, aby wypowiedziane przez

lub fałszywość zdania lub wyrażenia rozumiana jest jego zgodność/niezgodność z przedmiotem (stanem), do którego się owo zdanie lub wyrażenie odnosi. Co jednak w sytuacji, kiedy ten przedmiot lub stan jest przez dane wyrażenie ontologizowany? Wówczas pytanie o poznanie sytuacji reprezentowanej przez dane wyrażenie jest pytaniem o interpretację tego wyrażenia⁷.

W przypadku pojęć abstrakcyjnych ich konstruowanie odbywa się na drodze analiz. Ale na samym początku istotne jest ich wydobywanie na światło dzienne, ich uprzedmiotowienie za pomocą nazwy, nadanie im bytu za pomocą słowa.⁸ A że dzieje się to za pomocą wyrażań metaforycznych dziwić nie powinno zważywszy, że metafora jest zjawiskiem wszechobecnym, stanowiącym „podstawowy tryb ludzkiego myślenia i podstawę wszelkich procesów apercepcji”⁹ a także i to, że metafora „decyduje o powstawaniu nowych znaczeń” (Tabakowska 2000: 62)¹⁰.

stronę lub jej reprezentanta słowa zachowały się w pamięci członków składu orzekającego, gdyż zgodnie z art. 158 KPC brak jest obowiązku wpisywania treści wystąpienia do protokołu rozprawy (por. Stefaniak 1985, cyt. za Rybiński/Zeidler 2010: 157). „W postępowaniu sądowym, zwłaszcza cywilnym, gdzie oświadczenia składane są głównie w formie pisemnej, metaforyczne użycie wyrażań jest zbędnym i niepotrzebnym ozdobnikiem. Adresatem pism jest bowiem profesjonalista: sąd lub pełnomocnik strony przeciwnej (por. Rybiński/Zeidler 2010: 157).

- 7 W gruncie rzeczy w każdej sytuacji związanej z relacją referencji mamy do czynienia ze swego rodzaju czynnością ontologizującą. Dlatego, że nie mamy wglądu w istotę rzeczy, w to, co Kant nazywał *Ding an sich*. I stąd przypisywanie określonej treści znakowi językowemu, jest rodzajem ontologizacji, to znaczy próbą strukturyzacji rzeczywistości opisywanej znakami językowymi i powiązanych z nimi pojęciami (treściami). Kant wyjaśniał możliwość wzajemnego rozumienia się ludzi w istocie jednakowym wyposażeniem ich instrumentów postrzegania i myślenia. Ale to, że istnieje dla nas w ogóle coś, jakiś świat, a nie raczej nic, zawdzięczamy właśnie kantowskiej *rzeczy samej w sobie* (dem *Ding an sich*), która stoi za każdym doświadczeniem, ale sama jest zasadniczo niepoznawalna. Por. Dürr / Oesterreicher 2011: 15. Odrzucenie *rzeczy samej w sobie* skazuje człowieka w istocie na perspektywę solipsyzmu, nawet wówczas, gdyby podjęto próbę obiektywizacji poszczególnych ujęć solipsystycznych i ujęcia ich w jeden uśredniony zobiektywizowany obraz rzeczywistości.
- 8 W istocie pierwszą „materialną” formą bytu tych pojęć jest *słowo*. Choć można oczywiście spekulować na temat tego, co było pierwsze. Nie ulega wątpliwości, że pierwsza jest zawsze obserwacja, towarzysząca jej świadomość, że widzimy lub wyobrażamy sobie coś, co w jakiś sposób odkłada się od folii doświadczonego, sprawdzonego nawyku (por. *erprobte Gewohnheit*, w: Dürr 2011: 16). I nadajemy temu czemuś nazwę. Wyrażam pogląd, że takie słowo jest zawsze w jakiś sposób umotywowane. W każdym razie nie jest ono zawieszona w próżni. Ta motywacja ma charakter skojarzeniowy i jest charakterystyczna dla obserwacji inicjującej lub dla wyobrażenia, które stało się impulsem do podjęcia dialogu na początku z własnymi myślami. Ponadto uważam, że taka pierwsza, inicjująca obserwacja czy myśl nie jest pozbawiona refleksji. Uważam natomiast, że refleksja sprzyja dalszemu rozwijaniu tej pierwszej obserwacji i związanej z nią myśli. Prowadzi to po jakimś czasie do skonstruowania struktury, wplatania w nią zaobserwowanego lub pomyślanego zjawiska i przenoszenia tej konstrukcji, która, zrodzona z obserwacji i / lub myśli, zostaje wprowadzona niejako do rzeczywistości, do ontyczności.
- 9 Leibniz wprowadzając pojęcie apercepcji odróżniał percepcję – przedstawienie sobie rzeczy – od apercepcji, która oznacza zdawanie sobie sprawy z tego przedstawiania (por. <http://pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apercepcja>).
- 10 Por. także rozważania Blacka na temat interpretacji metafory: „Die Armen sind die Neger Europas” [Biedni są murzynami Europy]. Black pisze: Auf die einfachste Formulierung gebracht, bringen wir beim Gebrauch der Metapher zwei unterschiedliche Vorstellungen in einen gegenseitigen aktiven Zusammenhang, unterstützt von einem einzelnen Wort oder einer einzelnen Wendung, deren Bedeutung das Ergebnis der Interaktion beider ist. Was hier beabsichtigt ist, erkennen wir, wenn wir Richards’ Bemerkungen auf unser Beispiel von vorhin beziehen, auf „die Armen sind die Neger Europas“. In ihrer grössten Form belehrt die Substitutionstheorie darüber, dass indirekt etwas über die Armen Europas ausgesagt wird. (Aber was? Daß sie eine unterdrückte Klasse, ein ständiger Vorwurf für die offiziellen Ideale der Gesellschaft sind, daß Armut ein untilgbares Erbe ist?) Die Vergleichstheorie behauptet, das Epigramm mache einen Vergleich zwischen Armen und Negern. Im Gegensatz zu beiden Auffassungen sagt Richards, daß unsere „Vorstellungen“ von den Armen Europas und von amerikanischen Negern „in einem gegenseitigen aktiven Zusammenhang stehen“ und „zusammenwirken“ [interact],

Metafora prawna w koncepcji prawa Hansa Kelsena

Pojęcia *metafora prawna* używam dla podkreślenia jej istotnej funkcji w koncepcji prawa. Według definicji metafory podanej przez Kwintyliana:

Übertragen wird also ein Nomen oder Verbum von der Stelle, wo seine eigentliche Bedeutung liegt (*in quo proprium est*), auf die, wo eine eigentliche Bedeutung fehlt oder die übertragene besser ist als die eigentliche“ (Quintilian VIII, 6,5; cyt. za: Gast 2006: 416).

[Przenoszony jest zatem rzeczownik lub czasownik z miejsca, w którym znajduje się jego właściwe znaczenie (*in quo proprium est*)] do miejsca, w którym właściwego znaczenia jest brak lub w którym znaczenie przenośne jest lepsze niż to właściwe. Tłum.: R. Sz.].

Na podstawie powyższego twierdzenia Kwintyliana można sformułować wniosek, że w przypadku metafory mamy do czynienia nie tylko z przeniesieniem słowa (wyrażenia), lecz że jednocześnie za każdym razem przez to słowo (wyrażenie) zostaje (dosłownie) zapośredniczony ogląd rzeczy (*Sachansicht*). Można wobec tego powiedzieć, że ta rzecz, metaforycznie wyrażona, doświadczana lub rozumiana jest w terminach innej rzeczy lub innego procesu (por. Gast 2006: 416). Przywodzi to na myśl koncepcję kognitywnej teorii metafory, która polega na tym, że:

Metafory pojęciowe („X to Y”) dostarczają modeli myślowych, dzięki którym przedmiot poznania z domeny docelowej (X) staje się dostępny poznawczo poprzez odwołanie się do całkiem innego obszaru doświadczenia (Y). Z uwagi na funkcję wyjaśniającą metafory można by nazwać oba elementy X i Y odpowiednio *explanandum* i *explanans*. W metaforze utworzonej według wzoru „X to Y”, domena źródłowa dostarcza Y jako *explanans* dla częściowego wyjaśnienia *explanandum* X (Jäkel ([1997] 2003: 33, por. także Szubert 2012: 358).

