Academic Journal of Modern Philology

doi: 10.34616/ajmp.2023.19.18

ISSN 2299–7164

Vol. 19 (2023)

Open Access. Published by Committee for Philology of the Polish Academy of Sciences, Wrocław Branch and College for Interdisciplinary Studies, University of Wrocław. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported License.

Ciro Porcaro

University of Rome “La Sapienza”, Germanic and Slavic Studies

Von den “Luftgebäuden” der Philosophie in der Stadt
der Sprache: An Analysis of the Metaphors in the First Part of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations

Abstract

The present study has as its object three of the most frequent and representative metaphors of the first part (paragraphs from 1 to 133) of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations. In particular, the analysis focuses on the following mappings: LINGUISTIC EXPRESSIONS ARE TOOLS, LANGUAGE IS A CITY and MEANING IS A PURE CRYSTAL. The methodological approach adopted in the study as well as the analytical proceedings are both borrowed from the theory of conceptual metaphor (see: Lakoff and Johnson 1980, Lakoff 1993 and Kövecses 2002, 2020). The three metaphors were identified through a careful manual search of the text. An automatic search for source domain vocabulary followed to identify any further instances of the metaphors. In a second step, the conceptual structure of the metaphors was outlined; the entailments of the mappings were listed and interpreted on the backdrop of the arguments developed in Wittgenstein’s work. Finally, a comparison of the structures of the three conceptual metaphors was made. The analysis revealed the existence of complex and coherent conceptual mappings motivating the use of the identified metaphorical expressions. The comparison among the three metaphors confirmed the hypothesis that the entailments of the first two mappings mentioned above are all consistent with each other, playing a fundamental role in the comprehension of Wittgenstein’s position on language and meaning. Conversely, the internal logic of the third metaphor reflects a conception of language rejected by the philosopher.

Keywords: Metaphor Analysis, Philosophical Investigations, German Linguistics, Wittgenstein, Philosophy of Language

1. Introduction

Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations are considered to be one of the most influential contributions that emerged in the field of philosophy in the twentieth century. It is no exaggeration to state that ever since its publication in 1953 this book has had an enormous impact not only on the subsequent philosophical works but also on the majority of the fields of the humanities and social sciences (see: Stern 2004). This is also due to the variety and the relevance of the topics covered by the Investigations which the author introduces in the form of often interconnected dilemmas and wisecracks and which prove to be significant for different areas of thought and disciplines. Among other things, the Investigations mark Wittgenstein’s departure from logicism and his disavowal of any attempt (including the one he himself undertook in the Tractatus) to reduce mathematical and linguistic facts to the notions and rules of logic (see: Gargani 2007 and Perissinotto 2018).

The author’s break with the idea of an essential logical nature of meaning is witnessed by the introduction in the Investigations of notions aimed at conveying the idea of the heterogeneity of the facts of “what we call language” (Wittgenstein 1953, §§ 108) and of the multiplicity of their functions. Such is the purpose of now widely discussed notions such as “language games” and “family resemblances”. These and other concepts enrich the arguments of the Austrian philosopher who entrusts them to the voice of his narrator, who is often engaged in refuting and subjecting to skeptical criticism the analyses formulated by different interlocutors’ voices. In fact, the text takes the form of a collection of short dialogues among a number of different voices, each of which gives the reader a particular perspective or opinion on philosophical dilemmas (see: Stern 2004). The discussions of the Investigations are often characterized by the presence of several complex and articulated metaphors aimed at exemplifying different – often opposed – perspectives about linguistic facts and meaning.

Given the centrality and the importance of these metaphors in the reception of Wittgenstein’s work, it’s noteworthy that the literature in the field of linguistics does not provide a detailed analysis of the metaphoric expressions populating the Investigations. The present paper aims to fill at least part of that gap by presenting an analysis of the three most frequent metaphors (immediately after the two mentioned above) characterizing the first part of the Philosophical Investigations (§§ ١–133). These three metaphorical expressions play a central role in the first part of the work as they help to convey and contrast two opposite views of language and meaning. Two of these metaphors, namely SPRACHLICHE AUSDRÜCKE SIND WERKZEUGE [LINGUISTIC EXPRESSIONS ARE TOOLS] and DIE SPRACHE IST EINE STADT [LANGUAGE IS A CITY] (see: Sections 3.1. and 3.2.), reflect the (implicit) author’s positions concerning linguistic facts and meaning; the third one, namely the metaphor DIE BEDEUTUNG IST EIN REINER KRISTALL [MEANING IS A PURE CRYSTAL] (see: Section 3.3.), is aimed at conveying a perspective on meaning that Wittgenstein ascribes to the logicians and which motivates their analyses.

The major aim of the present study is to verify the hypothesis according to which the first two of the above mentioned metaphors and their entailments are consistent with each other in opposition to the third one.