Doprecyzowania wymaga tu słowo *wyjaśnienie*, które w oryginale brzmi *Erklärung* (por. Jäkel ([1997] 2003): 32) i które w kontekście rozważania funkcji metafory w dyskursie prawnym nabiera kluczowego znaczenia. W jaki sposób należy rozumieć owo wyjaśnienie? Decyzja o zastosowaniu metafory w wypowiedzi może być – jak mówi Kwintylian – powodowana chęcią oddziaływania na uczucia lub dążeniem do wyraźnego oznaczenia rzeczy (*die Dinge deutlich bezeichnen*), to znaczy do ich unaocznienia (*vor Augen stellen*) (por. Quint. VIII, 6, 19, cyt. wg Gast 2006: 419). Kwintylian jednym tchem wymienia całą paletę znaczeń i oddziaływań, które sięgają od ekspresji emocji aż do ulepszonego oglądu rzeczy (*verbesserte Sachansicht*), na przykład wówczas, gdy jakieś pojęcie abstrakcyjne ukazywane jest na sposób obrazowy (*anschaulich*) i gdy staje się ono przez to ewidentne, oczywiste, widoczne, wyraźne (*Evidenz ausgelöst*), aż po metodologiczne sterowanie myśleniem (por. Gast 2006: 419). Trudno jednak byłoby zaakceptować stanowisko, że poznajemy rzecz nieznaną za pomocą znanej. Takie twierdzenie miałyby charakter absurdu wynikający z błędnego koła w rozumowaniu (*circulus vitiosus*). Prowadziłoby do zamknięcia poznania w ramach istniejących doświadczeń. Nie miałyby ono charakteru poznawczego, ale rozpoznawczy o charakterze odtwórczym, to znaczy, że w każdym nowym zjawisku analogia stanowiłaby podstawę kategoryzacji tego zjawiska i jednocześnie zawęzałaby perspektywę poznawczą tegoż.

um eine Bedeutung hervorzubringen, die ein Resultat dieser Interaktion darstellt. Meiner Ansicht nach bedeutet dies, daß das fokale Wort „Neger“ eine neue Bedeutung gewinnt, die weder genau seiner Bedeutung im wörtlichen Gebrauch noch genau der Bedeutung eines wörtlichen Substituts entspricht. Der neue Kontext (in meiner Terminologie der „Rahmen“ der Metapher) bewirkt beim fokalen Wort eine Erweiterung des Bedeutungsumfangs [extension of meaning]“ (Black 1996 : 69).

Z oczywistych względów takiej tezy przyjąć nie sposób, jeśli uważa się poznanie nie za błędne koło, ale za odkrywanie nowego i dotąd nieznanego, a w każdym razie za pogłębianie osiągniętego już przez człowieka stanu wiedzy. Wydaje się, że taki charakter błędnego koła mają pewne rozważania kognitywistów amerykańskich, na przykład te, w których próbują oni dowodzić, że pojęcie ARGUMENTOWANIE da się wywieść od metafory ARGUMENTOWANIE TO WOJNA, że „ta właśnie metafora pojawia się w naszym codziennym języku w wielkiej różnorodności wyrażań” (Lakoff ([1980] 1988: 26). Bylibyśmy skłonni przyjąć taką tezę za wiarygodną, gdyby spełniała ona wymóg wiarygodności. Lakoff zdaje się pojmować analogię, na której zbudowana jest metafora, jako podobieństwo powierzchowne, a nie podobieństwo strukturalne. „Przez analogię rozumie się zachowanie w modelu wszystkich istotnych dla celu badawczego elementów i relacji występujących w modelowanym zjawisku (...) – bez tej własności model nie mógłby być trafny. Jednocześnie przez uproszczenie abstrahujemy od wielu nieistotnych elementów i relacji, które mogłyby utrudnić znalezienie przyczyn określonego zachowania modelu. To, które elementy są istotne, a które nie, zależy od tego, jakie zjawisko próbuje się zrozumieć.” (por. Chuderski 2016: 175). To rozmycie cech, na które zwraca uwagę Chuderski, rodzi pytanie o intencję autora opartej o analogię metafory. W jakim sensie ARGUMENTOWANIE TO WOJNA? Nie może przecież chodzić o tożsamość pojęć, a tylko o zaznaczenie pewnej tendencji. Jakiej? Gdzie są okopy, ranni? Gdzie broń, gdzie broń, amunicja i strzały? Czy pisząc sprawozdanie z wyniku badań i przytaczając argumenty za moją tezę lub przeciwko tezie obcej chcę wypowiedzieć swoim poprzednikom wojnę? A może tym, którzy będą badać „mój” przedmiot później? Po co? Jaki cel ma wojna a jaki argumentowanie? Czy nie mogę sobie wyobrazić argumentowania inaczej niż jako wojny? A może ARGUMENTOWANIE TO TANIEC? Może ARGUMENTOWANIE TO ROZMOWA, DIALOG? Czy rozmowa i / lub dialog to wojna? Wydaje się, że konstruowanie modelu, za pomocą którego próbuje się wyjaśnić zjawiska, czy określone idee – jak na przykład ideę *osoby prawnej* – jest bardziej złożone¹¹. Można przyjąć, że analogie, o których mówił Lakoff, są zaledwie zaznaczeniem punktu wyjścia, pierwszą inicjalną obserwacją. Dopiero ich rozwinięcie w postaci zapisanego tekstu i innych śladów ich realizacji może przynieść odpowiedź na pytanie, o co chodzi w prezentowanym modelu, za pomocą którego jego autor lub autorzy próbuje / próbują wyjaśnić opisywane zjawisko.

Fikcja

Zastanawiając się nad istotą pojęcia *osoby prawnej* (*Personbegriff*) i nad jej metaforycznym charakterem w języku prawnym, nad znaczeniem samego wyrażenia¹² i jego funkcją, należy moim zdaniem rozpocząć od uzmysłowienia sobie, że pojęcie to – jak zresztą wiele pojęć nie tylko w świecie rzeczywistości prawnej – jest fikcją. Przez fikcję należy tu rozumieć wynik działania wyrażonego za pomocą łacińskiego

11 W dosłownym tego słowa znaczeniu, to znaczy składający się z wielu części, nierzadko trudny do zrozumienia, bo abstrakcyjny, nierzadko skomplikowany, bo wielowątkowy, trudny do poznania i opisanie.

12 W historii dyskursu poświęconego teoriom osoby prawnej nazw określających tę drugą oprócz osoby indywidualnej (indywidualnego człowieka) referencję określającą podmiot praw i obowiązków było znacznie więcej: *eine fingierte Person*, *Person*, *persona ficta* lub *persona representata*, *personae*, *juristische Personen*, *personas fictas*, *mysticas*, *imaginarias*, *persona vice fungi*, *die sogenannten juristischen Personen*, *nicht menschliche*, *nicht physische*, *intelligibile Person*, *die unkörperlichen oder un Leiblichen Personen*. Spośród wszystkich przywołanych tu nazw odnoszę się obszerniej do nazwy *juristische Person*, ponieważ tę nazwę przywołuje Hans Kelsen w „Reine Rechtslehre” (Czystej teorii prawa).

czasownika *ingere* (*ingo, ingere, finxi, fictum*), tzn. formować, kształtować, prezentować, wyobrażać sobie, uzmysławiać. Tak jak różnorodny jest zakres znaczeniowy pojęcia *fikcja*, tak różnorodne są *obszary fikcji*.¹³

Fikcja jest w moim przekonaniu pojęciem, którym można w dyskursie prawnym zaznaczyć różnicę między znaczeniem wyrażenia wyjściowego (*osoby*) a jego sensem referencyjnym (*osobą prawniczą* jako podmiotem praw i obowiązków). Pojęcie fikcji nie zawsze jest niezbędne do ukazania sensu wyrażenia. W analitycznych (intencjonalnych) teoriach znaczeń (por. Ullmann 1973: 67-80) może być fikcja instrumentem przybliżającym do poznania dzięki temu, że ukazuje różnicę¹⁴ pomiędzy domeną wyjściową (*source domain*) danego wyrażenia metaforycznego a jego domeną docelową (*target domain*). W operacyjnych teoriach znaczenia (por. Ullmann 1973: 81-85) takie rozróżnienie jest zbędne, jednak jego brak może mieć wpływ na eksplikację znaczenia danego wyrażenia. Z dyskursu naukowego dotyczącego osoby prawnej (por. Bernatzik, Meurer, de Vareilles-Sommières, Herritt, Belirend, Michaud, Hölder, Ferrara, O. Mayer, Binder, Saleilles, Jellinek, Schwarz, Duguit, Planiol, Longchamps de Berier) wynika, że wybór teorii znaczenia może mieć wpływ na interpretację przedmiotu (zjawiska), dla oznaczenia którego mówiący używa określonego wyrażenia. Tak na przykład ujęcie osoby prawnej według teorii organicznej (*die organische Theorie der juristische Person*), opracowanej w szczególności przez Gierkego (1873, 1895)¹⁵, zgodnie z którą osoba prawna (*juristische Person*) postrzegana jest jako realny organizm, żyjący własnym życiem, obdarzony własną wolą i posiadający skutkiem tego taką samą zdolność prawną jak człowiek, różni się od pojęcia osoby prawnej w teorii fikcyjnej (*Fiktionstheorie*) (por. Savigny 1840, Puchta 1854, Unger 1892, Krainz 1899), która to teoria w osobach prawnych upatruje jedynie zmyślone podmioty praw¹⁶, oraz od teorii negatywnych (*negative Theorien*) (por. Meurer, Planiol,

13 Myślą tą kieruję się także za sprawą rozważań Franciszka Gruczy o statusie modeli lingwistycznych, o wzajemnej relacji między nimi oraz o procedurach badawczych (por. Grucza 2010: 64). Próbę przedstawienia zarysu pewnego stratyfikacyjnego modelu analizy językowej płaszczyzny wyrażeniowej poprzedza Franciszek Grucza kilkoma uwagami na temat jego poglądu dotyczącego statusu modeli lingwistycznych i wzajemnej relacji między nimi oraz procedurami badawczymi. Na początku odróżnia on dwa następujące znaczenia terminu system językowy: 1) system językowy jako elementy (lub jednostki) i struktury fundujące konkretne sygnały językowe (ciągi sygnałowe) występujące w aktach konkretnej komunikacji: w tym rozumieniu system językowy to pewnego rodzaju kod, którym się posługuje mówca-słuchacz; 2) system językowy to tyle, co jednostki wyróżnione przez lingwistę i rozpoznane przez niego struktury istniejące między tymi jednostkami stanowiącymi konkretne ciągi sygnałowe. Franciszek Grucza odróżnia wyraźnie te dwa zakresy przedmiotowe, do których odnosi się wyrażenie „system językowy”. W pierwszym przypadku mówi on o systemie językowym mówcy-słuchacza, względnie o rzeczywistości językowej, w drugim – o lingwistycznym systemie językowym, względnie modelu języka lub o rzeczywistości lingwistycznej (por. Grucza 2010: 64).

14 Podkreślam, że chodzi tu o różnicę, a nie o podobieństwo, o którym nierzadko wspomina się w kontekście rozważań o roli metafory w poznaniu.

15 Teoria organiczna rozwijana była także przez innych autorów: Jellinka, Bernatzika, Michauda, Ferrare, Salleilles'a.

16 Owo zmyślenie ma swoją przyczynę w potrzebie rozwiązania problemów, które rodziły się wraz z rozwojem cywilizacji ludzkiej. Na pewnym etapie jej rozwoju pojawiła się potrzeba postawienia probostw i zakładów kościelnych pod względem prawnym na równi z korporacjami prawa rzymskiego, w wyniku czego zaczęto poszukiwać jakiegoś zbiorowego wyższego pojęcia, które by te różne rodzaje podmiotów prawnych nie będących ludźmi obejmowało a zarazem umożliwiło zastosowanie do nich całego szeregu postulatów praktycznych, jak na przykład postulat zdolności do dziedziczenia, postulat odpowiedzialności za przestępstwa. W dążeniu do tego celu skonstruowano fikcję, która polegała na założeniu, że korporacje i zakłady kościelne są pewnym indywiduum i jako takie są osobą na równi z człowiekiem. Por. Longchamps de Berier 1911: 3. Komentując teorię Savigny'ego Longchamps de Berier podkreśla, że „u osób prawnych zmyślona jest (...) tylko ich filozoficzna osobowość i idąca za nią zdolność prawna” (Longchamps de Berier 1911: 7), co wynika ze sformułowań

de Vareilles-Sommières, Van den Heuvel, Hölder, Binder, Windscheid i Köppen), które zaprzeczają osobom prawnym charakteru podmiotów praw i pojmują prawa im przypisywane jako kompleksy praw bezpodmiotowych lub wielopodmiotowych (por. Longchamps de Berier 1911: v).

Leon Petrażycki odwołuje się w traktacie *O pobudkach postępowania i o istocie moralności i prawa do pojęcia fikcji w sposób następujący:*

Jeżeli mniemamy, że ktoś posiada to czy inne prawo, to istnieje wprawdzie coś realnego, ale nie tam, gdzie się znajduje ów człowiek lub jakaś inna istota, której przypisujemy prawo, lecz w naszej psychice: tam właśnie należy spojrzeć, jeżeli się chce wiedzieć, czym są prawa. Prawa (...) to nic innego, jak obowiązki szczególnego rodzaju ze stanowiska aktywu; co się zaś tyczy obowiązków (...) są one czymś idealnym, rzutowanym przez nas na różne wyobrażane istoty, i opierają się na skojarzeniach wyobrażeń pewnego postępowania i swoistych (...) emocji w psychice tego, kto przypisuje obowiązki różnym istotom w teraźniejszości, przeszłości i przyszłości, na ziemi, w niebie, w piekle itd. (Petrażycki 2002: 59).

Petrażycki uważa, że nie mniej trudności, jak odnalezienie praw w świecie względem poszukujących zewnętrznym, sprawia prawoznawstwu odnalezienie niektórych podmiotów prawa w świecie zewnętrznym:

Na przykład skarb państwa ma wiele ważnych praw, ale jak odszukać skarb państwa, gdzie i czym on jest? (słynna łamigłówka prawoznawstwa o tzw. osobach prawnych) (Petrażycki 2002: 59).

Chciałbym teraz skoncentrować się na tytułowej metaforze osoby jako działającego podmiotu (*Person als handelndes Subjekt*). Kelsen eksplikuje tę metaforę na przykładzie państwa jako osoby. Umiejscawia on metaforyczne użycie pojęcia osoby w kontekście pytania o tożsamość państwa i prawa (por. Kelsen 1992: 289). Najpierw omawia on państwo jako *porządek prawny*. Po tym wprowadzeniu rozwija myśl o państwie jako *osobie prawnej*.

Osobę prawną traktuję jako metaforę konceptualną, która dostarcza modeli myślowych, dzięki którym przedmiot poznania z domeny docelowej (X), w tym wypadku *państwo*, staje się dostępny poznawczo poprzez odwołanie się do całkiem innego obszaru doświadczenia (Y), w tym przypadku: *osoby*. W metaforze państwa jako osoby prawnej według wzoru „X to Y” domena źródłowa dostarcza Y (*osoby*) jako *explanans* dla częściowego wyjaśnienia *explanandum* X (*państwa*) (por. Jäkel ([1997] 2003: 32; por. także Szubert 2012: 359). Metafora ta ma swoje źródło w myśli Jana z Salisburii (1115 – 1180) i Marsyliusza z Padwy (znanego także jako *Marsilio da Padova*, *Marsilio Mainardini*) (1275-1342), którzy rozumieli państwo na sposób organologiczny. Zgodnie z tą koncepcją wszyscy obywatele postrzegani byli jako „dusza państwa” a tym samym jako zasada napędzająca państwowości, która w osobie władcy (*principatusa*) stworzyła odpowiedni organ, którego pełnomocnictwo do sprawowania władzy pozostawało związane z ustanowionym przez wspólnotę obywateli prawem (*Gesetz*). Ponieważ to ustanowione przez człowieka, uwzględniające wyłącznie doczesne potrzeby prawo, nie było rozumiane jako adaptacja pozaziemskiej normy, mogło ono reagować dużo większą elastycznością na zmiany wynikające z przemian historycznych (por. Struve 2006). W tym miejscu powiem tylko, że ślady tej elastycznej reakcji systemów prawnych na rozwój historyczny w kontekście odpowiedzialności

Savigny'ego: „sztuczna zdolność prawna osób prawniczych” (Savigny 184: 239) lub „osoba, którą przyjmuje się tylko w celach prawniczych” (Savigny 184: 239f., por. także Longchamps de Berier 1911: 7, Flume 1983: 6). Stąd wydaje się niezbędnym, aby w eksplikacji pojęcia osoby prawnej (*die juristische Person*) uwzględnić pojęcie osoby (*Person*) i osoby fizycznej/naturalnej (*die natürliche Person*) oraz pojęcie prawa podmiotowego (*subjektives Recht*).

osoby prawnej są odczuwalne do dnia dzisiejszego. W każdym razie można stwierdzić, że zlikwidowana w czasach rewolucji francuskiej, a następnie przywrócona do życia instytucja *osoby prawnej* (a tym samym jej odpowiedzialności karnej) poddana jest różnym regulacjom w porządkach prawnych poszczególnych państw. Współcześnie zauważa się przejście od niekarania do karania *osób prawnych*. Zmienia to właściwie spojrzenie na kwestię karalności osób prawnych, którą porusza Kelsen w swej „Czystej Teorii Prawa” ([1992] 2014). Kelsen twierdzi bowiem, że ukarane może zostać tylko ludzkie indywiduum (*menschliches Individuum*) a nie osoba prawna (*juristische Person*), podczas gdy współczesne prawo karne dopuszcza karanie zarówno indywiduum ludzkiego (np. przewodniczącego zarządu spółki) jak również osoby prawnej (np. spółki akcyjnej), do której to indywiduum jest zarachowane. Tendencję tę tłumaczy się rosnącym dążeniem państwowej gospodarki finansowej do forsownego poszerzenia zakresu państwowej możliwości rozporządzania majątkiem narodowym, to znaczy rosnącym fiskalizmem państwa.