It is essential to point out that the two most prevalent metaphors in the first part of the work, i.e. those underlying the well-known notions of “language-games” and “family resemblances”, were deliberately excluded from the purposes of the present study for the reason that these two notions have been widely discussed in literature1. In other words, these two metaphors have been more or less directly enucleated in the various comprehensive and in-depth treatises on the Investigations. The focus of the present work is therefore on the above mentioned salient metaphors of the first 133 paragraphs which have been mostly neglected or which have in any case received less critical attention.

This paper is organized as follows. Section 2.1. contains a brief report of some of the central topics dealt with in the first part of the work. Clearly, the report doesn’t aim to be exhaustive but simply to outline an interpretative framework useful to contextualize and understand the analysis of the metaphors. Section 2.2. focuses on the methodological approach adopted in the present study. Section 2.3. illustrates the analytical procedures aimed at extracting, analyzing and comparing the metaphors. Sections 3.1., 3.2. and 3.3. contain an analysis of the three metaphors and of the identified entailments. Finally, section 4 has as its object the discussion of the result. More specifically, the section gives an overview of the different entailments that emerged from the analysis which will allow to highlight the internal structures of the metaphors and to show the relations of conceptual coherence linking the first two metaphors [LINGUISTIC EXPRESSIONS ARE TOOLS and LANGUAGE IS A CITY] and opposing them to the third one [MEANING IS A PURE CRYSTAL].

2. Methodology

2.1. Materials

Exactly like the rest of the work, paragraphs from 1 to 133 of the Investigations are concerned with several interconnected topics which the author frames and problematizes from multiple perspectives. Probably, the most direct way of briefly mentioning the salient topics as well as the connections that hold them together and that give to the dialogues of the Investigations that kind of characteristic “kaleidoscopic depth” is to start from the notion of “language-games”. This notion is based on the author’s conviction that “what we call ‘language’” lacks the formal unity that many philosophers – as Wittgenstein himself in the first phase of his philosophy (see: Gargani 2007: 39)2 – and scholars generally imputed to it and has instead to be considered as “a family of structures more or less akin to one another” (Wittgenstein 1953, §§ 108). In this regard, Wittgenstein emphasizes the heterogeneity of the possible manifestations of language which he considers to be integral and indivisible parts of the multiple human practices in which they are woven (see: Wittgenstein 1953, §§ ٢٣). Directly related to the idea of the heterogeneity of the linguistic facts is the notion of “family resemblances” (ivi., §§ ٦٧). This notion – extendable in principle to many of the concepts speakers use – is mainly aimed at shedding light on the nature of the kinship between the various linguistic activities. Wittgenstein brings up the vision of a “criss-crossing pattern of similarities and dissimilarities” relating the different linguistic activities (Stern 2004: 111) just like resemblances among the members of a family.3 The direct consequence of such a multifaceted conception of language is the rejection of the firm belief of some philosophers in the existence of a single essence of language and meaning. In other words, according to Wittgenstein, the possibility of the meaning of a proposition cannot be analyzed by reducing it to a putative essential logical form as the logicians try to do. On the contrary, the meaning of a linguistic expression depends on how it is used in a specific context (see: Gargani 2007: 52). To use Wittgenstein’s words: “For a large class of cases […] the meaning of a word is its use in the language” (Wittgenstein 1953, §§ ٤٣).

Connected to the conceptions of “language-games”, “family resemblances”, “meaning as use” and to the rejection of a single essence animating the language is the paradox of rule-following.4 Wittgenstein brings forward – first implicitly and then from §§ 65 onwards in more explicit terms (see: Stern 2004) – a criticism of rule based theories of meaning. The Austrian philosopher position could be stated in the following terms: a rule, whether understood in terms of a logical or a psychological process or explanation, cannot account for the meaning of an expression since the rule itself can be “variously interpreted in every case” (Wittgenstein 1953, §§28) (see: also Stern 2004: 119 and Gargani 2007: 88). What the author means is that any attempt to explain the functioning of linguistic facts must necessarily presuppose the grammar of which the expression constituting the attempt is part. Therefore, all the philosophical explanations postulating the existence of a “spiritual process” at the basis of meaning turn out to be nothing more than “unexplained explainers” (see: Stern 2004: 98); cases in which language keeps “running idle” (Wittgenstein 1953, §§ 88). Hence the author’s radical belief in the futility of the search for a “Über-Ordnung zwischen – sozusagen – Über-Begriffen” (“super-order between – so to speak – super-concepts”) (Wittgenstein 1953, §§ 97).

As already pointed out, this extremely short exposition of the salient contents of the first part of the work does not even vaguely do justice to the complexity and scope of the topics discussed by the philosopher. Also omitted here was the reference to the still lively debate concerning the position and the intentions of the author in many of the paragraphs of the Investigations.5 However it is believed that this brief review can provide a sufficient starting platform to introduce the analysis of the metaphors in Sections 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3.