Wyobrażenie państwa jako *osoby* i przedstawienie go jako działającego podmiotu sięgają daleko w przeszłość. W średniowiecznej koncepcji państwa jako osoby prawnej (Marsilio Mainardiniego) ogółowi obywateli jako ludzkiemu ustawodawcy (*Gesetzgeber*), a zatem rodzajowi korporacji (*Körperschaft*), przypadała rola suwerena, co z kolei dawało państwu przekraczającą osobę władcy – i w tym przypadku oczywiście już nieorganiczną – ponadosobową trwałość (*transpersonale Dauer*) (por. Struve 2006: 185-206).

Ray Paton (2002: 271)¹⁷ wyróżnia funkcję ontologiczną metafory jako jej istotną funkcję i podkreśla, że metafora pozwala tworzyć nowe, hipotetyczne byty.¹⁸ Innego zdania jest Hans Kelsen, który twierdzi, że problem państwa jako osoby działającej (*die handelnde Person*) jest problemem zarachowania (przypisania). Dlatego, aby móc uchwycić istotny sens tego zagadnienia, należy być świadomym natury tego procesu myślowego. Stanowisko Kelsena zdaje się być w opozycji do ontologicznej czy kreacyjnej funkcji metafory:

Pytanie, czy określone zachowanie, w szczególności określony akt, jest określoną funkcją zachowania państwa, jest aktem państwowym lub funkcją państwową, to znaczy, czy jest to państwo, które jako osoba stanowi akt, świadczy funkcję, nie jest pytaniem nakierowanym na istnienie faktu, tak jak pytanie, czy określony człowiek podjął określone działanie. Gdyby pytanie to miało takie znaczenie, nie mogłoby nigdy uzyskać afirmatywnej odpowiedzi. Ponieważ faktycznie to nigdy nie jest państwo, lecz zawsze tylko określony człowiek, który działa, który ustanawia określony akt, świadczy określoną funkcję (Kelsen [1992] 2014: 416).

Stanowienie określonego aktu przez państwo można wyobrazić sobie jako rzeczywiste tylko pod jednym warunkiem:

Tylko jeżeli państwo jako osoba działająca przedstawiana jest jako różna od człowieka realność [Kelsen pokazuje tu z jednej strony, że postrzega *osobę prawną* jako człowieka, a z drugiej strony dowodzi odejścia od tego obrazu w sytuacji, kiedy interpretacji poddaje konkretną sytuację z udziałem *osoby prawnej*], jako rodzaj nadczłowieka, to znaczy gdy hipostazuje się konstrukcję pomocniczą osoby [to znaczy, kiedy metaforę *osoby* jako konstrukcję pomocniczą prawa postrzega się jako realność – uwaga: R.Sz.], pytanie, czy zachodzi akt państwowy, czy funkcja państwowa, może

17 Na Patona powołuję się za Zawisławską (por. 2011: 1).

18 Zawisławską przywołuje Paton w oryginale: „They are involved in the formulation of hypothetical entities” (Paton 2002: 271), cytat za Zawisławską (2011: 110). Powołując się na Gajdę (2008) Zawisławską reprezentuje pogląd, że synonimem funkcji ontologicznej jest funkcja kreacyjna metafory (por. Zawisławską 2011: 110).

mieć znaczenie pytania skierowanego na egzystencję faktu. Odpowiedzią na to pytanie może być, że określony akt lub określona funkcja *jest* bądź *nie jest* aktem państwowym lub funkcją państwową (Kelsen [1992] 2014: 416).

Jeśli warunek ten nie jest spełniony, to na pytanie o sprawczą rolę państwa w metaforze państwa jako osoby nie można odpowiedzieć twierdząco:

Ponieważ jednak państwo jako działająca osoba nie jest realnością, lecz konstrukcją pomocniczą myślenia prawniczego, pytanie, czy jakaś funkcja jest funkcją państwową, nie może być skierowane na egzystencję faktów. Jeżeli postawiono je i odpowiedziano na nie w tym znaczeniu, jest ono źle postawione i źle na nie odpowiedziano. Właściwe bowiem może być jedynie znaczenie następujące: czy i w jakich warunkach wyświadczona przez określonego człowieka funkcja może zostać zarachowana państwu. (Kelsen [1992] 2014: 416).

Kelsen postrzega sytuację ontologizowaną przez metaforyczne *pojęcie osoby prawnej* za ściśle związaną z postrzeganiem *osoby* jako człowieka. Świadczy to o tym, że traktuje on metaforę do pewnego stopnia jako konstrukcję pomocniczą a do pewnego stopnia jako rozwiązanie modelowe. W tym sposobie myślenia rozpoznajemy dwa źródła człowieczego poznania: myślenie pojęciowe i postrzeganie zmysłowe. Na przykładzie eksplikacji pojęcia osoby prawnej w koncepcji prawa Hansa Kelsena widzimy, że postrzeganie jest konstytutywne dla poznania (por. Jäkel [1997] 2003: 132). Jak pisze Kant:

Wszelkie myślenie jednak musi albo wprost (*direkt*), albo pośrednio (*indirekt*) za pomocą pewnych znamion odnosić się ostatecznie do danych naocznych, u nas przeto do zmysłowości, gdyż w inny sposób nie może nam być dany żaden przedmiot (Kant 1904 [1787]: 49, tłum.: R. Sz.).

Metaforyczne pojęcie *osoby*, *osoby prawnej* należy do takiego rodzaju pojęć, którym nie odpowiada bezpośrednio żadne postrzeganie zmysłowe. Takie pojęcia muszą zostać najpierw „uzmysłowione” pośrednio (za pomocą wyrażenia metaforycznego, zapośredniczonego z innego obszaru poznania niż ten, do opisu którego zostaje on w danej sytuacji zaadaptowany). To metaforyczne uzmysłowienie wyraża się w interpretacji podanej przez Kelsena jako pewnego rodzaju analogia. Można to metaforyczne uzmysłowienie opisać słowami Kanta, który uważa, że w takiej, jak omawiana tu sytuacja, władza sądenia dokonuje podwójnej czynności: pierwsza polega na zastosowaniu pojęcia do przedmiotu zmysłowej naoczności, a druga na zastosowaniu samego tylko prawidła dokonywania refleksji nad tą naocznością do zupełnie innego przedmiotu, którego pierwszy przedmiot jest tylko symbolem (por. Kant [1922] 1986, por. Jäkel ([1997] 2003: 132).

Na podstawie przeprowadzonej przez Kelsena eksplikacji pojęcia *osoby prawnej* można zaobserwować, że poczucie metaforyczności nie pojawia się tylko w ramach reklasyfikacji danego obiektu, tzn. nie tylko wtedy, kiedy wskazujemy na jego przynależność do innej kategorii, ale szczególnie wówczas, kiedy nie klasyfikujemy obiektu, lecz próbujemy coś powiedzieć, ujawnić jakieś właściwości świata (a niekoniecznie samego obiektu), które są lepiej widoczne, gdy popatrzymy na ten przedmiot, tak jakby był czymś innym czy posiadał właściwości, które dosłownie nie mogą mu przysługiwać. W przypadku pojęcia *osoby prawnej* implikacje takiej obserwacji mogą rodzić skutki nie tylko natury prawnej, ale przede wszystkim etycznej, bo to, czy ich uświadomienie będzie skutkowało zmianą normy prawnej (lub obyczajowej) już istniejącej, czy też wprowadzeniem jakiejś innej, nowej normy, leży poza kręgiem rozstrzygnięć językoznawcy.

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MATTHIAS URBAN
Center for Advanced Studies “Words, Bones, Genes, Tools”
University of Tübingen, Germany

Language Contact and the Linguistic Prehistory of the Central Andes

Abstract

The Central Andes of Peru and Bolivia belong to those areas of the world whose linguistic landscape has been shaped decisively by language contact. Scholars have long recognized the intricate similarities between the Quechuan and Aymaran languages, and the consensus view is to attribute these to convergence arising from long periods of stable bilingualism in prehistory. As more recent research shows, also the languages of Northern Peru were shaped by language contact before their extinction. As a result, contact effects need to be taken into account as a general factor in studies of the linguistic history and prehistory of the Central Andes since without them crucial aspects of the lexical and grammatical structure of Central Andean languages cannot be properly understood. Thus, language contact constitutes a privileged and overarching point of access to understanding the linguistic prehistory of the region as a whole.