2.2. Methodological Approach

The approach adopted for the analysis of the metaphors in the following sections is a cognitive one. The analytical categories and proceedings are both borrowed from the theory of conceptual metaphor. More specifically, reference is made here to the works of Lakoff and Johnson (1980), Lakoff (1987), Lakoff (1993) and Kövecses (2002, 2020). Cognitive linguistics is an interdisciplinary approach emerged during the 1970s and the 1980s. This approach adopts a holistic view of human mind as well as the assumption that language reflects the general functioning of cognition. Thus, according to the principles of Cognitive Linguistics, meaning corresponds to conceptualization and is stored in conceptual domains. Conceptual domains are mental spaces containing coherent segments of experiences and provide the context for the interpretation of a semantic unit (see: Langacker 1986 and Lakoff 1987). One of the defining aspects of the cognitivist approach is the central role of metaphors in reasoning and understanding processes. More specifically, according to CL, metaphor is considered as one of the most important structuring principles of human cognition (see: Lakoff 1987: 68)6. The notion of metaphor emerging from the above mentioned contributions can be summarized as follows: a metaphor is a conceptual mapping that allows the comprehension of a conceptual domain (the “target domain”) in terms of another domain (“the source domain”) (see: Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 37 and Kövecses 2002: 4). Within this framework, metaphors are not seen as purely linguistic practices but as the result of a projection of experience-based elements of knowledge from a conceptual domain to another. Those projections are considered to be ubiquitous in reasoning and understanding and speakers’ conceptual system is described as structured by a system of metaphors (see: Lakoff 1993: 3). It is important to point out that metaphorical mappings are tightly structured and normally consist of a set of “ontological correspondences” between the elements of target and source domains (see also Lakoff 1993: 5). A common property of conceptual metaphors is “metaphorical entailments”. The entailments result from the projection of some portions of the source domain onto the target domain and constitute the structure of the metaphor (see: Kövecses 2002: 122). Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 89–91) define them as the imparting of characteristics of the source domain to the target domain by logical means.

The reasons for the choice of a cognitive approach lie in the centrality and cognitive importance of metaphor within CL. More specifically, CL considers metaphorical expressions, of the kind analyzed in this study (see: Sections 3.1., 3.2. and 3.3.), in terms of linguistic manifestation of more complex coherent mappings operating on the conceptual level (see: Lakoff 1993: 7). Therefore, the methodological and analytical tools developed in the cognitive approach are particularly suited to identifying and analyzing the conceptual structure underlying the expressions under analysis. The identification and the analysis of the aspects entailed by the underlying metaphorical mappings will allow to grouping the metaphors in a “coherent system of metaphorical concepts” and to eventually isolating metaphorical concepts which are inconsistent with the others “competing” mappings (see: Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 12). Last but not least, the delineation of the structure of the mappings can make a hermeneutic contribution to understanding the meaning of the passages of the work in which the metaphors analyzed are directly or indirectly evoked.

2.3. Analytical Procedures

Two strategies were combined for the extraction of the metaphoric expressions from the text: (i) manual searching and (ii) searching for source domain vocabulary (see: Stefanowitsch 2005). In a first step, all the 133 paragraphs were carefully read and searched manually for metaphors. An additional search was then conducted by directly searching for probable source domain lexical items. The list of the above mentioned lexical items was drawn up on the basis of the first reading. This second search made it possible to identify occurrences that had not been detected on a first reading.

The choice to favor a manual over an automatic searching and annotation procedure in the first phase depends mainly on three aspects: 1) the impossibility (due to the lack of contributions on the subject) of establishing a priori and automatically searching for the source domains used to understand concepts such as LANGUAGE and MEANING 2) the need to contextualize the metaphorical expressions – and thus the function of the mappings – against the background of the general context of the arguments developed in the various paragraphs; 3) the relatively small size of the analyzed text.

The identification of source domain expressions made it possible to deduce the existence of three particularly frequent metaphoric mappings. This operation was followed by a count of the occurrences of the metaphors. A detailed analysis of the linguistic instances of the metaphors made it possible to better outline the structure of the mappings and identify their entailments. The entailments were then compared in order to shed light onto similarities and dissimilarities in the structures of the metaphors. The comparison has shown that metaphors characterized by evident structural similarities and related internal logics reflect the same philosophical position.

3. Results

3.1. SPRACHLICHE AUSDRÜCKE SIND WERKZEUGE [LINGUISTIC EXPRESSIONS ARE TOOLS]

The most frequent of the metaphors identified can be referred to as SPRACHLICHE AUSDRÜCKE SIND WERKZEUGE [LINGUISTIC EXPRESSIONS ARE TOOLS]. This metaphor occurs fourteen times, namely in the paragraphs 4, 6, 11, 12, 14, 17, 21, 22, 23, 27, 50, 88, 92, 93. The lexical items denouncing the metaphor include both nouns of different types of tools and verbs referring to activities and actions which are typically carried out with tools. Among the most frequent and salient source-domain-lexemes are: Funktion (function), Stange (rod), Hebel (lever), Bremse (brake), Bremshebel (brake-lever), Werkzeug (tool), Werkzeugkasten (toolbox), Hammer (hammer), Zange (pliers), Säge (saw), Schraubenzieher (screwdriver), Maßstab (rule), Leimtopf (glue-pot), Leim (glue), Nagel (nail), Schraube (screw), Handgriff (handle), modifizieren (to modify), verbinden (to connect) etc. The metaphor is characterized by a complex and layered internal structure. The following metaphorical entailments were identified:

a) speakers are the users of the tools;

b) different types of expressions are different types of tools;

c) the different meanings of the expressions correspond to the different functions of the tools;

d) the context of use of an expression is a specific connection of tools;

e) different connections of words are different connections of tools;

f) learning different types of expressions is learning how to use different types of tools;

g) philosophers are users who fail to discern the diversity of the tools and look for a non-existent universal mode of use.

By means of this metaphor Wittgenstein aims at highlighting the heterogeneous composition of the category “linguistic fats”, the multiplicity of the functions that words and expressions can potentially fulfill in linguistic performances as well as the fundamental role played by the context in defining the notion of meaning:

1) […] ‚Indem ich die Stange mit dem Hebel verbinde, setze ich die Bremse instand.‘ – Ja, gegeben den ganzen übrigen Mechanismus. Nur mit diesem ist er der Bremshebel; und losgelöst von seiner Unterstützung ist er nicht einmal Hebel, sondern kann alles Mögliche sein, oder nichts.7 (Wittgenstein 1953, §§ 6)

In this paragraph, Wittgenstein is trying to draw the reader’s attention to the fact that the effects of ostensive linguistic behavior are nothing more than the result of a specific training which presupposes itself the mastery of a specific linguistic game, namely asking what the name of an object is.

This specific occurrence of the metaphor (1) sheds light onto the importance of the “connections” among expressions, contexts and circumstances. It is precisely these connections that determine the different “functions” of linguistic facts, which is to say their meaning. Such meaning can only be identified on the backdrop of a larger linguistic and extra linguistic context (see also Stern 2004: 90), which is understood in (1) in terms of a complex Mechanismus (mechanism), more specifically a Bremse (brake), formed by the connection of a Stange (rod) and a Hebel (lever). In other words, there is no point in asking what the function of these two components is by taking them out of context and looking for a general rule which inheres to a single “mode of use” of the tools regardless of the context. This conviction emerges strongly from the following occurrence of the metaphor:

2) […] Denke dir, jemand sagte: ‚Alle Werkzeuge dienen dazu, etwas zu modifizieren. So, der Hammer die Lage des Nagels, die Säge die Form des Bretts, etc.‘ – Und was modifiziert der Maßstab, der Leimtopf, die Nägel? – ‚Unser Wissen um die Länge eines Dings, die Temperatur des Leims, und die Festigkeit der Kiste.‘ – Wäre mit dieser Assimilation des Ausdrucks etwas gewonnen?8 (Wittgenstein 1953, §§14)

It is clear from this passage that Wittgenstein firmly rejects the approach of those philosophers who advocate the existence of a super-ordinate rule capable of (pre)determining speakers’ intellectual processes during linguistic performances, i.e. a general explanation of the “essence of meaning” (see: Wittgenstein 1953, §§ 92). The first interlocutor in the passage, introduced by means of the pronoun jemand (someone), has evidently the function of representing the position contested by the author. In this occurrence of the metaphor, the postulation of a general explanation or rule at the basis of all linguistic facts is represented by the interlocutor’s conviction that the ultimate goal of the different tools corresponds to the possibility of modifying something: “Alle Werkzeuge dienen dazu, etwas zu modifizieren”. The unacceptability, if not absurdity, of such a position is then immediately emphasized by showing its character as an argumentative paradox within the metaphorical formulation. This effect is achieved by showing the obvious nonsense of trying to trace all instruments to a single principle of use: for example, it would be a bizarre and fruitless stretch to say that a rule (Maßstab) modifies people’s “knowledge of a thing’s length”.

3.2. DIE SPRACHE IST EINE STADT [LANGUAGE IS A CITY]

In order of frequency of occurrences, the second of the metaphors analyzed can be labeled as DIE SPRACHE IST EINE STADT [LANGUAGE IS A CITY]. This metaphor appears seven times in the following paragraphs: 18, 29, 81, 85, 98, 118, 120. Among the most salient lexical items identified in these paragraphs evoking the source domain STADT (CITY) one finds: Stadt (city), Vorstadt (suburb), Haus (house), Straße (street), Gaßchen (alley / little street), Platz (square), Zubaute (extension), Luftgebäude (“house of air”), Bauwerk (building), Steinbrocken (bits of stone), Schutt (debris), Wegweiser (signpost), konstruieren (to construct), bauen (to build) etc. The structure of this metaphor also consists of several complex entailments:

a) speakers are wanderers

b) linguistic facts are different architectural structures

c) interpretations are directions

d) rules are signposts

e) ideal languages are “houses of air”

f) philosophers are builders who construct “houses of air.”