Keywords: Central Andean languages, contact linguistics, anthropological linguistics, ethnicity.

1. Introduction¹

As understood in the present article, the Central Andes comprise the coast and highlands of all of Peru and the Andean part of Bolivia, in which the basin of Lake Titicaca is located (cf. Stanish 2001: 41). It is a region characterized and defined by a long-standing and continuous cultural trajectory towards societal complexity that set in as early as the third millennium BC. The ultimate representative was the famous Inca Empire, which exerted control over the entire Central Andes as defined here and beyond. Periods of relative cultural homogeneity and at least in some cases also political unification, such as the Inca hegemony, are called Horizons by Andean archaeologists. For other points of time, however, one can distinguish roughly three different subareas of the Central Andes with different cultural expressions

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(cf. Stanish 2001: 44 and furthermore Isbell and Silverman 2008). One of these was centered in what is today Northern Peru, where a succession of complex, maritimately adapted societies were based in the fertile river valleys intersecting the narrow strip of arid desert on the Peruvian coast. Another subarea of the Central Andes was located in the highlands of Central and Southern Peru, where subsistence was based heavily on pastoralism in addition to agriculture. From this area the Inca would ultimately emerge. A third, southern hotspot of cultural development in the Central Andes can be discerned on the altiplano around Lake Titicaca.

Linguistically, at the eve of Spanish conquest the Central Andes presented a mosaic of languages coexisting in geographical and social space, with some salient differences in the structure of the linguistic landscape between regions which correspond roughly to the different archaeologically recognizable subareas distinguished above (cf. fig. 1).

While the distribution of languages in Southern Peru and Bolivia was mosaic-like (in reality, in fact, likely more mosaic-like than the map in figure 1 suggests) due to the social organization of Andean societies, and while bi- or multilingualism was extensive (cf. Mannheim 1991: 33), in terms of language families the linguistic diversity was and is relatively modest. As far as southern Peru is concerned, we know of languages belonging to the shallow Quechuan and Aymaran families as well as of an unaffiliated language, Puquina. All three were also spoken in Bolivia, in addition to the small Uru-Chipaya language family. When one includes the eastern Andean slopes, in Northern Peru, in contrast, we know of as many of fourteen languages distinguishable at least by name: Tallán, Sechura, Mochica, and Quingnam on the coast, Culli in the highlands, and Hibito, Cholón, and the virtually undocumented languages Xoroca, Chirino, Bagua, Patagón, Sácata, and Copallín on the eastern slopes near Jaén. In addition, still today three different varieties of Quechua are spoken in Northern Peru, even though at least two are severely endangered. Very little can be said about the wider genealogical affiliations of the non-Quechuan languages of Northern Peru. Hibito and Cholón are generally considered to form a small language family of modest geographical extension (though cf. the doubts expressed by Torero 2002). The others, however, are best considered linguistic isolates, i.e. languages that cannot be shown to be related to any other language (see Torero 1993 for some suggestions for wider affiliations of Patagón, Chirino, Xirino and Copallín, and Sácata, based on very little data).² Thus, also on the genealogical level, Northern Peru was originally more diverse linguistically than the Central and Southern highlands and the altiplano of Bolivia. What is more, toponymy betrays the presence of further languages in Chachapoyas and the highlands of Cajamarca (Torero 1989). These languages may have been related to Cholón (Urban to appear). Yet, as we will see now, there is one overarching commonality between the languages once spoken in the different areas of the Central Andes: the importance of language contact in shaping lexicon and, as far as is discernible, structure. For reasons of space, I here provide only a very general summary of relevant phenomena at a high level of abstraction.

2 In this particular case, indeed, the inability to demonstrate such relationships may well result from the lack of adequate lexical and grammatical documentation for many of the languages. It seems safe to say though that if the languages were in reality related to others that relationship was not a particularly close one.




Figure 1. A reconstruction of the linguistic situation in the Central Andes at the point of European contact, from Urban (2018). Based on Cerrón-Palomino (2010), Urban (2019 b), and Torero (1986, 1990, 1993). The figure is for illustration purposes only; all linguistic boundaries shown are approximate and lowland languages further east are not shown.

2. Language contact and the Quechuan-Aymaran mesh

Scholars have for a long time noted the striking similarities between the Quechuan and Aymaran languages, and a significant amount of scholarly effort has been dedicated to understanding the genesis and nature of these similarities (recent contributions include, *inter alia*, Cerrón-Palomino 2003, Heggarty 2005, Adelaar 2010, 2012a, 2012b, 2017, Muysken 2012a, 2012b, van de Kerke und Muysken 2014, and Emlen 2017). The grammatical structures of both lineages show many similarities: at a rather coarse level of description, both Quechuan and Aymaran languages are agglutinating and exclusively suffixing, with extensive case marking on nouns and cross-referencing of subject and object and verbs. Similarities are also found in the vowel and consonant systems: a three-vowel system characterizes both the Quechuan and the Aymaran languages; the consonant inventory characteristically involves a uvular (lost in some Quechua varieties) and a retroflex affricate. But parallel structures can extend to such minute details that they are hardly explainable through chance factors, also because the particular language type represented by Quechuan and Aymaran is not too frequent in South America overall (Adelaar 2012: 607).³ What is more, the lineages share a significant amount of vocabulary, including basic vocabulary. The similarities are not shallow either: in fact, all of the aforementioned properties reconstruct to the respective proto-languages, with the qualification that many Quechuan case markers appear to have only been in the process of lexicalization at the proto-Quechua level (cf. Cerrón-Palomino 1987: 132–137) and that generally the Quechua morphological template gives the impression of being a more recent development than that of Aymaran (cf. Adelaar 2012a: 593, 2012b: 463). What to make of all this? The grammatical and in particular lexical similarities have suggested to some that at a deeper time level, both families are descendants of a still older common ancestor (Orr and Longacre 1968, cf. Campbell 1985). More recently, however, the consensus has emerged that the similarities are better explained through language contact. Although not framed as part of an answer to the question of the relationship between Quechuan and Aymaran, Emlen and Dellert's (to appear) realization that some of the usually disyllabic proto-Quechua roots can be etymologized as consisting of smaller monomorphemic building blocks that must have been productively combinable at a very early stage of development of the Quechuan lineage is not easily reconciled with the idea of a common origin of Quechuan and Aymaran because Aymaran roots cannot be analyzed in this way. A genealogical relationship is always a costly hypothesis, but the alternative contact-based explanation of the similarities does not come cheap in this case either, for it means that speakers of the respective ancestor languages, proto-Quechua and proto-Aymara, must have been engaged in long-term language contact that was capable of leading to a wide-ranging convergence of the grammatical systems, or, given the larger transparency and regularity of the Quechuan grammatical apparatus, the reorganization of proto-Quechua's grammatical structure according to an Aymaran model (cf. Adelaar 2012a: 593, Adelaar 2012b: 465). To complicate matters further, the Quechuan-Aymaran contact relationship harks not only back to the respective proto-languages, but further later layers of contact influences at more local levels overlay the so-called initial convergence (Adelaar 2012b). These arose as speakers of individual Quechuan and Aymaran varieties, after the split of the respective lineages and the dispersal of the language families from their inferred homeland in Central Peru to other parts of the central Andes, came into contact once more. The details are very complex and not yet entirely understood. What seems beyond doubt, however, is that this happened in at least two places: on the one

3 See Cerrón-Palomino (2003) for more details.

hand, close to the homeland, speakers of the so-called Quechua I varieties of Central Peru interacted with speakers of Jaqaru, which represents a branch of Aymaran languages that is today restricted to a few villages in the highlands near Lima. On the other hand, in southern Peru, the area around Cuzco in particular, the local Quechua variety has not only exchanged a notable amount of vocabulary with Aymara, but has also acquired aspirates and ejectives which are widely attributed to Aymaran influence (cf. Mannheim 1991 on the precise mechanisms by which the contrasts were introduced into Cuzco Quechua). The Quechuan-Aymaran relationship is thus a complex story of multilayered language contact.

3. Language contact and the Northern Peruvian sphere

As we will see now, also the linguistic landscape of Northern Peru has been shaped decisively by language contact. One can observe commonalities between many of the Northern Peruvian languages that make them align with one another, but that at the same time set them apart in particular from Quechuan and Aymaran (Urban 2019a, 2019b). The languages do not generally give the impression of standing in a genealogical relationship to one another given the largely different lexical stocks with different characteristics. Yet, one can, even with the restricted amount of lexical documentation available, detect sets of loanwords that criss-cross coast, highlands, and eastern slopes (Urban 2017, 2019b). These include basic vocabulary items, not thought to be easily borrowed in casual contact situations (Thomason and Kaufman 1988). Concomitantly, one can observe rather clear similarities in root shape canons and phonotactic structures among the languages of Northern Peru which sometimes contrast starkly with the situation in Quechuan and Aymaran (Urban 2019a, 2019b): Northern Peruvian languages rely to varying degrees on monosyllabic roots which are, however, always more prominent than in Quechuan and Aymaran, which both have very strict disyllabic root canons. Northern Peruvian languages also allow word-final plosives more liberally than Quechuan and in particular than Aymaran. Together with the preference for monosyllabic structure and a certain predilection for lexical reduplication, this gives many northern Peruvian languages a distinctly recognizable fingerprint. One can even see how these preferences become activated in the adoption of Quechuan lexical material in a short list of numerals of the Quingnam language (Quilter et al. 2010), which actually constitutes the only dedicated direct documentation of this language that is available (see Urban 2019b for an analysis of placenames, personal names, and lexical localisms in the Spanish spoken in the former Quingnam-speaking area). Applying Thomason and Kaufman's (1988) borrowing scale post hoc to the northern Peruvian data leads to the impression that Northern Peruvian languages were in non-casual contact with one another for a significant period of time (Urban 2017).

4. Language contact as an overarching point of access to the linguistic history and prehistory of the Central Andes

As the overviews in the preceding two sections have made clear, language contact looms large in the linguistic history of the Central Andes as a whole: there is no way of understanding the history of the Quechuan and Aymaran languages, and in the future possibly their deeper external relations (cf. Emlen

2017), without paying attention to the language contact phenomena that link them together. And in Northern Peru, analysis of available data in terms of language contact opens up perspectives on linguistic interactions and convergence across the different altitudinal belts of the Andes. Therefore, it makes sense to frame a general linguistic prehistory of the Central Andes not exclusively on the basis of the expansion of the Quechuan and Aymaran languages (cf. e.g. Heggarty and Beresford-Jones 2010), but to specifically exploit the contact histories of the individual languages to gain a more fine-grained understanding of linguistic relationships and thereby past interactions. As Lass (1997: 184–185) puts it beautifully, “[t]he palimpsest that makes up the observable surface of a language is rarely (if ever) entirely the result of its own internal history. At least part, either superficial like lexis, or ‘deeper’ in structure will likely be the scars of encounters with other languages.” The distinct advantage of a contact-based approach is that it is capable of giving a voice also to the many Central Andean isolates, which are unduly relegated to supernumerary status in an approach focused on language dispersals: as Campbell (2017) shows, it is not true that language isolates have to remain entities without histories just because our methods fail to trace their genealogies. Rather, there is a bundle of techniques available to elucidate the history of language isolates on par with languages belonging to larger genealogical groupings. Campbell (2017) mentions, among others, the “[p]hilological study of attestations and historical reports” to achieve a better understanding of the former extension of language isolates; as far as the Central Andes are concerned, the value of these types of data has long been recognized and taken into account; in fact, the map in fig. 1 is based to a not inconsiderable extent precisely on evidence of these types. Campbell, however, also mentions the “[e]vidence from loanwords,” “[l]anguage contact and areal linguistics,” and the study of “[t]oponyms and other proper names.” Neither of these have been entirely unexplored in research of the historical linguistics of the Central Andes either, and language contact between Quechuan and Aymaran has in fact been a central topic ever since, but it is these that promise still further insights into the dynamics of the development of the linguistic situation in the Central Andes as a whole.

The research project “The Language Dynamics of the ancient Central Andes,” hosted by the University of Tübingen and funded by the German Research Foundation’s (DFG) Emmy-Noether Program, seeks to explore these in close dialogue with evidence from archaeology and anthropology. For instance, archaeological findings show that goods were exchanged within the Central Andes across short and large distances from early on in prehistory, and likewise, the evidence indicates also early and continuing interactions across ecological zones, in particular with the moist and hot lowlands of western Amazonia (cf. e.g. Paulsen 1974, Lathrap 1973). At the same time, however, organic material is poorly preserved in the climatic conditions of the rainforest. This leads to a situation in which trade routes and patterns of exchange often cannot be pinned down with ultimate certainty. Through the analysis of lexical borrowing, linguistics has the potential to help by establishing a second, and logically independent, pillar of evidence for pre-Columbian exchange within and across the Central Andes. In fact, linguist Johanna Nichols (as quoted in McConvell and Evans 1997: 13) has likened a loanword whose borrowing history can be traced to the excavation of a pot which has the fingerprint of the previous owner still attached. Therefore, members of the project are currently investigating possible lexical similarities in the languages of the Central Andes and adjacent parts of Western South America, with a targeted focus on items and goods that have been traded or exchanged in pre-Columbian times.

Of particular interest for the understanding for the language dynamics of the ancient Central Andes is also the situation on the eastern slopes of the Andes. Extant studies (e.g. Muysken 2012a: 239–

240 on Cholón, Adelaar 1996 on Amuesha, Pache 2018 on the languages of Bolivia) suggest that speakers of languages of the eastern slopes were engaged in complex and multifaceted interactions with neighbors from the highlands that is both reflected in the loanword record as well as their areal-typological profile; likely such interactions also took place with the lowlands in the east (as e.g. suggested by Torero 2002: 161 for Cholón). Interactions were not only such that they reflect imperial Inca influence, but also bespeak more long-term, likely egalitarian, relations. Project members will seek to determine more clearly just what the linguistic record says about the nature of highland-lowland interactions.

Not only are, as Lass's (1997) metaphor of the palimpsest suggests, languages often layered entities (cf. Aikhenvald 1996: 4–7), but many regions of the Central Andes have also seen successions of different languages at different points of time in history and prehistory. Spanish is now spoken in many areas of the Central Andes where formerly indigenous languages were spoken. Previously, Quechua must have replaced many local indigenous languages as it expanded from its homeland in Central Peru. Language shift, of course, can be conceived of as an extreme outcome of language contact, rendering also the succession of languages in geographical space relevant to a contact-based approach to the linguistic prehistory of the Central Andes. To deepen the understanding of the patterns of language replacement and shift and to reach layers of linguistic prehistory before prehistoric language shifts to Quechua, the study of toponymy plays an important role. Toponymic research can advantageously be complemented by investigating the lexicon of the replacing language (often, a local variety of Quechua) for possible remnants of the original language (so-called “substrate” vocabulary) as well as by paying attention to local personal names. Through the triangulation of such types of evidence, Urban (to appear) was able to suggest that a language related to Cholón has likely been replaced in the Chachapoyas area of the northern Peruvian Andes. A further application of an approach centered on the investigation of toponymy but supplemented by other types of data concerns the existence of a linguistic layer related to Aymaran in much of present-day Peru which Heggarty and Beresford-Jones (2010) associate with the so-called Early Horizon in the Central Andean cultural chronology. However, while indeed toponyms that can potentially be explained through Aymaran have been noted (Cerrón-Palomino 2000), more systematic research efforts are necessary to corroborate the idea of a former presence of Aymara especially in Northern Peru and, if successful, to determine the relationship of the language from which these toponyms remain to the Aymaran languages as we know them. Possibly, this is one of the earliest linguistic layers that can be reached in this linguistically and culturally complex region of South America.

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HIROKO WAKAMATSU
University of Tsukuba

Relexification of English *Let's* in Japanese

Abstract

This paper exhibits the ways in which English *let's* is borrowed into contemporary Japanese. It shows that, in addition to the insertion of English phrases containing *let's* into a matrix of Japanese, *let's* alone is borrowed, whose process involves relexification. This relexification, however, diverges from the standard one, because the English word order introduced by *let's* is also borrowed into Japanese. In other words, a verbal element always comes after *let's*, while the Japanese word order is basically SOV. Hortative and volition are expressed in Japanese usually by a sentence final particle *-yoo* or *-oo*, which is attached to verbs. *Let's*, or *rettsu* in Japanese, relexifies this Japanese sentence final particle, when *rettsu* is followed by a verb (e.g. *Rettsu ikou* 'lit. Let's go') or a verbal noun (*Rettsu kukkingu* 'lit. Let's cooking'). When *rettsu* is followed by a simple noun (*Rettsu buraunii* 'lit. Let's brownie'), *rettsu* relexifies a Japanese verbal element as well as the sentence final particle. In cases such as the latter, the simple noun following *rettsu* needs to satisfy the first sister principle of the implicit verb relexified by *rettsu*.

1. Introduction

This paper demonstrates how the English expression *let's* has come to be borrowed and used creatively in Japanese†.¹ Being perceived as a globally used language, English enjoys its predominant status as a foreign language in Japan. English phrases or loanwords deriving from it are ubiquitous in the public sphere, such as commercial advertisements or governmental publications. English is the language that most pre-teens and teenagers learn at school. To a large extent, words and expressions borrowed from English are familiar to Japanese speakers today.