A first glance at the entailments already suggests several points of connection of this metaphor with the previous one. A significant parallelism that can be guessed concerns the already mentioned multifaceted character of linguistic facts which is rendered in this case in terms of the structural differences of the many buildings, suburbs and districts that make up the “city of language”. Contrary to the previous metaphor, the reference to the “difference of functions” does not seem to be a salient structural feature in this case. Conversely, a relevant aspect introduced is that of the co-presence in language of elements of different chronological derivation:

3) …so frage dich, ob unsere Sprache vollständig ist; – ob sie es war, ehe ihr der chemische Symbolismus und die Infinitesimalnotation einverleibt wurden; denn dies sind, sozusagen, Vorstädte unserer Sprache. (Und mit wie viel Häusern, oder Straßen, fängt eine Stadt an, Stadt zu sein?) Unsere Sprache kann man ansehen als eine alte Stadt: Ein Gewinkel von Gäßchen und Plätzen, alten und neuen Häusern, und Häusern mit Zubauten aus verschiedenen Zeiten; und dies umgeben von einer Menge neuer Vororte mit geraden und regelmäßigen Straßen und mit einförmigen Häusern.9 (ivi, §§ ١٨)

In (3) the author’s intention is to emphasize once again the multiform composition of language. The idea of the significance of the connection among heterogeneous elements does emerge also from this metaphor, albeit less explicitly: more specifically it is exemplified by means of the reference to the constituent areas of a city, such as a Vorstadt (suburb), which are the result of an agglomeration of structures. As can be seen, in some places of the text, the mapping between the source domain STADT (CITY) and the target domain SPRACHE (LANGUAGE) takes the shape of a simile, as in Unsere Sprache kann man ansehen als eine alte Stadt (Our language can be regarded as an ancient city). Also noteworthy are cases like dies sind, sozusagen, Vorstädte unserer Sprache (these are, so to speak, suburbs of our language), where both source and target domain lexical items coexist in the same phrase, making the mapping linguistically explicit.

4) Und wie ist es mit der letzten Erklärung in dieser Kette? (Sag nicht ‚Es gibt keine ‘letzte’ Erklärung”. Das ist gerade so, als wolltest du sagen: ‚Es gibt kein letztes Haus in dieser Straße; man kann immer noch eines dazubauen‘)10. (ivi, §§ 29)

In the “city metaphor” explanations correspond to houses (4). The idea behind the entailment is that there can be no “final explanations” concerning language and meaning that have the character of “Überbegriffe” (super-concepts) (ivi, §§ 97), since any statement with explanatory function “hangs in the air unless supported by another” (see: Stern 2004, 19). This does also imply that – just like the houses of a street – “explanations come to an end somewhere” (Wittgenstein 1953, §§ 1). Even if the possibility of building a “new house” (i.e. an explanation) remains open, they will always be statements, whose final interpretation cannot be defined once and for all by a putative super-statement.

A similar reflection seems to be invited also by passage (5), in which rules are understood in terms of Wegweiser (signposts) which give guidance to speakers as to the direction (the interpretation) to take:

5) Eine Regel steht da, wie ein Wegweiser. – Läßt er keinen Zweifel offen über den Weg, den ich zu gehen habe? Zeigt er, in welche Richtung ich gehen soll, wenn ich an ihm vorbei bin; ob der Straße nach, oder dem Feldweg, oder querfeldein? Aber wo steht, in welchem Sinne ich ihm zu folgen habe; ob in der Richtung der Hand, oder (z. B.) in der entgegengesetzten? – Und wenn statt eines Wegweisers eine geschlossene Kette von Wegweisern stünden, oder Kreidestriche auf dem.

Boden liefen, – gibt es für sie nur eine Deutung? – Also kann ich sagen, der Wegweiser läßt doch einen Zweifel offen11. (ivi, §§ 85)

The central issue of passage (5) can be identified in the observation that there is not just a single way of interpreting a rule and that every rule may leave “room for doubt”: the fact that “wanderers” chose a direction – i.e. an interpretation – instead of another doesn’t imply the existence of an inner process determining the interpretation in question; it is just the result of a habit or, to put it in Wittgenstein’s words, of a “particular kind of instruction” (§§ 6). In the end it can be said that each Wegweiser läßt doch einen Zweifel offen (signpost does after all leave room for doubt).