English and Japanese are two distinct and typologically different languages. English is classified as an SVO language, has prepositions and articles, and is written in Latin alphabets. It is usually characterised as an analytic language. Japanese, on the other hand, is basically an SOV language. It does not have

1 † The revised analysis of the borrowing of English *let's* into Japanese is discussed in Nagano (2019) and Wakamatsu (2019).

prepositions or articles, but has postpositions to mark nominal dependent arguments. Its writing system uses a mixture of Chinese characters, *hiragana*, *katakana*—both of which are phonographic writings—and occasionally Latin alphabets, which, however, tend to be employed in some limited registers. Japanese is an agglutinative language.

In the field of language contact, issues involving the borrowings of functional categories of a language into another typologically distinct language have attracted not a few linguists (cf. Chan 2008; Muysken 2000; Muysken 2008; Myser-Scott 1993, among others). The notion of functional categories has been approached variously and is in need of extensive discussion (cf. Muysken 2008), but for the sake of convenience and simplicity here, let us assume that the inventory of functional categories includes determiners, auxiliaries, and adpositions, for they usually signal structural relationships rather than representing semantic content.² The issues of the borrowing of functional categories, therefore, can be rephrased as questions, one of which is, for instance, what happens when a preposition-less language such as Japanese borrows English prepositions.³ One of the early studies that touch on this enterprise is Namiki (2005), which concerns the English preposition *in*. He analyses *rinsu in shanpuu* '(lit.) rinse in shampoo,' which is a commercial product name given to shampoo, as a Japanese compound. He argues that the *in* corresponds with the Japanese deverbal noun *iri* 'containing.' This rescues *rinsu in shanpuu* from being a wrong English phrase, since the phrase "rinse in shampoo" in English should indicate a rinse, not shampoo. Recall that English is a head initial language, and Japanese is a head final language. His argument also buttresses empirical evidence that *in* in NP_1 *in* NP_2 is used productively in contemporary Japanese. Building upon Namiki's (2005) insight, Shimada and Nagano (2014) and Nagano and Shimada (2018) further exhibit borrowings of other English prepositions such as *on*, and convincingly show that they are transformed into Japanese lexemic verbal elements to function as nominal modifiers. Nagano and Shimada (2018) also classify the *in* used in Japanese into three subtypes. The first and the second subtypes of *in* are considered as classifiers with the meaning of 'containing.' They differ from each other in that the first subtype of *in* borrows only the morphological and phonological shape of English *in*; while the second subtype borrows the word-order of English, i.e., a head-initial word order, in addition to *in*'s morphological and phonological shape. The third subtype is the case where *in*, as in English locative *in*-phrase, retains English word-order and selectional properties.

The finding that English functional elements such as prepositions are at times reanalysed as Japanese lexemic elements through borrowing is in line with the borrowing of English definite article *the* into Japanese (Wakamatsu 2018a, 2018b). Observing single-word *the* in Japanese today is not rare at all, and often found in advertising media or day-to-day conversation. For instance, *za gyouza* '(lit.) the dumpling' is interpreted as "genuine dumpling" or "typical dumpling." The word *the* is always placed left of the head and functions as the modifier. There has not been observed anaphoric use of *the* in Japanese.

So far, the findings of the previous studies suggest that the straightforward borrowing of English functional categories is not easy; and when the borrowing of functional categories did take place, some forms of expedients seem to be required. This paper takes up the borrowing of *let's*, which serves as an auxiliary, and is considered to be included in the functional categories of English. The examples shown

2 Muysken (2008) does not include adpositions as constituting functional categories when explaining them in perspective of generative grammar. Baker (2003), on the other hand, argue that they are classified as functional categories.

3 English preposition borrowing into Hong Kong Cantonese is discussed in Chan (2018).

in (1a) and (1b) are expressions containing *let's/rettsu* in Japanese.⁴ The phrase in (1a) is taken from a quoted utterance in a book and that in (1b) is from an article in a blog run by a car company.

- (1) a. *Rettsu kukkingu*
 let's cooking
 'Let's cooking' (Kamebuchi & Doi 2010:4)
- b. *Oita-ken-o rettsu saikuringu*
 Oita-prefecture-ACC let's cycling
 'Let's go bicycle riding in Oita prefecture' (<https://urabus.jp/article/670.html>)

In English, *let's* is always followed by infinitive verbs, while these two examples are cases where *rettsu* is followed by English borrowed verbal nouns.

What follows explicates several types of *let's/rettsu* in Japanese, including the type shown in (1a, b). It argues that *let's/rettsu* in Japanese involves the process of *relexification* defined by Lumsden (1999), which will be explained shortly below. This process of relexification, however, is rather incomplete, at least for the time being. It also shows that *rettsu* is interpretable as a Japanese sentence final particle, *-yoo* or *-oo*, when *rettsu* is followed by a verb or a verbal noun. The sentence final particles *-yoo* and *-oo* mark a hortative mood as well as a volition. When *rettsu* is followed by a simple noun, *rettsu* is interpretable as a combination of a verbal element with the sentence final particle.

The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 2 briefly introduces two technical notions. The first is *relexification*, which seems to be involved in the use of *let's/rettsu* in Japanese. The second is *doubling*, also known as portmanteau or multiple exponence, which is also observed in the borrowing of *let's/rettsu*. Section 3 exhibits attested data obtained from a popular cooking recipe website in Japan and other sources. It shows the types in which (i) *rettsu* appears as a part of a phrase, (ii) *rettsu* is followed by verbal nouns, (iii) *rettsu* is followed by a Japanese verb, and (iv) *rettsu* is followed by a simple noun. Section 4 concludes with a summary of findings and limitations of this paper.

2. Phenomena involving language contact

2.1 Relexification

To a certain extent, relexification is, or perhaps was, often associated with creole (cf. DeGraff 2002 for refuting relexification in creole genesis); however, I use this notion as a technical one to describe the phenomena observed in my analysis. Relexification basically means a vocabulary substitution. It takes place where meaning correspondence is found between the lexicon of a native language and that of a target language. Lumsden (1999:129) notes that “[r]elexification is a mental process that builds new lexical entries by combining new phonological forms with the syntactic and semantic information of

4 The first line translates a Japanese expression in Romanization, the second line contains glosses following the Leipzig abbreviation convention, and the third line is a free translation. For consistency's sake, *let's* written in Latin alphabets in Japanese are also transcribed as *rettsu*.

lexical entries that are already established” [in the lexicon of his native language (added by Winford 2003: 342)].

In this regard, the sentence in (2) in *Media Lengua*, spoken in a town in Cotopaxi province of Ecuador, exemplifies the outcome of relexification. The sentence largely preserves the syntactic structure of Quechua, the native language of the Andean region, but lexicons are derived from Spanish.⁵

(2) (Quechua)	yalli-da	tamia-pi-ga,	mana	ri-sha-chu
(Media Lengua)	dimas-ta	llubi-pi-ga,	no	i-sha-chu
too much	rain-SUB-TO,	not	go-1FU-NEG	
(Spanish)	si llueve	demás,	no	voy a ir.
‘If it rains too much, I won’t go.’			(Muysken 1981:53)	

Lumsden (1999:129) is of the opinion that “relexification apply only to lexical categories (i.e., nouns, verbs, adjectives and prepositions).” His remark is in accord with Winford (2003:191), who regards the term, relexification, as “appropriate for the process of single morpheme insertion into a maintained ML [matrix language] frame.” Muysken (1996:390) notes that “[R]elexification is feasible [...] for lexical items, but it operates in a very incomplete manner for grammatical items.” What follows in this paper will describe this ‘incomplete’ relexification regarding the borrowing of *let’s* into Japanese.

2.2 Doubling

The phenomenon called doubling is not limited to the context of language contact. Using the term, multiple exponence, Harris (2017) exhibits constituents or sentences within which two or more of the overlapping sets of features are observed in one language. At the same time, however, doubling is often observed when two distinct, and perhaps, contrasting head-complement ordered languages are mixed.

In the phrase in (3a), plural markers are repeated in both languages of Lingala, which is a Bantu language spoken in Congo, and French. The sentence in (3b) is the utterance by a bilingual speaker of English and Japanese, in which both English *for* and Japanese *ni* are used to mark dative case.⁶ The phrase in (3c) is a creatively named recipe title by a Japanese speaker. It contains *in* and a Japanese verbal noun *iri*, both of which carry the meaning of ‘containing.’

(3) a.	... <i>ba-jeune-s</i>
	... CL2-young-PL
	‘young people’ (Lingala/French, Bokamba 1988:37)

5 The following abbreviations are used in the glosses: FU = future tense, NEG = negation marker, SUB = adverbial subordinator, TO = topic, 1 = first person.