The occurrences of the metaphor in passages (4) and (5) represent Wittgenstein’s reaction against the attempts of logicians to “construct ideal languages” (§§ 81) aimed at “unraveling” the putative rules governing the usage of language. Also such “ideale Sprachen” (“ideal languages”) (ivi.) are absorbed by the “city metaphor” and their “misleading” nature and lack of consistency are defined by contrast to the other architectural structures surrounding them:

6) Woher nimmt die Betrachtung ihre Wichtigkeit, da sie doch nur alles Interessante, d. h. alles Große und Wichtige, zu zerstören scheint? (Gleichsam alle Bauwerke; indem sie nur Steinbrocken und Schutt übrig läßt.) Aber es sind nur Luftgebäude, die wir zerstören, und wir legen den Grund der Sprache frei, auf dem sie standen.12 (ivi, §§ 118)

In (6) the ideal languages constructed by logicians are metaphorically referred to as Luftgebäude (houses of air)13. The idea emerging from this occurrence of the metaphor suggests the lack of a real structure of the above mentioned buildings that blend in among others in the city. Their inconsistency is concealed by their misleading appearance and they should therefore be removed. To clear up the ground of language on which they stood corresponds here to dissolve the confusion generated by philosophers around language: there are neither super orders nor super concepts (ivi., §§97) and the only justified use of words is the “humble one” (ibidem) which is woven into everyday actions and activities. It follows that in these theories language “is running idle” (see: ivi, §§ ٨٨ and ١٣٢) since it doesn’t “stand” on an entrenched language game.

3.3. DIE BEDEUTUNG IST EIN REINER KRISTALL [MEANING IS A PURE CRYSTAL]

The third and last of the metaphors under analysis in this study will be named DIE BEDEUTUNG IST EIN REINER KRISTALL (MEANING IS A PURE CRYSTAL). It is a metaphor that can be defined as “misleading” for the role it plays in the economy of the paragraphs in which it occurs. Its function is to illustrate the logician’s conception of language and meaning. Therefore, it is radically opposed to the representation conveyed by the previous two metaphors analyzed. The crystal metaphor is the third one in terms of frequency with its five occurrences in the paragraphs 91, 92, 97, 107, 108. The lexical items signaling the metaphor refer to the source domain CRYSTAL and to the frame “unearthing a crystal”: Kristall (crystal), ans Licht befördern (to bring to light), hervorgraben (to unearth), rein (pure), hart (hard), Kristallreinheit (crystalline purity) etc. Even if it’s a “misleading metaphor” – and as such reflecting a view of meaning that Wittgenstein strongly rejected in the second phase of his philosophy – it can nevertheless boast a fairly complex structure, although less so than the other two. Among the entailments identified are:

a) everyday linguistic facts are the impurities concealing the crystal

b) looking for the meaning is digging to remove the impurities

c) finding the meaning is unearthing the crystal

d) philosophers are crystal seekers.

The image of the crystal evoked by this metaphor refers to the conviction, widespread among logicians, that the logic of language has to be sublimated to “have access” to the meaning of linguistic facts (see: ivi, §§ 38). This “seltsame Auffassung” (“odd conception”) (ibidem) is based on the preconception that there is “something like a final analysis of our linguistic expressions, and so a single completely analysed form of every expression” (see: ivi., §§ 91), which must be derived from everyday linguistic uses:

7) Dies drückt sich aus in der Frage nach dem Wesen der Sprache, des Satzes, des Denkens. […]. Denn sie sieht in dem Wesen nicht etwas, was schon offen zutage liegt […] Sondern etwas, was unter der Oberfläche liegt. Etwas, was im Innern liegt, was wir sehen, wenn wir die Sache durchschauen, und was eine Analyse hervorgraben soll.14 (ivi., §§ 92)

Even if the crystal is not yet explicitly mentioned in this passage (the first direct reference appears in §§ 97), it seems obvious that (7) can be ascribed to the metaphor in question. According to this mapping, logicians are trying to “hervorgraben” (“to unearth”) the essence of language through their analyses. The “Oberfläche“ (“surface“) corresponds here to the impure everyday linguistic facts that need to be “penetrated” in search for “[e]twas, was im Innern liegt” (“something that lies within”), the “crystal of meaning”:

8) Sie [das Wesen der Sprache] muß vielmehr vom reinsten Kristall sein. Dieser Kristall aber erscheint nicht als eine Abstraktion; sondern als etwas Konkretes, ja als das Konkreteste, gleichsam Härteste. Diese Ordnung ist eine Über-Ordnung zwischen – sozusagen – Über-Begriffen. Während doch die Worte Sprache”, “Erfahrung”, “Welt”, wenn sie eine Verwendung haben, eine so niedrige haben müssen, wie die Worte “Tisch”, “Lampe”, “Tür”.15 (ivi., §§ 97)

The occurrence (8) of the crystal metaphor brings out the salient characteristic of the “hardness” of the essence of language. By means of this adjective, that predicates an essential quality of the crystal, Wittgenstein is inviting a critical reflection on the practice of logicians of reducing sentences to “primary elements” (see: ivi., §§ 46), which is to say elements that cannot be analyzed, or – to continue with the metaphor – broken into fragments any further. He attacks the conception underlying this practice immediately after by suggesting that the only language-game to which words such as “language”, “experience”, “world” should be applied correspond to the “humble” everyday activities: in other words, they are not super-concepts and this last interpretation is based on a preconception, which he defines as “Das Vorurteil der Kristallreinheit” (“the preconception of crystalline purity”) (ivi., §§ 108). It is against the backdrop of such reflection that Wittgenstein’s implicit author rejects this metaphor by pointing out that there is nothing to “unearth” and that one can “come up only with externalities about language”, since any explanation concerning language and meaning necessarily involves the use of “language full-blown” and not of a preparatory language (see: ivi., §§ 120).