6 Chan (2015) calls this a portmanteau construction, and explains the reason behind it. In addition to portmanteau, the term, resumption is also employed to describe the phenomena discussed here. The overlapping but differentiated delineations indicated by doubling, multiple exponence, portmanteau, and resumption may be in need of explanation. I chose doubling as an umbrella notion to include the rest, at least for the time being, for the sake of convenience and for the limitation of space.

- b. Look at the things she buys *for* Sean *ni*
 Look at the things she buys for Sean for
 ‘Look at the things she buys for Sean.’ (English-Japanese, Nishimura 1986:140)
- c. *guriin karee in shio-koujiiri*
 green curry containing salted rice malt containing
 ‘green curry containing salted rice malt’
 (<https://cookpad.com/recipe/1827835>)

As shown below, one type of the borrowing of *let's* into Japanese which is the one followed by a Japanese verb with a sentence final particle, provides the case of doubling.

3. Classification of attested data

The main data relied on in this paper is taken from a dataset jointly provided by Cookpad Inc. and the National Institute of Informatics, Japan. The dataset comprises text data from the website Cookpad.⁷ The website offers a platform to its visitors who can post their own created recipes with pictures and instructions as well as searching for their recipes and leaving their comments on the recipes with pictures. The site is the biggest of this kind in Japan, compiling 2.97 million recipes as of September 2018. I use this dataset as a corpus, for it reflects ordinary Japanese speakers' spontaneous and creative language use. Additionally, the Balanced Corpus of Contemporary Written Japanese (BCCWJ) and some blog articles provide the source of data analyzed below.

There are four types of the borrowing of *let's* into Japanese today, as unfolded below.

3.1 *Rettsu as a part of a phrase*

The first type is considered to be a phrasal insertion containing *let's* in the Japanese matrix, as shown in (4). The phrases in (4a) and (4b) are comments made by contributors who posted their recipes.

- (4) a. *mochiyori paatii ni rettsu gou*
 potluck party ALL let's go
 ‘Let's go to a potluck party’ (<https://cookpad.com/recipe/2419743>)
- b. *rettsu enjoyoi haru-no-aji*
 let's enjoy spring-GEN-taste
 ‘Let's enjoy the taste of the spring season’ (Cookpad dataset)

It is likely that *rettsu go* is used as one phrase whose inner structure may be opaque to the speakers. The same may be found in *rettsu enjoyoi*. Note that the expression in (4b) follows the English word order, as the subsequent constituent of *rettsu enjoyoi* is an object, *haru-no-aji* ‘the taste of the spring season.’

⁷ This website is accessed at <https://cookpad.com/>.

3.2 *Rettsu* followed by verbal nouns

There are, however, many cases where *rettsu* is borrowed into Japanese as a single-word. This *rettsu* is grafted onto Japanese verbs or nouns. Let us see the cases where *rettsu* is followed by verbal nouns as in the examples in (5).

- (5) a. *rettsu* *reitou*
 let's freezing
 'Let's freeze (materials).' (https://cookpad.com/recipe/1849528)
- b. *rettsu* *henshin!*
 let's transformation
 'I'll transform myself!"
 (shouted by a hero during his transformation into a transhuman in a TV show)
- c. *soto* *kara* *jikkurito rettsu* *kansatu*
 outside from carefully let's observation
 'I encourage you/let's observe (him) carefully from the outside.' (BCCWJ-NT)
- d. *rettsu* *sakana-tsuru*
 let's fishing
 'Let's catch fish' (https://ameblo.jp/ginokochan/entry-12076291244.html)
- e. *rettsu* *kukkingu*
 let's cooking
 'Let's cooking' (= (1a))

In all of these examples, *rettsu* functions as a hortative or volitional marker. It is also that the verbal nouns following *rettsu* in (5a), (5b) and (5c) have hidden or implicit arguments, although such arguments are easily reconstructed from the context; that is to say, they are complex event nominals. The verbal nouns, *sakana-tsuru*, 'fishing' in (5d) and *kukkingu*, 'cooking', are also event nominals. The fact that *rettsu* is interpreted as a hortative or volitional marker allows us to consider that it substitutes a native equivalent lexicon, that is, a Japanese sentence final particle '-you' or '-oo' depending on the type of a verbal stem to which attached. In other words, *rettsu* is the outcome of relexification of '-you' or '-oo.'

This relexification, however, is incomplete. The expression in (6), which has a contrasting word order of (5d), reveals that when located in the place of Japanese sentence final particle, *let's* is judged to be awkward.

- (6) ? *sakana-tsuru* *rettsu*
 fishing let's

In other words, the English word order involving *let's* is retained, though *rettsu* relexifies a Japanese hortative or volition element.

3.2 *Rettsu* followed by a Japanese verb

Rettsu as a single word is also followed by Japanese verbs as shown in (7). Note, however, that the verbs are always together with the sentence final particles. In (7a), *ikou*, is formulated by a present indicative form of *iku* 'go' with the sentence final particle *-oo*. In (7b), *tanoshimi-mashoo*, is formulated by the fusion of *tanoshimu* 'enjoy,' *masu*, a polite form and *-oo*, the sentence final particle.

- (7) a. *kaki-goori o tabe ni rettsu ikoo*
 shaved.ice ACC eat ALL let's go.SFP
 'Let's go to have shaved ice'
 (https://aho-driver.at.webry.info/201307/article_11.html)
- b. *rettsu tanoshimi-mash-oo*
 let's enjoy-POL.SFP
 'Let's enjoy' (<https://inouereco.exblog.jp/7723379/>)

The example phrase shown in (8) is created from (7a) by removing the sentence final particle.

- (8)? *rettsu iku*
 let's go

The phrase (8) is judged by some native speakers of Japanese as awkward, while a few suggest that the phrase sounds like a soliloquy, if phonological emphasis is placed on *iku*.

Considering that both *let's* and the sentence final particle are hortative markers, the expressions in (7) exhibit the case of doubling. Note also that the location of *let's* is, again, left of the verb, indicating the English word order.

3.4 *Rettsu* followed by a simple noun

Finally, *rettsu* is followed by a simple noun. Let us observe the expressions in (9). All of them lack verbal elements on the surface; however, they can be easily reconstructed from the context.

- (9) a. *rettsu ume-jamu*
 let's plum-jam
 'Let's make plum jam' (<https://cookpad.com/recipe/1147431>)
- b. *saa anata mo rettsu buraunii*
 FILLER you too let's brownie
 'So, I encourage that you, too, make brownies'
 (<https://cookpad.com/recipe/698917>)
- c. *isshoni rettsu yuuenchi*
 together let's amusement park

‘Let’s go to/play in an amusement park’ (<https://369days.net/archives/644>)

For instance, as shown in (9b), *rettsu* together with its right element, *buraunii* ‘brownie’ signifies the expression encouraging hearers to make brownies. In this regard, *rettsu* is considered as the outcome of relexification of Japanese verbal element, *tsukuru* ‘make’, together with its sentence final particle marking hortative. Similarly *rettsu* in the expression in (9c) is interpreted as an amalgamation of ‘go’ and a hortative marker.

The relationships of this implicit verbal element realized by *rettsu* and simple nouns located on the right of *rettsu* remind us of the first sister principle (Roeper and Siegel, 1978). The violation of the first sister principle, as shown in (10a) is judged to be unacceptable.

- (10) a. * *rettsu* koppu
 let’s cup
 ‘Let’s drink with a cup’ (cf. ^{OK} ‘Let’s use a cup.’)
- b. *rettsu* sake
 let’s sake
 ‘Let’s drink sake.’

4. Concluding Remarks

We have seen four types of *let’s* borrowed from English into Japanese. When *rettsu* is followed by a VN as well as a Japanese V, relexification is observed, in that *rettsu* functions as the hortative or volitional marker, which is usually assumed by a Japanese sentence final particle. When *rettsu* is followed by a simple noun, *rettsu* relexifies a Japanese verbal element and a sentence final particle. The relexification, however, is incomplete, in that the word order of English *let’s* is retained, as the verbal element always appear on the right of *rettsu*. In other words, *rettsu* does not appear in the position occupied by the sentence final particle. The summary of the analysis is shown in Fig.1.

types of <i>let’s/rettsu</i> in Japanese	mechanism of the borrowing
<i>let’s/rettsu</i> + English Vs	phrasal insertion
<i>let’s/rettsu</i> + Japanese or English VNs	incomplete relexification / <i>let’s</i> = SFP
<i>let’s/rettsu</i> + Japanese Vs	incomplete relexification / <i>let’s</i> = SFP
<i>let’s/rettsu</i> + simple Ns	incomplete relexification / <i>let’s</i> = verb + SFP

Fig.1 SFP = sentence final particle

The study of the borrowing of *let’s* into Japanese suggests that the behaviour of the borrowing of functional categories is distinct from lexical categories. This, however, is in need of further empirical evidence and theoretical exploration.

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