4. Discussion

At this point, on the basis of the analysis it can be illustrated how the structures of the two metaphors SPRACHLICHE AUSDRÜCKE SIND WERKZEUGE and DIE SPRACHE IST EINE STADT are consistent with one another, whereas the DIE BEDEUTUNG IST EIN REINER KRISTALL metaphor has a completely different conceptual structure, since it aims at conveying an opposite conception of language and meaning (see: Fig. 1)

Figure 1: Comparison of the entailments

City Metaphor

Tools Metaphor

Crystal Metaphor

Multiplicity of linguistic facts:

different architectural structures

different suburbs

different directions

different functions

different uses

multiple connections

X

Rule following paradox:

different interpretations of signpost

building new houses

different instructions for use of tools

X

Formulating ideal languages:

building “houses of air”

looking for a non-existent universal mode of use of tools

attempts to unearth the crystal

Meaning as use:

taking different directions (moving in different suburbs)

connection of the tools as the essence of their function

X

As the table shows, the elements selected from the source domains WERKZEUGE (TOOLS) and STADT (CITY) are aimed at understanding the same salient aspects and characteristics of the target domain SPRACHE (LANGUAGE), as it is conceived in Wittgenstein’s work. Even if the city metaphor seems to make more conceptual entailments available in order to express the rule following paradox16, it is clear from the analysis that both mappings are aimed at conveying the same conception of linguistic facts.

Conversely, the conceptual structure of the crystal metaphor does not seem to contain any reference to the salient notions of “multiplicity of linguistic facts”, “rule following paradox” and “meaning as use”. The reason for this lies in its status of “misleading metaphor”, reflecting a conception of language attacked by the author. The only entailment recalling a structural aspect of the other two metaphors has as its object the “formulation of ideal languages” which is understood here in terms of attempts to unearth the crystal, the “sublime” essence of language. Unlike in the other two metaphors, this entailment is not characterized by a paradoxical connotation: according to the (misleading) internal structure of the “crystal metaphor” the crystal exists and is just waiting to be “unearthed”. However, in the case of the other two metaphors the entailments “building houses of ‘air’” and “looking for a non-existent universal mode of use of tools” immediately show themselves as paradoxes against the background of the entire mappings.

To summarize, the analysis made it possible to identify the entailments of the three metaphors. The metaphor SPRACHLICHE AUSDRÜCKE SIND WERKZEUGE revealed the most complex conceptual structure, consisting of seven entailments (see Section 3.1). Six entailments were identified in the conceptual structure of the second metaphor DIE SPRACHE IST EINE STADT (see: Section 3.2.). Finally, DIE BEDEUTUNG IST EIN REINER KRISTALL revealed to be the less complex of the three metaphors, with only four entailments (see: Section 3.3.).

The analysis of the entailments also conducted against the general background of the position of Wittgenstein concerning language and meaning made it possible to confirm the hypothesis according to which the conceptual structure as well as the internal logic of the first two metaphors SPRACHLICHE AUSDRÜCKE SIND WERKZEUGE and DIE SPRACHE IST EINE STADT are consistent with each other. On the basis of the same procedure it could also be shown that the third metaphor, namely DIE BEDEUTUNG IST EIN REINER KRISTALL, is not consistent with the other two mappings. The reason for the inconsistency with the first two metaphors is related with the specific function of the crystal metaphor in the work of Wittgenstein: it is aimed at conveying a view of language and meaning that Wittgenstein rejects and attacks by means of the first two metaphors. This is probably also the reason for the not particularly elaborate structure of the metaphor and the small number of entailments it consists of.

The study conducted here has shed light on the structure of metaphors that are anything but ornamental in the author’s work. They contribute significantly to the synthesis and exemplification of the author’s position on the central topics of language and meaning. It is no coincidence that Wittgenstein systematically makes use of such metaphors and that none of their linguistic manifestations, even at a distance of paragraphs, is in contraddiction with the internal coherence, affects the internal coherence of the mapping. He tries to make full use of their explanatory power. In-depth studies of metaphors and relationships between mappings in Wittgenstein’s work can make a significant contribution to the understanding the author’s thought and the various positions expounded throughout the work. It is well known that many paragraphs of the Investigations are still the subject of heated controversy (see: Stern 2004). It is also believed that a clarification of the role, relationships and conceptual structure of the metaphors evoked in the Investigations can also play an important informative function in didactic works concerning the philosopher’s work.

During the extraction of the metaphors, more than ten additional less frequent mappings were identified. These are more or less complex metaphors that reflect the two perspectives on language mentioned during the present analysis. A first glance at the data seems to suggest that coherent systems of metaphorical concepts are scattered throughout the text. Future research perspectives should focus on an in-depth analysis of such complex metaphorical systems within the work. This would shed light on the dense network of relationships among the conceptual mappings underlying the text, which could provide new and enriching perspectives on the reflections contained in the Investigations.

1 See, for example: Bambrough (1961), Hintikka (1973), Griffin (1974), Rosch and Mervis (1975) Black (1979), Baker and Hacker (1980), Hacker (1996), Pitcher (1985), Canfield (1986), Pearse (1986), Lakoff (1987), Von Savigny (1995), Wilson (1998), Sluga (2006).

2 In the first phase of his philosophy, Wittgenstein (1921) used to conceive the relationship between a proposition and state of affairs in terms of a conceptual scheme derived from the projective geometry. He gave up this idea of a representational essence of language in the Investigations (see: Gargani 2007: 39).

3 To clarify this notion, Wittgenstein uses (Wittgenstein 1953, §§ 66) the well-known example of games: “Consider, for example, the activities that we call “games”. I mean board-games, card-games, ball games, athletic games, and so on. What is common to them all? – Don’t say: “They must have something in common, or they would not be called ‘games’ – ” but look and see whether there is anything common to all. – For if you look at them, you won’t see something that is common to all, but similarities, affinities, and a whole series of them at that.”

4 In this regard, see also Kripke’s (1984) reading of Wittgenstein’s (1953) philosophical contribution.

5 For an in-depth discussion of the debates around the different interpretations of Wittgenstein’s work see: Stern (1995; 2004).

6 According to Lakoff (1987: 68), the remaining structuring principles are 1) propositional structures, 2) metonymic mappings, 3) image-schematic structures.

7 “[…] ‘I set the brake up by connecting up rod and lever.’ - Yes, given the whole of the rest of the mechanism. Only in conjunction with that is it a brake-lever, and separated from its support it is not even a lever; it may be anything, or nothing.” (emphasis added).

8 “[…] Suppose someone said, ‘All tools serve to modify something. So, a hammer modifies the position of a nail, a saw the shape of a board, and so on.’ - And what is modified by a rule, a glue-pot and nails? – ‘Our knowledge of a thing’s length, the temperature of the glue, and the solidity of a box.’ – Would anything be gained by this assimilation of expressions? ” (emphasis added).

9 “…ask yourself whether our own language is complete – whether it was so before the symbolism of chemistry and the notation of the infinitesimal calculus were incorporated in to it; for these are, so to speak, suburbs of our language. (And how many houses or streets does it take before a town begins to be a town?) Our language can be regarded as an ancient city: a maze of little streets and squares, of old and new houses, of houses with extensions from various periods, and all this surrounded by a multitude of new suburbs with straight and regular streets and uniform houses” (emphasis added).

10 “And what about the last explanation in this chain? (Don’t say: “There isn’t a ‘last’ explanation. ‘That is just as if you were to say: “There isn’t a last house in this road; one can always build an additional one.’)” (emphasis added).

11 “A rule stands there like a signpost. – Does the signpost leave no doubt about the way I have to go? Does it show which direction I am to take when I have passed it, whether along the road or the footpath or cross-country? But where does it say which way I am to follow it; whether in the direction of its finger or (for example) in the opposite one? - And if there were not a single signpost, but a sequence of signposts or chalk marks on the ground – is there only one way of interpreting them? - So I can say that the signpost does after all leave room for doubt” (emphasis added).

12 “Where does this investigation get its importance from, given that it seems only to destroy everything interesting: that is, all that is great and important? (As it were, all the buildings, leaving behind only bits of stone and rubble.) But what we are destroying are only houses of cards, and we are clearing up the ground of language on which they stood” (emphasis added).

13 Even if Ansombe’s translation reads “houses of cards”, the literal translation could be rendered as “houses of air”.

14 “This finds expression in the question of the essence of language, of propositions, of thought. […]. For it sees the essence of things not as something that already lies open to view […] but as something that lies beneath the surface. Something that lies within, which we perceive when we see right into the thing, and which an analysis is supposed to unearth” (emphasis added).

15 “It [the essence of language] must rather be of the purest crystal. But this crystal does not appear as an abstraction, but as something concrete, indeed, as the most concrete, as it were the hardest thing there is. This order is a super-order between – so to speak – super-concepts. Whereas, in fact, if the words “language”, “experience”, “world” have a use, it must be as humble a one as that of the words ‘table’, ‘lamp’, ‘door’” (emphasis added).

16 The comprehension of houses in terms of explanations in the STADT metaphor can be considered as an instance of the more general rule following paradox (see also Stern 2004, 119), which is evoked by the reference to the “signposts” in the same metaphor and to the “instructions for use of the tools” in the WERKZEUGE metaphor.

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Received:

12/07/2023

Reviewed:

05/09/2023

Accepted:

14/10/2023